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Preface
Much of the material used in this study was gathered in the course of
an election research project co-ordinated through the Department of
Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Papua New
Guinea in 1981-2, and partly financed by that University's Research
Committee, to whom thanks. The Research Committee also helped
finance a two-day seminar on the 1982 elections held in the Council
Room, UPNG, from 7-8 November 1982 at which 16 short papers were
delivered. (Attendance at this seminar is listed in Appendix C.) The
editor would like to thank the participants in the UPNG seminar who
threw much light on the campaigning and the conduct of the election,
particularly Reuben Kaiulo of the PNG Electoral Commission and Paul
Fearman, Provincial Returning Officer, Southern Highlands.
Thanks are also due to Leila Lisi and Tetei Charlie, who gave
invaluable help in keeping files and typing manuscripts in Port Moresby.
The final word processing of manuscripts was speedily and cheerfully
done by Sonja Waikawa, Maria Robertson and Nancy van Duuren in
the Department of Government, University of Sydney. John Roberts of
the Department of Geography, University of Sydney, drew the
individual electorate maps.
A final word is necessary to explain the long delay in publication of this
study and the sometimes awkward contrast between chapters
composed soon after the heat of electoral battle and those composed or
recast with the benefit of considerable hindsight. Contributor and
editorial tardiness played their part - not previously unknown in the
long, glorious history of Papua New Guinea election studies! But it
must be noted that this study was ready for printing in early 1987. It
took well over a year to establish that the University of Papua New
Guinea Press would not in fact be able to proceed with its promise of
publication for financial reasons. In this situation the editor was grateful
that the Department of Political and Social Change, ANU, felt able to
step into the breach. To Ron May in particular, for all his help, heartfelt
thanks.
Peter King
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Key to National
and Highlands Open
Electorate Maps
(The 19 provinces and the National Capital District make up 20 additional
electorates.)
Map Electorate Province
No.
1 Abau Central
2 Aitape-Lumi West Sepik
3 Alotau Milne Bay
4 Ambunti-Dreikikir East Sepik
5 Angalimp-South Wahgi Western Highlands
6 Angoram East Sepik
7 Baiyer-Mul Western Highlands
8 Bogia Madang
9 Bulolo Morobe
10 Central Bougainville Bougainville
II Chuave Chimbu
12 Daulo Eastern Highlands
13 Dei Western Highlands
14 Esa'ala Milne Bay
I5 Finschhafen Morobe
16 Gazelle East New Britain
17 Ooilala Central
18 Goroka Eastern Highlands
19 Gumiue Chimbu
20 llagen Western Highlands
21 Henganofi Eastern Highlands
22 Huon Gulf Morobe
23 lalibu-Pangia Southern Highlands
24 Ijivitari Northern
25 Imbonggu Southern Highlands
26 Jimi Western Highlands
27 Kabwum Morobe
28 Kagua-Erave Southern Highlands
29 Kainantu Eastern Highlands
30 Kairuku-Hiri Central
31 Kandep Enga
32 Kandrian Gloucester West New Britain
33 Karimui-Nomane Chimbu
34 Kavieng Nesv Ireland
35 Kerema Gulf
36 Kerowagi Chimbu
37 Kikori Gulf
38 Kiriwina-Goodenough Milne Bay
39 Kokopo East New Britain
40 Komo-Margarima Southern Highlands
41 Kompiam-Ambum Enga
42 Koroba-Lake Kopiago Southern Highlands
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Key to National and Highlands Open Electorate Maps Contd.
Map Electorate Province
No.
43 Kundiawa Chimbu
44 Lae Morobe
45 Lagaip-Porgera Pnga
46 Lufa Pastern Highlands
47 Madang Madang
48 Manus Manus
49 Maprik Past Scpik
5O Markham Morobe
5I Mendi Southern 1 lighlnnds
52 Menyamya Morobe
53 Middle Fly Western
54 Middle Ramu Madang
55 Moresby North-East National Capital Dist.
56 Moresby Norlh-West National Capital Dist.
57 Moresby South National Capital Dist.
58 Namatanai New Ireland
59 Nawae Morobe
60 Nipa-Kutubu Southern Highlands
61 North Bougainville Bougainville
62 North Fly Western
63 North VVahgi Western 1 lighlands
64 Nuku West Sepik
65 Obura-Wonenara Pastern Highlands
66 Okapa Pastern Highlands
67 Pomio Past New Brit an
68 Rabaul Past New Britain
69 Rai Coast Madang
70 Rigo Central
71 Samarai-Murua Milne Hay
72 Sinasina-Yonggamugl Chimbu
73 Sohe Northern
74 South Bougainville Bougainville
75 South Fly Western
76 Sumkar Madang
77 Talasea West New Biilain
78 Tanibul-Nebilyer Western Highlands
79 Tari Southern Highlands
80 Telefomin West Sepik
81 Tewai-Siassi Morobe
82 Unggai-Bena Pastern Highlands
83 Usino-Bundi Madang
84 Vanimo-Green River West Sepik
85 Wabag Pnga
86 Wapenamanda Pnga
87 Wewak Past Sepik
88 Wosera-Oaui Past Sepik
89 Yangoru-Saussia Past Scpik
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Chapter 1
PARTIES AND OUTCOMES IN THE 1982 ELECTIONS
Peter King
Political parties in Papua New Guinea are commonly held to be little
more than machines for ensuring the election and re-election of
parliamentary leaders and their followers. Their 'grass roots'
organization, their policy-making capacity, their post-electoral
cohesiveness, their ideological distinctiveness and their ability to establish
a hold on the popular mind are said to be negligible or non-existent. But
it is also said that they are slowly improving or 'modernizing' their
performance; that the Australian or Westminster type party system
remains an appropriate and influential model for future development; and
that from election to election parties and the party system are gathering
strength in Papua New Guinea.
In June 1982, Papua New Guinea held its second post-
Independence election for the unicameral National Parliament which
resulted in the replacement of a five-party coalition led by Sir Julius Chan
and his People's Progress Party by a two-party coalition led by Michael
Somare and his Pangu Party. The three pre-Independence elections for
the House of Assembly (1964, 1968 and 1972) and the National
Parliament election have all been studied at length (Bettison et al., 1964;
Epstein et al., 1971; Stone, 1976; Hegarty, 1983). Bearing in mind the
record of party electoral and post-electoral performance stretching back
to the 1968 election when parties came into their own, what light do the
election results of 1982 and their parliamentary aftermath throw on the
hopeful hypothesis sketched above - that parties are growing stronger?
First, I outline the financial and organizational gearing up of the
parties for 1982. Secondly, I assess the comparative success of the
parties in endorsing 'quality' candidates and the striking success of
endorsed candidates as against independents in 1982. Thirdly, I assess
the policy performance of the parties in the election period and estimate
the significance of the 1982 election for post-election policy choices. Did
the Somare government win any effective mandates for change?
Fourthly, I scrutinize the election result and its parliamentary aftermath
to estimate the significance of the Pangu Party's big victory in the light of
developments since the election year. Has the 1982 experience
permanently strengthened the role of parties in the Papua New Guinea
political system? And are the bases of party strength shifting?
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Eight significant parties contested the 1982 elections:
Pangu Pati. Founded in 1967 to push for self-government and
independence from the Australian colonial power, Pangu under
Michael Somare was the ruling party from 1972 through
independence in 1975 until 1980 when it was overthrown in a vote
of no confidence. Pangu is sometimes said to have a left wing of
socially concerned nationalists, but they were little in evidence
during the 1982 election.
People's Progress Party. Founded in 1970 by like-minded members
of the House of Assembly, Sir Julius Chan's PPP has always been a
tightly-knit, business-oriented party. Sir Julius was prime minister
from 1980 to 1982.
National Party. Founded before the 1972 election by Thomas
Kavali as a Highlands equivalent of Pangu, the National Party came
into its own under the leadership of Iambakey Okuk by pushing for
Highlands leadership of the country and business opportunities for
Papua New Guineans.
United Party. Set up in 1970-1 by conservative Highlands politicians
and expatriate businessmen to oppose Pangu, the UP under Paul
Torato and Roy Evara has been interested in office above all during
recent years.
Melanesian Alliance Party. Launched in 1980 by Father John
Momis and John Kaputin after their break with the second Somare
government, MA brought together the former secessionists of
Bougainville and the former radicals who had opposed the colonial
administration on the Gazelle Peninsula. Standing for economic
nationalism, Christian-social ideals, the Melanesian Way and pan-
Melanesianism, MA alone qualified as a radical party in the Papua
New Guinea of 1982 , although the business interests of Deputy
Leader John Kaputin sit uneasily with the social conscience of
Father Momis and party philosophe and deputy chairman, Bernard
Narokobi. Nevertheless, MA has slowly built a national following.
Papua Party. The domesticated rump of the secessionist Papua
Besena, the PP consisted in 1982 of MPs who had broken with
Josephine Abaijah and her Papua Besena by entering the Chan
government and working for Papuan development rather than an
independent Papua.
PNG Independent Group. As the vehicle of the former Defence
Force Commander, Ted Diro, for contesting the 1982 election, the
IG was chiefly active in Papua.
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Papua Action Party. Founded under Okuk's influence by former
Pangu politicians to muster support in Papua for the NP leader's
prime ministerial ambitions, the PAP failed to win a seat and
collapsed after the 1982 election.
Organization and Finance
The Constitution requires that no foreign corporation or citizen shall
contribute money to political parties in Papua New Guinea, but the
National Parliament has failed for over a decade to pass or even draft
the necessary organic law on political parties. As a result there is no
effective government monitoring of party finances in Papua New Guinea
because there is no requirement to reveal funding sources. The level of
party spending is therefore speculative, and hard data emerged only well
after the election. The hardest data concerned the biggest spender,
Pangu. In 1986 it was reported that the Pangu business arm, Damai Pty.
Ltd., had obtained a loan of K700,000 in two instalments from the Papua
New Guinea Banking Corporation - part of which was used to pay out
an existing debt to the ANZ Bank. The PNGBC loans were made on
the security of a block of flats owned by Damai, but the beneficial
owners of Damai were not revealed. There was criticism of this large
loan made on nebulous security by the PNGBC's freewheeling expatriate
manager, Peter Nicholls, who has since resigned; but a Law Reform
Commission enquiry into the loan was aborted under political pressure
(The Times, April 12, 1986).
It has since been rumoured that the PNGBC has written off over
K3m of bad debts arising from the 1982 election, although Pangu's
lawyer has claimed that Pangu had paid off most of its debt by 1986 (The
Times, April 12, 1986). If the PNGBC did indeed lend over K3m to
parties and leaders, it seems likely that NP leader Okuk got the second
largest share. While Pangu by all accounts spent over Kim in total on
the election, Okuk claims to have spent K240,000 on his own campaign
in Chimbu, and K540,000 more for the National Party (Standish,
1984:62), a total not so far short of Pangu's.
Of the other parties, Robin Osborne below quotes Julius Chan as
claiming that PPP spent K500,000, although perhaps this estimate
includes candidates' own expenses, while UP spent perhaps K200,000,
and MA managed to raise only about K20,000.
UP had the benefit of its well established business arm, Tarangu,
which owned a major stake in leading Mazda dealer, PNG Motors,
through Melanesian Investments Pty. Ltd and PNG Associated
Industries - as indeed also did Pangu through Damai (Hegarty in
Amarshi et al., 1979: 201; The Times, May 31, 1986). The uneasy co
habitation of these two parties through their business arms eventually
came to breaking point in 1986. PPP on the other hand relied more on
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the personal wealth of its leading personalities than any other sources,
and MA was undoubtedly more hampered by financial stringency than
any other party.
Thus Pangu at one extreme was able to run a high profile campaign,
including radio jingles, T-shirts and newspaper advertisements, in
addition to paying the nomination fees (K100) for all its fully endorsed
candidates and supplying most of them with posters, while the
Melanesian Alliance at the other extreme was unable to give many of its
candidates signficant support at all. Pangu was also able to pay election
expenses of party-swappers who gravitated to Michael Somare after the
June election in hope of perks or a ministry.
Apart from bank loans and party business arms, foreign sources of
funds were tapped, including donations by expatriate and white citizen
businessmen and by locally established foreign firms, as well as 'offshore'
money raised by leaders in their travels. These may well have accounted
for most other party spending in view of some hard evidence which
finally surfaced more than five years after the election, when Ted Diro
admitted that his good friend the Indonesian armed forces commander,
General Benny Murdani, had kicked in U.S.$139,400 to fund the
Independent Group (The Times, November 4, 1987; Post-Courier,
November 12-13, 1987; Weekend Nius, November 14, 1987). Donations
by national firms and grassroots fund-raising were probably a negligible
factor. The most visible relationship was between Okuk and South
Pacific Brewery, which made it possible for him to give away 96,000
bottles of beer at one extraordinary campaign meeting (Wolfers, 1982).
As for organization, party branches did revive all round the country
as the elections approached. Pangu, PPP, NP and MA managed to
maintain national offices, although not always separate from ministerial
suites and official Opposition offices, while a few vigorous regional and
provincial offices functioned as well.
As Ron May shows for East Sepik, below, Pangu from a standing
start in late 1981 mounted an impressive province-wide organizational
effort out of an office in Wewak. Stephen Pokawin tells a similar story
for Manus, and Peter Larmour for Enga.
Given that the sums of money available to parties in 1982 seem to
have been 50-100 per cent greater in real terms than for the 1977
election (cf. Hegarty, 1983), and given the unprecedented
competitiveness of the election which saw almost a 40 per cent rise in
the number of candidates (from 881 to 1125) - and given also, as we
shall see, that parties had become more acceptable to the voters - it
seems clear that the scope and intensity of party organization and
campaigning eclipsed the 1977 effort.
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Candidates, Party Endorsement and Party Penetration
Pangu, PPP and MA showed considerable energy in seeking out 'quality'
candidates in 1982. PPP opened a national file on potential candidates,
systematically conducted enquiries and interviews, and claimed great
success in putting a high quality team together. There was fierce
competition for Pangu endorsement and, to relieve the resulting tension, it
was decided to re-endorse all Pangu sitting members. (Most other
parties did the same). MA, despite its poor financial situation, endorsed
over 70, as did the UP. Multiple candidacies in the Highlands electorates
took the National Party's total to over 140. PPP had almost one
candidate for every seat but Pangu had almost two.
As in previous elections, the party endorsement process remained
quite complex in Papua New Guinea. While parties fully endorsed only
one candidate per seat as a rule in 1982, they did acknowledge and
assist other candidates as party supporters or as being 'pro' the party or
its leader, especially Pangu. Candidates, for their part, might or might not
acknowledge or stress their party affiliation; but more candidates in 1982
than ever before seemed to actively seek or claim party endorsement.
Thus most candidates in 1982 ran under party labels, but only a minority
carried full party endorsement. Party candidates of whatever kind did far
better than independent ones, as Table 1.2 below shows, thus intensifying
a trend already evident in 1977 (Hegarty, 1983:10). With 17 per cent of
the candidates standing, Pangu received 34 per cent of the vote and
'owned' 46.8 per cent of the candidates elected, while Independent
candidates, who were 41.2 per cent of the total, received only 20.9 per
cent of the votes cast, and constituted only 3.7 per cent of MPs after
June.
However, despite these rather striking statistics, it remains true that
a strong candidate can win under any or no party label, and there is no
opinion polling to tell us directly whether there is an authentic party vote
or not. All indications still are that clan and language affiliations and
personal qualities are more important, especially as any party vote is
quite often split between several party candidates.
Nevertheless, observers (including this one) are wont to casually
invoke a 'party effect' to explain a national political trend when they
would scarcely dare do so to explain a result in a single electorate
without careful enquiry. For at least one seat (Sohe Open) in 1982 we
have a careful demonstration that party affiliation and party activity were
just about irrelevant to the result (Saffu below), and there is little doubt
that this demonstration could be widely repeated. Nevertheless, in 1982
Somare and Pangu were said to have been helped by the collapse of
prices for Papua New Guinea's leading export commodities in the 'lean
years' of Chan, and also by the remarkable disunity of the Chan coalition.
These generalizations appeal to common sense, but no one really knows
how important the party effect was.
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We do know, however, from good anecdotal evidence, including
most of the chapters below, that parties penetrated the electorate more
than ever in 1982. As Pokawin shows for Manus, candidates were less
fearful of adverse effects from bearing a party label and more avid to
share in the financial and leadership strength that goes with the party
label. And May shows clearly for the East Sepik that there was far
more awareness of parties at the village level and that the party
affiliation of candidates was less likely to be a private financial
arrangement carefully concealed from the electors.
The fact is that strong parties attract strong candidates and vice
versa (Standish, 1984:60). For the candidate a strong (or merely rich)
party can provide money and support in kind (posters, leader visits and
vehicles). For the party a strong candidate means a better prospect of
'getting the numbers' in the election of a prime minister. Policy and
ideology are a secondary consideration on both sides - although often
the candidate is grateful for a manifesto to quote, when asked a question
about policy. And yet policy - even ideology - seemed to play a
substantial role in the 1982 elections, as we shall now see. '
Party Performance, Policy and Ideology in 1982
Party efforts in holding conferences and drafting manifestos during the
run up to the 1982 election were on the whole less impressive than
before the 1977 poll. Pangu held a large national convention for 400-plus
delegates and thousands of Highlands supporters in Mt.Hagen in late
February, but the lustre of the event was dimmed by acting Convention
Chairman, John Noel, who scathingly criticised the party's organizational
performance since 1977 and its propensity to use 'spivs' in the party
organization and business arms (The Times, February 12, 1982).
However, Pangu did manage to launch a new party platform, the
celebrated Blue Book, in a Tok Pisin and Motu as well as an English
version (Pangu Pati Policies, 1982.)
The National Party had already held its national convention near
Kundiawa, capital of Mr. Okuk's Simbu province, in late September 1981.
It was a K60,000 extravaganza (The Times, 25 September and 2
October, 1981). The NP's new platform was launched in the New Year
(The Papua New Guinea National Party Policies, 1982; Papua New
Guinea Nesenel Pati as Tingling, 1982).
The Melanesian Alliance held its first national convention in Lae
with over 200 delegates during late February. (Minutes of the National
Convention of the Melanesian Alliance Party of Papua New Guinea, 28
February, 1982). National Co-ordinator, Patterson Lowa, tabled a draft
party platform of 112 pages, a PNG record (Melanesian Alliance Party
Platform, 1982); but, unable to outline its contents in the time available,
he did not press for adoption and asked delegates to forward written
comments to the party (Minutes: p.20).
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The People's Progress Party, which did hold regional conventions,
failed to hold a national convention and was forced to re-issue its 1977
platform, while the UP, although it held a national convention in Mt.
Hagen in January (The Times, January 29, 1982), barely functioned as a
national body during the election period except for the purpose of
distributing substantial sums of money to approved candidates. It also
failed to issue a new platform.
All in all the party conventions were an impressive effort - new
party executives were elected, candidates were endorsed, morale was
raised, some policy was adopted and the grass roots were energised in
the aftermath. But the new platforms - save for the promising MA draft,
with its detailed vision of a more autonomous economy - were much less
so.
Nevertheless, party leaders acted as though national policy debate
was an important factor in the 1982 election. One sign of this was that
most of the established political leaders and distinguished new candidates
agreed to appear at a series of meetings at the University of Papua New
Guinea during the election period. The taped record of their speeches
and responses to questions is a very useful source, in addition to the
party platforms and press and radio coverage of leaders, when we try to
evaluate national debate on political issues in 1982.
At the University of Papua New Guinea eleven leaders - Michael
Somare, Philip Bouraga and Tony Siaguru (Pangu), Julius Chan (PPP),
Iambakey Okuk (NP), John Momis, John Kaputin and Bernard Narokobi
(MA), Roy Evara (UP) and Josephine Abaijah (Papua Besena) - spoke
for their parties and themselves, and they canvassed a wide range of
domestic and a few foreign policy issues quite thoroughly. The transcript
of proceedings (Griffin and King, 1985) is heavily drawn on below where
I try to sketch the scope, content and quality of the election debate. I
shall raise the question whether any mandates were effectively won and
implemented by the incoming Pangu government - a conventional index
of democratic party effectiveness; and I conclude with a note on the
ideological implications of the party campaigns.
Chan governmentfailures
Opponents of the five-party coalition which went to the polls in June
1982 were fully agreed on the main failures of the Chan government.
The unauthorised and unnecessary K27m purchase of Dash-7 aircraft for
Air Niugini by Chan's deputy prime minister, Transport and Civil
Aviation minister, Okuk, was a crippling expense for the national airline.
Likewise the purchase of an executive jet by the prime minister at a
price tag of K6m was a needless extravagance. More importantly, the
so-called sectoral programs in transport and agriculture, introduced by
ministers Okuk and Evara in 1980-81, whereby project funding was
transferred direct by cheque to national MPs thus by-passing provincial
governments and regular planning processes, were an invitation to abuse,
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and had become a scandal by early 1982 (Standish, 1984:54). Finally, the
US tuna boat, Danica, which had been seized in early 1982 while
poaching in Papua New Guinea's exclusive economic zone, was sold
back to the owners by the government at a fraction of its purchase price
- a decision widely criticized as a sell-out (Hegarty and King, 1982).
Beyond these specific points of criticism, there was a litany of
complaints which could apply quite well to any government in
independent Papua New Guinea, but which the Chan government
nevertheless had to face once more. The public service is too large, said
the critics, too expensive, and insufficiently productive. Corruption is a
major problem in deals done by the government, especially for the timber
and fishing industries, they said; and complacency and connivance in
corruption at the top are a threat to the integrity of the whole public
service. Above all, said the critics, especially in Pangu, the government
has proved to be divided, incoherent and partly paralysed in making and
carrying out policy. (The fact that the five governing parties campaigned
entirely independently of each other made this criticism somewhat
otiose.)
Performance claims
Sir Julius fought back against his Pangu and other critics by pointing out
that he had not had to face a vote of no confidence in his two years and
more of office; that fiscal reponsibility had been upheld in lean times, and
that the Kumul operation by the Papua New Guinea Defence force in
1980 to secure the newly independent government of Vanuatu against a
secessionist threat had been a brilliant success. As for the executive jet
purchase, he said at the University in April: 'If you don't invest you don't
get anywhere .... we have to be optimistic... The US reached the moon
and we buy tuna and worry about six million kina' (Meeting, University
of Papua New Guinea, May 4, 1982).
In reply, Somare at the University hinted that Pangu was the natural
government of Papua New Guinea and declared that the Chan
government was an unpopular aberration, a quirk of parliamentary
maneuver. Okuk for the NP sketched a rather inflated role for himself in
the self-government struggle and claimed to be the father of localized
coffee buying and Air Niugini, while Evara for the National Party pointed
out that he had shown quite extraodinary tactical flair in surviving as a
minister (Griffin and King, 1985).
Issues, policies and mandates
The great issue of 1982, was, of course, in Humpty Dumpty's immortal
phrase, who is to be master? There was a strong presidential element in
the party campaigns, with five potential prime ministers on the hustings:
Somare, Chan, Okuk, Momis, and, less plausibly, Diro, who was almost
as candid about his prime ministerial ambitions as that frustrated
contender for the top job, Okuk. (Okuk had led two parliamentary
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assaults on the second Somare government in his own name before he
helped Sir Julius to power in 1980.)
The conflicting ambitions of the bigmen and their followers in Papua
New Guinea's national politics produced fairly chronic political instability
during most of the years after Independence. This also was an election
issue in 1982. Ex-General Diro deplored dishonesty and division in the
Chan government and called for firm, business-like and, by implication,
military style leadership. For his part, Somare promised large Pangu
numbers ('65 for '82' - a clear majority in a parliament of 109) and hence
stability. A Civil Rights and Voters' Manifesto circulated during the
campaign deplored personal and party opportunism and the resulting
parliamentary volatility, and declared that a change of government should
mean a new election - something the constitutional fathers had
deliberately sought to avoid. During the campaign Tony Siaguru, new
Pangu candidate for a Moresby seat and former secretary of Foreign
Affairs, called for legislation to make party-swapping by MPs ('political
prositution') an offence punishable by the ordeal of by-election (Griffin
and King, 1985:34); but in the event it was Pangu which exploited
political volatility to the hilt in assembling the numbers to govern after the
election.
Nevertheless Pangu in office foreshadowed legislation to ban party-
swapping, a proposal later endorsed by the General Constitutional
Commission (Final Report 1983:116). But a parliament of potentially free-
floating MPs was unlikely ever to pass such legislation, and did not.
Almost all leaders called for goverment economies. After selling off
the Dash-7 and the Kumul executive jet, it was agreed (as we have
seen) that the inflated and under-productive 50,000-strong public service
inherited from the Australians must be cut back. Ted Diro was
particularly scathing about the public service: 'Some of our Department
Heads can't speak standard English', he said, and: 'The news media have
given us ample evidence of government training people it cannot employ
... and employing people it does not train' (Griffin and King, 1985:21-2).
Pangu promised personnel cuts and to make the public service more
responsive by substituting a Board of senior bureaucrats for the
recalcitrant existing Public Services Commission made up of independent
appointees. In addition, Somare promised a ministry of only 20 as
opposed to Chan's 27, the constitutional maximum. Pangu clearly had a
mandate in these areas, and there was some action after August. The
Kumul jet was sold; but selling the Dashes proved too difficult, and, when
KLM was later hired to take over the management of Air Nuigini,
Fokker aircraft were sold instead. Pangu Public Services minister
Siaguru did try to restructure the PSC and retrench 3,000 in the public
service; and while the PSC did eventually become a Department of
Personnel Management, over-generous severance payments and
insufficiently tight re-employment provisions turned the 'retrenchment
exercise' into an expensive fiasco (King, 1984). Moreover, the promised
12 Pangu Returns to Power: the 1982 Elections in Papua New Guinea
cuts in the ministry fell victim to the imperatives of representing 19
provinces and a coalition partner (UP) in the new government. A more
determined public service - and ministerial - shake-up came under the
Wingti government, led by Pangu defectors, which overthrew the
Somare government late in 1985. Three departments were dissolved and
ten department heads sacked at that time (Age, November 23, 1985).
Insofar as the state of the economy was debated in 1982, attention
focused on three issues: industrial development, bank credit, and youth
employment. Pangu's Blue Book promised to replace the Development
Bank with a combined Agriculture, Housing and Industry Bank, which
was to have expanded capital and been responsive to the little man and
small business. However the Somare government's financial advisers
eventually vetoed the plan. Ted Diro called eloquently for 'downstream'
investment in rural industries, while Tony Siaguru expounded an
imaginative multi-pronged approach to the problems of youth, and Philip
Bouraga, who had been Chan's Police Commissioner and was to be
Somare's Finance Minister, called for youth resettlement schemes
(Griffin and King, 1985:23, 29-30, 34-7). However, in view of the
deteriorating law and order situation in Papua New Guinea towns after
1982 - which led to a political crisis, the mobilizing of the Defence Force
and an enforced curfew in Port Moresby for much of 1985 - we can say
with hindsight that law and order, and the associated problems of under-
educated and under-employed youth, were neglected issues in the 1982
campaign.
The Melanesian Alliance leaders insisted that class polarization was
at the root of the law and order problem as well as many others. Here is
how the deputy chairman of the MA, Bernard Narokobi, who was also
the party's candidate for the East Sepik provincial electorate against
Michael Somare, posed the issue: 'Did you know [he asked the Sepik
villagers] that some of our leaders are sending their children to school in
Australia? ...Em [Pangu] i no pati bilong mipela kanaka man. Em bilong ol
rich man hia.' [It's no party for us primitives. It's for the rich people.]
(Griffin and King, 1985:89). But no other party accepted this line of
analysis.
MA pointed out that there was another potentially very serious law
and order problem in Papua New Guinea apart from urban crime and
tribal fighting in the Highlands: the problem of corruption in government,
which, both as a reality and as a revelation, tends to exacerbate class
polarization. Here the Ombudsman Commission supplied important
materials for election debate with its report on the so-called Diaries
Affair (Corruption in Government: A Case Study, 1982), which
implicated nine public servants and three ministers, including the prime
minister. For his part, Somare denounced the KlOOm Vanimo timber deal
recently concluded against bureaucratic advice (Hegarty and King,
1983), referred to criminal offences (including rape) committed by Chan
ministers and deplored the mishandling of public funds (Griffin and King,
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1985:74-6), which had been most outrageous in the pork barrel sectoral
funds for agriculture and transport. Pangu also challenged the
government to introduce a tough leadership code banning the pursuit of
private business interests by active political leaders; but in the event
failed to do so itself. Nevertheless Pangu did terminate the Vanimo deal
with the inexplicably inexperienced Filipino company, Hetura Meja, and
called for new tenders; and Pangu also ended the agriculture and
transport sectoral programs in their corruption-prone form: two more
cases of mandates sought and implemented in 1982 (Hegarty and King,
1983: King, 1984).
Finally in foreign policy little of substance was said during the
campaign except by Okuk who made a calculated attempt to stir up
nationalist feeling on two highly sensitive issues - the border with West
Irian and the future of Filipino ('Asian') immigration to Papua New
Guinea. Okuk called for solidarity with the Melanesian brothers ('they
will never be Asian') in Irian Jaya and accelerated development of the
border region; and he promised defiance of Indonesia as necessary: 'A
National Party-led government will never never deport fellow
Melanesians to the coldest part of Europe', he said (Griffin and King,
1985: 59-61) - a reference to the deportation of Organisasi Papua
Merdeka leader, Jacob Prai, to Sweden in 1978. (But, one wondered,
would deportation to the warmer parts of Europe be acceptable?) Okuk
repeatedly challenged other parties to debate these issues, but, save for
the MA with its longstanding sympathy for the West Papuan cause, they
were not drawn. Julius Chan affirmed impressively that he was 'very
concerned about the West Irianese and about everyone on this earth'
(Meeting, University of Papua New Guinea, May 4, 1982) and Michael
Somare in office after 1982 continued to do as he had done before over
the border problem with Indonesia - very little - until a flood of 10,000
West Papuan refugees into Papua New Guinea in 1984 forced a more
activist approach on the Somare government. Okuk's attempt to shake
the official consensus on West Papua - even if not fully sincere - failed.
He largely failed also on the issue of Filipino immigration where he
claimed that contract Filipino teachers and public servants were
gravitating illegally into business and threatening local small-scale
enterprise (The Times, January 22 and 29, 1982) - although a
government committee was eventually set up under Pangu to monitor the
fate of national small business.
Okuk also challenged the Chan's government's attempt at foreign
affairs consensus-building as embodied in the foreign policy White Paper
of November 1981 - something he had actually voted for in parliament.
The controversial consultant on the White Paper was Dr Ted Wolfers of
Macquarie University, Sydney. According to Okuk:
When I was in Opposition [in 1979] they selected him to write
our policy and I said, look, no foreigner should write our policy ...
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And I'm telling you when we come in we'll write our own
foreign policy (Griffin and King 1985:61).
But the next Pangu Foreign Minister, Rabbie Namaliu, had fully accepted
the White Paper by year's end (King, 1985:277), and when Okuk
returned to government under Paias Wingti in 1985 no revisionist efforts
in foreign policy were forthcoming from the National Party.
Ideological themes
The dominant ideological themes in the 1982 election campaign were
variants of nationalism. For the MA and, to a lesser extent, the NP,
Papua New Guinea must begin standing up to - or standing down -
locally employed expatriates, visiting expatriate experts and foreign
interests generally. Achieving the egalitarian social-Christian and
communal-traditional ideals of the MA - or at least of Father Momis and
Bernard Narokobi - is made difficult by the comprador leaders in Pangu
and other parties with their Australian-educated children. For Okuk the
big challenge in 1982 was standing up to Indonesia - conceived as the
local anti-Melanesian bully; and a subsidiary challenge was to assert
Melanesianism against that other form of supposed creeping Asianisation
represented by an influx of skilled Filipinos into the public services and
small business.
But MA remained more worried about the activities of privileged
Papua New Guineans than Indonesian political leaders or Filipio binis
pioneers. For Narokobi the established parties were indifferent to grass
roots concerns and practised only 'big man' democracy. MA aspired to a
party leadership controlled from below, and had begun to draft
organizational rules providing for an elaborate extra-parliamentary party
structure. By 1987 MA had proved itself to be quite dynamic in
provincial electoral contests, where parties at first had played a negligible
role. MA and close allies such as Premier Stephen Pokawin of Manus
and Premier Utula Samana with his Morobe Independent Group had
control of government in four provinces (the other two Premiers were
Pedi Anis in New Ireland and Dr. Alexis Sarei in North Solomons) - an
appropriate accomplishment for the party led by the constitutional father
of decentralisation, Father Momis. For his part, in 1982 Bernard
Narokobi sought to combat disillusion at the grass roots:
One day I went to campaign in one very populous area -
Wosera district [East Sepik province]. I came to a village and
an old man said: 'Yangpela yu painim namba na yu kam ahl
[Young man, are you looking for numbers?'] I said, 'Sori tru - mi
vot vot na olegeta namba i pinis.' [Tm very sorry - 1 have voted
and voted and all the numbers are finished'.] (Griffin and King,
1985:84)
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MA perhaps showed the courage of its convictions when it expelled
deputy leader John Kaputin from the party in late 1985 for joining the
new Wingti coalition as Minerals and Energy Minister in defiance of the
party consensus (The Times, December 7, 1985). MA thus refused to
tolerate a situation almost normal for the UP and even the NP of having
party MPs in both government and opposition. But the expulsion was
ironical in that Father Momis had joined Michael Somare as deputy
prime minister and helped his government in the crisis brought about by
Paias Wingti's defection from Pangu in February 1985, thus making a
mockery of Narokobi's anti-Pangu diatribes in the 1982 campaign. (His
campaign trademark was a send-up of Pangu mania:
'Pangupangupangupangupangupangu !').
If big man democracy and political opportunism were MA's bug
bear, opportunism almost constituted the ruling philosophy of the United
Party. In a disarmingly frank presentation at the University of Papua
New Guinea, Roy Evara elevated political flexibility into a principle:
During my time in office as leader of the United Party, when
there were changes of government, the United Party was
always there. We never missed ....
It was the United Party who brought the change of government
[in March 1980] ....
We were able to cross the floor to join this party and that party.
Other people have said these people are like pamuk meri
[prositutes], they go here, they go there. Yes, we did that....
Having achieved these changes of government we also
undertook the task of breaking every other party.... We wanted
to make Julius [Chan] weak, and then we wanted to make
Somare weak. So in this election we will all be saying, no party
is going to be strong enough to form a one-party government
(Griffin and King, 1985:53-4).
When asked with which parties he would be prepared to form a
government, Evara replied: 'There are one or two I would not join with,
but I will not let you know now' (Griffin and King, 1985:71).
Although not quite so candid as Evara, PNG Independent Group
leader, Ted Diro, also sang the praises of opportunism. Explaining why
his Group would not constitute itself as a party for the time being, he
said: 'We prefer to enhance our chances of attracting the ...
Independents after the election .... should the political winds blow in our
direction we will welcome the challenge' (Griffin and King, 1985:15). In
the event, after June 1982, Diro's respectable following of seven was
shaken by his consenting to assume leadership of the National Party
while Okuk, who had lost his Chimbu seat, sought a new one. The
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Independent Group was shaken again in 1983 as Diro rather supinely
conceded both party and Opposition leadership to Okuk when that force
of nature returned to parliament after a by-election in Eastern Highlands.
Although Diro eventually won a ministry, Forests, under Wingti in 1985,
his following by then was scarcely discernible - although it did revive
later. Evara, by contrast, found the United Party's parliamentary strength
considerably eroded in 1982 - from 14 before to 9 after the election - but
he was able to keep a ministry throughout the third Somare government
despite a continuing split in his party.
Whilst the philosophy of naked opportunism could not be said with
hindsight to have entirely triumphed in 1982, it remains important; and so
perhaps Papua New Guinea's political parties in revent years could
usefully be divided into two categories: major parties, being those proven
capable of leading or credibly able to lead a government; and minor or
scavenger parties. Pangu, PPP, NP, Paias Wingti's People's Democratic
Movement and even MA would qualify for major party status. The UP,
the Papua Party and the Independent Group would not. In Roy Evara's
words:
We are and we have been a humble and working party ... We
have not been greedy in the political power struggle.
The UP are the most accomplished scavengers of PNG politics.
The Election result and the basis of party strength
Election polling was carried out between June 5 and 26. In terms of
voter support for party-endorsed candidates Pangu clearly outpolled
every other party and, at the close of counting, had won 50 of 108 seats,
up by half (see Table 1.1). (The Sumka Open seat in Madang province,
contested late because of the death of a candidate before the poll, was
won by Pangu). Table 1 .2 reveals the extent of voter support for each of
the parties. Pangu candidates were 17 percent of the total, but they
received twice this proportion of the vote, whereas independents - 40
percent of candidates - received only half this share of the vote, and won
only four seats. As for party regional strengths, Table 1.3 shows that
Pangu candidates won more votes than any other party in three of the
four regions. In the Northern region it won 24 of the 28 seats,
consolidating its traditional support bases, and it later won the support of
two other MPs in that region. The Melanesian Alliance outpolled Pangu
in the Islands region and won eight seats overall, but lost two MPs to
Pangu in the post-election lobbying. The PPP's votes were evenly spread
throughout the country, but it lost significant support in the Northern
region. The National Party polled surprisingly weakly, particularly in the
Highlands, and Okuk lost his own Chimbu provincial seat despite
extraordinary efforts. (He was later returned in a by-election in his wife's
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area of Eastern Highlands province.) Diro's PNG Independent Group
polled well in Papua and made inroads in other regions, winning nine
seats, but losing three of these to Pangu after the count. The secessionist
wing of Papua Besena disappeared, indicating the steady erosion of
support for secession since independence, while Besena's non-
secessionist wing, the Papua Party, managed to retain three seats. The
Papua Action Party did not win a seat.
Voter turnout for the 1982 elections was approximately 60% of the
eligible voting poulation (18 years and over), which continued the pattern
of previous elections. Of the 103 incumbent MPs who contested, only 50
retained their seats, again continuing the 1977 pattern of a high turnover
of incumbents. Twelve of the 27 ministers in the outgoing government
were defeated. The first-past-the-post voting system, together with the
unusually large number of candidates, meant that many seats were won
by candidates who captured only a small percentage of the total vote. In
all, 62 seats were won by candidates who received less than 30% of the
votes cast in their electorates.
Table 1.1
Party Strengths - Before and After June 1982
Parliament
March 1982
Pangu PPP NP MA UP PP IG Ind. Total
33 20 22 6 13 7 - 8 109
After June
Election
50 14 13 8 108*
Parliament,
Aug.2,1982
61 13 19 108
Key: Pangu = Pangu Pati (Michael Somare)
PPP = People's Progress Party (Sir Julius Chan)
NP = National Party (Iambakey Okuk)
MA = Melanesian Alliance (Fr. John Momis)
UP = United Party (Roy Evara)
PP = Papua Party (Galeva Kwarara)
IG = PNG Independent Group (Ted Diro)
Ind. = Independent
*The election for one seat in Madang province was postponed
when a candidate died. (Pangu won the by-election.)
Source: Hegarty and King, 1982.
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On Monday, 2 August the National Parliament elected Michael
Somare to be prime minister of Papua New Guinea for the third time.
Somare defeated the outgoing coalition's last-minute nominee, Father
John Momis, by 66 votes to 40. The prime ministerial ballot (required by
Section 142 of the constitution) ended a confused and debilitating month
of maneuver and speculation concerning which group of parties would
form the new government.
At the start of the maneuvers, the defeated Okuk successfully and
sensationally nominated the newly elected leader of the Independent
Group, Ted Diro, as the new leader of the National Party, effecting a
merger of the two parties in the process, and effectively blocking a Diro-
Somare coalition because the new grouping was too large for Somare's
purposes. Somare's victory on August 2 gave him a parliamentary
majority of 26 over the oppostion - and in fact he had eleven more
supporters than the required parliamentary majority of 55. The new
government consisted of 50 Pangu MPs; 11 MPs who were either
independents or who switched to Pangu from other parties immediately
after the poll or just before the parliamentary ballot, and 6 United Party
MPs. As it turned out, Pangu did not need the UP, but in the interests of
a more secure working majority invited it 'on board'.
The Opposition, after August, was led by the new National Party
leader, Ted Diro, who defeated Father Momis for that position by 18
votes to 17. The Opposition membership consisted of 19 National Party
(i.e., 14 'Old' NP and 5 Diro Independent Group); 6 Melanesian Alliance;
3 Papua Besena, and 13 People's Progress Party. Sir Julius, however, did
not throw in his lot fully with the official Opposition, since the PPP
managed to secure minority party status with its own support staff and
sat on the cross benches.
Despite earlier promises to trim the size of the ministry amidst
general belt-tightening, Somare in fact announced a cabinet of 27 the
week after the election, the maximum allowed by the Constitution. Four
principles of appointment lay open to him - talent and experience;
regional and provincial balance; partisan reward to Pangu stalwarts; and
'balance' among his coalition partners. In the event, all principles came
into play, but geography - and pressures to maximise patronage -
triumphed, despite Pangu's unprecedentedly large parliamentary plurality
and Somare's seemingly formidable personal position. The allocation of
ministries by party is shown in Table 1.5 and the full ministry is listed in
Appendix B. The United Party, which helped to break up the previous
Somare government by a timely defection, had been disproportionately
rewarded.
Eleven of the 27 ministers were sitting in parliament for the first
time, and Pangu stalwarts such as former Planning minister Tony Da
(Lae Open) felt neglected. Nevertheless, the new men included such
outstanding talents as former department heads, Philip Bouraga and Tony
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Casting a vote, Port Moresby (Photo: Robin Osborne)
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A symbol of things to come? The United Party campaign van comes to
grief outside Gordons police barracks, Port Moresby
(Photo: Robin Osborne)
'It is forbidden to "grease" a voter' announces a polling booth sign in Port
Moresby
(Photo: Robin Osborne)
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Siaguru, and former Public Services Commission chairman, Rabbie
Namaliu.
Pangu appeared formidable indeed in August 1982, not only for its
victory at the polls, but because it had split and poached on the
opposition to such brilliant effect. But only two-and-half years after
Somare's triumph it transpired that Pangu itself was not unsplittable.
When Somare's deputy, Paias Wingti, led 14 other members out of the
party into Oppostion in February 1985, Somare only avoided
parliamentary defeat by hastily restructuring his coalition to include NP
and MA representatives. Nevertheless, in November 1985 Wingti
toppled Somare and formed independent Papua New Guinea's fourth
coalition with PPP, NP,UP (Torato faction), Papua Party and Diro
support. One maverick MA, John Kaputin, also joined Wingti. Prophets
who thought in 1982 that Pangu might achieve permanent ascendancy in
the political system, or might force the other parties to coalesce against
the Pangu challenge, were confounded by Wingti's success, which owed
something to his appeal for Highlanders across party lines - but probably
more to the feeling that the Somare ascendancy in Papua New Guinea
politics was passing; that the turn of the next political generation had
come. This feeling was confirmed in 1986 when Tony Siaguru and four
other Pangu MPs, three of them ministers (including Pangu founder, Sir
Barry Holloway), also broke away from Pangu, and set up a League for
National Advancement. The Chief at only 49 was felt to be holding up
the leadership prospects of Namaliu and Siaguru, the other contenders
for the Pangu crown (The Times, July 11, 1986). In retrospect, in view
of the PDM and LNA revolts, Somare had perhaps been wise to insure
against Pangu factionalism through his apparently superfluous coalition of
convenience with the NP.
Returning to June 1982, and referring to Table 1.2, what is most
striking is the poor record of independents by comparison with party-
endorsed or party-supporting ('Pro Pangu', 'Pro Somare') candidates, and
the glittering record of Pangu candidates compared to all others. How do
we explain these two trends?
As noted above there has been an inconclusive debate among
political scientists in recent years about trends in Papua New Guinea's
party system and her electoral and parliamentary politics. The debate
firstly concerns the relative influence of various factors supposed to
explain electoral success:
(a) the so-called primordial characteristics of candidates - clan,
language, domicile, etc.;
(b) candidates' secondary associations - in churches, community
organisations and the workplace;
(c) sentiments of provincial or regional solidarity;
(d) class feeling, and the impact of growing social polarisation; and
(e) party affiliation.
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Table 1.2
The Party Vote, 1982
% Candidates
Standing
(no. = 1125)
% Votes
Received
% Members
Elected
No.
Members
Elected
Pangu Pari 17 34 47 51
People's Progress
Party
9 10 13 14
National Party 13 10 12 13
United Party 7 7 8 9
Melanesian
Alliance Party
6 9 7 8
PNG Independent
Group
4 7 6 7
Papua New Guinea
Party
1 2 3 3
Papua Action Party 1 1 0 0
Independents 41 21 4 4
Source: Hegarty and Jackson, 1983
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Table 1J
Party Voting by Region, 1982
Percent of votes cast
Party North Coast Papua Highlands Islands
Pangu 54.7 22.0 30.0 24.5
PPP 6.3 8.4 11.5 14.9
NP 10.1 3.2 13.3 7.6
MA 11.5 7.1 2.2 28.1
UP 5.1 6.8 9.3 4.5
PP - 9.0 - -
IG - 18.3 6.7 5.2
PAP - 4.7 - -
Ind. 12.3 20.5 27.0 15.2
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source : Hegarty and Jackson, 1983
Table 1.4
Regional Support for Somare in Key Parliamentary Votes
Percentage of Regional MPs Voting
with Somare
Region 1972 1977 1980 1982
Papua 78.4 47.8 29.2 37.5
Highlands 25.7 51.3 35.9 59.0
North Coast 64.3 89.7 82.8 92.9
Islands 76.5 70.6 23.5 47.1
Source: Hegarty and Jackson, 1983.
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Table 1.5
Ratio of Ministers to Government MPs by Party
Parties Ministers No. of Party Ratio
MPs
Pangu
Pro-Pangu
United Party
21
3
3
50
11
6
1:2.4
1:3.7
1:2
Total 27 67
Source: Hegarty and King, 1983.
Are primordial qualities and secondary associations becoming less
important, and, if so, is provincialism and/or regionalism becoming the
stuff of national electoral politics? Or, alternatively, is the admitted social
polarisation of the period since self-government in 1973 leading to a
class-based politics which will in turn see the rise of mass-based
ideological parties to replace the existing caucus-based parties with their
poor ideological coherence and powerful tendency to undergo die-back
after elections?
These questions, which have been much agonised over (Hegarty,
1983; Hegarty and Jackson, 1983; May 1984), are not quiet satisfactory
as they stand. First, there is a level of analysis problem: explanations of
political outcomes at the level of the individual electorate and at the
national level tend to proceed in blithe independence of each other. The
same electoral analysts who can confidently show that the success of an
individual candidate was almost entirely due to clan and secondary
associations may nevertheless invoke low commodity prices, or
Somare's charisma and Pangu mania, or divisions, extravagance and
corruption in the Chan government to account for the national election
result in 1982. As I have said before, strong candidates and strong
parties (parties which are rich, numerous in parliament, well-organised
and notably led) have a natural affinity. That is why in principle an
election could be won by a party in the absence of any significant 'party
effect'. In 1982 material support for candidates by Pangu and loyalty to
Pangu among voters may have been decisive in only a handful of seats -
and only painstaking nationwide field research of a kind not so far
possible in Papua New Guinea could properly establish the facts one
way or another. This is not to deny that 'party awareness' among the
people and party spending set new records in 1982 - they certainly did.
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The real test of party strength of course is the parliamentary vote
for prime minister. Here a new game arises in which individual allegiance
to a party, party allegiance to a coalition, and party stability and unity in
coalition-building are all at issue. Many observers have suggested that
provincial and regional loyalties continue to govern this arena of politics
in Papua New Guinea, and Tables 3 and 4 remind us that there are
persisting patterns of regional support for particular parties, but also that
there is great volatility in regional voting patterns in parliament. Thus,
although Somare has always enjoyed majority support from North Coast
MPs, his support in other regions has varied from abysmal minorities to
handsome or thumping majorities. Likewise, although Pangu is supposed
to be the party of the North Coast above all, it has now - or at least had
until the 1985-6 splits - substantial support in all regions. PPP had almost
as much support in the Highlands in 1982 as in its traditional Islands
base; and, if the vote of its Papuan surrogate, the PAP, is counted in, the
NP is seen to have national support on a similar pattern, as does the UP.
MA had a small but significant following outside its Islands base
everywhere except in the Highlands, and the Independent Group's
pattern of support in 1982 was similar. Only the surviving - and now
domesticated - rump of the separatist Papua Besena, the Papua Party,
had a purely regional base - and that record is not encouraging for
would-be regional parties. Thus regional parties in the full sense of that
word are a non-starter in Papua New Guinea. All major parties are
national by common sense criteria, and strive to develop appeal on a
nation-wide basis. They are only 'regional' parties by default. Hegarty
and Jackson point out that Pangu in office has not particularly favoured
its most reliable base - the under-developed North Coast, and they are
right to say that MPs cross the floor more for 'perks' than 'pork', even
though pork - widely spread and partly convertible to perk (the sectoral
funds) - did play a key role in many incumbents' campaigns in 1982. Ron
May's claim that there is a 'clear regional orientation in political party
organisation' (May, 1984:184) seems to have been less true in 1982 than
at any time since Independence. What of the Hegarty and Jackson claim
that the 1982 election suggested 'a shift away from geographical to, if not
ideological, then at least party politics'? They cite two reasons for their
view - first, the remarkable success of endorsed as opposed to
independent candidates; and, secondly, the fact that the election took the
form of a contest between Pangu/Somare and the rest, and
Pangu/Somare clearly won (Hegarty and Jackson, 1983:335). For these
authors ideological or at least class politics are now not too far away:
'As class divisions ... develop ... political parties as representatives of
distinct [national] interest groups will ineluctably emerge' (1983:336) -
and with them, presumably, those disciplined, branch-based parties of the
Anglo-Australian type which David Hegarty used to hold up as a model
for Papua New Guinea during a distinguished decade of teaching politics
at the University of Papua New Guinea.
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Ron May is sceptical, suggesting that 'ethnic' and regional bases of
party organisation will have a long and possibly permanent innings in
Papua New Guinea (May, 1984:188-90). My own scepticism is of a
different kind. Clearly Pangu in office was less united than anyone
expected in the heady days of 1982. With party systems the proof of the
pudding is ultimately in government performance. Hegarty and Jackson
note that factional volatility 'has ... had a debilitating effect on responsible
government in Papua New Guinea' (1983:334), and they could hardly
claim that this pattern was broken in 1982. To call for or hope for
ideological and/or class-based parties is perhaps reasonable, but the
grass roots reality is discouraging. Strong candidates will continue to win
- or be able to win - without party endorsement for a long time to come,
and hence their party loyalty will continue to be questionable, while
incentives to party-swap will remain high and disincentives hard to build.
Ideological and policy concerns among MPs and parties alike will be
hard to develop and will pay off poorly while there is a vote of no
confidence in parliament on average once or twice a year. The problem
is part constitutional, part educational, part organisational but also human,
and will certainly take a long time to solve.
Meanwhile there are continuing intimations of serious ideological
and policy debate among parties in Papua New Guinea, not least at
election time, as I have tried to show. Several important policy
mandates were arguably won by Pangu in 1982. Moreover, as Brett
Evans has pointed out, the Melanesian Alliance at least has positioned
itself ideologically to benefit from the politics of the disposessed if that
should finally take off in Papua New Guinea (Evans, 1985:16) - and the
MA should be closely watched as the likely bell-wether of a shift to class
politics.
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Chapter 2
A GOOD ONE TO LOSE?
MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE 1982 ELECTIONS
Robin Osborne
Overview
To analyse the media's role in the 1982 election one must choose a
suitable time-frame. When did the campaign start and when did it end?
Did it begin after the Second Parliament (1977-82) was dissolved? On
the closing date for candidates' nominations? Or after the Parliamentary
vote at 6.06 p.m. on 11 March, 1980 when Sir Julius Chan toppled
Michael Somare? And when did the campaign stop? After the results
of the count became clear? Or when the Third Parliament elected
Somare to form a new Government on 2 August 1982?
Without doubt the campaign gauntlet was thrown down in that 1980
parliamentary session, but it only formalised the split between Chan and
Somare which had hitherto been marked mostly by their contrasting
attitudes to the proposed new Leadership Code of 1978, which takes us
back almost to the 1977 election. To make the topic manageable, I have
chosen a personal time-frame which begins in November 1981, when I
arrived in Papua New Guinea, and extends to November 1982. My 12-
month period commences when the election was beginning to be
discussed as an issue, and ends with the Pangu-led government facing
tough decisions in the all-important area of budgeting.
Before I came to Port Moresby the main news was about how
commodity-reliant Papua New Guinea was suffering from the world
recession. In an interview Sir Julius Chan said: 'It is the most difficult
time in all the years I've been in politics' (Australian 7 September 1981).
Economic problems soon emerged as the main issue of the campaign.
Many journalists believed the economy was the only issue, and
continued to write that none of the leaders had proposed any
satisfactory solutions.
Paradoxically, the first major election story appeared outside Papua
New Guinea in a November 1981 issue of the Far Eastern Economic
Review (FEER). The magazine's Port Moresby 'stringer', Rowan
Callick, who worked full time at Word Publishing, advised readers not to
bet on the result of the election: 'Only a fool - even in this nation of
gamblers ready to rival the Chinese - would place odds on the result,
since at the past two elections more than half the members lost their
seats. Perhaps that proves that the electors are certainly not fools'
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(FEER 6 November 1981). Callick reported that the parties were
preparing slowly for the coming campaign. The most active seemed to
be the National Party which had launched its campaign in
spectacular, American style with sky-diving, dancing, a beauty
contest and feasting in [Deputy Prime Minister] Okuk's Simbu
province. One of the country's most popular rock bands, April
Sun, performed the party's theme song for the campaign, due for
heavy radio plugging now that the government-owned National
Broadcasting Commission has decided to accept political
advertising for the first time' (ibid.)
My perspective was mostly Port Moresby's. For news from the
campaign trail I relied on the print media and the National Broadcasting
Commission (NBC). I confess that I was disappointed. In Port
Moresby, with the noisy exception of polling day, it was often hard to
believe that the election was on. Yet when I visited the highlands,
political activity was omnipresent. The 'frontline' event that gained most
coverage was Okuk's beer-fest at Kundiawa airport just before the
close of polling. Kevin Ricketts of Australian Associated Press (AAP)
filed a story that received wide exposure in Australia.
The women from the electoral sub-district and clan
simultaneously emit high-pitched yodels and move for-ward in
a line to accept in turn the 300 cartons of beer that they carry
back on their heads to their menfolk. By day's end Iambakey
Okuk has distributed 4,000 cartons of beer - 96,000 stubbies to
the voters of his Chimbu electorate (Canberra Times 6 June
1982).
With pictures of an 'arse-grassed' and befeathered Okuk - 'next to him,
dutifully bare-breasted in accordance with old custom, stood his wife
Karina', Time magazine (12 June 1982) noted - it certainly brought the
provinces closer to Moresby, but I felt that rural campaigning, involving
85 per cent of the electorate, was mostly happening beyond my ken.
Capital dwellers were interested in the contests between certain
key personalities- Rabbie Namaliu vs. Oscar Tammur, for instance - but
we received almost no news through the media. The notable exception
was The Times of Papua New Guinea which sent Euralia Paine (a
Papua New Guinean) into the field in May to file several reports. The
NBC assigned journalists full-time to the leaders, yet produced no in-
depth documentary programmes. By combining the recorded material
that could have been sent in from the journalists (by air if phone lines
were poor) the NBC could have produced a good feature programme
every week. Radio is ideally suited to reporting an election because
both rely on the abilities of the human voice.
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Ironically, Australian audiences were better served. Using studio
equipment identical to the NBC's - that old workhorse, the Rola tape
recorder - Sean Dorney of the Australian Broadcasting Commission
(ABC) produced a stimulating documentary that ran for 45 minutes on
the national service. This 'Background Briefing' programme included
interviews with leaders as well as officials such as the Electoral
Commissioner and the Ombudsman. The ABC also put a film crew on
the campaign trail and, with frontman Dorney, produced news items on
Chan, Okuk and Somare. By contrast the NBC's national service relied
on news scripts, occasional voice reports sent in over bad phone lines,
and a series of studio discussions. Some of these were stimulating.
Many, alas, were loosely directed bouts of verbiage where everyone
finally lost sight of the forest for the trees.
NBC's nineteen provincial stations, on the other hand aired
numerous field interviews collected by their own journalists. Sir Julius
Chan was only one leader who knew the importance of finding time to
talk on provincial radio. But the Radio-3 service has problems with
reception (due to the use of the short-wave bands) and language
comprehension. These stations re-broadcasted a number of nationally
(i.e. Port Moresby) produced programmes, but they were mostly
intellectual, in English and thus incomprehensible to much of the
audience.
To help ameliorate this problem the NBC management asked its
broadcasters to remember the importance of clear writing, particularly
for less educated listeners. Applauding this in one of his Times 'Radio'
columns - delightfully titled 'Simple English per se' - University of Papua
New Guinea journalism lecturer, Alan Chatterton, noted that the NBC
now regards simple English as a professional and constitutional
responsibility. News items now make fewer assumptions about
listeners' awareness, especially where foreign events are concerned, he
suggested. Useful indeed, but one wonders what the audience learns
from items such as one which began: 'In that little European country
called Beirut or from the information (in a current affairs broadcast
for schools) that China is inhabited by a people known as Mongoloids.
NBC is a particularly important medium because of Papua New
Guinea's 68 per cent illiteracy rate.
Most of the population was, fortunately, exposed to election news in
a language they did understand. However the material was
overwhelmingly parochial. There was little news from the other side of
the fence whether one lived in a village or a town. Insularity also
prevailed with regard to Papua New Guinea's view of the outside world.
While the nation was contemplating its own election it virtually ignored
the important, if predictable, polling next door in Indonesia, not to
mention the initial Israeli advance into the Lebanon and the resignation
of Alexander Haig as US Secretary of State.
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Again the NBC deserves criticism. While the local papers reserve
some space for world news, the NBC appeared to have no such rule.
Events of global import sometimes got no mention in ten minute news
bulletins which found room for some very trivial utterances by local
politicians.
The electorate and the media
Lack of adequate statistics is a constant complaint of planners in Papua
New Guinea. Many important figures have never been collected while
others are long outdated. The results from the 1980 National Population
Census were of limited value because of the structuring of the question
form. During the planning of the Census there was strong
disagreement among the compilers and, in the end, respondents were
not asked which languages they comprehended. Instead, varying
samples of urban and rural dwellers were asked what was the main
language they spoke at home and the one they used in the market. For
media analysts the responses, while interesting, are of little use.
Instead we must look at the previous (1971) Census and speculate. In
those days Tokpisin was easily the dominant language, being spoken by
44 per cent of the population. English came next, with 20 per cent,
while 9 per cent spoke Motu. In the five biggest towns Tokpisin may
now be understood by over half the population, while Motu and English
are probably holding steady.
Another unfortunate omission from the 1980 Census was
information about radio listening. In the 1971 Census 340,000 people
aged ten years and over said they listened to radio at least once a day -
22 per cent of the potential audience. The NBC's researcher, Keith
Jackson, noted: 'It is indicative of radio's predominance as the only
significant mass medium in Papua New Guinea' (Jackson 1974). A
1978 NBC rural survey provided some general data (NBC 1978). For
example, nine out of every ten villages in Papua New Guinea had at
least one radio set. A different survey revealed that radio's best
audience lay with people aged between ten and 19 (NBC 1975).
Another investigation, by a Broadcasting Working Party in 1977,
revealed that 56 per cent of the 130 families surveyed in the Highlands
rural areas had no radio. The group's illiteracy rate was 68 per cent, the
national average. This survey showed that:
• about one family in four listened to provincial radio, while one in
twelve had listened to the NBC national service (three families
had listened to Radio Australia or other overseas services);
• listening was done in groups, the number of people averaging
between 5 and 6; the same in the morning as at night
(Commercial Radio Listening in Highland Rural Areas of PNG,
1977).
A Good One to Lose? Media Cover of the Elections 31
At present, then, we have no clear profile of radio audiences
country-wide nor details of listening habits. However the potential and
actual audiences would be much increased over, say, 1971 due to
population growth (3,006,799 in 1980) and a higher set ownership
resulting from increased incomes.
Papua New Guinea's first radio station began broadcasting in 1934.
The Australian Broadcasting Commission opened a station in 1946 and
by independence 15 provincial stations were operating. In 1982 there
were 19 provincial stations broadcasting in about 150 languages.
In 1982 the provincial service, Radio-3, broadcast on short-wave for
9 hours a day; Radio- 1, the medium wave national service, for 18.5
hours daily from Port Moresby and various provincial capitals, with
programming initiated in Port Moresby - as it was for Radio-2, the FM
service which started in May that year. Radio-2 broadcast popular
programmes from Port Moresby to nine larger towns (Kieta, Panguna,
Mt Hagen, Goroka, Lae, Madang, Wewak and Kundiawa), again for
18.5 hours daily. The 'line of sight' nature of FM transmission and the
maximum reach of 14 kms means that Radio-2 has little impact on
Papua New Guinea's hinterland. However a bounce from a satellite
would bring superb radio reception to even the remotest hilly areas.
Radio-2 is now the only commercial service, but during the election
most of the political advertising was still on Radio- 1. The former has
adopted a slicker programme format, while the latter continues as a
more staid station for cultural and educational programmes as well as
direct broadcasts of parliamentary question time. Provincial stations
take some national programmes and relay them on short-wave, but
through a station manager and committee they do manage to produce
most of their own programmes using local staff and facilities. Provincial
stations also take development extension programmes produced by the
Office of Information, including short items on nutrition, business and
farming.
In the absence of statistics the NBC believes that virtually everyone
in the country is reached regularly. But that did not mean that everyone
was aware of the progress of the election. A select few tuned to
Australian radio broadcasts which can be received clearly, particularly
at night. The ABC and Radio Australia presented world and Pacific
news (including regular items from Papua New Guinea) - Radio
Australia in Tokpisin as well as English.
In 1982 there were two daily papers, both tabloid: the Post-Courier
and Niugini Nius. The former, owned by Melbourne's Herald and
Weekly Times group, held a monopoly of the daily market from 1969
until 1979, when it sold 27.8 per cent of its equity to the Papua New
Guinea public. In the same year the Lae-based Niugini Nius began.
The Post-Courier reported in October 1982 that it was selling 29,000
copies, with about half the circulation in Port Moresby (interview with
Wayne Grant, Managing Director, Post-Courier, October 1982). The
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Nius, and its Weekender edition, were then selling around 15,000 copies
daily, about 10,000 going to Lae readers (interview with the then-owner
of Niugini Nius, Raymond Thurecht, October 1982). Both papers claim
a pass-on value of about five readers per copy, though the National
Librarian, Sir John Yocklunn, has commented that: The Post-Courier
circulates mainly to expatriates and the educated elite while the Niugini
Nius probably reaches a less elite readership' (Yocklunn 1981). Both
papers have small bureaux - usually a single staffer - in four other towns
apart from their main bases.
Niugini Nius ownership passed from Raymond Thurecht, an
Australian turned Papua New Guinea citizen, to Word Publishing, owned
by the Melanesian Council of Churches, in 1982. However Thurecht
was the paper's proprietor during the election campaign. Word
Publishing's titles include the weekly Wantok (founded 1970), the only
Tokpisin paper; the weekly (1980-82) and then bi-weekly Times, and
other journals not relevant to the elections. Wantok was selling 14,500
and the Times 12,500 copies per issue in 1982.
The majority of editorial staff in all of these papers was Papua New
Guinean, although expatriate journalists also performed an important
role. While the latter are sometimes accused of dominating the print
media, the editors of all papers, with the exception of Niugini Nius, were
Papua New Guinea nationals at the time of the 1982 election. However
the appearance of being 'localised' did not always tally with reality. The
Post-Courier, notably, was using only Papua New Guinea nationals to
gather news, but most of the stories were either written or heavily
rewritten by expatriate 'sub-editors'.
The circulation figures of these papers may seem small, but when
compared on a ratio-to-population basis with Australian national journals
they compare quite favourably. In fact by this measure the Post-Courier
has better market penetration than do the National Times, The Bulletin
or The Australian^ While Papua New Guinea may have a low literacy
rate, those who do read are strong 'consumers' of the press. The main
problem is distribution. As Word's Fr Kevin Walcott has explained, 'Air
freight rates, even when discounted for publications, are so high that
distribution costs to the more distant provinces must threaten the value
of materials that can be sent there'. He added that newspapers and
magazines are the 'most critical materials for promoting literacy in
Papua New Guinea at present. A newspaper is cheap, relevant, readily
available and contains information of significant current interest' (paper
presented to National Book Week Seminar, Port Moresby, 4 August
1982).
The Post-Courier reaches 0.96 per cent of Papua New Guinea's population
of three million. The National Times, The Bulletin and The Australian
reach about 0.66 per cent of Australia's fifteen million population, with a
circulation of around 100,000 each.
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Total weekly sales for the main Australian journals in Papua New
Guinea were between 1,000 and 2,000 in 1982. The top seller was The
Australian (especially the Weekend edition) while The Bulletin sold
1,300, Time about 2,4000 a week (including subscriptions) and
Newsweek about 1600 (personal communication, T.B. Clarke & Co.
(Sydney), distributors in Papua New Guinea for Australian papers).
I will digress to note that the fortnightly Phantom comic - emanating
from the US - has a circulation far higher than any of the above2 despite
its theme of a powerful white-man lording it over 'native' tribes in the
jungle. The Phantom's popularity prompted a group of wags, early in the
campaign, to consider entering a Phantom election candidate. It was
planned that when he appeared at the Electoral Commission to lodge his
nomination - riding his white horse 'Hero' and accompanied by his dog
'Devil' - the press would record the event. The 'Friends of Phantom'
believed, perhaps justifiably, that the Ghost Who Walks would have
polled well.
Campaign posters and other leaflets should also be considered as
significant printed media. So should the ubiquitous campaign T-shirts
which, along with having the potential to become cult items for
afficionados, can be expected to remain in circulation for some time.
The Office of Information received K80,000 very late in the day to
make a one-hour film of the election; but the end product would not be
seen for more than a year. As it transpired the film was a lack-lustre
effort, making the election seem just what it never was - boring. No one
used film advertising in cinemas, although there was an early suggestion
that Pangu might film its campaign. This gave birth to a classic 'Grass
Roots' cartoon from Bob Brown, Papua New Guinea's only regular
cartoonist. On a film set Michael Somare was shown wearing cowboy
gear and preparing to star in a film titled 'On the Trail with Mike'. The
star's comment: 'Well, it worked well for Reagan'.
The main media for political advertising were commercial radio and
the newspapers. In the vital weeks before voting the major parties,
especially Pangu, mounted heavy campaigns aimed at supporting those
candidates campaigning in the party's name.
The campaign
Perhaps the first sign that campaigning was seriously under way came
in September 1981 when the president of the Papua New Guinea
Journalists' Association called on the government 'not to intimidate the
press if it wants fair reporting on the election'. He said past experience
showed that government ministers had threatened the press and its
Peter Richardson, FREW Enterprises, Australian licensee for Phantom,
and sole distributor in Papua New Guinea, estimated sales at 'around 8,000
fortnightly' (interview, October 1982).
34 Pangu Returns to Power: the 1982 Elections in Papua New Guinea
freedom (Post-Courier 19 September 1981). (Under Section 46 of the
Constitution freedom of expression and publication are guaranteed.)
Any fear that the election might be fought with bullets was dispelled by
a story headed: 'Image builders get busy as election looms'. The story
focused on a new Chan staff member,
former beauty queen Eva Ami, who, until recently, was running
public relations for a Port Moresby hotel chain. The Prime
Minister is said to be looking for further strength in his own
public relations ... he needs it. It's not that Chan gets a bad
press; it's simply that he gets very little press at all, apart from
the ritual, knee-bending approval administered by the NBC...
Pangu was reportedly 'finalising its policy, to be unveiled around
New Year'. Melanesian Alliance's Fr John Momis was expected to
appoint a press officer shortly, while the United Party's leader, Paul
Torato, was said not to need one: 'He is a glutton for media exposure
who calls press conferences at every conceivable opportunity and at
several inconceivable ones'. The article said that with his 'superior
advice and his own natural talent for self publicity', Mr Okuk would start
favourite. But the finishing post, the article warned, 'is still a long way
off (The Bulletin 27 October 1981).3
Indeed it was, as was the next - and only other - article which
looked at the staff behind the leaders. In an article entitled 'The
Backroom Mafia', the Times's Tarcissius Bobola examined the
personalities and tactics of the image-makers and the numbers people.
The report would have won the ebullient, opinionated writer few friends.
He described David Gavera Giobun (nee Halliday) as 'Chan's loud
mouthed research officer' and said that Jeff Wall, an Australian advising
the National Party, and his colleague, Robert Suckling, 'did not appear to
be worried about what others may consider to be scruples' (The Times
11 June 1982). Perhaps Bobola's early experience as Mr Somare's
press secretary gave him extra insight.
In the main, however, the press focused on the movements and
pronouncements of the key figures. Shortly before the 1981 Christmas
holiday Somare promised that Pangu's campaign would be clean and
honest, adding that 'mud-throwing and belittling' would not be
appreciated' (Post-Courier 21 December 1981). Later, apparently
refreshed after the break, he predicted a Pangu landslide victory (Post-
Courier 18 January 1982). He told a Rabaul rally that Pangu stood to
win 65 seats in the 109-seat parliament. The front page article carried a
picture of 'The Chief smiling confidently, and it set the tone for Pangu's
continuing dominance of the print media. I suspect it also set the other
3 The article was by Russell Hunter of Word Publishing, and stringer for
overseas journals.
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parties to thinking that the Post-Courier was pro-Pangu, a belief that
grew as Somare got more and more coverage, particularly pictorial.
I did not feel that the paper was pro-Pangu, any more than was the
Times (4 September 1982) for running a large front-page photo of Mr
and Mrs Somare and office staff celebrating the Chiefs 46th birthday
with champagne. 'Happy Birthday, Prime Minister' said the headline,
referring to a birthday card he had received. Of course Sir Julius, the
real prime minister, was somewhat upset. But he should not have been,
because Niugini Nius was consistently pro-People's Progress Party, a
bias that emanated from a leading reporter Bernard Paliau who had
previously worked as Sir Julius's press secretary (and would be back
with him later in 1982). I raised the issue of partisanship with Nius
owner Thurecht, mentioning, inter alia, a report, 'Country's moment of
truth' (Niugini Nius Weekender 30 June 1982), and was told I had made
a 'fair comment'. Apparently the journalist had been asked to 'tone it
down'. I agreed with Thurecht's comment that 'Bernard Paliau is a good
journalist ... probing ... intelligent', but felt that readers deserved more
than being told on the eve of the poll that PPP would win 36 seats (to
Pangu's 30) and then learning, five days later, that 'PPP looks like ending
up with 13 seats' (Niugini Nius 5 July 1982). Mr Thurecht added that
the editor was often very busy and 'you know what it's like when your
head's down and your arse up'.
In his study of the world's great newspapers, Martin Walker (1982)
quotes the founder of the modern New York Times, Adolph Ochs, who
once said: 'No reader of my newspaper should ever be surprised'. This
means that a paper should cover the transition between events rather
than surprising their readers with inexplicably dramatic changes. On that
criterion the Niugini Nius certainly did not rate as a great newspaper.
Nor, as I intend to show, did the Post-Courier.
In late January Mr Okuk made what in retrospect was an ironic
boast, saying that he would spend most of the campaign touring the
country and 'leave the safety of his Chimbu seat in his people's hands'.
He said he was leasing his coffee factory and trade store to meet his
campaign commitments. 'I do not expect other people to financially
support the party if I do nothing myself (Post-Courier 22 January 1982).
Funding was always a key issue for the deputy prime minister (and
others). Within two months he was accusing Australia's Ansett Airlines
of plotting to unseat him at the polls so that it could take 40 per cent of
Air Niugini - Okuk was Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation - and
so gain access to international routes. He accused Ansett of
guaranteeing K2m in funds for an electoral campaign against him (The
Bulletin [Stuart Inder] 2 February 1982). He said 'a Pangu man has
recently flown to Melbourne for consultations with Ansett board
officials' (Niugini Nius 6 February 1982).
Some people considered his timing tactless: he spoke on the same
day that Michael Somare was in Melbourne attending a memorial
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service for his late friend, Sir Reginald Ansett. But Iambakey Okuk was
not planning a campaign based on diplomacy. Evidently he was not
even planning on being loyal to his leader, the prime minister. He said he
would challenge any contender, including Sir Julius, for prime
ministership if he were returned in June (Post-Courier 8 August 1982).
By joining his Nationals with the new Papua Action Party (PAP) he
also showed that he had little affinity with the present coalition. Party
president Michael Mel called Okuk 'a definite goer' for the top job and
said that PAP would win seats in every Papuan province and the
National Capital District.
The extraordinary speed with which the ethnocentric highlander
Okuk linked with the PAP provoked surprisingly little comment from the
local media. However the Melbourne Age's David Broadbent was
amazed by the blatant display of political opportunism. He said he had
attended Mr Okuk's talk at the University of Papua New Guinea a few
days earlier, and had heard him say that Papuans, unlike highlanders,
were extremely lazy people.4 Broadbent was surprised at the lack of
protest from the Papuan students present and staggered when a joint
National-PAP rally was called later in the week. In a story wryly
headed 'The pork barrel election', he wrote of Okuk in Port Moresby
'handing over 12 live pigs and organising a motor cavalcade headed by
Highlanders and Papuan dancers bearing bamboo poles festooned with
Aust. $10,000 worth of K20 notes' (The Age 15 May 1982).
This ceremony echoed traditional highlands custom where relations
between different groups are cemented by exchange of goods and
money carried on poles. Doubtless the journalist would have been
amused to learn that the notes had been borrowed over the weekend on
the short-term money market. The whole rally had been a PR ruse.
One evident cynic was Susan Addison who wrote occasional media
columns for the Times. After attending a bridge opening by Chan she
was angered by the media coverage of the event: 'the press must be on
its guard not to merely boost the egos of politicians and to play a game
of ping-pong - action reported one day, reaction the next' (The Times 2
December 1982). An example of ping-pong was the claim by the
national president of Pangu that the government was operating a slush
fund aimed at buying community support (NBC News 14 July 1982). Sir
Julius issued the standard press release saying that 'the unpleasant term
"slush fund" was used during the Somare era but was dropped when the
Coalition came to power. The "Minor Projects Development Fund" is
neither a slush fund in name nor in function' (Chan, Press Release, 15
July 1982).
One wondered who was the winner in this sort of exchange.
Okuk's meeting, held on 20 April 1982 was one of a series on 'The
Leaders', organised by the Department of Political and Administrative
Studies at the University of Papua New Guinea.
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The 'old' parliament ended at 7.00 p.m. on 17 February when debate
on the National Intelligence Organisation Bill was adjourned due to lack
of numbers. A total of 63 legislative items remained to be debated. The
Speaker, Sevese Morea, now deceased, was angry that members
seemed more interested in the coming election than the present
Parliament. Likening Papua New Guinea politics to the game of musical
chairs, the Post-Courier's political roundsman Susuve Laumaea wrote:
'When the parliament sits we see the Government making a show of
coalition solidarity while outside the legislature they continue their pre-
poll plots aimed at unseating each other' (Post-Courier 8 February
1982). However all parliamentarians 'joined together in a moving final
tribute to veteran politician, Sir John Guise', the following week. Sir
John announced he was returning to his village to grow vegetables
(Post-Courier 17 February 1982). One hoped his garden was not as
acidic as some of the comments he was making over the NBC.
By this time the government seemed to have suffered a number of
public relations setbacks. Regardless of the merits, they bear listing
here. A great deal of mud was flying around and much of it stuck on the
government. An old political adage holds that Oppositions don't usually
win elections, rather governments lose them. Amongst the issues that
troubled the Coalition were the following:
• The acrimonious feud between Police Minister Warren Dutton and
Commissioner Phillip Bouraga over operational control of the
police. Although the government did not lose this encounter it
gained nothing, from it. Bouraga eventually resigned to campaign
successfully as pro-Somare candidate for the National Capital
District.
• The Executive Diary affair, wherein the government spent
K82,500 buying 15,000 diaries for 1982. The press quickly
pointed out that the Singapore-produced diary had a hopelessly
out of date world map, was purchased without standard tendering
procedures being observed, and was too expensive (K7.50) for
most Papua New Guinean public servants. The affair was a
fiasco and a year later fewer than 100 diaries had been sold. I
heard of some being given away as scribbling pads to students in
one Port Moresby school. The Ombudsman report of November
1982 took a more serious view, even alleging that PPP election
materials, such as T-shirts, were shipped into Papua New Guinea
in the same exempt-from-duty crates as the diaries (Ombudsman
Commission, 1982).
Commerce Minister Opai Kunangel's alleged misappropriation of
Village Economic Development Funds by paying money to
companies run by his wives. Kunangel resigned his portfolio in
February 1982 and was eventually gaoled by the National Court
in 1983 (Post-Courier 18 February 1982; 16 March 1983). The
National Fiscal Commission did not help by claiming that Messrs.
A Good One to Lose? Media Cover of the Elections 39
Okuk and Torato had also played fast and loose with sectoral
monies (see Post-Courier 13, 20 November 1981; Hegarty and
King 1983).
• The government's decision to commission a K 10,000 report in
favour of introducing TV by Australian consultant, Joe Joel. This
was called a 'waste of money and a farce' by Niugini Nius, while
the Times totalled up the few words in the report and found that
each one had cost the nation K5.00.48 Sir Julius told the Nius
that he had not even bothered to read the Joel Report.
• The K6 million Grumman Gulfstream executive jet, known as
Kumul-1 (Bird of Paradise One), was a constant thorn in the
PM's side. Only briefly did it become an asset - when it helped
to spot a large American tuna-boat, the Danica, fishing illegally in
Papua New Guinea's waters. But soon the government found it
had bitten off more than it could chew, and after tense
negotiations with the owners and the US government it sold the
boat back for what the press called a giveaway price (Hegarty
and King 1983).
It often seemed as if the government was holding four aces and still
managing to lose.
Perhaps the worst setback of all was the government's failed bid to
increase the electoral nomination fee from K100 to K 1,000. The new
fee was introduced in the budget session of parliament and defended in
February. But the Ombudsman challenged its validity under Section 20
of the Constitution, which guarantees every citizen the right to a
reasonable opportunity to stand for election. The Chief Ombudsman,
Ignatius Kilage, said: "Wealth should not be the yardstick to determine
the ordinary citizen's right to stand for executive public office' (Post-
Courier 18 February 1982).
The Coalition portrayed a grouping for the wealthy, not for the
common people. The K 1,000 fee would have removed the people's
access to power - albeit rather theoretical - and it was not believed that
the government's main purpose was simply to limit the enormous
number of nominations. The government's blunders left it open to attack
and Pangu was quick on the uptake. Somare promised that he would
set up a royal commission to look into the mismanagement of the Chan-
Okuk coalition. He said it had 'lived up to its title of a stop-gap
government' (Post-Courier 9 March 1982).
On 12 April the NBC began a series of unpaid political talks by
leading members of the parties. Each party was allowed six original
talks and six repeats. The ten minute talks were broadcast in Tokpisin,
English and Motu. The NBC said that the schedule had been prepared
on the principle of granting 'equal time to all 'recognized' political parties
and not on the basis of size' (NBC 1982). The talks were in prime time,
morning and night.
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This free opportunity was passed up in some quarters. The United
Party, for example, seldom found time to produce a policy talk, thus
raising doubts about whether they even had a policy. However some
leaders spoke strongly and convincingly. The best performers were
Michael Somare, John Momis and Iambakey Okuk. Despite these first
declarations of intent many observers still felt that there was little talk
about real issues. The world recession and the commodity price slump
loomed like black clouds that no one could make disappear. The best
thing seemed to be to ignore it.
Shortly after nominations closed the Times (30 April 1982 et seq.)
ran a liftout series with the names of all 1126 candidates. This useful
public service was followed later by supplements about the Electoral
Commission and past voting (The Times 4 June 1982); details on polling
places and times; and, later, the full election results (ibid. 2 July 1982).
The Post-Courier, despite its superior financial resources, showed far
less ingenuity.
The NBC had issued a booklet of guidelines for its free broadcasts.
It said that scripts must be submitted to the NBC at least one week prior
to the scheduled date for recording. In a dynamic political climate this
seemed very inflexible. Another guideline stressed that only one voice
might be used in any talk. But immediately the Nationals broke the rule
by using the multiple voices of April Sun singing the party's Tokpisin
theme song:
Yu na mi na Iambakey
Yumi stretim kwiktaim PNG...
(Yu and me and Iambakey
We'll quickly fix up PNG)
When the People's Progress Party queried this breach it was told by
the NBC chairman that the rules had now been changed. Official party
songs could be included as long as NBC received a copy of the lyrics.
Pangu talks also featured the party song, 'Now we are a nation',
which soon captivated the musical hearts of many people.
We've seen from the beginning,
We've known it all along
Somare brought us freedom
Now we know where we belong...
Chorus: Now we are a nation, growing big and growing strong
With Pangu and Somare helping us to grow along
We'll have to pull together,
It won't happen on its own
The going's tough, but Pangu's there
To help to lead us home...
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We know what the 'Pangu' means,
We're going to vote the Pangu team
We need Somare and Pangu today
Because the Pangu Pati knows the way....
We know the way.. .yes we know the way ...
PANGU!
The words were written by Pangu consultants in Port Moresby and
the song was orchestrated in New Zealand. The recording was done in
New Zealand using an 80-person Maori choir and Maori lead singer.
As one of the producers (Bruce Dahlenburg, Dalton Electronics, Port
Moresby) rightly said, it was a rousing, well-orchestrated song. Dubbed
onto 3,000 audio cassettes along with Somare's speeches it was
distributed to Pangu komiti workers throughout the country. Loud
speaker trucks played the tapes to village audiences and soon even non-
English speakers were trying to sing along.
PPP's 'Come vote for us. ..come put your trust in the PPP was a
catchy but belated production. The background music came from a US
record containing 'factory-made' jingles and was married with lyrics that
paralleled the message in PPP press advertisements. These focused on
promises for the future and boasts about the past record. This aspect of
the campaign incensed Sir John Guise, the man parliament had revered,
who took press space at his own expense to refute some of the claims
made by Sir Julius. Appalled by 'political gimmickry' he warned voters
not to be fooled by any one party claiming to be the originator of the kina
and toea currency, or the national airline, bank, flag and broadcasting
service (Post-Courier 28 April 1982 et seq.) He was clearly referring to
the PPP's full page ad which claimed to have given Papua New Guinea
all of these things (Post-Courier 26 May 1982 et seq.). However Sir
John voiced no such objections to that part of Pangu's campaign which
suggested that Somare, more or less single-handedly, had brought the
nation to independence.
The Nationals' press campaign showed Okuk, again befeathered
(but minus his bare-breasted wife), and presented more details than the
simplistic party song. His platform favoured strong leadership and
private business; he was pro-Melanesian in West Papua (Irian Jaya) but
strongly anti-communist (Post-Courier 4 June 1982). 'Action Man -
Action Party', read the tagline.
Another man-on-the-go was retired Brigadier-General Ted Diro,
heading the new Independent Group and hurrying to succeed. He
distributed T-shirts with the message 'Time for Change'. It was not the
first time this slogan had contested an election. Gough Whitlam and the
Australian Labor Party won with it in 1972. It was not even the first
time a general-turned-politician had used it. In his study of political
consultants Larry Sabato recalled that General Dwight D. Eisenhower's
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slogan 'It's Time for a Change' was a 'perennial production' (Sabato
1981).
The Papua Action Party thought along similar lines: their T-shirts
read, 'It's Time for Papua', while Diro soon got the hang of
campaigning, describing the Chan government as 'a bunch of clowns'
and a 'desperate group'.
Papua Besena's Josephine Abaijah campaigned once again on a
Papuan separatist platform, while another Papuan woman, Fide Bale,
declared her belief that 'God created woman from the rib of man, not
from his head to top him, nor from his feet to be walked upon. ..she was
made from his side to be equal'. The latter's fine sentiments did not
convince the voters. Abaijah also suffered defeat at the poll.
Again to the credit of its planners, Pangu broadened its press
advertising to include information ads along with image ones. A series of
double-page spreads headed 'How to Vote Pangu' listed all the endorsed
candidates in Papua New Guinea. The ads gave the impression of a
party which considered its candidates loyal. No other party was
confident enough to do this. Like the aforementioned Times
supplements, the ads also assisted the public in this case about how to
vote Pangu. 'Lift this page out and pin it on your wall', said the baseline
in three languages.
Tarcissius Bobola of the Times remained a cynical observer. He
accused Papua New Guinea of being 'a nation without a memory' which
has a 'feeble, superficial press, both radio and print, and a fickle,
sentimental public'. His point was that both the press and public had a
tendency to quickly forget major scandals and thus to forgive the past
excesses of the major parties. He was probably the only Papua New
Guinean journalist to write with anger, doubtless honed by losing his job
at the Post-Courier as a result of a vendetta by Mr Okuk.5
The Times presented good coverage of Pangu's convention at Mt
Hagen and the Melanesian Alliance's in Lae where Bernard Narokobi
spoke out against what he called 'Pangu's cult of Somare as saviour of
this country', and the Pangu slogan, 'Pangu i save rod (Pangu knows the
way), with its hint of blasphemy. 'I know the way, too', Narokobi
quipped, 'All we Christians know that only Jesus Christ knows the way'
(The Times 3 May 1982). Perhaps, but Michael Thomas Somare was
certainly on the right path towards winning the election. To mark Red
Cross Day he and Tony Siaguru gave blood at a transfusion centre at
the Boroko shops. The Red Cross said that the 'political lead' was
followed by a 41 -pint 'flood of donations'. He also made definite
campaign promises, one being a pledge about passing legislation to stop
MP's switching parties 'in search of power and perks'. (This never saw
' According to Mr Okuk at the University of Papua New Guinea on 20 April
1982: 'I got rid of ... I don't want to mention his name ... well, Tarcissius
Bobola'.
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the light of day.) A week before the polling he said there was 'no doubt
his party would form a government'. Although the other leaders said the
same they seemed to be equally busy arguing with their coalition
'partners'.
The Times took the initiative again by commissioning (at K1,000
each) two opinion polls from an independent organisation, Human
Resources Development in Port Moresby. The polls were conducted on
1 and 29 May 1982. The second found that 39 per cent of the capital's
voters favoured Somare and only 13 per cent Sir Julius. Mr Okuk's
rating had dropped from 1 6 per cent to 5 per cent. The main issue that
concerned voters was the lack of jobs (23 per cent of respondents),
followed by law and order (20 per cent). Naturally, all parties except
Pangu disparaged the polls.
Sir John Guise summed up the mood when he said that politics in
Papua New Guinea had become 'rough to the point that brother would
disagree with brother and father with son. ..it is going to be damned
ruthless. There will be no Ten Commandments'. He said that in his day
MP's had thought of their people but now the feeling was: 'How much
can I get out of Parliament?' and 'What can I do to become a wealthy
man?' (Radio Australia special on elections, by Sean Dorney). Rowan
Callick went even further, writing of prospective MP's 'dreaming of
awaking ... to take delivery of the new VIP car, planning the now
traditional 'familiarisation visit' to Manila, collecting the unsecured loan
from the bank and so on ... the parties have done little to disabuse the
candidates of their vain ambitions'. He predicted that due to recession
the election could be a 'good one to lose' (Australian Financial Review
June 1982). I believe that Sir Julius rather agreed, no doubt knowing
that the budgetary cutbacks necessary for the next couple of years
would prove unpopular with the people.
In the weeks before polling day the leaders allowed in-depth
interviews with the media. On the half-hour NBC 'Newsman'
programmes each faced a panel of journalists, local and foreign, with
varying degrees of success. The United Party's Roy Evara received the
toughest grilling. Somewhat belatedly the Post-Courier discovered the
interview business and ran a three-part series, 'The Leaders', on Chan,
Okuk and Somare. Other leaders were said to be unavailable. Again
Somare made the most of the opportunity and his remark that 'even the
kids are screaming Pangu' became the headline. Okuk said that people
in Papua New Guinea needed 'some instant decisions, right or wrong',
while Sir Julius stood on his 'sound record of national management'
{Post-Courier, interviews by editor Luke Sela, 1-3 June 1982).
A long Times editorial the day before polling, spelled out a few
home truths, telling readers: 'This is how you must vote', and referring
to candidates who were honest, reliable and so on. 'Your choice may
well be a woman', it advised readers. In the same issue Tarcissius
Bobola reminded us that: 'No political party has announced who they
44 Pangu Returns to Power: the 1982 Elections in Papua New Guinea
will or would like to partner to form the next government' (The Times 4
June 1982). This would now not happen until after the results.
Emulating an Australian practice, the NBC blacked out all election
stories for two days before polling. As in Australia, the ban did not
apply to the press. One missed the pungent comments of the veteran
observers - Cecil Abel, Percy Chatterton, John Guise - who had
brightened the airwaves. One memorable remark was Abel's: 'The
outcome of democracy is to dupe the electorate'.
The day before the vote a last-minute candidate declared himself.
This was the Post-Courier's cartoon character, Grass Roots, who,
calling himself 'Candidate Roots' and using the slogan 'It's Time for Me',
published his own ballot paper and asked readers to post it in (Post-
Courier 4 June 1982). Before the end of polling Roots had received
some 200 postal 'votes', well in excess of the number that many
candidates would ultimately get.
The poll
Voting had barely started when both Chan and Somare left for Australia
where both delivered speeches designed partly for home consumption.
Somare got the better of this, making a speech to a Pacific resources
seminar in Sydney which showed him to be a man of regional vision.
Okuk, with the field to himself back home, made the most of his
opportunities. In these few days he attacked all and sundry, particularly
Indonesia for its repeated crossings of the Papua New Guinea border
and its treatment of the Melanesians in Irian. He even sent a strong
article about Javanese domination of the Indonesian province to a
leading Australian paper (National Times 13 June 1982).
Okuk's - and, by extension, the government's - relations with
Indonesia lay in sharp contrast to Somare's. Under the heading
'Indonesia wants Somare' the Times reported that Suara Karya, the
newspaper of Indonesia's ruling Golkar party, had said on June 29 that
'Mr Somare's return would mean better relations between the two
countries' (The Times [Stephen Mandana] 9 July 1982). Somare was
said to be respected by the Indonesian leadership, a claim that probably
won little support inside Papua New Guinea where sympathy for the
West Papuans runs high. Okuk also caused a stir by dropping election
leaflets from a helicopter hovering over polling areas. Electoral officers
had to warn him that the distribution of advertising material was illegal
within seven metres of polling booths. 'Quick-to-react officials issued
orders barring voters from polling areas while Mr Okuk's messages
were cleared away' (Post-Courier 10 June 1982).
By polling time the overseas press contingent had arrived in town.
It included Australian TV crews as well as journalists from a dozen
other outlets. Most had no previous experience in Papua New Guinea
and many seemed to have come rather unprepared. Local journalists
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soon tired of having their brains picked. One remarked, after seeing a
report in an overseas journal by a visiting journalist, 'I thought I
deserved a by-line as well'.
One exception was The Age's David Broadbent, who covered the
election in a professional way by making two preliminary visits to gain a
feeling for the process. Time's John Dunn visited twice and produced
good 'wrap-up' stories. Another visitor was Pacific-watcher Stuart
Inder (Pacific Islands Monthly, The Bulletin), who understood the
proceedings with the one notable slip of concluding that, despite all,
Chan and Somare were still friends. Newsweek's Carl Robinson
telexed an excellent report to New York, but received back a copy of a
desk editor's rewrite bearing little relation to the original - or to the facts.
This report, 'by Jill Smolowe with Carl Robinson in Port Moresby', using
terms such as 'natives' and 'Stone Age paradise', completely ignored the
Prime Minister and included errors in the spelling of proper names.
Robinson's return telex to New York was ignored, while my own letter
to the editor was abbreviated in such a way as to make it appear a
partisan plea for my boss. This Newsweek experience was a prime
example of how media majors can misinterpret different countries and,
as a result, call down upon their heads the wrath of the developing
world.
In his analysis of news-making in Southeast Asia, Dr Rod Tiffen
points out that the contact of foreign correspondents with the local
society is often limited and shallow (Tiffen 1979). But in Papua New
Guinea the foreign press always seems able to establish good contacts.
Thus it was a pity to see - as in the case of Newsweek - well-
researched copy being misused.
On Saturday night, 26 June, the Tally Room press boxes were full.
The NBC had begun a live commentary that would last until 4 a.m.
(provincial stations had the count from 6.30 p.m. - 1 1 .00 p.m.). The night
wore on and the counting from the regional centres continued slowly.
The commentators as distinct from analysts - began to run out of steam.
Clearly the results would not be gripping until the next day. But by then
the NBC seemed hardly interested at all. With the exception of a good
summing up by the University of Papua New Guinea's David Hegarty,
there was little analysis. I believe it would have been wiser for the NBC
to concentrate its coverage on the Sunday, by which time more definite
results were available. As it was, you felt left out unless you could visit
the Tally Room (from which the public was excluded). Radio-2 news
had stories on polling incidents such as a pro-Okuk riot in his highlands
home of Kundiawa, but little on the figures.
The result
The leaders were not relying on the media for news of the count. By
Sunday afternoon Somare felt confident enough to convene a press
46 Pangu Returns to Power: the 1982 Elections in Papua New Guinea
conference at the Opposition's Boroko office and declare a Pangu
victory. By how many seats he would not comment. Although he said a
coalition partner would not be necessary, the Post-Courier speculated
about whether he had talked with Chan or Diro. Niugini Nius said the
government was 'Up for grabs'. The NBC preferred not to speculate,
perhaps because their journalists ritually arrived late at press
conferences. For Somare's important Sunday conference the NBC
came fifteen minutes after the Chief had explained his seat count and
predictions. The same applied later at Okuk's house when Okuk handed
the Nationals' leadership to Ted Diro and announced that things would
be 'different with me not around'. It was reminiscent of US President
Nixon's demise, except that Okuk was praising the press not blaming
them.
The press, in turn, said they would miss Okuk and told him that he
had 'added colour to the scene'. Certainly he had provided plenty of
colourful copy. Although Okuk was graceful in defeat his supporters
were not. In ancient Roman times leaders would execute messengers
who arrived bearing ill tidings in the hope that the bad news would
disappear along with the bearer of it. The ultimate 'kill the messenger'
story came from Kundiawa, where hundreds of Okuk supporters
threatened to burn down the local NBC station which had announced
Okuk's imminent defeat. Although management told staff to leave town
and stay with friends or family, many were trapped in the building for
some time. The trouble began because the NBC had broadcast some
conflicting tally results from the provincial electorate office. Announcer
Fabian Waim told Australian Associated Press that 'We had issued
figures indicating Nilkare had 22,000 votes and Okuk 17,000. It was a
mistake - the figures should have been 22,000 and 15,208. We altered
the results. It was after that that we had trouble' (Niugini Nius [Kevin
Ricketts, AAP, Port Moresby] 30 June 1982).
Other outbreaks of violence created a bad image of the Papua New
Guinea election in the Australian press, although the most dramatic loss,
Okuk's, was best symbolised by the National Party deputy, Thomas
Kavali, in tears at Goroka airport. This was one of the rare campaign
photographs that conveyed the true feeling of these emotional weeks.
Mostly the daily press kept re-running the same little mug shots of the
politicians. In the absence of TV the responsibility for visual coverage
fell to the press photographers and travelling journalists. Yet their eyes
did not seem to be looking for the picture that would be worth a
thousand words.
The coalition manoeuvring raised a frenzy of speculation in the
press. There was no greater contrast than between the Post-Courier
and The Times of 2 July. 'Diro "All but in as PM" said the former,
using Diro's own phrase, and explaining that 'minor differences among
the coalition parties may be all that stands between Ted Diro and the
prime ministership'. The Times, however, said immediately after the
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count that Somare had won. 'By this stage we were in no doubt at all',
acting editor Callick told me. 'We are even getting ready to publish a
full-colour front cover picture of the new PM, a decision that requires
some advance notice because we've not run colour before. If we're
wrong we will have to pulp the whole run of the paper, but I don't think
we are'. The Times noted that the party had made history by becoming
the first ever to win more than fifty seats. Mr Somare promised that his
first actions would be to cut government spending and sell the
Grumman jet.
The outside world was also being told of Somare's comeback. The
Sydney Morning Herald (30 June 1982) editorialized that Ted Diro's
apparently dramatic arrival on the scene was not surprising, for 'like
Somare he planned carefully and tirelessly'. However it felt he may
have made his first serious mistake in joining forces with the Nationals.
On the NBC Sir Percy Chatterton said that when it came to politics the
retired general was only 'a raw recruit'. Another of Bob Brown's Grass
Roots cartoons also commented on Diro's haste to get to the top.
'Somare here I come', yelled a determined Diro in combat gear at the
charge with fixed bayonet (Post-Courier 7 July 1982).
By the time of Pangu's post-election convention for new members
the remaining media were inclined to accept Somare's claim of a voting
bloc numbering around 60 MP's. A Post-Courier editorial sounded the
Coalition's death knell:
Without a [common ideological] base a coalition be-comes
simply a matter of convenience, or worse, a means to
sequester power. No one, save 109 MP's, had a chance to
vote in favour or disfavour of the Chan-Okuk government until
last month's election. And no amount of political rhetoric can
disguise the result: when they finally got a chance to have
their say, the people's verdict was a resounding 'No' (ibid.).
As expected there were accusations, particularly against Pangu,
that parties had attempted to buy the allegiance of MP's. 'Beware of
sweet-talking party hustlers', Chan warned. The Nationals' president,
Michael Mel, said that a new highlands member was paid K7,500 by
cheque number 850900 drawn on Pangu's Goroka account. 'Both Mr
Okuk and Mr Diro supported him during the campaign. Now his name
appears among the list of so-called Pangu supporters released at the
weekend'. He said it was ridiculous to say that Pangu had only
'reimbursed his electoral expenses' because these had been met by the
National Party (Post-Courier 8 July 1982). The Coalition also accused
Pangu of holding the new MP's incommunicado in Goroka and, later, in
Port Moresby. Pangu hotels were called 'gaols' and officials known as
'warders'. Melanesian Alliance, fond of considering itself the conscience
of Papua New Guinea, was especially critical.
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While Pangu might not have abducted its Members it certainly held
onto its gains. The Coalition continued to chase possible partners, but
even the Niugini Nius, which was pushing the Coalition's claim of having
58 Members (26 July 1982), could not help. Clearly the previous
government was in disarray. Loser Okuk said: 'If we had started to cry
the Highlands would have gone wild. I want the stupid Highlanders to
suffer. I won't suffer. They'll miss me...'(77ie Times 16 July 1982).
Amidst the emotion there was little analysis of the kind provided by
UPNG's David Hegarty who was now calculating percentages of
winning candidates and parties and concluding: 'The message is fairly
clear: it no longer pays to be an independent' (ibid.).
When Sir Julius stepped down as leader - 'I quit, says fed up Chan',
the Post-Courier (30 July 1982) headlined - the Coalition began working
hard to find a leader to represent it in the parliamentary vote. After
several cancelled press conferences Fr Momis agreed to step forward.
The MA, now free of the Coalition, was waiting to be wooed by other
parties. A Grass Roots cartoon showed Momis, dressed as a prostitute,
standing on a street corner waiting to be picked up. But the cartoon
was self-censored by the paper on the grounds of taste. Instead, artist
Brown redrew Momis as a man looking for a suitable partner.
The big question remained - who would go with Pangu? The NBC,
alone, announced it would be Ted Diro, who then 'categorically denied'
the report that he would accept the deputy prime ministership in a
Pangu-led coalition. For days Pangu had been saying that Diro was the
only leader with whom it would not consider coalescing. But the NBC
newshounds seemed not to have heard.
In the days preceding the parliamentary vote Pangu took the
unprecedented step of recommencing its advertising on both radio and in
the press. This time the aim was to win support from parliamentarians
rather than the public, and indeed the theme song did combine with large
ads of a smiling Somare to produce a positive image of a winning team.
This mini-campaign helped Pangu seal its victory.
The Post-Courier was the only paper published on the morning of
the vote (Niugini Nius did not appear on Mondays). '66+ say (sic)
Somare...Home, hosed says Chief (Post-Courier 2 August 1982). This
contrasted with its earlier prediction - the only one it ever made - that
Pangu would get only 35 seats (Post-Courier 25 June 1982). By the
yardstick of Ochs, the New York Times founder, it had proven itself to
be a far cry from a good newspaper. But the paper had no trouble with
the final parliamentary vote: 'SOMARE TEAM...Full steam ahead after
66-40 vote'. The Times (3 August 1982) was more sardonic: 'The
quest for power is, thank God, finally over'. It then questioned the
strength of the 'renewed marriage between Somare and Evara'.
Some observers linked Somare's victory with the economic
problems mentioned at the start of the campaign. Callick wrote that the
father of independence's 'old political magic may be dampened by
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lingering economic problems such as unemployment' (FEER 13 August
1982). The National Times ([Colleen Ryan] 8 August 1982) announced
from Australia: 'Somare returns - to a grim new reality?'. During polling
Callick was told by Pangu that it had spent 'more than K500,000 on the
campaign - which came from fund-raising events and a small investment
company with real estate' (The Times 3 August 1982). Some people
felt that at least Kim had been spent, much of it contributed quietly by
large businesses in Papua New Guinea and even Australia. But,
regardless of publicity, Pangu's bubble had swelled as a result of the
government's setbacks. According to Sir Julius Chan the PPP spent
around K500,000 campaigning, 'of which K200,000 was useful and the
rest was more or less a complete waste' (interview with Sir Julius Chan,
11 December 1982).
Like electoral victors in other democracies, Pangu had developed a
better organization and successfully promoted an image of strength and
vitality. However in the post-election economic climate it did not take
the media long to place the new regime under the critical microscope,
thus confirming that for the winners the battle had only begun.
In review
Predictably, all sections of the media felt that they covered the election
well. Niugini Nius's Thurecht said the only room for improvement was
with the candidates themselves. 'They didn't utilise the press well,
although the parties were well organised and used the media well for
both their ads and news coverage'. The Post-Courier's Wayne Grant
returned from holidays in mid-campaign and remarked that he thought
his own paper's coverage had been 'pretty poor'. But when it was all
over he said the paper had done a 'pretty good job'. On behalf of Word
Publishing, the Times's editor, Franzalbert Joku, said he thought they did
better than any of the other papers. Like Word's Callick, he cited the
liftout supplements, the opinion polls and the stories from the campaign
trail. He regretted that they had not had more funds to send journalists
out to the provinces. He denied suggestions that the group had favoured
candidates from the Melanesian Alliance. 'It's true that we ran a few
long articles by MA people, but we have a policy of encouraging
contributions from interested Papua New Guineans. It so happened that
the majority of unsolicited material came from MA. But our own
journalists did not concentrate on that party or any other'.
The NBC said it laid great emphasis on presenting a 'fair coverage',
as befitted a government-run organization. This was not always easy,
as when PPP candidate and ex-chairman of NBC, Sam Piniau, called it
'the worst radio station in the world'. (The next day he withdrew his
claim). I would contend that while NBC was fair to the parties it was
less helpful to its audience, who often received what one writer called 'a
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newsfare of undigested ministerial and bureaucratic statements'.6
Although the NBC disavowed such criticism it provided air-time for
commentators to direct similar criticism at the print media. In a talk on
Radio-2's 'Ace' programme, journalism lecturer Alan Chatterton said
that 'Too often the morning election coverage in our daily newspapers
has consisted of six column inches for the prime minister matched
almost exactly by six for the leader of the opposition. ...all neatly ruled off
in a big black border and marked "Election"'. He urged the media to
check at least a percentage of their items and to beware of the 'image-
makers'. He deserves the last word on the subject:
Image-makers come in all kinds of disguises....public relations
experts, press officers [Chatterton himself once worked as
press officer for Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta] ... and they can
provide honest information. But they present a fundamental
problem for the media in all parts of the world. It is easy for
their influence to become too strong. In all areas where there is
a free press, such as Papua New Guinea, that state of freedom
has to be defended and worked for all the time... as is the case
with most good things in life (NBC Radio-2, 30 May 1982).
As a journalist working in government at the time, I would endorse
these sentiments. But one cannot expect politicians to stop making
pronouncements. Thus, I believe, the responsibility of action lies with the
press itself. As veteran US journalist Mort Rosenblum said in his
memoirs (Rosenblum 1979), no major reforms are needed in the
information system operated by free countries - just better reporting,
better writing and a public more actively committed to daily affairs.
6 Rowan Callick, 'Letter from Port Moresby', FEER 11 June 1982.
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Chapter 3
EARNEST EXPOSITION OR ENTERTAINING
EXOTICA?
A Foreign Correspondent and the 1982 Election
Sean Dorney
'I can write about politics till I'm blue in the face but all they want
down there is plane crashes and tribal fights!' That quote, from one of
my former colleagues in Port Moresby,1 points to what I might rather
grandly and self-indulgently describe as the 'dilemma' facing the foreign
correspondent writing about Papua New Guinea.
A constant concern of the journalist in any foreign setting is: 'What
sort of a run am I getting back home?' If the journalist is on a special
trip from home base and his product does not appeal to the sub-editors
who decide what gets used ('gatekeepers' in Kurt Lewin's apt
description), then he might not get another overseas assignment. Or if
he is actually based overseas, and his material is regularly not getting
used, it might be his last foreign posting. Even worse, but more than
possible, the bureau might be closed down (the number of foreign
correspondents based in Port Moresby was halved from four to two
during 1981-2)2
Thus a few days before counting began in the elections I was
having a beer with a foreign journalist sent here on assignment and we
were attempting to conjure up the definitive headline that would warm
the heart of even the most obstinate gate-keeper and perhaps lassoo the
brief attention of the casual foreign reader. What, we were trying to
think, would push, say (to freshen up the example), Prince Andrew and
Koo Stark off the page? One early suggestion was 'Stone Age
Democrats in Bow and Arrow Election'. But we both lapsed into
reverent silence when we hit on a three word headline that would sum
1 Conversation with Michael Prain, correspondent in Port Moresby for the
Herald & Weekly Times group from January 1980 until the close of the
Herald & Weekly Times bureau in mid 1981.
2 The Sydney Morning Herald closed its bureau in Port Moresby in early
1981. Paul Byrnes was the last Sydney Morning Herald correspondent.
Before Paul's arrival in late 1979 the Sydney Morning Herald and the Age
operated a joint bureau, but the Age pulled out of the arrangement in
mid-1979. The remaining full-time correspondents in mid-1982 were
Kevin Ricketts of Australian Associated Press (AAP), and the present
author, for the ABC. Rowan Callick, who wrote for the Australian
Financial Review, and Russell Hunter, who occasionally wrote for The
Bulletin, were both employed by Word Publishing: they wrote for
Australian journals on a stringer basis.
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up the whole matter, guarantee splash usage and reinforce every
preconceived prejudice about Papua New Guinea. There it was in huge
headline type: 'POLLING TEAM EATEN*.
Thankfully, working for the ABC I have a range of more serious
outlets than most journalists working for papers with rather strictly
defined home audiences to aim at. However in the area of general news
there is still the problem of scoring space or time against an
overwhelming mass of news from the rest of the world. It has become
very obvious to journalists stationed here that with independence now
back in that distant decade of the 1970s the news media in Australia
increasingly regard Papua New Guinea as just another overseas
country. If it does fall into any special category it is one labelled 'Exotic'.
The challenge is to write what is true but interesting, serious but
entertaining, undistorted but intriguing. Naturally the challenge is not
always well met. The interesting, entertaining and intriguing snippets are
the easy ones. Achieving balanced copy is harder; and getting it used is
yet harder again.
Let me quote a line or two from some of the stories I filed on the
elections that I am pretty sure were used:
'Potential voters in Papua New Guinea have been warned they
could be jailed if they bet on the outcome of the coming elections'
(story filed 28 January 1982).
'Papua New Guinea's Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Okuk, today
gave away ninety-six thousand bottles of beer to the people of his
electorate in the most lavish wealth display of the election
campaign so far' (story filed 29 May 1982).
'In Papua New Guinea's New Ireland province, followers of the
cargo cult that grew up around President Lyndon Johnson in the
nineteen-sixties are demanding a presidential election. They've
demonstrated outside a polling station with placards reading
"Vote U.S.A."' (story filed 10 June 1982).
'An aircraft carrying the Australian Governor General was
turned back from Goroka at the last minute today because of
tribal fighting in the wake of the election' (story filed 28 June
1989).
'In the Highlands of Papua New Guinea the wife of a leading
official of the National Party has sliced off her ear in a traditional
show of grief at the defeat of the Party's leader, the Deputy
Prime Minister, Mr. Iambakey Okuk' (story filed 3 August 1982).
If I have given the impression that the ABC covered only the quirky
side of the election, let me rush to correct it. I believe the ABC ran a
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more comprehensive coverage than any other overseas media outlet. I
must admit that I was surprised and delighted by the amount of detailed
coverage the ABC accepted and used.3
Robin Osborne has elsewhere assessed foreign as well as domestic
media coverage of the election. Let me explain some of the difficulties
in reporting on a Papua New Guinea election for a foreign audience.
The most intensive period of the campaign for me was a one week
trip in mid-May when I hired Chris Owen, the Institute of Papua New
Guinea Studies' cinematographer, to track Somare around the Morobe
Province, Okuk around the Southern Highlands and Sir Julius Chan in the
Western Highlands and Simbu. We produced three television reports.
Somare was greeted by one of the largest crowds of the whole
campaign when he landed in Lae from Manus on 16 May. Thousands
were there and Somare was chaired from the plane to the terminal. The
next day, when we flew with him into the mountains of the Huon
peninsula, the story was a little different. No one at all was waiting at
our first stop. Those who did wander up expressed surprise at Somare's
presence. They said that according to the Tok Save on Radio Morobe
Somare was in Wau and Bulolo that day. The night before, during a
poolside party at the lavish home of Harry Pelgen, the supermarket king
of Lae, a rather elated John Harangu, Somare's press secretary, had told
me Pangu might win 80 seats. At Pindiu, on film, Somare was prepared
to predict 60. Later in the week during a National Party rally at Kagua in
the Southern Highlands, Okuk committed himself on film to 45 seats
which made us wonder why we needed to bother filming Chan since
there were only four seats left for the People's Progress Party! Hudson
Arek, though, assured me after a particularly good Chan rally in Enga
that the PPP would 'sweep the Highlands' (conversation with Hudson
Arek, PPP chairman, Mt. Hagen, 18 May 1982). Everyone was shooting
wild, but as it turned out Somare was much closer to the mark than I
was.
Somare was the most natural campaigner of the three leading
figures. He exudes confidence, is immensely popular, and that sulu-
dressed swagger of his wavers between the 'happy hero' and the feudal
On the Sunday night after voting started (June 6) the ABC's 'Background
Briefing' programme ran a 45-minute detailed look at the elections,
which also surveyed the appropriateness of the present electoral
process. People heard on the programme included Somare, Chan, Okuk,
Momis, Diro, Siaguru, the Ombudsman (Kilage), the Electoral
Commissioner (Veratau), Sir John Guise, Cecil Abel and David Hegarty.
The ABC's 'World on Wednesday' used a 15-minute item, while Radio
Australia's 'Four Corners' used two 16-minute items previewing the
election and another after the results became known. The ABC's
television current affairs programme 'Nationwide' used two lengthy
items. ABC radio news used more than 30 separate stories on the PNG
elections, including numerous voice reports. And Radio Australia used at
least 100 election-related news items.
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lord surveying what he knows is rightfully his. It is a style that I would
label 'jolly monarch'.
Iambakey Okuk barked at the people who flocked to his campagn
rallies. His election strategy stressed the Action Man image and the
popular picture of him was one of just barely suppressed fury. Strangely
he had good rapport with journalists, certainly expatriate journalists.
After a few days they came away genuinely liking the man. Of course
he was excellent news copy. David Broadbent of the Age led off his
major campaign feature with a description of Okuk in the Highlands, and
I ended off a 16-minute radio programme for Radio Australia on the
three leaders with Okuk confidently predicting that he would become
the first highlander prime minister. His cocky boast was simply very
good radio.
The Okuk beerfest was the news highlight of the campaign for the
foreign media. (Despite an NBC news report, there was no riot on the
Kundiawa airstrip, just one brief disturbance when a few over-anxious
potential voters from one of the sub-clans got fed up with waiting for the
'skeling' [calculation] of their beer share. I did not hear the NBC report
and was stunned when my wife asked me the next day in Port Moresby
whether I was hurt in the riot.)
I was very pleased with our television story of Sir Julius Chan
campaigning in Simbu. It captured on film not so much the themes but
some highly significant traces of the campaign. It opened with Sir Julius
descending in a helicopter onto a dusty Chuave ridge. He and his
entourage stepped out into a clearing just vacated by villagers, who had
fled under the sudden onslaught of dust. Sir Julius, wearing a smart
safari suit with a quarter inch of white singlet showing at his chest,
smiled broadly - the smile that just fails to achieve the charismatic
warmth so natural to Somare. Another significant image was Robert
Yabara, the local member, dressed in his traditional finery, warmly
greeting his People's Progress Party leader. Yet all around the posters
declared 'Robert Yabara - National Party'. National was the party he
had deserted two weeks earlier.
On the subject of campaign posters, my eye was caught by two in
Mount Hagen. One was for a candidate who seemed to be deliberately
modelling himself on Sir Julius Chan - you would have sworn from his
poster photo that he was Sir Julius' younger brother. Apparently it did
not work for him. The other was the centrepiece in a shop window jam-
packed with election posters. It was the same size as the others and,
underneath the face, it said 'Jesus'. How many of the others were to be
crucified by the voters!
On the campaign trail I was privy to the dramatic Okuk walk-in on
Sir Julius Chan and John Nilkare (successful Pangu candidate for
Chimbu Provincial) having dinner together in the Chimbu Lodge. I had
been with Okuk early that afternoon at Kagua in the Southern
Highlands several hundred kilo-metres away. There he had been
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annoyed when a message came through that former minister Yano Belo
had not got home to the district to organize the rally because Sir Julius
had vetoed his travel by government aircraft.4 We left Kagua for
Kundiawa in the early afternoon to film Sir Julius's campaign in Simbu
the next day. But Okuk stayed there until nightfall waiting for Kumul
Two to fetch him back to Port Moresby. It never arrived, so he set off
for Kundiawa with his wife and family in his Range Rover, and he claims
he almost crashed three times. He had driven the whole distance the
other way around dawn. Okuk reached Chimbu Lodge around 9.30 to
find Sir Julius and the man who was his greatest electoral threat (and
who beat him) finishing a bottle of wine. The atmosphere was highly
charged. Chan and Okuk spent a good twenty minutes of 'intense
private conversation' in a corner of the Chimbu Lodge lounge.
A couple of lighter moments: one, the look of absolute horror on the
face of one visiting correspondent when told about the month-long beer
ban;, another, the problem of assuming too much when working with a
visiting television team. The ABC sent a cameraman and sound
recordist to PNG for TV news film on the close of voting, the count and
the results. On the Saturday night that polling closed I was dashing off a
voice report for ABC radio news when Chan walked in to be shown
around the tally room. I directed the cameraman to get a few shots of
Sir Julius looking at the figures, and from a distance I pointed out who he
was. It was only after Chan finished his tour and shook hands with
Somare in the observation enclosure that my cameraman realised who
was who. We had some great film of the Electoral Commissioner, Henry
Veratau, surveying the tally board.
Finally, let me return to that earlier exercise, trying to decide on the
definitive headline. I can think of no better headline to sum up the 1982
elections for an uninformed foreign audience than the two words:
'Democracy Flourishes'.
Sir Julius had decreed that no ministerswere to use government money
for election trips (Prime Minister's Office Press Release, 25 March 1982).

PART II: PAPUA
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Chapter 4
THE NORTH FLY REPEATS ITSELF
Richard Jackson*
The parallels between the 1977 and 1982 elections for the North Fly
Open seat were striking. (For a description of the circumstances in 1977
see Jackson (1983).) In both elections a strong, well-known, local
candidate failed after campaigning weakly; the question of who did not
stand had a significant effect on the result; and Warren Dutton won on
both occasions by collecting the largest share of votes from those parts
of the electorate which did not put up a 'native son' candidate.
These parallels are made all the more striking by the radically
different circumstances under which the elections were held. In 1977,
the chances of the Ok Tedi project proceeding were not particularly
good, very few people had jobs or cash crops, and the electorate was
amongst the poorest and least developed in the country. By June 1982,
project construction had been underway for a year, Kiunga township had
been transformed, the road to Tabubil was well on the way to
completion, three thousand jobs had been created in the area of which
half or more were held by local people, successful business groups had
sprung up in all census divisions except Biami, Pare, and the eastern Min
areas, and villagers were flocking into the Kiunga corners and to Tabubil.
In general, the 'development' for which the people of the North Fly had
been crying out had arrived with a vengeance. The electorate was one
of the very few in recession-wracked Papua New Guinea whose voters
were economically better off - and by a very marked degree - than they
had been five years earlier. The question was, had this spectacular
economic development been in any way matched by more sophisticated
political processes?
In view of the pattern of the election, the overall result and the
details of voting, it is tempting, with hindsight, to answer this question
with a resounding no! But I feel the election did not in fact truly reflect
the political changes that had occurred since 1977. These changes were
real; they were not forced upon the area through circumstances. Quite
the reverse, it was a remarkable feature, especially of the period after
1979, that it was local leaders who made and/or grabbed political
opportunities with such finesse that national leaders and the bureaucracy
effectively had to follow local initiatives. It may be that the diffusion of
this sense of political opportunity through the mass of the voters from
* I would like to acknowledge the kind assistance of Dominic Tan, Returning
Officer, Kiunga for statistics used in this chapter.
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astute leaders was slow to occur and that this is what the 1982 results
show, but my own interpretation is that the unity of purpose which the
North Fly was able to muster in its relations with the rest of the world
merely foundered on the ail-too obvious reef of ethnicity when its people
were asked to choose just one of their number to represent them in
Parliament.
In 1978, the Fly River Provincial Government (FRPG) shed its
interim status by holding its elections, in the course of which Isidore
Kaseng was elected. Kaseng had been a candidate in the 1977 elections
but had performed poorly having suffered ill-health for some time until
just prior to those elections and being relatively unknown outside his
Moian provincial electorate. Kaseng, like many of his fellow Yonggom
whose area is split in two by the international border, could as easily
have claimed Indonesian citizenship as Papua New Guinean. Once
elected to Darn, he rapidly organized the North Fly and Lake Murray
Assembly members, assisted by Noah Daikimeng (provincial member
for the Olsobip/Faiwolmin area) and Norbert Makmop, at that time a
student of politics at UPNG, and previously an assistant to the regional
member for Western Province in the National Parliament, Kala Swokin.
It seems likely that, had Kaseng cared to do so, he could have mustered
the numbers to replace Tatie Olewale as premier. Instead, he accepted
the position of deputy premier and Finance minister.
Even more significant political developments followed in the North
Fly. By 1980 Ok Tedi was virtually certain to proceed. There then
arose the question of the division of the responsibilities between the
national and the Fly River Provincial governments for the implementation
of work relevant to the project. A good number of senior public servants
felt very strongly that the FRPG was not capable of playing its role in
such an implementation process. They did not want their strenuous
efforts during negotiations wasted, and wished to see implementation
remain in the national government's hands. On the other hand, Daru
argued that the role was rightfully theirs and that, in any case, they
should have been more thoroughly involved in the negotiations. National
ministers were split on the issue: the minister for Decentralisation, Fr
John Momis, was clearly on Darn's side whilst the minister for Police
and member for North Fly, Warren Dutton, wanted a separate province.
(Clearly, I was in error in my earlier comments on Warren Dutton's
views on secession (ibid., 144). Many members of Parliament did not
want to see the creation of any new provinces, either because they
were, generally, antagonistic towards provincial governments in any
case or because they did not want precedents set in the North Fly case
which might be used by potential secessionists from their own provinces.
The result was that very little progress was made towards an agreed
allocation of responsibility.
Into this vacuum stepped Isidore Kaseng. Whilst Moresby and
Daru squabbled he established the ad hoc Kiunga/Lake Murray Political
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Advisory Committee (KLMPAC) and demanded that all decisions on the
future development of the North Fly area be made either by it or with
reference to it. To cut a long and tortuous story short: Kaseng's
initiative was successful. All agreed, Daru reluctantly, that the
administration of the North Fly until 1986 would be vested with the
Department of (what is now) Provincial Affairs under a co-ordinator, J.
Desmond Fitzer, who attends all KLMPAC meetings and acts as liaison
officer between KLMPAC and the national government as well as being
the officer in charge of all public servants in the North Fly. (Des Fitzer
led the first patrol into the western half of the Star Mountains in 1963. In
July 1983 pressure was building in the North Fly for this agreement to
be extended to 1991). Effectively, the KLMPAC proposes development
projects through Fitzer to the national government within an annual
budget of Kim. Daru has no effective say and Moresby bureaucrats and
politicans pay very close attention to what KLMPAC and Isidore
Kaseng say.
Aside from such formal political development, the coming of Ok
Tedi itself has created innumerable opportunities for aspirant politicans to
flex their muscles and to show whether they are made of stern stuff or
not. Kaseng did this on several occasions in 1981 and 1982, closing
project operations on one occasion and twisting both government and
company arms over a wide range of issues. Whilst Kaseng clearly
terrified everyone, especially in early 1981, on one occasion his will did
evaporate. He threatened to secede and stop operations by mid-August
1981 unless separate status was granted. Since he had shown he could
do what he threatened on previous occasions the refusal by national
government to allow his demand left everyone in a state of suspense as
the deadline approached. But Kaseng did nothing when the deadline
came and passed; indeed he seemed to vanish from Kiunga for some
time, leaving everyone tentatively relieved, if puzzled.
Several demonstrations were attempted by others in the lead-up to
the election. A rowdy one (for Kiunga) featured Wyre Wobi, the
National Party nominee in January 1982. The most interesting feature of
that particular event was the conciliatory role played by Kala Swokin,
the sitting member for Western Province, who cut a particularly cool
figure, elegantly attired in suit and tie, as he flitted with his briefcase
between demonstrators adorned with bilas and rather tired
administrators and onlookers. Warren Dutton recorded the demonstration
on his video camera, which not only provided a vivid record of events
but also portrayed an important side of Dutton's own character:
although he has particularly strong feelings on many project-related
issues he tries to operate as far as possible within the system. His strong
views are reflected in the number of controversies he manages to get
himself involved in and the great regularity of his appearances in
Hansard, but his position, at that time, as a minister reinforced the
strength of his conviction to operate inside the rules. This applied also to
The North Fly Repeats Itself 63
Norbert Makmop, if less forcefully. Norbert, it seemed to me, could
never quite make up his mind exactly where to be in order to exploit the
political potential of the Ok Tedi situation. He moved between Moresby,
Daru and Kiunga almost constantly and his studies at University
alternated with attempts at business, thinking about joing OTML staff
and involving himself in political manoeuvres in the province. On the
whole Norbert never came to prominence in any of these activities.
One last consequence of Ok Tedi's development should be noted:
the project had led to rapid urbanization and considerable internal
migration within the North Fly. This had two effects. First, in theory, the
urban electorate should have been as high as 2000 persons - making
campaigning for all candidates somewhat easier than in 1977. Secondly,
however, there was a danger that migrants might disenfranchise
themselves by not being present in the village of their registration on
polling day or through a variety of other potentially confusing
circumstances.
All in all, therefore, it did seem quite clear that by early 1982 the
development of Ok Tedi had thrown up a group of North Fly people who
showed that they were not only aware of the political opportunities the
project provided but could be astute in manipulating such opportunities.
The North Fly was no longer the ultimate boondocks and its people were
no longer readily forgotten. Indeed, as the recession deepened, Papua
New Guinea's hopes for the future came to depend upon Ok Tedi, and
the once peripheral people of the North Fly now played a central role in
national government thinking.
The Candidates (and One Non-Runner)
There were five candidates: Isidore Kaseng, Norbert Makmop, Wayre
Wobi, Gen Gom, and Warren Dutton. Isidore Kaseng's activities I have
already described in some detail. I would add that Kaseng is a man of
small, slight physical stature who nevertheless has a commanding
presence in any committee meeting. Whether or not his fellow
KLMPAC or provincial government colleagues actually like him is
difficult to say, but they all at times seem to be in awe of him. This is not
surprising for he has used his sharp tongue with good effect on national
ministers and experienced bureaucrats alike. His basic point on Ok Tedi
is that he, and his people, have managed without it and lived on sago for
centuries past. They can therefore continue to do without Ok Tedi, but
the national government cannot. I have witnessed Kaseng completely
outwit, humiliate and eventually silence National Planning Office staff up
from Moresby for a day in the bush - and with great dexterity. As
deputy premier of Western Province, chairman of KLMPAC, and
licensee of Kiunga's only tavern (which position has certainly brought
him wealth) Kaseng had all the right contacts. His greatest apparent
weakness was his ethnic origin. He is a Yonggom and the Yonggom are
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the smallest ethnic group in the electorate, except for the Ba. Whilst he
could get to the top through the strength of his personality in small,
formalised groups it remained to be seen whether that was the same as
winning a popular vote in a wider, multi-ethnic situation. To most
outsiders, it must have seemed that Kaseng was a formidable candidate.
Certainly Naipuri Maina, Pangu organizer for Western Province, felt this
was so and Kaseng ran as the official Pangu candidate.
Until April, it was not certain who would obtain Pangu backing.
One outstanding possibility was Michael Namalok, who worked (and still
does) as a member of OTML's public relations staff. His job as an
OTML community liaison officer seemed a very suitable take-off point
for a would be politican. Namalok is himself a Min; no Min had ever
stood in a national election previously and any one who did so could be
assured of a block ethnic vote of roughly 2000 in an electorate of not
quite 10,000 votes, providing the voters could be told a Min was
standing. But on top of that Namalok was widely know in Kiunga and
everywhere else affected by the mine constructions - known and liked.
Not only did his position show him to be powerful, but his quiet, friendly
manner won him many friends. What is more, as part of his job he was
seen at almost all compensation payment meetings and played a role in
ensuring that locals were recruited for work in mine construction. And,
if those were not sufficiently impressive qualifications, he had also shown
himself to be forthright in defending North Fly people, even against
OTML, his employers. In July 1981 he had publicly sided with OTML
labourers in their dispute with the company. It seems to me that
Namalok could have probably overcome ethnic obstacles better than any
other local candidate, and would have done well in urban areas. In other
words he could have won quite comfortably.
Such was the worry of Warren Dutton who felt that campaigning
against Namalok would have been difficult, at best. Fortunately for the
sitting member, however, Namalok did not stand and Dutton continued to
sit. Precisely why this happened is not clear but two factors contributed
to the situation. First, because Kala Swokin, who stood for the provincial
seat as a Pangu candidate (having held it previously as a PPP member),
was overruled by Naipuri Maina - the latter wanting Kaseng, the former
wanting Namalok for Pangu. Secondly, and more importantly, Norbert
Makmop, Namalok's cousin, also wanted to stand. With Michael already
in a position to do much for his people, many Min felt that Norbert should
try for parliament. The same logic seems to have also disqualified Noah
Daikimeng, provincial minister of Agriculture, from Golgubip, and a vocal
ally of Isidore Kaseng. Whatever the reason, Namalok eventually did
not run and Makmop did.
Norbert Makmop is one of only three Min students ever to have
seriously attended a university, having been a politics student at UPNG
at the time of his campaign. Given that pre-eminence, he has suffered,
like so many Papua New Guineans, as a result of the expectations
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placed on him by his people. These are so great that he is certain to
disappoint some of them. Makmop ran as a pro-Diro independent but
two other points should be noted. He was very close to Kala Swokin
and thus, by association, was seen as being in the same party as Kala
(ex-PPP, now Pangu). Secondly, he was on very good terms indeed
with Arum Matiabe who was contesting the Koroba/Kopiago seat. No
doubt, had Norbert emulated Aruru's victory their paths would have
been similar.
On Gen Gom I have very little information; I was unable to see
him during the election and, in Kiunga and Tabubil, very few people
were clear as to who he was (other than that he was a North Awin) or
what he did. In fact he was a schoolteacher little known outside his
home areas who stood as an independent claiming United Party support.
He seemed to be the rank outsider.
Wayre Wobi seemed equally unlikely to win, even though he was
known in Kiunga and up and down the road to Tabubil as very active in
demonstrations against OTML actions. Nevertheless, his candidature
was of considerable interest since he stood for the National Party under
what were certainly curious circumstances. The first curiosity was that
when he announced his candidature in April 1981, he received front
page headline publicity in Niugini Nius, whose support both for Sir Julius
Chan's government and Okuk's National Party was strong throughout
the election. Wobi had been a policeman for nine years in Wabag and
Mt Hagen. He resigned from the force some fifteen months prior to the
election but gave no details of how he proposed to support himself during
his campaign. He announced that he was an independent candidate, and
thus, presumably, of independent means but added that he was 'going
home .. to ask my people which party, if any, I should support'; clearly,
he must have received unequivocal advice on the matter. But then for
Wobi, as a policeman, clear cut orders were what he was used to. His
views on politics were enlightening. He was reported by Niugini Nius as
being 'confident of making the transition from policeman to politician
successfully' for, he was quoted as saying, 'they do basically the same
thing'. To the weak-hearted political scientist, Wobi had a reason for this
chilling comparison: 'I have seen Highlands politicians operating for nine
years and I know exactly what it is about'. Despite having spent nine
years observing Superintendents Doa, Wingti, Okuk, Kavali and the rest
of the riot squad, Wobi claimed that he had been in constant touch with
the North Fly people and knew 'exactly what they want in the way of
roads, and villages and development programs'. He aspired to the post
of Police minister although 'he did not expect to get it immediately'.
Warren Dutton, member for the North Fly 1968-72 and again from
1977-82, ex-patrol officer, founding member of the PPP, director of
Ningerum Transport (which owned the only commercial accommodation
in Kiunga in 1982), and minister for Police, came to the 1982 election
with a record of controversy (Jackson 1983). His ministry had had a
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stormy time. Always under pressure, it was barely holding its own
against the depredations of the gangs of thieves who more or less rule
Port Moresby at night when a long simmering dispute between Dutton
the minister and Police Commissioner Philip Bouraga effectively brought
cooperation between the ministry and the force to an end. The Dutton-
Bouraga dispute had fundamental repercussions for the Papua New
Guinea Constitution and exercised a very large proportion of the
collective legal-bureaucratic mind in Moresby for several weeks. But to
Dutton's own electorate it meant nothing. Far more important to their
peace of mind had been the posting by Commissioner Bouraga to Kiunga
of a detachment of the police riot squad very shortly before his dismissal.
This caused Dutton considerable embarrassment. The squad had
nothing to do and nowhere to live. Within a short time of their arrival the
crime rate at Kiunga had, in fact, increased as the bemused regular
police spent much of their time arresting members of the riot squad for
drunk and disorderly behaviour. The residents of Kiunga, by now quite
used to the glaring floodlights and twenty-four hour din on OTML/BMKI
workshops, found the riot squad's nightly revels too much to bear. But
Dutton, constitutionally castrated by the decisions in the Bouraga case,
could do nothing directly about the problem. He could not himself issue
orders for the squad's transfer. His prayers for a surge of clan violence
elsewhere were eventually answered and, hopefully, the squad was
transferred to be more usefully employed elsewhere.
Dutton was a hard-working MP. Despite being embroiled in several
major disputes at the national level, he worked very hard at ensuring that
he knew what was going on with the Ok Tedi project (not an easy task),
and at lobbying on behalf of his constituents on aspects of the project
which he felt might not be in their best interests. Despite having been, in
1977, the only businessman in the North Fly worth talking of and despite
his senior position in the two years preceding the election, Ok Tedi had
certainly not made his fortune nor had he abused his position in any way
to become wealthy by means of the project. He and the companies
involved in the project were frequently at loggerheads. Nevertheless,
Wobi's claims of being closer to the people (providing by 'people' Wobi
meant 'Awin') than Dutton had some truth. Moreover, even if Dutton
had made surprisingly little out of Ok Tedi, to almost all of his electorate
he was a rich man. He, more than most candidates, had a credibility
problem. But to be weighed against this was the undoubted fact that the
project had gone ahead during his membership of parliament, that he had
helped achieve that and that the electorate was going ahead at a
remarkable rate. And, in addition, Dutton remained an approchable,
friendly person, a good and patient listener.
All in all, every candidate had something to offer the electorate - a
viable choice was being presented. Nevertheless, when nominations
closed it was apparent that three candidates alone seemed to be in
serious contention. Kaseng might have built up links through the FRPG
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and the KLMPAC strong enough to carry him through; Makmop as the
only Min candidate needed to campaign vigorously in the other
peripheral areas; Dutton was fortunate that neither a Ningerum nor a
Biami candidate had presented himself. The other two candidates were
both Awin and had thus seriously and mutually undercut each other's
natural support.
The campaign
Frankly, the campaign for the election was torpid at best. When I visited
Kiunga during the campaign I met three of the five candidates within
twenty minutes of touchdown; none was on the election trail, for even
the fourth (Gom), I established, was in his home village and the fifth
(Kaseng ) was in Daru (people thought) not having been seen for some
time. Kaseng indeed made precisely the same error in 1982 as Wingen
had in 1977. He relied on his formal contacts and his record (which was
impressive). He did little campaigning in person, had few posters, and
seemingly felt he had the election already won. Makmop spent too
much time in Kiunga and did not venture for more than a few days into
Ba and Biami areas. Gom did do the latter, on foot, but had virtually no
funds and, consequently, not enough time to do the job properly. Dutton
was surprisingly lethargic but did get out to the only two areas in which
he could expect winning votes - Biami and Ningerum. The lethargy was
palpable - except in one case, that of Wayre Wobi.
It was evident that Wobi was energetic and had money. His
posters outnumbered everyone else's. Iambakey Okuk's face smiled
down relentlessly on the electorate and his finger pointed implacably at
the ex-policeman as the only choice for the North Fly. The only election
vehicles readily identifiable as such were Wobi's. Gom had none,
Dutton's car remained virtually anonymous, Kaseng was hardly ever
seen, and Makmop (pro-Diro independent) hitched rides in Swokin's
Pangu-labelled utility. But Wobi's Land Cruiser and mini-bus, plastered
with posters and megaphone-equipped, cruised Kiunga and the Kiunga-
Ningerum road continually.
Whilst there could be no doubting Wobi's energy, the source of his
funding was the subject of extremely serious allegations. It will be
recalled that Wobi's candidature, supposedly as an independent, had
received fairly unusual press coverage as well as having been
announced far in advance of the election. At the time, Roy Evara was
minister for Primary Industry. However, following Evara's unkind
remarks about Sir Julius Chan, Paul Torato replaced him in that capacity
in September 1981. Shortly after these events, Torato contacted Dutton
to enquire when he, Dutton, would be taking up the remainder of his
allocation from the agricultural sectoral funds. This request puzzled
Dutton since he had not, at that stage, used any of the funds. Upon
further investigation, Dutton established that at least K10,000 of his
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original allocation had been used, prior to Torato's appointment as
minister, to set up a chicken farming project in the home village of
Wayre Wobi. This allocation had been made at some date between
Wobi's announcement of his candidature and Evara's dismissal. Further
investigation revealed that neither egg nor poultry production in the
Kiunga area had climbed above previous levels of zero. Dutton was
satisfied, in his own mind, that Wobi's candidature had not only been
sponsored all along by Okuk but that Dutton's own sectoral allocation
had been diverted to Wobi in order to fund his campaign against Dutton.
Dutton, however, was not particularly worried about the threat
posed to him by Wobi and whilst he took precautions, he took no direct
action, preferring instead to hold his information in reserve for more
fruitful future action against either Evara or Okuk by means of the Public
Accounts Committee of which Dutton was a member.
Whilst this bombshell has, at the time of writing, not yet exploded it
was in fact virtually the only one that fell during the North Fly campaign.
Since all candidates agreed upon the one main issue - continuance of the
campaign for a separate province and since most candidates spent most
of their time either in Kiunga or outside the electorate altogether there
was only one remarkable feature to the campaign - its virtual non
existence.
The results
In 1977 when two Awin, two Yonggom and Warren Dutton had stood,
Dutton had won very easily by picking up most of the Min, Ningerum
and Biami votes. This time he faced one Yonggom, two Awin and a Min
opponent.
Because of these factors one must be very cautious in interpreting
aspects of the ethnic vote. But despite them it is interesting to note that
the highest two turn-outs were in areas without candidates of their own
and that the lowest two were in areas with 'native son' candidates. Only
Ningerum and Min areas break this pattern and, as mentioned above,
there are reasons for believing that Ningerum turn-out was higher than
my estimate and the Min lower. Certainly, Norbert Makmop claimed
that several remoter Min villages were never polled.
Table 4.1 (below) gives a rough idea of the proportional size of the
ethnic groups in the electorate. It is only 'rough' for the following
reasons:
(a) it shows figures for areas (census division which are
increasingly less coterminous with ethnicity;
(b) given internal migration since 1980 it is very likely that total
populations in Yonggom and Ningerum areas are too high;
(c) Similarly, the Awin plus Kiunga group clearly includes quite
substantial numbers of non-Awin, whilst the Min area also
includes outsiders.
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Table 4.1
Ethnic composition of the North Fly Electorate
Area Population
1982
Eligible Votes
Cast
Valid Turnout
Votes (C-B x 100)Voters
(Estimated)3 (Estimated)1*
(A) (B)
1982
(C) (D) (E)
Yonggom 2,930 1,520 790 774 51.6
Awin plus
Kiunga
11,160 5,800 3,240 3,215 55.4
Minc 4,400 2,290 1,840 1,822 80.4
Biami 3,840 2,000 1,902 1,880 95.1
Ba 1,045 545 524 504 96.1
26,425 13,735 9,347 9,244 68.0
Notes: a 1980 census plus 5%, except in Kiunga's case where
estimate is based on 1980 and 1983 censuses.
b Column (A) x 0.52
c Including Tabubil at 1980 population plus
5% only.
Also from Table 4.1 we can calculate (very roughly) how many
votes each candidate might expect to get if votes were cast entirely on
ethnic lines. If those who could, voted only for a member of their own
group and for no one else then Makmop would just beat Gom and Wobi
(assuring that the last two split the Awin vote equally). Dutton would, of
course, get none. However, on top of that the Biami, Ba and Ningerum
had no kinsman to vote for. If these groups refused entirely to vote for
Awin, Yonggom or Min candidates and gave Dutton their votes as the
least unlikeable candidate, then Dutton would win from Makmop.
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Table 4.2
Votes Cast by Area and Candidate
Dutton Makmop Kaseng Wobi Gom Total
Valid
Votes
Total votes 2634 2426 1619 1348 1217 9244
% result in each
major area:
Mina 4 89 3 2 2 1512
Yonggom 19 13 58 10 0 774
Awin 7 9 28 29 27e 2,817
Ningerumc 96 0 3 0 1 929
Biami 40 15 8 16 21 1,880
Ba 67 23 3 2 4 504
Urban Areasd 29 40 17 12 2 828
Overall percentage 29 26 18 15 2 100
Notes: a Excludes Tabubil
b Excludes Kiunga
c Excludes Ningerum
d Kiunga (votes cast: 289), Tabubil (321), Ningerum (249)
e In his North Awin home area Gom scored 78% of the
vote
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The results, shown in Table 4.2, suggest that this is, approximately,
what happened. Makmop swept all the Min areas except the Star
Mountains; the Wopkaimin there regarded themselves as traditional
enemies of Makmop's Faiwolmin but even there he got 48 per cent of
the vote. Of 1197 votes cast in other Min areas only 6 votes did not go
to Makmop. Gom obtained nearly 80 per cent of the vote in North
Awin. Wobi did not do particularly well in his home area (South/West
Awin) where Kaseng put up a good show, but still cornered 37 per cent
of the vote. Kaseng not only did not get a very good turnout in his area
but also got only 58 per cent of that vote. Kaseng was the only local
candidate who gathered more than half his votes (actually 72 per cent)
from outside his ethnic base.
But, as in 1977, Dutton got over 95 per cent of the Ningerum vote,
won two thirds of the Ba vote, and got 40 per cent of the Biami vote.
Together with a surprisingly good vote from the Yonggom, this was
enough for him to win. No wonder Dutton's firm rejoices in the name
Ningerum Transport.
Two points concerning the urban areas might be mentioned.
Kiunga, with a population the vicinity of 2000 persons in 1982 (excluding
the high school and construction camps), recorded a miserable 289
votes, probably because many of its inhabitants were enrolled in the
census division of their origin; many of these probably did not vote at all.
Secondly, the urban vote had nonetheless increased to over 850. By the
time of the next election that should have further increased to well over
2000. All candidates except Gom did reasonably well in the urban
areas. Certainly, in 1987 the candidates' exhibited predilection for urban
campaigning may, at last, prove to be useful, if not crucial.
Finally, we might consider the Biami. As explained in my 1977 election
paper, the Biami are only in the North Fly to 'make up the numbers'.
Their neighbours, the Nomad, are in the Middle Fly. The Biami have
virtually nothing in common with any other group in the electorate. Yet,
clearly, if a single, and only a single, Biami had stood in this election he
would have had an excellent chance of winning, especially if the Ba vote
could also have been gathered. It remains something of a puzzle why
none of the major parties sponsored a Biami candidate and casts doubt
on their ability to add up.
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Chapter 5
THE ELECTIONS IN ORO: SOHE OPEN
Yaw Saffu
Electoral studies have encompassed a great variety of topics. From the
purely administrative to the unambiguously political; from the ecological
to the behavioural; from the campaign to the policy consequences; from
the characteristics of the elite to the systemic and developmental import
- the number of themes that books and articles on elections have brought
under scrutiny has been staggering. Nevertheless, the most enduring
concern of most electoral studies is with the explanation of the results. It
is easy to show that the standard fare of most electoral studies - party
organization; financing of campaigns; social characteristics of candidates
and socio-economic profiles of constituencies; campaign issues and so on
- relate to the fundamental, integrative theme. This chapter is in the
mainstream. It attempts to explain the results of the 1982 Papua New
Guinea elections in one constituency, Sohe Open, in the Northern (Oro)
Province.
For explanatory electoral studies there has traditionally been a
choice among three approaches: the descriptive; the ecological; and the
sample survey. The descriptive approach is the least theoretical, and
offers only a limited opportunity for comparative endeavours because a
great deal of the resultant material tends to be pretty impressionistic.
However, descriptive studies can usefully convey the atmosphere of
politics, and describe and analyse the campaign, organizational matters,
candidates, parties, and so on. All this can, in the end, lead one to feel
that one understands the result.
Where election results are, or can be, disaggregated at levels below
the constituency, analysis of where candidates and parties poll heaviest
or lowest can suggest, more straightforwardly, linkages between
ecological features such as economic activities of communities, their
religious affiliation, ethnic composition, social cleavages, and electoral
preferences. However, as is well-known, there is a major problem with
ecological voting analysis: the problem of ecological fallacy. As Robinson
(1950:351-7) pointed out over thirty years ago, in ecological analysis we
are unable to say anything with confidence about the individual voter
simply because the individual is not the unit of analysis. Knowledge of
individual voter behaviour or preference is usually far better approached
by sample survey.
Obviously a combination of all three approaches is the ideal strategy
for a comprehensive explanation of electoral behaviour. However, in this
study, there is a heavy reliance on what can be regarded as a watered-
down ecological voting analysis, combined with some description. There
are no survey data at all, unless the views of a small purposive sample,
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most of the candidates, can be so regarded. I have tried to analyse the
polling return in terms of who polled what and where. The objective of
that is to suggest what factors influence (not to say determine) electoral
choice in the constituency.
The first step in the analysis is to present the results, pointing out any
geographical patterns that may be striking or discernible in these results.
It is such patterns that will have to be explained in the second step by
reference to ecological features. Before one embarks on these steps,
however, a minimal introduction of the set and the dramatis personae will
not be out of place.
The Province
In terms of the familiar division of the country into Papua, Highlands,
Northern littoral, and islands, Oro Province is in the Papuan region. It
has an area of 22,000 square kilometres and a population of 77,442,
according to the 1980 census. It is thus one of the smallest provinces in
the country. It is in the same league as West New Britain, New Ireland
and Gulf, each with only two open constituencies. This is to be
compared with Manus, the smallest, which has only one, and with
Morobe, the largest, which has eleven. For electoral purposes, the
province is divided into two almost equal halves. The northern half is the
Sohe Open electorate with a population of 40,900, of whom 24,534 were
enrolled on the electoral register. The southern half is the Ijivitari Open.
Like every other province, Oro also returns one Provincial member to
the national parliament.
There are three administrative districts and two sub-districts in the
province. Kokoda district and Ioma sub-district lie wholly within Sohe
Open. Tufi district and Afore sub-district similarly lie wholly within
Ijivitari Open. But Popondetta administrative district is bisected by the
electoral boundary, with urban Popondetta, the provincial capital, and its
eastern rural environs belonging to the Ijivitari constituency. Similarly,
the Higaturu local government council, one of six local government
councils, and the largest, is divided almost equally between Sohe and
Ijivitari. Two local government councils lie wholly within the
constituency. These are: Ilimo local government council, catering for the
Hujara (population 7050), Chirima (236), Biage (562) and Wawonga
(1465) census districts, all to the west of Popondetta; and Tamata local
government council, based at Ioma, and covering Binandere (3907) and
Aeka (2342) census districts. Papua Waria (2033) census district at the
extreme northwest of the province has been administered as part of
Morobe Province. For electoral purposes, however, it is part of the
Sohe constituency.
Although these administrative entities are worth noting, if only
because of the observed tendency for such artificial administrative units
to congeal into 'administrative district tribes', it is the major language
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groups that have to be noted particularly for purposes of understanding
electoral politics in Sohe. Although about thirty languages are spoken in
the province, three language groups dominate electoral politics in Sohe.
The Orokaiva group, spreading out in the Popondetta, Saiho, Sohe, Oro
Bay and North Coast census districts is the largest. The group numbers
around 42,000, but only about half of that number is in the Sohe
constituency. The Hujara group, with their 'administrative district
cousins' in the Wawonga, Biage and Chirima census districts, number
around 9000, while the Binandere or Mambare group, together with their
close allies, the Aeka, with whom they intermarry, number around 7000.
These language groups do not by any means constitute cohesive
tribes. The Orokaiva, for instance, are said to be divided into about
twelve 'tribes'. As Crocombe has observed 'these "tribes" are very
loose units and recognise no single leader, and, before European contact,
warfare within the tribe was not uncommon ... Each tribe is divided into
a number of named clans ... [and] a clan is divided into a number of sub-
clans ... Each sub-clan holds rights over a specific area or areas of land'
(Crocombe 1963:5). With such social fragmentation, one cannot always
be sure that even the smallest unit will always act together politically
(Langness 1973). Yet most of the candidates sought to present
themselves as representatives and spokemen of these major language
groups.
The Sohe Constituency
Table 5.1, compiled from the Papua New Guinea National Statistical
Office publication, Provincial Data System (Northern Province), July
1981, offers a statistical profile of the Sohe constituency.
Column 1 presents the most significant electoral fact: the heavy
population concentration in the Popondetta District/Higaturu Local
Government Council area/Orokaiva census districts of Saiho, Rural
Popondetta and Sohe. Column 4 indicates that the predominant size of
traditional settlements is small, suggesting the high probability of intensely
personal, face to face community life in villages as the predominant mode
of social interaction. The number of rural non-village settlements in a
census district, shown in Column 2, can be used as a rough index of the
degree of penetration by modernizing influences. These settlements are
those that grew around government and mission facilities such as
schools, DPI camps, district administration posts, or around commercial
activities such as a sawmill or an oil palm project. The more such
settlements there are in a district, the higher the provision of other
services and amenities such as roads, air strips, wharves, telephones,
etc., as Columns 8 and 9 suggest.
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One can discern a certain amount of clustering of modern services
and amenities around Kokoda, Ioma and especially in the cocoa and oil
palm settlement areas around Popondetta. However, overall, it is not the
differentiation but the general uniformity that is the more striking. Oro is
a province of small, relatively accessible, externally dependent villages
under enormous Anglican Mission influence (which the figures in
Column 7 can only grossly underestimate), with high migration rates for
adult males (at 42.4 per cent, highest in Binandere, but with a median of
29.8 per cent for the nine census districts), and a high proportion of
children in the population (over 50 per cent everywhere). Subsistence
gardening and fishing are by far the most widespread economic
activities. Cocoa, coffee and copra on the coast have been the
traditional export crops. They are produced mostly on small traditional
land holdings or on government-acquired lands. These crops grow
equally well throughout the province. Oil palm, the newest cash crop
and, with timber, the biggest foreign exchange earner in the province, is
more geographically concentrated around Popondetta. Rubber is yet to
get off the ground in the Kokoda area, while cattle ranching appears to
be catching on in the Afore area. There are no sharp, distinct socio
economic or geographical differences in the constituency except for the
relative inaccessibility or isolation of the peripheral census districts of
Chirima, Biage, Wawonga and Papua Waria, and the heavy population
concentration in the Orokaivan area of Sohe, Saiho and Popondetta.
The Candidates
Misael Jiregari: 31, attended the University of Papua New Guinea but
left without completing his studies. He is from Ainsi, on the Gira River,
right in the centre of the Binandere census district. He was the
endorsed Melanesian Alliance candidate but he received no material
help from the Alliance, because the party was too poor. In 1977, he had
contested the provincial seat and had come a respectable third in a field
of six, behind Wesley Embahe and the 1972-77 incumbent, Mackenzie
Daugi. Apart from a wish for a political career, he hoped that his support
for traditionalism, particularly ideas surrounding traditional land
ownership, nationalism and the mildly socialist (communalistic?) ideas
associated with the Melanesian Alliance would lead him to the national
parliament.
In 1977 he had high credentials among his own Binandere and Aeka
people. He had managed to convince his people of his selflessness. He
was seen as having sacrificed his University education in order to lead
them in a fight against what he skilfully and successfully impressed on
them would be the sure beginning of a process of peasantization and
pauperization. He was fighting proposals by an overseas firm, Parsons
and Whitmore, to obtain a huge timber concession in the area.
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By 1982, however, Jiregari's electoral attractiveness to his own
people had palled. The Aeka and Binandere Development Corporation
which he had helped to found in the late seventies had folded up.
Further, he had ceased to live among the people after the 1977 election.
He had migrated to Moresby to work for a credit institution, coming
back only six months before the 1982 elections. In any case, during the
three weeks I was in the province, at the highest point of the campaign
period in April and May, I did not get the impression that Jiregari was
campaigning vigorously. Although he acknowledged that Gegera and
Beu could split the Binandere vote, he still believed that voters in his
home area, and also the unionised workers around Popondetta - at the
Higaturu Oil Palm Project for instance - would turn out for him.
David Beu: 35, from the north-west corner in the Binandere census
district, the Ivatave-Bovera area on the Eia River, was a pro-Pangu
candidate. After dropping out of High School, Grade I, he joined the
Lands Department as a field assistant and went steady with the
department for ten years, serving in six provinces. After resigning from
the Lands Department in 1973, however, he chopped and changed jobs
at the rate of about one a year, largely in the Mount Hagen area.
Among others, he worked for Mobil, for Doa Motors, for the Papua
New Guinea Volunteer Reserve and for Works and Supply. He
resigned from Works and Supply in 1979 to go home and build a base
for the 1982 elections. Once home, he tried to start a building
contracting business, no doubt expecting that he could turn his stint with
Works and Supply to personal advantage. Certainly he sought, and
obtained, a provincial government contract to build a house.
Beu and Jiregari are related through the latter's mother who is
Beu's first cousin. Beu and Steven Tago, the Sohe MP and Minister
1972-82, and a candidate for the Oro Provincial seat in the 1982
elections, are also related. They are members of the same clan. That
relationship, however, did not stop Beu from denouncing Tago most
vehemently for alleged neglect of his constituents. Beu perhaps took his
Pangu Party affiliation and the party label more seriously than any other
candidate, including the offically endorsed party candidates. Tago, on
the other hand, was the National Party torchbearer in the province and,
indeed, in the whole Papuan region.
Beu had gone to the Pangu convention in Mount Hagen in February
1982 under his own steam and had approached Somare personally to
seek Pangu endorsement. But the Pangu executive committee in the
province instead nominated Mackenzie Jovopa for Sohe. Beu, as a pro-
Pangu candidate, worked closely and enthusiastically with the endorsed
Pangu candidate in the Provincial electorate Cromwell Wari Burai, and
benefitted from access to Pangu material and organisational support: a
brand new 4-wheel drive, T-shirts, posters, handbills, and Pangu komiti.
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Apart from the joys and rewards of elite status as an MP, Beu's
very mild nationalism, encapsulated in his admiration for Somare, was
probably the best explanation for his candidacy. He expected his major
support to come from his area, the Tamata LGC area, where he
claimed to be hand in glove with the councillors and with 'village
lawyers', the 'interpreters'. These are persons in the rural areas with a
reputation for understanding the workings of the bureaucracy and the
modern political system and manipulating them appropriately. They are
respected makers of community opinion. Beu believed he had their
support sewn up in his home area.
Wescott Gegera: Much older than either Beu or Jiregari, Gegera is
business manager of a bakery. Gegera also comes from Binandere
census district. Heis from Evore, on the upper reaches of the Gira River
in the southern part of the district.
George Jambara Inga: 39, was a teacher in Anglican mission schools in
the province from 1957, when he was a standard six leaver, until 1969
when he quit teaching in order to grow and buy cocoa and coffee, and
also, as he hoped, provide leadership to his community. Inga comes from
Sorape, about 80 kilometres southwest of Popondetta, in the Kokoda
district. It was from his own people in the district, especially some six
villages around his own village, that he expected his greatest support
because, as he put it: T am a grassroots man living with my people'. His
wife also comes from the area. He expected to get some 'church vote'
from within the district because addressing congregations after service
was his principal method of campaigning. He had no vehicle and no
komitis working for him.
He claimed he was an independent candidate without any party
affiliation, but from the extremely close working relationship with Steven
Tago which I observed, and from the way he enthused about the
National Party's 'action image', he was probably secretly affiliated to that
party. It was widely believed that Inga was put up by Tago who needed
an interested collaborator in the Kokoda District. After all, Wesley
Embahe, the United Party strong man in the province, the sitting member
for the Oro Provincial seat and thus the man Tago had to beat, comes
from the Kokoda district. Thus a local 'agent' who had a personal
interest in getting out to campaign was very valuable from Tago's point
of view.
Although Inga appeared to be politically aware and wily, his
intellectual experiences were very limited. He had, for instance, never
been out of his own province. He found it difficult to articulate what
parliamentarians do, beyond the blanket view of them as spokesmen for
their people. By local standards, Inga was fairly well-off. He put his
monetary income from his cocoa and coffee farms alone at around
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K2000 p.a. However, two months before the elections, he claimed he
had spent only about K300 on his campaign.
Lindsay Tofoambo: 40, from Hamara village on the Kumusi River, in the
Hunjara census district, was the United Party candidate for Sohe. It was
his cousin Wesley Embahe who talked him into standing. He believed
Tofoambo to be eminently qualified to represent the constituency. But,
above all, it would appear he urged him on because candidates for the
Provincial seat sought to supplement their own efforts by putting up
candidates for the Sohe seat. Apart from the Tago-Inga relationship that
has already been referred to, it was widely known that Gideon Orosa
was campaigning for Kipling Gombo, a candidate for the Provincial seat
from Tufi, and that George Korove was Robin Safitoa's Hunjara
candidate. Safitoa, like Gombo, was a candidate for the Provincial seat,
and was also from Tufi.
If educational background and work experience counted for more in
electoral choice in Papua New Guinea than they do currently, Tofoambo
would have been a very strong candidate indeed. He had a grade 12
certificate from Martyrs' High School, the leading Anglican High School
in the province, and a diploma in Public Administration from the
Administrative College in Moresby. He had worked for seventeen years
in the public service, starting as the clerk of Ilimo local government
council and ending up as an acting provincial secretary. He had served
in fourteen of the nineteen provinces in the country. Tofoambo claimed
that, apart from the urgings of his cousin, it was the failures of politicians
to whom he had been an official adviser - particularly their failure to
provide policy leadership, to have the courage of their convictions and to
be consistent in their decisions - that made him decide in 1 980 to resign
from the public service and to come back to the province to start laying
the necessary foundations for his candidacy.
Like all the candidates I interviewed, Tofoambo expected his home
area to turn out massively for him. Relations and friends, and those of his
wife from the next village, were expected to support a 'wantok'. He had
taken the view that he would not spend time or resources in his home
area, or in Biage and Wawonga, where he was sure of the people's
support. Instead, he was concentrating all his energies on the Orokaiva
areas of Saiho and Popondetta census districts, not only because of their
heavy population concentrations, but because there were problems - land
and social - caused by 'settlement schemes' that he believed he could
address himself to.
As a party-sponsored candidate, Tofoambo had received only K600
from the United Party. He spoke bitterly of the mismanagement of
United Party finances by the party bosses. By courtesy of Embahe,
however, he had access to a 4-wheel drive pick-up bought with
Agricultural Sectoral Funds for a Rubber Project in the district.
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Gideon Orosa: Orosa comes from Hanjiri, near Ilimo, in the same part of
th Kokoda district as Tofoambo. He lives at Ambene, not far from Ilimo.
He is a coffee farmer and a businessman and runs the IJI Cooperative
Society a farmers' cooperative - in the district.
Balwin Paul Javoko: 34, a graduate in Civil Engineering from the
University of Technology, Lae (1969-1973), had been with the Public
Works Department in Moresby. Extensive television coverage of
Australian elections while he was on a short course in 1976 stirred
political ambition in him. On his return to Papua New Guinea in October
1976, he sought and obtained a job on the personal staff of Steven Tago,
then minister for Environment and Conservation. After mutual
disenchantment, Javoko resigned in 1979, vowing to take up a challenge
which Tago allegedly threw him: 'If you think you are so smart, why
don't you go home and contest me?' He went back to the province to
work, first for Hebou Constructions as a construction manager, and then
as the works coordinator for the Provincial government.
By his own admission, Javoko started campaigning just as soon as
he returned to the province. As a field engineer his job took him to the
rural areas, building roads and airstrips. He never missed an opportunity
to tell people of his intention to run and to make a preliminary bid for
their support. But it was as an Orokaivan that he expected to win his
greatest support. Javoko is from Koirata, at the foot of Mt. Lamington.
His wife, a nurse, is also from Koirata. He was concentrating his
campaign efforts in the Orokaiva area only, telling them that as the
Orokaivans are in the majority in the province, it was time to have
Orokaivans as spokesmen for the province. Presumably because he
worked closely with the members of the provincial government, he
believed that most of the provincial assembly members supported him
and were campaigning for him.
Inconsistently with his position on which group should provide
spokesmen for the province, one of the two candidates for the Provincial
seat with whom Javoko had a gentleman's agreement to cooperate on
campaigning matters was Robin Safitoa, the then provincial secretary.
Safitoa is not an Orokaivan. He is from Tufi. It is true that Javoko's
other collaborator, Gideon Pinoko, is an Orokaivan. But one must accept
Javoko's denial that the understanding with Pinoko had anything to do
with ethnic relations. After all, there were six other Orokaivans
contesting the provincial seat. He insisted that their party affiliation to
PPP and their personal, administrative and organizational capabilities
were the sole considerations for choosing them as his collaborators.
To the public, Javoko was an independent candidate. However,
unknown to one another, PPP, Papua Besena and Ted Diro's
Independent Group were all supporting Javoko with funds. He
maintained contact with all three of them throughout the campaign
period. Not only did Javoko believe in casting his net wide, evidently he
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also found something about each of the three groups that struck a
responsive chord in him. He admired Chan's unabashed and forthright
embrace of capitalism, as well as his reputation for efficiency. The
Papuan core of Besena's concerns and the dashing, aggressive image of
Diro, as well as his apparent desire at the time to promote Papuan
interests, also attracted Javoko. But if elected, he said, he would seek to
affiliate with a parliamentary group in this order: Ted Diro's Independent
Group first, PPP second, and then Papua Besena. It was more certain
that he would wish to join a winning coalition. Javoko's prospective
electoral supporters were not told anything of this intricate flexibility of
their candidate. But then he was not alone in concealing his true
relations with the parties from the electorate.
Mackenzie Jovopa: At 58 the oldest candidate in the Sohe Open, Jovopa
is from Tojemo village on the outskirts of Popondetta. His wife comes
from the same Singala clan. After Standard 7 at the Martyrs' School, he
joined the Administration in 1951. In 1957, he transferred to the
Education Department to become a radio announcer. Apart from a short
stint in the Western Province, his career as a radio announcer was
pursued in his own province. Among the older voters in the constituency,
therefore, Jovopa's name would be a familiar one. He resigned in 1974
with a view to standing for the Sohe Open in the 1977 general election.
In 1977, he stood on the United Party ticket and came third in a field of
five.
Jovopa says it was the Pangu branch in the province which
approached him and offered to sponsor him as its endorsed candidate.
He accepted Pangu's offer partly because of his friendship with Somare
and partly because of expectations of Pangu organizational and financial
support. With the approach of the election, the Pangu branch in the
province had bestirred itself into action, particularly in the cocoa and oil
palm settler areas on the outskirts of Popondetta, thanks to the personal
dedication of three dynamic individuals: Michael Mattes, who became
secretary, Sylvanus Menine, a former patrol officer who became
chairman, and Napoleon Aiga, all of whom were brought together and
prodded into action by the grand old man of Pangu Party in the province,
Edric Eupu, MBE.
Up to the end of April 1982, Jovopa had received from Pangu K600,
posters and T-shirts for his campaign. In addition, he had access to the
Pangu 4-wheel drive vehicle stationed in the province. But he did not
appear to have a high opinion of the other Pangu-endorsed or Pangu-
affiliated candidates in the province. As far as he was concerned good
men, capable men, came before party men. The ability to deliver quality
service to the province was what should count most. He distanced
himself somewhat from Pangu and thus largely passed up his option of
access to the party campaign vehicle.
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Pangu's approach to Jovopa was a shrewd move because he is
simply one of the most gregarious organizers and joiners of pressure
groups. As far back as 1972, KAPITS Association (K = Kokoda, A =
Afore, P = Popondetta, I = Ioma, T = Tufi, S = Safia) was formed to
safeguard traditional land rights and press for development. Virtually
every aspiring politician in the province joins the Association. Jovopa is
the president, and Akoka Doi, the sitting member for Jjivitari, is the vice-
president. In 1981, a more narrowly-based pressure group, the Orokaiva
- Eri Group, covering the Ilimo and the Higaturu council areas, was
formed to concern itself with the development of the two districts.
Wesley Embahe is the president, with Jovopa as the vice-president. In
1980, a pressure group was organised to collect signatures for a petition
to be sent to the minister for Lands about compensation for the land
alienated for the Higaturu Oil Palm project. Jovopa was the president of
the group. For six years, from 1974-1980, he was the president of the
Higaturu local government council, the largest council in the most heavily
populated area.
Jovopa's claim that he is well-known in the constituency is not an
idle boast. Apart from his pressure group activities, his broadcasting and
his local government work, he is also the author of an autobiographical
reader on the Orokaivans (Jovopa 1967). His campaign strategy was
therefore simple. He would present himself to the elders of communities
and would say: 'I will not make any empty promises to you. You know
me. If you want my services, I am ready to represent you ably in
Parliament'. He believed that the Anglican mission hierarchy in the
province looked sympathetically on his candidature. And he also
believed that his age was an asset over the youthfulness of the two other
Orokaivans contesting the seat: Paul Javoko and Eric Tikambari.
Eric Tikambari: An energetic teacher who is an Orokaivan from the
Waseta area of Saiho, Tikambari started his teaching career in
Binandere. His wife, in fact, comes from the village of Manau there. He
has also taught in the Kokoda district. He was standing for election
because his people invited him to do so and promised him their support in
the campaign. He claimed he was not affiliated to any party and was not
collaborating with any candidate for the provincial seat. He was relying
on young men he had taught to organize his campaign in their home
areas for him.
Among candidates with visible party affiliation and party support
David Beu was clearly the one who made the most of his party
connection in his campaign effort. Mackenzie Jovopa also, in appropriate
places such as the settlement blocks around Popondetta, quietly
emphasized his Pangu connection. And especially when Somare visited
the province in April, the candidates with Pangu affiliation had to come
out clearly onto the stage and be counted. But Jovopa did not care
particularly to push the party connection in his campaign. All the
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candidates, with the exception of Beu, evidently preferred to stand or fall
on their personal qualities, whether, like Javoko, Tofoambo or Jiregari,
they were party-sponsored, or like the others, their party affiliation
remained a confidential matter. Parties were thus, by and large,
irrelevant in the elections. Candidates with party affiliation obtained
some financial help but minimal organizational help, as the parties
themselves hardly existed. So, parties were not completely absent from
the campaign, but their profile was so low they were hardly visible,
except when leaders of parties at the national level visited to give
whatever boost they could to their candidates - as they all did in April or
May.
There were no visible campaign or policy issues which could divide,
or with which one could identify, candidates. A general blank cheque
called trust is what all the candidates asked the electorate to endorse for
them. In not highlighting problems such as low export prices,
unemployment, and poor performance by the provincial government -
and in not specifying their policies regarding these - the candidates
showed greater realism than the academic commentators who lamented
the absence of such issues in the election (Saffu 1983). As for
resources available to candidates, Javoko, Beu and Jovopa were
modestly supported by PPP or Pangu, and the amounts claimed by
candidates to have been spent on campaigns may be somewhat low.
However, it must be pointed out that the electoral campaign in Oro was
really a very gentlemanly affair: leisurely, quiet, and low profile.
Candidates tended to concentrate their efforts on their home areas,
each relying on personal, kinship or friendship ties for spreading the word
about their candidacy and the personal characteristics that presumably
made them trustworthy and capable spokesmen. Three glaring
exceptions were Tofoambo, who said he was concentrating on the
Orokaiva areas because he had no worries about his home support;
Jiregari, who seemed to imagine that workers around Popondetta could
be shown the Melanesian light and be attracted, not that he was
particularly energetic in matching hopes with effort; and Beu, who really
believed there was a party vote around Popondetta that could be picked
up. It is possible that Jovopa's less than enthusiastic references to other
Pangu-sponsored candidates in the province had something to do with
Beu's drive to pick up some of the imagined party vote.
The Results
Table 5.2 reveals the pattern of candidate endorsement by the voters.
The most striking feature of the polls shown by the table is that voters
voted overwhelmingly for local candidates. Only two candidates, Eric
Tikambari and Wescott Gegera, managed to win 5 per cent or more of
the votes cast in each of the three administrative districts/language
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Table 5.2
Percentage of Poll: Candidates by Administrative District
Candidate % of Total Poll % of Poll in % in Ioma % in Kokoda
(N=10085) Popondetta Sub-District District
District
(N=47in
(N=2050) (N=3324)
M. Jovopa 15.2 30.5 1.8 2.3
G. Orosa 12.6 6.0 4.9 26.7
E. Tikambari 12.1 19.0 7.8 5.0
D. Beu 10.7 9.0 28.0 2.4
L. Tofoambo 9.9 4.0 0.7 24.0
W. Gegera 9.9 5.7 25.0 6.6
B.P. Javoko 9.7 15.6 4.9 4.3
M. Jiregari 8.1 4.6 23.2 3.7
G. Inga 7.1 4.1 2.6 14.2
H.G. Korove 4.5 1.3 0.9 11.2
Total polled by
local candidates
65.1 76.2 76.1
areas. Mackenzie Jovopa, who won the election, managed to poll only
2.3 per cent and 1.8 per cent in Kokoda and Ioma districts, respectively.
Even the weakest candidates, H.G. Korove and George Inga, managed
to poll more than their theoretical share of 10 per cent of the vote in then-
own districts.
Table 5.3 shows that support for candidates is even more localized
than Table 5.2 suggests. For purposes of counting the votes, there were
thirteen polling areas in Popondetta district, six in Ioma sub-district and
eight in Kokoda district. There were thus twenty-seven polling areas
altogether. Seven of the ten candidates obtained more than 50 per cent
of their entire votes from just three of the polling areas within their own
district. In two extreme cases, Korove and Javoko, the candidates
polled 44 per cent and 40 per cent of their entire votes respectively from
just one polling/counting area. In the case of Jiregari and Inga, the
percentage of their total votes accounted for by two polling/counting
areas were 47 per cent and 39 per cent respectively.
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Table 5.3
Local Support as Percentage of Poll of Candidates
Candidate Votes obtained in Votes obtained by
candidate's district as candidate in 3 counting/
percentage of polling areas in his
candidate's total district as percentage
of candidate's total
M. Jovopa 93.7 54.3
G. Orosa 69.7 58.5
E. Tikambari 73.2 57.5
D. Beu 53.1 47.7
L. Tofoambo 79.7 60.6
w. Gegera 51.7 34.1
B.P. Javoko 75.2 53.4a
M. Jiregari 58.5 50.0b
G. Inga 60.3 46.5c
H.G. Korove 79.6 75.4d
Notes: (a) % from just one area = 40
(b) % from two areas = 47
(c) % from two areas = 39.2
(d) % from one area = 44
The order in which the ballot boxes were picked up for counting at
the end of the balloting followed exactly the itinerary of the polling teams
sent out by the provincial electoral office. Thus, with the help of some
officials and scrutineers or agents of candidates, it was possible to say
almost exactly where the votes had come from. Knowing where the
votes came from and where the candidates come from, live or work, one
can conclude with confidence that personal factors were virtually the
exclusive determinants of choice in the Sohe Open: following V.O. Key
(1949:302) but adding kinship to his formula, the 'relatives, friends and
neighbours effect' was in operation. The candidates appealed for a blank
cheque of trust almost exclusively on the basis of personal
characteristics, and also on the basis of services rendered or capable of
being rendered. The voters responded appropriately on the basis of
personal knowledge or lack of knowledge of the candidates, which are
quite clearly not unrelated to where the candidates come from, live or
work.
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Conclusion
One can say that Mackenzie Jovopa won the election in Sohe Open
because he was the favourite son from the most densely populated area
of the constituency. True, Jovopa is an inveterate joiner. He has
formed, joined or led many pressure groups. True, he has provided
leadership through these and through the presidency of the biggest local
government council in the province. His broadcasting career had made
his name widely known in the constituency. He was the officially
endorsed candidate of Pangu Pati, clearly the most vigorous in a field of
admittedly very feeble parties in the constituency. Yet even he did not
have constituency-wide support. His support was even more localized
than most of his rivals. He did not have constituency-wide support
because all the local communities in the constituency were busy
endorsing their own sons.
With ten candidates for an estimated electorate of only some 20,000,
in a situation of only weakly developed parties and attachment of
electors to parties, and a tradition of electoral campaigning on the basis
of personal qualities and trust, it is rational for the local community to
endorse its own son or resident. After all, the local community can
truthfully pronounce on the character only of its own son or resident.
And personal virtues were definitely the primary basis on which all the
candidates sought to convince the electorate that they merited its trust
and, hence, its votes. But, reinforcing personal knowledge of the
candidate, was the effect of the ubiquitous wantok system and exchange
relationships in Papua New Guinea. The candidate's obligation to further
the interests of wantoks, and their right to claim help, was manifested in
the votes which entire villages and clusters of villages gave exclusively
to the local candidate.
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Chapter 6
THE ELECTIONS IN GULF
Prosey Koiviepomari K. Mailau
Papua New Guinea can be proud of upholding democratic values such
as allowing a change of government through votes of no confidence, and
having five free general elections since 1 964. As in any democratic state
conflict among different tribal, language, religious, social, and regional
groups is expressed through political parties, which make possible a
democratic management of the struggle for political power. The 1982
general election was no exception.
Geography of the Gulf Province Electorates
The Gulf Province is located in Papua and shares borders with Southern
Highlands, Chimbu, Eastern Highlands, Morobe, Western, and Central
provinces. It is divided into six administrative districts with Kerema as
its provincial capital. Other provincial towns include Kikori, Baimuru,
Ihu, Kaintiba and Malalaua. The total population of the province is
64,167 (1980 census figures). The breakdown of the population by
districts is as follows:
The total land area of the province is 35,500 square km, including
560 km of shoreline stretching from Bell Point in the west to Cape
Possession in the east. There are very few roads and these few may
never be extended due to the extent of rivers and swamps in the
province. Most travel is by air and river. However, many still travel
today by foot along the coastline. As for climate, in the west Kikori has
an average annual rainfall of 5766mm inches while Malalaua in the east
has 1067mm. West from Kerema the province is continuously wet
throughout the year, but the voters will go to the polls nevertheless.
Gulf Province is one of the most difficult provinces in Papua New
Guinea to get around. Apart from rivers, swamps, high mountains and
steep valleys, and lack of roads, airfares are very expensive for short
distances, coastal shipping charges are costly, and prices of consumer
Kikori 8,697
7,218
8,885
7,998
14,852
16,517
Baimuru
Diu
Kerema
Kaintiba
Malalaua
90 Pangu Returns to Power: the 1982 Elections in Papua New Guinea
goods, petrol and kerosine are exorbitant. In addition, because of high
rainfall throughout the year the province is infested with many different
species of mosquito and malaria. These and other problems were faced
by the 44 candidates who contested the three electorates in the province.
Candidates
Kikori Open was contested by eleven candidates of whom four had no
political party affiliation; for Kerema Open there were 16 candidates, all
of whom were affiliated with political parties either as 'pro' or officially
endorsed candidates. Of the 17 candidates who contested the provincial
seat four had no political party affiliation.
Not all candidates travelled throughout their electorates, due to
geographical and financial difficulties, but some managed to use their
relatives, friends and other such people as their agents to put up posters.
However most of these agents, some of whom were public servants, did
not appear in the public meetings in the towns and villages. Perhaps they
were merely frightened to appear before the big crowds; or, if they were
public servants, they did not want to be seen to be violating the public
service rule which calls for their neutrality in politics.
Most candidates campaigned vigorously in their own districts. They
relied heavily on party policies but occasionally referred to local district
issues. These issues were sharpened by personal attacks on candidates
from other districts and by stories intended to give themselves status as
proven scholars and leaders in the eyes of the voters.
One candidate told a village gathering that he was the only
candidate in Papua New Guinea who had graduated from the world's
leading university, the Oxford University in London. Another candidate
claimed to be the expert in developing all the natural resources that
PNG has ever produced. As an expert he was capable of creating job
opportunities for everybody and could turn long-neglected under
developed areas, including mangrove swamps, into bustling cities with
railway lines, not only connecting major towns in the province but
subsequently linking up with other provinces to create opportunities for
inter-provincial trade. Two other candidates in separate public meetings
told the voters that if elected to the parliament they would immediately
become Finance minister.
Some voters are now confused as to why their elected members of
the parliament did not finally become the first Papuan prime minister.
They are still waiting for the day when their members of parliament will
give them easy access to all government goods and services.
Many older candidates relied heavily on their traditional charismatic
leadership qualities and condemned young candidates as having
contributed nothing constructive to the development of the province.
These views were also shared by the provincial government members
who claimed that they knew more about social, political and economic
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problems in the province than city-based 'expatriates' who only came
home to show their faces during the election period.
Only seven out of 44 candidates claimed to have campaigned
cleanly and honestly and avoided any criticism of individual candidates
or their political parties. This group of seven further claimed that they
were all exercising their constitutional freedom to compete for high
public office and it was up to the voters to choose who they wanted to
represent them in the parliament. They met other candidates in good
faith and even helped them with transport, accommodation and other
related problems, despite suffering personal attacks.
Some of the seven travelled widely, and were well received by the
village people; but their openness and honesty proved to be costly in the
end. They stated that they were not Father Christmas, like other
candidates who had bags full of money and gifts for everybody to win
votes. But giving out costly gifts such as outboard motors, generators,
drums of petrol and other material at the expense of the tax paying public
has set a precedent for both candidates and the voters. The less well-off
candidates find it very difficult to establish committees in the villages if
they cannot afford to buy or give whatever the members of the
committee and influential village youth leaders and elders may ask for in
return for their services.
It is equally bad for the voters to accept gifts from the candidates,
because they are allowing themselves to be corrupted to vote for any
fool rather than for good, reliable leaders with proven past records. The
village people regard the election period as a time for them to get free
handouts from the candidates, and as a result Papua New Guinea style
election campaigns have produced many political prostitutes. These men
present themselves to the candidates as holding traditional authority and
being able to influence the village to vote for the candidates who are on
good terms with them. They directly demand money or other material
wealth in return for their services. Usually what happens in reality is
that, as soon as one candidate has left the village for another, they
immediately stop and wait for other candidates to come to their village.
Not surprisingly, many of these political prostitutes became rich in the
election period at the expense of the naive candidates who did not know
that they were dealing with men who were not genuine village leaders.
The 44 candidates were all men and they were all married with
children. In this day and age, marital status is an important element in
the calculation of support. The candidates whose wives came from
different villages, clans, tribes, or language groups, or from different
districts within the province, were fortunate because their wives' people
also voted for them. Primordial ties and sentiments based on shared
origin are perceived to be politically significant.
A little over half the candidates were over forty years of age, while
the rest were between twenty-five and thirty-nine years of age. The
concept of age and seniority did not have much influence on the voters.
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There was only one European candidate, a naturalized businessman
based at Ihu, and only one candidate from one of the Highlands
provinces. The rest were Papua New Guineans from the province.
Before discussing the voting pattern, I shall analyse the candidates
according to district of origin, language group, and clan and tribal
affiliation. All candidates expected to get majority votes from their own
relatives, villages, clans and tribes - and also from their own districts.
Most candidates expected not to do well in other districts.
For Kikori Open, eleven candidates came from three districts as
follows:
1. Kikori
1. Sarowami Wareke
2. Allan Ebu
3. Ivei Kurei
4. Dodobai Wautai
2. Baimuru
5. Aua Roy Evara
6. Ivan Ivia Evara
7. Jack John (Ako Ipai)
3. Ihu
8. Mareko Mark Mauvake
9. William Keare
10. Pori Arialave
11. Leo Kavaua
There were six civil servants, two sitting members of the Gulf
Provincial Assembly, one former MP, and the current MP for Kikori
Open (Roy Evara).
In Kerema Open electorate there were sixteen candidates from
three districts:
1. Kerema
1. Roseva Rovela
2. Alex A. Miai
3. Jerome Kevea
4. Conrad Fox
2. Kaintiba
5. Damien Pio
6. Aron Noaio
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3. Malalaua
7. Jack Loho Mokoko
8. Lari Ori Ivarapou
9. Jack Koavea Karukuru
10. Torea Erekofa
11. James Haro
12. Nelson Lari
13. Leiloro Meakoro
14. Raphael Eka Oraka
15. Ben Pukori Malaifeofe
16. Harou Orake.
The majority of the candidates in this electorate came from
Malalaua district, especially from the Toaripi linguistic group, while one
came from the Kaipi language group, and two from Kaintiba (formerly
known as Kukukuku district). In Kerema district there was a highlander
and there were three local Kerema Bay residents. Among those who
contested there were eleven former civil servants and two members of
the provincial assembly. The rest were businessmen.
The Gulf Provincial seat attracted 17 contestants, all but two of
whom were endorsed by political parties. There were four provincial
assembly members, five well-established businessmen, an academic and
a former MP. The rest were former career civil servants. They came
from all six districts in the province.
1. Kikori
1. Ridler Kimave
2. Kuberi Epi
2. Baimuru
3. Ephraim Nanto Karara
4. Prosey Koiviepomari Mailau
3. Ihu
5. Ope Oeaka
6. Virgil B. Council
4. Kerema
7. Itaea Forova
8. Lama Kaia
9. Tom Koraea
5. Kaintiba
10. Daniel Miko
11. Joel Paito
12. Lemek Kum
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6. Malalaua
13. Raphael Karahure
14. Semese Ivaraoa
15. Kauti Pikou
16. Cletus Malaisa Morasoru
17. Tony Haro Farapo
As stated earlier, party politics do not have strong roots in the Gulf
Province and since for all three seats there were two or more candidates
from each district most votes were split and many undecided voters
voted carelessly.
Voting patterns
According to the rationalist conception of democracy, individuals go to
the poll in a highly deliberate and informed way. In all Western
democracies this assumption has been qualified by observing actual
electoral behaviour, and in Papua New Guinea, too, not least in Gulf
Province, voters are not very interested in voting for candidates. They
feel that candidates who win a seat in the parliament will not come back
to hear their grievances or fulfil campaign promises. They know that
MPs live in isolation from their voters and often establish businesses so
that they will have something to fall back on when they lose in the next
general election.
The voters' attitudes to politics combine lack of interest with
fatalistic skepticism. In general, they are not politically motivated; they
are in fact politically under-developed: they do not possess ideas and
opinions about politics. Politics for such people is simply a vacancy, an
unused space. Politics is not much discussed in village social gatherings,
or in the houses of the elders or councillors, or in the various village
organizations. It is not regarded as essential to the ordinary business of
life as it is in the Highlands, in North Solomons and in East New Britain.
There are only small numbers of well-informed, politically aware
individuals in the Gulf Province. Most people do not read city-based
newspapers (but buy them for rolling smokes), nor do they listen to local
and national news although they do listen to radio messages (Hadibaia
Hereva), traditional music and the listeners' request programmes.
Nearly every household has a transistor radio made in Japan but news
programmes are in foreign languages such as English, Pidgin and Motu.
Though Radio Kerema news is read only in Orokolo, Kamia and Toaripi,
this station does not serve the people of Baimuru and Kikori districts for
some unknown reason.
As for political parties, they are only urban-based and are not
organized right down to the grassroot level. Most political parties in
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Papua New Guinea are hanging in the air. So what is emerging in the
villages is that even if the candidate is a Pangu or United Party or a
People's Progress Party member, then only his village, or only his own
clan within the village, will be supporters of the party. Those who
support the party are not registered members; they can withdraw their
support any time when their MP relative fails to fulfil any of the
traditional obligations. Political party machinery, even if established in
the villages, will not last for long: the party executives in the
headquarters would have to perform miracles to keep the village
members happy.
Influences on the Voter
Voting was conducted in some places in the Gulf Province during the
wet season. This was one reason why many eligible voters did not turn
up to cast their votes. While some voters had to travel for a day or two
to the nearest polling booth, others were simply not interested in voting.
Those who did vote mostly supported candidates from their own clan,
tribe, or district, while others were motivated to oust the sitting MPs or
block candidates from other districts.
Others again had been given money or goods, or promised job
opportunities, business ventures, or assistance with village projects. For
many of these voters, clan, tribe, or district ceased to matter: they voted
for the candidate regardless of his district, clan or tribe. It seems that
many more candidates will in future elections set out to buy votes.
Although such practice is illegal under the existing electoral laws, it is
now well established and is here to stay.
The voters express their dissatisfaction with the candidates from
their own areas or from other areas by voting for a man and not in
practice for a political party. They have little confidence in party leaders
or programmes. People are elected on the basis of personal influence,
wealth and ability to distribute goods to genuine village leaders. Having
plenty of hard cash during the election is the key to victory. As
expected, candidates were strong in their own districts but weak in other
districts, but candidates who did extremely well in their own districts
despite splitting of votes with other candidates came out strong in other
districts.
Communications
Candidates can use many different methods for getting their electoral
messages across to the voters, including close personal contacts with the
people on a house to house basis or through public meetings; but also
through newspapers and electronic media.
Candidates must also make contact through formal organizations
such as youth groups, women's fellowship groups, village sports clubs,
church members' groups, clan groups, and groups of village elders. A
candidate's membership in social or other village groups reinforces the
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tendency to vote for him, especially if he is supported by the leaders of
these groups. A case study will illustrate this. The Purari Action Group
(PAG) is very influential in the Baimuru district. Among its 7,128 eligible
voters PAG leaders (mostly from the elite) are very influential in their
respective villages and in the towns. The MP for Kikori Open, Roy
Evara, despite a strong challenge from Ivia Evan Evara (no relation) and
Jack John (both anti-PAG), did very well to regain Kikori Open because
he did not poll very well in Kikori or Ihu districts. With PAG support he
was able to collect votes from those who did not vote for the district
candidates. Many were voters he had helped with village projects while
he was the minister for Primary Industry in the Chan government.
Variations in voting behaviour are very much dependent on the
effectiveness of the communication methods used by the candidates
rather than correlating with socio-economic class. It will take a long
time before voters will be able to vote according to their social status.
There is no upper class, middle class or working class in the villages.
Many people vote only because they are still frightened of government
officers who might put them in gaol should they refuse. They are of the
opinion that by voting for a candidate they are making him rich while
they suffer in their villages. Who can blame them? Many people voted
under duress; they did not exercise their constitutional rights as good
citizens.
Conclusion
The politicians who won the election were generally those who
consistently bent the electoral rules of the game to their own advantage.
Some even engaged groups of hooligans to tear up posters of other
candidates and to threaten opposing candidates, their families and their
relatives. Although there was prohibition of canvassing near the polling
booths, many candidates did it. In addition some were seen giving gifts
in the market places and stores with the intention of securing votes.
The administration of the election was poor in the Gulf Province.
Many responsible government employees were not prepared. One lot of
voters waited in the rain at a certain polling booth from 7 o'clock in the
morning till 12.15 p.m. when the first vote was cast, but the voting was
still officially closed at 6 p.m. The electoral officers should have
extended the hours in the evening to make up for the hours lost in the
morning.
Many voters were turned away because voting was not allowed to
extend into the early hours of the night or the next day. Officials not only
lacked administrative and organizational skills but failed to understand the
people and their geographical surroundings. Those who were turned
away refused outright to travel to the next polling booth located in the
next village, which in their opinion was unnecessary. This problem
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would have been solved easily had the Electoral Commission extended
voting by two to three days.
Results
The final results of the 1982 elections in Gulf were as follows:
Gulf Provincial
Daniel Miko 628
Semese Ivaraoa 573
Itaea Forova 429
Raphael Karafure 662
Lama Kaia 684
Joel Paitho 1,726
Ridler Kimave 1,747
Ope Oeaka 764
Kauti Pikou 571
Ephraim Karara 2,114
Clement Morasuru 1,451
Virgil B. Council 740
Tony H. Farapo 4,083
Kuperi Epi 1,464
Tom Koraea 1,489
Lemek Kum 3,164
Prosey K. Mailau 963
Informal: 559
Kerema Open
Damian Pio 536
Roseva Rovela 430
Jack Loko Mokoko 636
Lari Ori Ivarapou 163
Alex A. Miai 641
Jack Koavea Karukuru 1,641
Torea Erekofa 2,514
Aron Noaio 4,341
James Haro 169
Jerome Kevea 232
Nelson Lari 410
Leilaro Meakoro 82
Raphael Eka Oraka 244
Ben Pukari Malaifeope 97
Harou Orake 442
Conrad Fox 1,780
Informal 289
23,811
14,640
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Kikori Open
Ivia Ivan Evara 312
Pori Arialave 450
Mareko M. Mauvake 420
Aua Roy Evara 2,611
Sarowame Warake 978
Allan Ebu 2,132
William Kiare 266
John J. Ipai 590
Ivei Kurei 948
Leo Kavava 508
Dodobai Wautai 161
Informal 230 9,606
Tony Farapo, the Provincial seat winner and a career diplomat, had
been aligned with Ted Diro's Papua New Guinea Independent Group
during the elections.
Aron Noaio, victorious in Kerema, had been the sitting member and
was also chairman of the Kamea Rural Development Authority.
Roy Evara, the other successful sitting member, former headmaster
and sometime Leader of the United Party, was minister for Primary
Industry in the Chan government.
PART III: HIGHLANDS
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Chapter 7
ENGA PROVINCIAL, WABAG OPEN AND
WAPENAMANDA OPEN
Peter Larmour with Garry Paia and Frank Kunia
For some candidates the campaign in Enga had begun two years before
the general election. By April 1982, just before nominations closed, at
least 23 candidates were actively campaigning in Wabag,
Wapenamanda, and up and down the road between them. The following
note is based on brief interviews with these candidates during a short
visit to Enga,1 the aggregated election results, and two studies of earlier
elections (Colebatch et al. 1971; Iangalio 1976). It deals with the
Provincial constituency, and two of the five open constituencies (Wabag
and Wapenamanda).
Candidates
Candidates were typically young and highly educated. The average age
and level of secondary education of candidates in both the Provincial
consituency and Wabag Open was 31 years and grade 10; in
Wapenamanda it was 36 and grade 7) (Electoral Commission 1983: 63-
64, 73-77). We asked candidates to estimate the size of the 'base' of
their support among voters, how much they had spent so far on the
campaign, and how much they estimated they would spend on the rest of
the campaign. The results for Wapenamanda Open are shown in Table
1. Neither notion (of 'base' and 'costs') is very clear or well defined, but
the questions seemed to make sense to the candidates. A candidate's
'base' is potential as well as actual, and needs protection against erosion.
Costs are often not in cash, or may not fall directly or immediately on the
candidate. Table 1 shows candidates typically overestimating their base
compared to their final vote, though the winner, Kakarya, predicted his
final vote with considerable precision. Estimates of costs varied widely,
with the winner expecting to pay most. Comparing costs to final vote,
Frank Taso's campaign seemed most efficient (65t per vote), while the
three lowest polling candidates were spending several hundred kina for
each vote they got.
1 We are very grateful to the candidates for the time they took to speak to us,
and to officials of the Electoral Commission and Office of Information in
Wabag for their assistance. The visit to Enga was funded by the UPNG
Research Committee.
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Table 7.1
Candidates' Estimates of 'Base' and 'Costs':WapenamandaOpen*
Candidate's
Candidate's estimate Estimate of
of 'base' Vote Cost (Kina
Candidates (early April) (June) to June)
Sai Yuguglio 2,000 82 15,000
John Tendamu 2,000 nil 10-11,000
Pupu Kaekin na 4 4,500
Clement Kuian 1,000 20 10,000
Ronald Rimbao 4-6,000 2,448 na
Frank Dei 4,500 2,416 2,500
Yupele Enn 1,800 2,263 10,000
Pato Kakarya 3,700 3,805 20,000+
Frank Taso 5,000 3,049 2,000
Leo Male 1,000 withdrew 2,000
Information for Wabag is sketchy, but consistent with Wapenamanda
information; Provincial candidates were more reluctant to talk figures.
The Electorate
The electoral roll is divided up by census division, and then into either
'rest houses' (for rural villages); rural 'non-village areas' (schools,
missions, etc.); and urban areas (defined as having a population of more
than 500). Electors are listed either by 'major clan' and 'subclan' in
'family order' (in Part A) or alphabetically (in Part B, Part C, rural non-
village and urban areas). Table 2 shows the number of 'major clans' and
'subclans' identified in the rolls. In terms of size the category 'major clan'
seems to correspond to what Talyaga calls 'tribes'(1982:60), and Meggit
calls 'phratries', 'the largest patrilineal group that the people usually
recognise' (1965:5). The rolls identify 162 distinct 'major clans' in the
province; Talyaga identifies 131 (1982:60).
The lists by rest house in Part A of the rolls come from the 1980
census. Parts B and C cover additional people who were enrolled after
1980, or whose names had appeared in the 1977 roll but not in the
census. Polling in rural areas took place over three weeks (5 to 26 June),
as polling teams moved between centres (generally the rest houses used
in the 1980 census). People whose names did not appear on the Table
7.2.
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Table 7.2
Ratio of Major Clans to Sub-Clans: Enga Open Seats
'Major Clans' 'Subclans' Ratio
Wapenamanda
Wabag
Lagaip-Porgera
Kandep
Kompiam Ambum
37
28
29
30
38
113
134
123
83
156
1:3
1:5
1:4
1:3
1:4
(Source: Principal Rolls of Electors, 30 November, 1981)
roll might nevertheless qualify to vote under various sections of the
electoral act ('section voters', whose votes, for example, comprised 8 per
cent of the total for Enga Provincial in 1977). Postal voting is also
possible, but only five Engans had used the opportunity in 1977. The rate
of 'informal' votes, discounted because ballot papers were not properly
completed, ran at less than 1 per cent in 1982. The votes were counted
in Wabag, the winner being the candidate with the largest number of
votes. Tables 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7 show the results.
The rolls appear to have been rather unreliable. There seems to
have been both over- and under-enrolment. Table 6 compares the
number of electors enrolled with population data from the Enga Rural
Development Study (Lea and Gray 1983: 44-45). To qualify to vote
electors should be 18 years old or over. People 18 years and over in
Enga in 1979 formed 52 per cent of the total population (ibid.:44). Yet
the number on the roll for Wapenamanda is almost exactly the same as
the whole population, including children. In both the Open and the
Provincial electorate the number of actual voters was considerably larger
than the number of indigenous people eighteen years and over in 1979.
Perhaps the difference was made up by non-indigenous people, people
who had come of age since 1979, and section voters. But turnout in any
case seems high, and the unreliability of the rolls must have put great
pressure on the polling teams to decide, on the spot, who qualified.
The electoral roll sorts most electors into clans and subclans. A
detailed study of polling would be needed to determine if people tended
to vote along clan lines. Clan voting might take two forms: all clan
members vote for the same candidate ('solidarity'); or a candidate can
rely on the support of his clan's people ('favourite son').
If there is solidarity, votes come to candidates in 'packets' as whole
clans vote one way or another (similarly, votes may come in smaller
packets if wives follow the votes of their husbands). The votes of clans
without favourite sons (or daughters) are presumably up for grabs by
candidates from other clans.
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Table 7.3
Population, Enrolment and Votes: 1979 and 1981
1 2 3 4 5
Resident
and Non Electors Indigenous
Traditional Indigenous Enrolled 18 years+ Votes
(1979) (1979) (1981) (1979) (1979)
Wapenamanda
Open
Wabag Open
32,800 32,636
32,123 33,231
32,702 19,313
25,319 16,999
32,691
18,249
Enga Provincial 166,691 159,310 136,820 89,790 95,856
(Source: Carrad et al. 1982: 44-45)
The National Party in particular was accused of using 'vote splitting'
tactics in the Provincial constituency. Vote splitting as a tactic needs to
be distinguished from the more general effects of an increased number of
candidates, depressing the average vote per candidate and often the
winner's vote ('vote spread'). In Wapenamanda and Wabag, for
example, the number of candidates increased radically between 1977
and 1982, and the winner's vote fell in both constituencies.
The idea of 'vote splitting' assumes the electorate is 'lumpy', a kind
of soup in which lumps of votes attach themselves to one candidate or
another. A vote splitter aims to break these lumps up. The electorate,
however, may be less 'lumpy' than some candidates think (or hope).
Offered a wider range of choice of candidates, the electorate will spread
its votes among them on all sorts of grounds, including - but not only -
the clan or place of origin of the candidate.
While clan identification may be strong, there are several reasons
for thinking that the connection between clan membership and voting
preference is not simple and direct. First, clans are relatively small
(even in relation to the size of open electorates) compared to the
numbers needed to win. (See Table 7.4 for Wapenamanda.) At the
very least, coalition and cross-clan appeals are involved in winning.
Secondly several candidates described the composition of their electoral
bases' in non-clan terms: contacts made during work and sport were
also important. Thirdly, many candidates felt the need to campaign -
some beginning two years before (Gordon and Kipalan 1983:318). They
campaigned to expand out from their base, but also to defend it from
splitting or from simple erosion: one provincial candidate warned, for
example, 'highway votes can change all the time' (Masket Iangalio).
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Votes have to be mobilized, clan or not. Fourthly, candidates talked a
great deal about personalities and reputations - their own, and those of
their opponents. Malipu Balakau's campaign seemed particularly
intensely focused on his own personal qualities. Finally, the unit of 'clan',
'home' or ethnic identity will become broader in the wider arena of
electoral competition.
'Base', 'Share' and '
Base 3,125
Share 1,398
Clan 680
Subclan 223
Winner's vote 3,805
Winner's margin 756
Average voter per
candidate 1,316
le 7.4
in': Wapenamanda Open
Average of eight candidates'
estimates in April
Average of enrolled voters/number
of candidates; indigenous population
over 18/number of candidates, and
final vote/number of candidates.
Average of enrolment votes/number
of 'major clans'; indigenous
population over 18/number of major
clans, and final vote/number of
major clans.
Average of enrolled voters/number
of subclans, and final vote/number of
subclans
Pato Kakarya
Kakarya over Taso
Votes cast/number of candidates
Political Parties
Half of the candidates were endorsed by one - or, in at least one case,
more than one - of the national political parties. Final party affiliations
are shown in Tables 7.5-7.7. Several candidates were less than fully
committed - either leaning towards a party (e.g., 'pro UP'), or to the
leader rather than the party (e.g., 'pro Somare'). It is difficult to assess
what these party identifications amounted to, and even more difficult to
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judge their impact on the campaign. For candidates, party affiliation
offered the promise of posters and refund of nomination fees. For the
parties, successful candidates offered votes in the subsequent election
for the prime minister. Hence parties might endorse more than one
candidate for a seat to increase their chances of success, and thus the
identification of parties with their leaders (who would be prime
ministerial candidates). Hence also the paradox that while the use of
party identification seemed to be increasing, it seemed to have little
relevance to the campaign: party membership was prospective, and
looked beyond the general election to the real business of electing a
Prime Minister. The general election in this sense was merely a
'primary' through which parties tested and chose their delegates to the
more important parliamentary election.
The National Party had set up a branch in Enga in December 1981.
The executive committee consisted of the provincial premier, and two
officials who worked out of a garage in Wabag and who were paid a
fortnightly wage by the party. The executive had endorsed 22 candidates
throughout the province: three for the provincial seat; and four each for
Wabag and Wapenamanda Open. 'Endorsement' meant that the party
paid the candidate's nomination fees, but the officials (Esau and Patrick)
reckoned only about eight of these 22 showed 'potential'. Candidates
with 'potential' would qualify for T Shirts and access to the party truck.
Pangu Parti organization seemed less formally structured, more
personalised, better funded and far more effective. The Pangu effort
was stimulated and coordinated by Pato Kakarya, the sitting member for
Wapenamanda, MP since 1972, and of an earlier political generation
than most of the candidates. Pangu had endorsed one candidate in the
provincial seat (Masket Iangalio), one in Wapenamanda (Pato himself),
but had hedged its bets with several 'pro Pangu' candidates in Wabag.
Pato expected to spend heavily, and was getting some help from
Mantons and Bromley, the Hagen company that had taken over the
WASO trade store and petrol station in Wapenamanda. (See Ipatas
1976)
Campaign Themes
Few candidates proposed specific policies that they would introduce or
support. Frank Iki (Wapenamanda Open) was exceptional in proposing
detailed policies for rural development. Several candidates had decided
to avoid, as far as possible, discussing what they would actually do in
power. People voted leaders (they suggested) rather than manifestos or
mandates. One candidate admitted he would 'not openly tell people
what I propose to do' (Wabag Open). Another advised more tersely:
'don't promise them' (Enga Provincial). Several candidates emphasized
the particular services they would push for (and Pangu benefited from
memories of its government's response to a severe frost). The
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distribution of VEDF and sectoral funds provided a stick with which to
beat the sitting member, Paul Torato, but overall 'pork barrel' appeals
seemed to be muted or made discreetly. In any case the provincial
government was increasingly taking over the provision of capital works
and direction of government field officers. The themes and issues most
candidates identified seemed more general and emotional: law and
order, restoration of traditional authority, highlands leadership, etc.
There was a fairly limited number of themes that most candidates
returned to. These included:
Prices: for coffee, and of imported trade store goods. It was
implied, but not promised, that a restored Pangu government would
restore 1970s world prices: 'When Pangu was there, we had
money in the pocket' (candidate, Wapenamanda Open).
Beer: particularly as a contributor to inter-group fighting or
domestic violence. This argument hit, particularly, Malipu Balakau
(Enga Provincial), who had built support around his promotion of
decentralized drinking in 'taverns' during his period as Liquor
Licensing Commissioner.
Youth: Pangu particularly picked on the problems of Grade 10
leavers finding jobs. The theme also related to 'law and order'
(youth being potential rascals) and 'authority' (the declining power
of older village leaders).
Restoration of traditional authority: Peter Ipatas (Wabag Open)
emphasized the theme of restoration of local, traditional, or elderly
authority: 'Old guys have accepted young guys, and we are
wrecking the place. I'm trying to give them back the powers they
had'. Ipatas proposed a 'Leadership Act' (rather than a restraining
'Code') that would require leaders to exercise authority, and punish
them if they failed to do so.
Highlands nationalism and leadership: The theme of 'matching the
coastals' (candidate, Wabag Open) was often linked to criticisms of
highlands leadership. The theme of the highlands being ill-served by
its leaders goes back to 1972, when Tei Abal was accused of
abandoning highlands interests in his equivocation about self
government (Iangalio 1976: 299). In 1982 the issue was Okuk -
whether he had been excessive on behalf of the highlands, and
whether a cooler, more 'graduate' style would be more effective in
promoting the same interests. 'Highlanders can lead - but not like
Iambakey' (candidate, Wabag Open).
Law and order: particularly tribal fighting. Candidates were fairly
reticent about what they would actually do.
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Restoration of egalitarian values: The Melanesian Alliance
candidate for the regional seat, Anton Parao, called for a return to
the values of village life and personal simplicity, expressed in the
1974 report of the Constitutional Planning Committee.
Anti-communism: Sir Tei Abal introduced this old theme that had a
continuing usefulness as a way of rubbishing university graduates
and the Melanesian Alliance. Parao complained that Pangu also
were using anti-communism by saying that, under Melanesian
Alliance, 'you wiU need a licence to kill a pig'.
Rubbishing opponents (and voters): Candidates frequently accused
each other of 'buying votes', but otherwise, especially early in the
campaign, accusations seemed to be fairly indirect and made by
supporters rather than the candidates themselves. Several
candidates expressed some hostility towards voters. The electorate,
it was said, had become more 'experienced' - demanding but fickle.
Some were said to have asked for cash for their votes. There was
a special admission fee for politicians at the fenced off singsing
place at Yaramanda. A sign read: 'ol man i laik tokim politiks:
K10." Paul Torato, the sitting member for Enga Provincial, was
quoted by the NBC (10 May 1983) as complaining that candidates
were paying them to the extent that some voters were 'living like
public servants'.
Comparisons with Previous Elections: Tables 7.8-7.10 compare the
1982 results with the results of the 1977 election. There was a
striking increase in the number of votes cast in all three electorates.
The number of candidates fell in the Provincial electorate but
increased several times in the two open electorates (there was a
similar trend in two of the three other open electorates in Enga).
The winner's vote fell in both open electorates, and winners'
margins were squeezed in both the open and the Provincial
electorates. Generally, the Provincial campaign seems to have
become more intense and polarized, with both the winner and the
runner-up increasing their vote and share, while the open
campaigns seem to have become more diffuse with the winners
losing votes and shares as the number of candidates increased.
In Enga Provincial Paul Torato managed to increase both his own
vote, and his share of the total vote. Nevertheless he was very closely
followed by Malipu Balakau, who replaced Anton Parao (previously
United Party secretary, now Melanesian Alliance) as the runner up, and
lost by only 215 votes.
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The sitting member, Pato Kakarya, was also re-elected in
Wapenamanda, but both his vote and share were severely reduced in
spite of the total votes cast being increased by nearly half.
The results for Wabag Open show most clearly the effects of an
increase in the number of candidates. The winner's votes fell by nearly
two thirds, and Albert Kipalan won with only 13 per cent of the votes
cast with a slender margin over the runner up. Sir Tei Abal's vote
completely collapsed, ending a career that began with the 1964 election.
Voting figures for earlier elections cannot be directly compared with
those in 1982: the system of voting (preferential) and some
constituencies were different (Enga was separated from Western
Highlands Province in 1974). Nevertheless some comparisons can be
made. The 1968 election was very thoroughly studied by Hal and Peta
Colebatch, Marie Reay and Andrew Strathern. They concentrated on
the regional seat, which included what is now Enga Provincial, and on
two open electorates in Western Highlands Province. The 1972 election
in Wabag Open was studied by Masket Iangalio, who himself became a
candidate for Enga Provincial in 1982.
Three themes of these earlier studies seem particularly relevant in
1982: the symbolic importance of Iambakey Okuk; the image of Pangu,
and the role of local government councils in the elections.
In 1968 Iambakey Okuk was working as a mechanic in Wabag and
stood for the regional seat. Iangalio has it that he wanted to stand for
Wabag Open but 'would not do so against his friend Tei Abal'
(1976:295). He was not the only indigenous candidate for the regional
seat, but was unusual in being 'prepared to argue with the European
candidates and stand up to cross examination'. (Colebatch et al.
1971:272)
The conclusion of Colebatch et al. that 'Iambakey's campaign
affected both the course of the [1968] election and the political climate
of the period' could be applied equally to 1982. Though standing in
Chimbu, his style, record and future were important issues in Enga. He
was an authentic, but to some disturbing, expression of Highlands
nationalism. He was said to have despatched a truck from Hagen to
support Malipu Balakau's campaign for the provincial seat. Balakau
rejected the gift, and had the truck turned back before it got far up the
valley. The story has an epic quality to it that expresses Okuk's
symbolic over-the-horizon importance in the campaign.
Photo Pangu's image underwent a striking reversal between the
two earlier elections and 1982. In 1968 in Western Highlands 'Pangu'
was a 'smear word' (Colebatch et al. 1971:235), used to associate
candidates with unpopular demands for self government. In 1972
Iangalio described how 'Pangu was a very bad name that nobody liked
to hear in the Highlands ...[Tei] took advantage of this by calling his
opponents members of the Pangu Pati' (1976:300) By 1982 'Pangu' had
achieved the opposite associations of stability, high coffee prices, firm
Pato Kakarya, Pangu organizer and sitting member, in his office at
Wapenamanda (Photo: Peter Larmour)
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A candidate addresses a roadside meeting near Pompabus. The stakes
in the ground are used in pig exchanges.
(Photo: Peter Larmour)
Sir Tei Abal shaking hands after a meeting attended by a number of
candidates at Irelya
(Photo: Peter Larmour)
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leadership and so on. In both cases, Pangu represented something more
than simply a party: in 1968 and 1972 it seemed to present fears for the
future; in 1982 it represented a kind of nostalgia for a 'golden age' in the
1970s.
Colebatch et al. describe how in the 1964 election local government
councils were used as means of getting campaign messages across to
the electorate (1971:230). By 1968, however, while the European
candidates continued to address councils in the expectation that
councillors would lead public opinion, the Melanesian candidates 'did not
see these [meetings] as a very effective means of communication'
(ibid.). Local councils play little role in Iangalio's account of the 1972
election in Wabag, and Meggit has described the collapse of the local
government system in the late 1970s (Meggit 1982). The Enga
provincial government began to function in 1978 (Scott and Pitzz 1982:
278), and while two members of the provincial assembly stood for
Wapenamanda Open, and one for Wabag, the government itself seems
to have tried to keep itself aloof from the campaigns (the premier, for
example, issuing a stern circular to candidates against the use of 'loud
yellers' in Wabag town).
However, Peter Ipatas's interesting campaign for Wabag Open was
based very clearly on the Wabag Local Government Council, of which
he had become president, and from which he was seeking endorsement
as a candidate. Ipatas's campaign was determinedly parochial, avoiding
national and regional issues, and calling for a revival of the authority of
councillors and older men (Ipatas was among the youngest candidates -
just 26). He also made calculated use of tradition ('moka politics'), for
example in a large public meeting hosted by his father outside Wabag at
which several candidates spoke, followed by a careful distribution of
sugar cane.
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Table 7.5
Enga Provincial Results
Canddiate Vote1 Party2
Malipu Balakau 19,196 PNG Independent
Lusan Lolan 10,238
Group
Anton Parao 10,551 Melanesian Alliance
Bill Kuala Laup 4,173
Ruth Enda Poio 1,637 Pro National Party
Lakaia Iki Ekana 6,788 PNG Independent
(Diro)
Group
Ken Kunia Manik 3,114 National Party
Herman Yongapen Kiap 4,367
Pialu Kamambu Savwene 189
Paul Paken Torato * 19,411 United Party
Masket Iangalio 15,778 Pangu Pati
Total
95,856
1. Figures from Electoral Commission
2. Figures from lists in national headquarters (David Hegarty: personal
communication)
* Winner
Enga Provincial, Wabag Open and Wapenamanda Open
Table 7.6
Wapenamanda Open Results
Candidate Vote Party
Kaewa Wambi
Pato Kakarya *
Yupele Enn
Man Raiya
Frank Dei Yapo
Joseph Enn Komba
Roma Ponda
Pao Karep
Pupu Miokali Kaekin
Clement Kuian
Inu Lei
Saa Ipu Galilee
Frank Yasima Taso
John Minakaso Tendamu
Sai Yugulio
Ronald Tipitape Rimbao
Lunga Polawa
Traimya Kambipi
(Informal)
947
3,805
2,263
148
2,416
1,089
1,207
793
4
20
1,401
1,594
3,049
Nil
82
2,448
839
1,533
53
Pangu Pati
PNG Independent
Group (Diro);
Melanesian Alliance
National Party
Pangu Pati
United Party
National Party; PNG
Independent Group
(Diro)
United Party
Total
* Winner
23,691
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Table 7.7
Wabag Open Results
Candidate Vote1 Party2
Paul Kurai 992
Katate Yapata 648
Robbie Lalen Samai 1,753 Pro Pangu Pali
Albert Ango Kipalan * 2,331 Peoples's Progr
Johnson Sikita Siki 503
Party
Yak Lusup 719
Peter Kongone Kia 79
Don John Kapi 208 National Party
Kepane Peraki 1,605 Pro Pangu Pari
SokoU L. Warent 785 Pro-Somare
Mathew Masket 1,002 ?
Tei Abal 731 United Party
Leo Nala Igiman 309 National Party
Tsan Brian Parao Nalao 517 National Party
Saa Kia 465 National Party
Peter Ipatas 579
Chris Kopyoto 1,208 Pro Pangu Pari
Andrew Lakau 350
Benny Malando 1,507 Pangu Pari
Lazarus Nia 311 ?
Dep Kepori Buakao 715
Nelson Yakan Kangun 878
(informal) 54
* Winner
18,249
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Table 7.8
Voting Statistics: Enga Provincial
1977 1982 %Change
Voters enrolled 109,063 136,820 +25
Votes cast 71,755 95,856 +34
Candidates 15 11 -26
Average votes/
candidate 4,784 8,714 +82
Winner's vote 12,850 19,411 +51
(Torato) (Torato)
-as % votes cast 18 20
Runner-up's vote 12,361 19,196 +55
(Parao) (Balakau)
-as % votes cast 17 20
Winner's margin 489 215 -56
-as % votes cast 0.7 0.2
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Table 7.9
Voting Statistics: Wapenamanda Open
Voters Enrolled
Votes Cast
1977
23,901
15,954
1982
32,702
23,691
% Change
+37
+48
Candidates 6
Av.Votes/Candidate 659
Winners vote
- as % votes cast
6,391 (Kakarya)
40
18
1,316
3,805 (Kakarya)
16
+200
-15
-41
Runner-up's vote
- as % vote cast
3,876 (Maiokali)
24
3,049 (Taso)
13
-21
Winner's margin 2,515
- as % votes cast 16
756
3
-70
Table 7.10
Voting Statistics: Wabag Open
Voters enrolled
Votes cast
1977
17,691
13,211
1982
25,319
18,249
% Change
+43
+38
Candidates
Av.votes/candidate
Winner's vote
- as % votes cast
5
2,642
6,326 (Abal)
48
22
830
+340
-69
2,331 (A. Kipalan) -230
13
Runner-up's vote
- as % votes cast
Winner's margin
- as % votes cast
2,368 (L.Kipalan)
18
3,958
30
1,753 (Samai) -26
10
578 -85
3
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Chapter 8
COFFEE, CANDIDATES AND CLASS STRUGGLE:
GOROKA OPEN
Randal G. Stewart*
Introduction
A serious weakness of critical social science (dependency theory,
Marxism) in its approach to the study of Third World development is its
failure to link class power with political power - that is, state and party
power. The failure is most evident in the few cases where critical social
scientists have attempted to deal with political events such as
competitive elections.1 Following Samoff, it is clear that the starting point
for analysis is class, understood as a
relationship, in fact two types of relationship simultaneously.
On the one hand, class is defined by role in production, as
production is organised at any particular moment. On the other
hand, at the same time, class is defined by opposition, classes
exist only in opposition to other classes. That is, class is
• Special thanks to Andrew Marubu, Daryl Woodward and Craig McConaghy
and to Ron May, Bill Standish and Peter King for commenting on earlier
drafts. Fieldwork was funded by the Australian National University with
valuable assistance from the University of Papua New Guinea.
1 Good and Donaldson (forthcoming) have attempted a critical electoral
study of Papua New Guinea, but what Good and Donaldson call 'class' in this
context is very similar to the static usage adopted by stratification
theorists. Successful candidates are simply listed with their individual
socio-economic characteristics, and from this information alone Good and
Donaldson conclude that such and such a proportion of the total were
from the rich rural classes. This example shows clearly that Good and
Donaldson's method is based on the uncovering of inequalities between
individuals, i.e., differences in socio-economic status; but such an
approach is particularly misleading in the highlands where, due to the
lateness of colonization, the delay in education, and the limits on
indigenous accumulation under colonialism, most influential Eastern
Highlanders will have similar life histories anyway. Good and Donaldson
find similarities among influential Eastern Highlanders which blinds
them to the important point that, while individuals may look and talk the
same, they may have a very dissimilar location in a mode of production.
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defined by both structure and process. Neither is adequate by
itself (Samoff 1982: 1 12-113).
This chapter will concentrate mainly on class process (in opposition)
rather than class structure (in production) but enough will be said in the
first section to show that the competitive mobilization of the petty
bourgeois and big peasant class fractions in the 1982 Goroka Open
election was based simultaneously on the economic reality of a one-crop
coffee economy and the social reality of a class structure whose
commanding heights comprise two main fractions: 1) a coalition of petty
bourgeois elements united by a network of production relations based on
the appropriation of relative surplus value and increasingly removed from
the point of coffee production; 2) a big peasant class fraction whose
network of production relations is based on the appropriation of absolute
surplus value close to the point of coffee production.
This chapter argues that, while class power in Eastern Highlands
does translate into political power, the process is diverse and diffuse, for
class power does not translate at all readily into party political power. It
will be shown that the success of individual political candidates depends
mainly upon their suitability as representatives of one or the other class
fractions,2 a suitability established during the dialectic of political struggle
and not determined by the candidate's individual characteristics or
background. The variable that seems most important during this
dialectical political struggle is the candidate's strategic location, that is
the strength of his rural or village base and the influence he can exercise
in Goroka town. My analysis suggests that the candidate's willingness to
adopt the party label most congenial to the particular class fraction is the
least important factor in his pursuit of political power.
Two main contradictions affect political organization among
Gorokans. The first is that while class fractions are based on
accumulation at the local level, after a certain level of development this
accumulation can only be maintained by recourse to state allocation and
intervention, principally at the national level. The second contradiction is
that while candidates aspiring to win Goroka Open seem to feel they
must have a village base in the electorate, the crucial votes which must
be won are those in Goroka town. The analysis which follows, if valid
for Goroka Open electorate, may also apply to electorates with different
material and social circumstances.
2 Fractions are understood as competing segments of the dominant classes in
circumstances where the subordinate classes remain unorganised at the
political level. Competition between fractions is real for, as Poulantzas
(1978) notes, fractions, to the extent that they become autonomous, are
capable of constituting themselves as social forces.
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Class Structure
Goroka Open is a good choice for class analysis of electoral struggle in
Papua New Guinea. It is an electorate in which class fractions both at
the level of production and in opposition can be clearly defined. This is
because the political economy of the area - service industry and coffee
production - is not only relatively uncomplicated but is clearly articulated
through the development corporations. Development corporations have
emerged out of a process of accumulation which began with big men
marshalling clan resources to finance their business ventures, and has
gone several stages beyond the informal process described by Finney
(1973). Good and Donaldson have shown how the process was first
formalised with the establishment of cooperatives and savings and loan
societies by the colonial state, and then intensely commercialised with
the spontaneous emergence of indigenous development corporations.
Development corporations are 'the most advanced mechanism to date -
far more so than the earlier cooperatives - for mobilising key resources,
labour, land and capital, behind the banner of rural capitalism' (Good and
Donaldson 1980:24).
The two main indigenous development corporations in the Goroka
area are the Gouna Development Corporation (formed 1977) and the
Eastern Highlands Development Corporation (formerly Bena
Development Corporation - formed 1973). The development
corporations were formed at the right time to take full advantage of two
possibly unique occurrences: the Plantation Redistribution Scheme
provided a setting in which the Eastern Highlands Development
Corporation, drawing on the resources of some 15,500 members, could
purchase four large plantations in 1975 and four more in 1977, and
Gouna (approximately 2000 members) could purchase two well-
established plantations, Erinvale and Roka (Mito 1981).
The coffee boom of 1976/77 further enhanced the power and wealth
of the development corporations. Gouna purchased its two major
plantations at the height of the boom and expanded its service activities
to include a controlling interest in Goroka Sports and Book store, a
Goroka soft drink company and Goroka Tyre and Battery plus a major
shareholding in Pacific Helicopters. Pacific Helicopters is a particularly
bold venture which began in 1975 with one helicopter and had ten
helicopters in 1980 (Good and Donaldson forthcoming; Anderson 1980).
Eastern Highlands Development Corporation also benefitted from the
boom, spending some K200,000 on extending processing capacity at its
K500,000 factory at Urona planatation. By 1977, after only two years, it
was able to repay in full loans taken out to buy its plantations - a total of
K350,000 (Post-Courier 29 March 1977).
While both Development Corporations clearly benefitted from the
coffee boom, for both were ultimately dependent on an expanding coffee
industry in a mono-crop local economy, the above pattern of purchases
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shows that Gouna had begun to invest in activities of the service type
while Eastern Highlands Development Corporation stayed close to the
point of coffee production. This difference is important. It means that a
potential antagonism exists at the point of production between the big
peasant class fraction (Eastern Highlands Development Corporation)
based on a network of production relations centred mainly on the coffee
industry, and the petty bourgeois class fraction (Gouna) based on a
network of production relations centred mainly on service type industries.
A consequence of this fact is that appropriation of surplus value by each
takes different forms, the petty bourgeosie being engaged mainly in the
production of relative surplus value while the big peasantry are engaged
mainly in the production of absolute surplus value. Marx has explained
theoretically the difference between the production of absolute surplus
value (which is increased mainly through the lengthening of the working
day) and the production of relative surplus value (which is increased by
putting labour to work with newer and more efficient techniques) and
more importantly how in each case the appropriation of surplus value
reaches certain limits. At this point real antgonism between class
fractions becomes likely. By the time of the 1982 election such a point
had been reached in the Goroka Open electorate.
On the one hand, economic activity had slowed down nationally and
locally, particularly as coffee prices had continued to fall despite
international quotas. Goroka had fallen behind its highlands rival, Mount
Hagen, as a growth centre, which brought a deterioration in Goroka's
service industry to accompany its coffee worries. Gouna turned in a
very modest profit before tax of K 17,672 for the year 1979. Gouna's
main investment since 1978 has been the construction of a K800,000
shopping and office complex in the heart of Goroka town, but Gouna
was warned by its bank manager to slow down and consolidate over the
next three years.3 As far as is known, Eastern Highlands Development
Corporation made no major purchases between 1979 and 1982.
On the other hand, the appropriation of surplus value by each of the
class fractions had reached its limit. The big peasantry are limited to the
production of absolute surplus value because the care and harvesting of
the coffee berry is a delicate process not susceptible to the introduction
of new techniques, complex machinery or developed skill. Labour is
unskilled. Little investment is made in its application and little investment
is devoted to developing it, for picking is a simple procedure which
cannot be made more efficient above a certain level. There seem to be
few ways in which labour can be coupled with machinery or developed
in skill for harvesting (or weeding) to improve productivity.
3 Gouna Raseloo purchased Marquell Press and had plans for building a
cinema in Goroka (personal interview, Andes Berquiest, executive
manager, Gouna Development Corporation, 10 June 1982.
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In the service activities of the petty bourgeoisie, however, the only
limit to the appropriation of surplus value is the present state of
technological development and the cost of installing new machinery and
developing new skills. In the Goroka Soft Drink Factory, for example,
there is a fairly sophisticated division of labour in which workers with
different levels of skill operate different stages of the production process.
Clearly also the intensity of labour can be increased with faster, more
efficient bottling machines, etc. However, the general decline in
economic activity had by 1982 made such investments less likely.
A result of the period of rapid accumulation by the development
corporations was that the focus of their activities shifted from the
marshalling of clan resources at the village level to protecting their,by
now, large-scale economic interests, which could only be achieved at the
national level through access to the agencies of the state. It now
became economically imperative for the development corporations to
gain access to financial resources, to seek protection from competitors
and to forestall state encroachment on their profits through 'unnecessary'
taxation. But by 1982 the development corporations were forced to
compete for finance as a result of declining economic circumstances
exacerbated by the defeat of the Somare government.
The Somare government's replacement by a People's Progress-
National Party coalition in March 1980 polarized the class fractions in
Eastern Highlands. The view from Eastern Highlands after March 1980
was that a national government increasingly dominated by big peasant
interests had severely curtailed the national reach of the provincial petty
bourgeoisie. The big peasant fraction used the opportunity to shore up
the declining fortunes of the coffee industry. World prices determine the
state of the industry, so big peasant successes could not be spectacular;
but in this period the industry, with the Eastern Highlands Development
Corporation in the vanguard, had the export tax withdrawn from coffee,
dissuaded the Coffee Industry Board from establishing its own export
company, saw Development Bank lending for coffee development double
(by amount) in 1980, saw the return of a system of bounty payments to
producers due to low world prices,(16) convinced almost everyone that
the industry had an overcapacity of dry processing plants so that no
more should be licensed, and, more sensationally, captured the national
government's sectoral funds for disbursement by national (big peasant)
ministers - inter alia, Iambakey Okuk, and Sailas Atopare - rather than
through provincial governments.
Gouna, on the other hand, has not been so influential at the national
political level. As coffee producers, Gouna have benefitted from
assistance to the industry but, not being exporters and with only a small
numberof processing plants on their own plantations, the value of this
assistance was limited. Gouna's service or petty bourgeois activities
have suffered from the national government petrol tax, and Goroka Soft
Drinks have not received the assistance which an infant industry like this
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might expect from a national government. However, the sorest point
with Gouna was clearly Pacific Helicopters, whose plight received little
sympathy from the Chan government. Although Pacific Helicopters had
expanded its fleet, Gouna believed it would be even more successful if its
operations could be protected by the national government from
competition by overseas operators: 'Pacific Helicopters must stay in
PNG' (Post-Courier 29 January 1981). Gouna is now suffering from the
antipathy its directors have always felt for national political involvement,(
and from commitment to the quaint liberal notion of a separation of
business and politics; Hari Gotaha, director of Gouna, is unusual among
Eastern Highlanders - an influential man who is not at the same time a
politicia. In the words of a director of Gouna, 'Business is business,
politics is politics' (personal interview, Auwo Ketauwo, Goroko, 23 June
1982). This idea contrasts vividly with the big peasant view that politics
is business by other means. By 1982, with the recession deepening and
a hostile government in Moresby for the first time, the petty bourgeoisie
were forced to reconsider their beliefs about business and politics.
Political Mobilization: Town and Country
There were good reasons for the class fractions in Lowa Census
Division to engage in national political struggle in 1982. I will show in
this section how the parameters of this political struggle were established
in the period before nominations closed as fractions attempted to
outmanoeuver each other by standing candidates with competing
characteristics.
As I have said, Goroka Open is split into a town population and a
rural village-based population. Only candiates with sound rural bases,
whose home villages are in Lowa Census Division, stand for election.
Yet more than a fifth of the enrolled voters live in town and town votes
can be crucial in winning. The problem is that town voters are
fragmented on regional and ethnic lines, and it is difficult to determine
how to win their votes. The outcome of this situation is what I call
negative politics: that is, fractions mobilize candidates who can split the
opponent's rural base rather than candidates who might win votes on
their merits (or on issues). Vote splitting is actually encouraged by the
first-past-the-post electoral system, as I will show. Political mobilization
in Goroka Open in 1982 was a diffuse and diverse process, the
culmination of hundreds of deals and agreements between all sorts of
people, but it was not formless, for behind the backs of all these people
was a basic political struggle between two class fractions.
The man to beat in Goroka Open in 1982 was the incumbent Sailas
Atopare, Minister for Works and Supply. Sailas was only 25 years old
when he won Goroka Open in 1977, some 680 votes ahead of runner-up
Bebes Korowaro. On Hegarty's Vulnerability Index (Hegarty 1972) this
was a slender victory (a 6.9 per cent margin of victory over the runner
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up), giving Sailas only a 39 per cent chance of holding the seat. But
Sailas had good reason to feel he could hold the seat. His village,
Goroviyufa, is well placed within Lowa CD, close to the Highlands
Highway on the heavily populated Asaro side of Goroka town and, most
importantly, it is solid big peasant territory.-* Sailas himself told me he
had 15 hectares of coffee and 1000 acres of cattle land in Madang
Province in 1982. He employed five permanent labourers in coffee
production, processed his coffee to the wet stage and then sold it to a
factory for dry processing and eventual export. Sailas ranked coffee as
his number one earner in the previous year (K20,000), ahead of income
from real estate and (ministerial) salary (see table 8.4). And Sailas's
party affiliations show a consistent peasant pattern over the years: in
1977 he stood for the Country Party, a middle peasant party, then, after
a period as an independent, he moved to the big peasant coalition party,
the National Party led by Iambakey Okuk.
Sailas also seemed to benefit from the familiar big peasant trait -
much loathed by the petty bourgeoisie and their academic apologists - of
using political office to advance his personal political position. Sailas had
access to sectoral funds and, being a National Party minister, probably
had greater freedom than other MPs in spending them as he saw fit.
The spending of these funds (some K13 million in 1981) by national
members was pork barrelling of the most blatant kind, something never
denied by the National Party. Sailas reportedly told Goroka Local
Government Council that 'people expected results from their nationally
elected members...the money handed out through the Transport Sectoral
Programme was a positive way of showing that members were not
useless' (Post-Courier 9 April 1981). Pork barrelling is possibly not the
same as corruption, as deputy prime minister and National Party leader,
Iambakey Okuk, seemed to be arguing in a roundabout way when he
released figures to show that Pangu opposition members did as well as
government members in the distribution of sectoral funds (Post-Courier
20 November 1981). But Sailas's method of pork barrelling was very
dramatic. The story is told around Goroka that Sailas used his
approximately K40,000 allocation to buy coffee processing machines
which were loaded into a semi-trailer and, with due ceremony, given out
to every village in Lowa CD with the compliments of Sailas. Sailas could
also benefit from his position as minister for Works and Supply. In a
4 It is quite striking to note how different is the proportion of town voters
to rural voters on the electoral rolls compared with the proportion of total
urban population to total rural population of Lowa CD given in the 1980
national census. On the electoral rolls, the ratio of town to rural votes is
22.7:77.3. In the census figures the ratio of total town to rural population
is about 50:50. This highlights the point that many people of voting age in
Goroka town do not get on the rolls and do not vote. A large proportion of
these people would be circular migrants (Skeldon 1976); others would be
in institutions in Goroka and a number would be a floating population.
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country where much politicking goes on over roads and bridges, this is a
popular ministry. As Sailas says, 'it looks after development and you can
see the immediate results' (personal interview, Sailas Atopare, Goroka
20 June 1982). Also because Works and Supply is centralised its
minister can easily claim credit for his department's activities. All these
factors suggest that Sailas was in a strong position to overcome
Hegarty's Vulnerability Index and retain Goroka Open in 1982.
To defeat Sailas, his opponents had to win town votes.5 What would
do this? Fragmentation on racial and regional lines has resulted from the
uneven development of capitalism in Papua New Guinea. Because the
highland towns were born late and grew rapidly in their early stages,
they rely quite heavily on imported labour and capital (expatriate and
'other' national). In Goroka, expatriates - most of whom are now
citizens - played an important role in the early growth of the town, and
today they are still prominent in commercial activities,^ and the provincial
government administration.7 But neither 'expatriate' citizens nor their
5 For example, the retail sector is divided between foreign-owned companies
(Steamships, Burns Philp, Collins and Leahy) and companies owned by
members of the petty bourgeoisie. However, Goroka is notable in Papua
New Guinea for the extent to which the retail sector is dominated by
foreign-owned companies. The weighted urban average for purchases of
all goods by type of outlet and type of expenditure in the nationwide 1975-
76 Household Expenditure Survey showed an average of K19.79 per
fortnight per household was spent at listed (foreign) outlets, while K43.68
per fortnight per household was spent at trade stores. In Goroka the
expenditure pattern was reversed: K30.79 was spent at listed (foreign)
outlets and only K17.68 at trade stores. See Household Expenditure Survey
1975-76 Bulletin No. 8. Purchases of Goods at various types of Retail Outlets,
National Statistical Office, Port Moresby.
6 For example, the retail sector is divided between foreign-owned companies
(Steamships, Burns Philp, Collins and Leahy) and companies owned by
members of the petty bourgeoisie. However, Goroka is notable in Papua
New Guinea for the extent to which the retail sector is dominated by
foreign .owned companies. The weighted urban average for purchases of
all goods by type of outlet and type of expenditure in the nationwide 1975-
76 Household Expenditure Survey showed an average of K19.79 per
fortnight perhousehold was spent at listed (foreign) outlets, while K43.68
per fortnight per household was spent at trade stores. In Goroka the
expenditure pattern was reversed: K30.79 was spent at listed (foreign)
outlets and only K17.68 at trade stores. See Household Expenditure Survey
1975 Bulletin No 8 . Purchases of Goods at various types of Retail Outlets,
National Statistical Office, Port Moresby.
7 I was told there were more expatriates in the provincial secretariat in 1982
than a few years before. It is argued that, initially, when the provincial
secretariat was staffed entirely with Eastern Highlanders, there was more
conflict in the provincial government, for these officers tended to get
involved politically. Expatriates on the other hand are thought to be able
to remain apolitical, merely giving policy advice (personal interview.
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petty bourgeois national competitors are a large town constituency, for
they are significantly outnumbered by those employed in salaried
government service. Most of these national public servants come from
outside the province. Gamaut, Wright and Curtain noted in 1977 that
only 28 per cent of those employed by the government in Goroka came
from Eastern Highlands Province (Garnaut, Wright and Curtain 1977).
Most of these other nationals do not own homes in Goroka and probably
consider themselves temporary residents, so it is difficult to identify any
basis for a stable political commitment among them.8 At the provincial
level, state functionaries do not constitute a class or class fraction, for
they are not directly engaged in the appropriation of surplus value and
are not effective at the level of class process (i.e., in opposition to other
classes or class fractions). For this reason their votes are up for grabs,
but also for this reason and, because of the internal fragmentation of this
category, no candidate is sure how to grab them.
Also floating are the votes of the less skilled wage earners, both
inside and outside govenment employment. The workers at present do
not constitute a class, for, while they share the experience of having their
surplus value appropriated, the regional and ethnic differences among
them diffuse class process, and working class opposition to other classes
or fractions has not yet been clearly expressed at the political level.9 It
is difficult also, then, to identify any stable political commitment among a
differentiated, unrepresented working class. The same is true of the
other large groups in Goroka town, women, the lumpenproletariat and
the unemployed, many of whom are non-voters.
Because winning town votes is difficult, mobilization generally takes
the negative form of standing second line and even third line candidates
to split the rural vote of rival candidates. Negative politics - vote splitting
- is actually encouraged by the first-past-by-the-post system which
Craig McConaghy, provincial projects officer, Eastern Highlands
provincial government), Goroka, 18 June 1982).
8 According to Diana Howlett (1976:252) 'Administration employees
frequently transferred to other districts after two or three years in a post
However the frequency of movement may be less since the
establishment of provincial government and localization of the
government service.
9 According to Garnaut, Wright and Curtain (1977:181), 'jobs requiring little
educational experience and few skills are filled by people from adjacent
village areas unless the town is located in a prosperous rural region, in
which case migrants are drawn from poorer, more distant areas'. Goroka
is the centre of a prosperous rural area, so non-skilled wage labourers are
mainly from Chimbu, while semi-skilled wage labourers generally come
from the peri-urban villages near Goroka.
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makes it possible for electorates to be won with a very small number of
total votes. 10
The obvious person to represent the petty bourgeoisie in opposition
to Sailas and the big peasantry was the 1977 runner-up, Bebes
Korowaro. Bebes was personally acceptable to the petty bourgeoisie;
he was tertiary educated, (see table 8.3) articulate and worldly. He had
been to Port Moresby. Bebes had no coffee and was not involved in
coffee politics at all. Indeed, Bebes told me he had no business interests,
for he did not believe in 'going in for business while in politics' (personal
inteview, Bebes Korowaro, Goroka, 7 June 1982). But Bebes had long
been prominent in Goroka town, first as an NBC radio announcer and
more recently as a member of the provincial secretariat, and he had a
solid rural base on the Asaro side of town.
Bebes is also what might be called a professional politician, for his
political loyalties tend to shift, partially in accordance with the state of the
fractional struggle, but mainly as a consequence of the deals he has been
able to negotiate for himself. This was evident in 1977 when he stood as
a United Party candidate in an attempt to win both big peasant and petty
bourgeois votes; and it was evident again in 1982 when he continued to
flirt with both Pangu and the PPP at a very late stage. Bebes initially
sought PPP endorsement (some say he was actually endorsed by PPP),
for he may have had in mind that PPP, being in the government, might be
in a stronger position to assist candidates financially. But Bebes is very
astute and would have known that he could not win Goroka Open
without petty bourgeois backing, and he must have soon discovered that
the petty bourgeoisie were not backing PPP in this election. Thus, he
may have sought PPP endorsement in order to put greater pressure on
his petty bourgeois backers and perhaps to wring further concessions out
of them (a ministry perhaps?).
Such a situation would not have bothered the petty bourgeoisie in
past elections. In the past, they would probably have swung behind Koni
Aize (then an alternative petty bourgeois candiate) either to frighten
Bebes or because of genuine support for Koni. The fact that Koni was
also a committed PPP candidate would not have worried the petty
bourgeoisie in the past because until 1979 the PPP was part of a national
government with obvious petty bourgeois complexion. A petty bourgeois
government in Port Moresby assured the national reach of the local petty
bourgeoisie, and in 1977 they could even afford the luxury of splitting
support between Bebes and Koni and thus losing the seat. By 1982,
1 0 The problem with tracing the process of mobilization in the manner I
propose is that no informant fully understands it, and most are reluctant
to discuss it during the election period. Candidates themselves are cautious
at this time, for they invest considerable time and personal money in
campaigning and are not prepared during an election, or even later, to
admit that they might have been vote-splitting rather than trying to win
the seat.
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however, things had changed. The PPP had joined with the big peasant
National Party to form the government in Port Moresby, an act of class
suicide at a time of economic crisis. The PPP was duly rejected at the
polls by large sections of the petty bourgeoisie. The party has developed
a dual personality which seriously impairs its ability to compete in a
situation where the political struggle is polarized. Koni Aize (eventually
endorsed by PPP) is himself a living example of this dualism, for his
interests straddle both petty bourgeois and big peasant networks of
production relations. Koni earns his living through wages as an
ambulance driver but is, by association, involved in big peasant politics,
for his seven acres of coffee are managed by ANGCO, a coffee export
company owned by the government but staffed by people with big
peasant connections, such as Ben Sabumei. Koni is an attractive
candidate because his job makes him well known in the town and his
village is Gama (or Kama) upon whose land Goroka town was built.
Koni's village base opened up the exciting prospect that he could win
town votes in the way others win rural votes. However, in 1982 his
commitment to PPP and his association with ANGCO made him
unacceptable to the petty bourgeoisie, even for tactical purposes.
The local petty bourgeoisie clearly had no alternative in 1982 but to
have their representative for Goroka Open labelled a Pangu candidate,
but it is important to emphasize that this outcome depended upon the
distinctive national and local circumstances that existed at the time. By
September 1981 elements within the petty bourgeoisie who wanted
Bebes as their representative and needed him to wear the Pangu label
were getting desperate. Pangu endorsements were to be held in mid-
October but Bebes was still flirting with other parties in early September.
Some further pressure on Bebes was needed and this emerged with a
serious new contender for the Pangu endorsement, Sali Hurtuve. Sali
resigned from his job as a carpenter with Goroka's largest construction
company, Summerscales and Lambert (Hari Gotaha and Auwo
Ketauwo are directors), and began actively campaigning for the Pangu
endorsement. Sali is a nice man but an inexperienced politician, who
seemed to find campaigning somewhat bewildering. In many ways he
was an unlikely petty bourgeois candidate. He had no apparent town
appeal, for he is not well educated and has few contacts in the state
bureaucracy. Sali grows coffee in two fairly large gardens but seems
not to have become embroiled in coffee politics. Sali's main advantage
as a candidate at this stage was his rural base close to Sailas's. (His
home village is Gotiyufa.) He might have been able to draw rural votes
away from the big peasant incumbent and, if Bebes did stand for PPP,
Sali could possibly have split Bebes' rural base by drawing on the support
of his wife's relations in Sezuha village, near Bebes' home village,
Masilakaiufa.
Sali's candidacy had the effect of bringing Bebes into Pangu Pati
and, after a bitter fight within the organization, Pangu endorsed Bebes
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(see Post-Courier 15 October 1981). The support of Auwo Ketauwo, a
director of Gouna, was probably crucial to this outcome. Auwo later
authorized Bebes' election posters and quietly campaigned for him. It is
not known how the outcome was explained to Sali, although being a
good natured man and a loyal Pangu supporter, he probably felt that the
best man won. Sali was an asset for the petty bourgeoisie as a second
line candidate, for he could still attempt to split Sailas's rural base but
could be encouraged not to work against Bebes' rural base. And his
Pangu loyalty was an asset to Pangu's Eastern Highlands provincial
member, Barry Holloway, for Sali did not hesitate to promote Holloway
and probably drew many votes to him in Lowa CD.
The support from the petty bourgeoisie for Bebes as an endorsed
Pangu candidate created some worries for the big peasantry. In
particular, Bebes' prominence in town and possible support from his
former workmates in the provincial bureaucracy had to be countered.
The second line candiate chosen for this purpose was Joe Irairo Wiwiao,
executive officer to the Premier before his nomination. Joe was young,
tertiary educated and well travelled. He was born in Lowa CD, so had a
firm rural base. Joe told me he had no coffee trees, nor was he involved
in any way in the coffee industry (personal interview, Joe Irairo Wiwiao,
8 June 1982). He was expected merely to keep town votes away from
Bebes, so was not expected to join the National Party nor to endorse big
peasant policies. In fact his purpose was more likely to be achieved if he
appeared aloof from the big peasantry and this he did, standing as an
independent. Joe probably performed this service for the big peasantry
as part of the deal that gave Eastern Highlands premier, James Yanepa,
the National Party endorsement for the Eastern Highlands Provincial
seat. Yanepa wanted National Party endorsement because, he told me,
'You can see true and honest leadership in Iambakey (Okuk) at the
national level'. But his long support for Pangu and opposition to the
National Party probably meant that he had to make many promises to
get the endorsement (personal interview, James Yanepa, Goroka, 14
June 1982). Joe Wiwiao campaigned quietly and may not have relished
the assignment, although his results suggest he fulfilled his task as a
second line candidate.
There were two other candidates who may have been useful to the
two class fractions as third line candidates, although at this level the
connections between the fractions and the candidates becomes more
distant. Patrick Gehapine, university educated, holder of a commercial
pilot's licence, and an auctioneer, clearly had a petty bourgeois
background and was connected through Paul Ine, owner of a dress
factory in Goroka and the man who authorised Gehapine's posters, into
the network of petty bourgeois production relations. However, both Ine
and Gehapine are known around Goroka for their outlandish behaviour
and seem to have fallen out with important sections of the petty
bourgeoisie. However, Gehapine and Ine were useful, as we will see in
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the next section, in organizing opposition on the retail sales tax issue and
putting the blame for this tax on the National Party minister for Works
and Supply, may have been a third line big peasant candidate. His village
location (Okiyufa) suggested he might be able to split Bebes' rural base,
and he was well known in town. Hoffman was very reticent about his
coffee sales and defensive about his earnings, so it is difficult to chart his
place in production relations (personal interview, Hoffman Aize, 7 June
1982). The two overt Country Party candidates, Doctor Hietire and Paul
Matimo, were of little interest for reasons suggested earlier, nor was the
Country Party's covert candidate, Robin Saho (indeed Saho went to
some length to hide his Country Party affiliation). The saddest candidate
was Clancy Atuwara Piholowa, former school headmaster, who
campaigned very hard but polled abysmally, probably because he never
understood that the election was a competition between class fractions, a
legacy perhaps of taking civics lessons a bit too seriously.
The Political Campaign National Influences and Local Issues
The campaign in Goroka Open during 1982 was essentially a local one.
National influences were felt, national symbols were used and national
personalities appeared but these were important only insofar as they
could be fitted into a local context. Candidates raised almost all their
campaign funds locally; very little was contributed by the parties'
national organizations. Pangu was clearly the best organized party in
Goroka Open, but my analysis sees party as among the least important
variables affecting political outcomes. Hence it is understandable that
most parties were not very well organised in Goroka Open. Barry
Holloway's organization for the Eastern Highlands Provincial campaign
was outstanding, but Holloway had little direct influence on the result in
Goroka Open as he and the Pangu candidate were not very supportive of
each other. The most eventful visit to the electorate by a national leader
was Okuk's. He spoke at a rally on the local issue of Provincial retail
sales tax.
Papua New Guinea elections are not generally noted as struggles
over identifiable political issues. Much of the political competition is
covert: in Goroka Open the subterranean manoeuverings of class
fractions in the process of political mobilisation. However, in 1982 the
Eastern Highlands provincial government's imposition of a 3 per cent
retail sales tax did emerge as a major election issue. The tax had been
under preparation for some time in the provincial secretariat, and was
presented to cabinet for approval in December 1981. Cabinet baulked:
the political implications of the introduction of such a tax were difficult for
the politicians to swallow, and the tax was delayed. The tax came into
effect on 1 May, less than two months before the beginning of polling in
the national election, which was very bad timing, for it allowed opponents
of the tax to combine with enemies of the Premier and the National Party
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in protest {Post-Courier 13 May 1982). Huge rallies were held in Goroka
town, organized by Paul Ine, Patrick Gehapine and John Kihena (pro-
Pangu candidate for Henganofi electorate), who tried to blame the
National Party for the tax. Gehapine told me: 'We told the shopkeepers
to close up at the time of the rally or we'll ransack them. One fast food
guy took ten minutes too long, so people just came in and took
everything, bags of rice, etc., out of the shop. It cost him Kl 0,000'
(personal interview, Patrick Gehapine, 13 June 1982). Generally,
however, traders were as much opposed to the tax as anyone and went
out of their way to ensure consumers knew they were being forced to
levy the tax (Goroka Book and Sports Store (a Gouna Company)
charged 15.5 toea for the Post-Courier for weeks, despite the fact that
there is no half toea coin in Papua New Guinea; customers had to pay
1 6 toea and in return received the newspaper and some boiled lollies.
Premier Yanepa never repudiated the tax throughout the campaign,
despite the pressure on him from Okuk, among others, to drop it. Yanepa
felt people would respect him because he stuck to his guns, (personal
interview, James Yanepa, 14 June 1982) but Yanepa's poor showing at
the polls suggests the tax did have an effect on his personal vote. It is
difficult, though, to identify any other effect the tax had on voting
patterns. Candidates could not agree on which section of the population
in the electorate would be most affected by the tax. Yanepa said
villagers were not concerned about the tax and this view was supported
by Doctor Hietire, a village politician, who said he accepted it (personal
interview, Doctor Hietire, 8 June 1982). However, both Sailas and Bebes
said the villagers were feeling the pinch of an extra tax during a time of
low coffee prices. These men were also concerned that the tax would
drive business away from the province. Joe said he was keeping out of
the sales tax issue.
The tax issue puzzled me, for I received very surprised reactions
from all candidates when I asked the question, 'What do you say when
voters ask you about your views on the retail sales tax?' Perhaps people
did not ask this question of candidates because they have a clear notion
of the separate levels of government and thus regarded the question of
provincial retail sales tax as irrelevant for candidates in national
electorates. It is more likely, however, as suggested throughout this
paper, that because votes are not gathered in Papua New Guinea on the
basis of candidates' positions on issues so candidates are not asked
questions about them.
Few other topics arose during the campaign that could be called
election issues. All candidates and voters were concerned about the
decline in the economy, but this concern was not translated into any
specific policy proposal. Petty bourgeois candidates talked generally
about the government's mismanagement and occasionally about
corruption over the sectoral funds programme. These candidates argued
that Papua New Guinea was well managed under former prime minister
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Somare and that a return to a Pangu-led government must lead to
economic improvement. Big peasant candidates spoke less optimistically
about the economy and more concretely about loosening up the
conditions for Development Bank loans as a way of stimulating the
economy. However, all candidates noted that Papua New Guinea's
economy was subject to the vagaries of the world market and that there
was little a Papua New Guinea government could do about commodity
prices. All candidates relied rather heavily on party platforms to answer
policy questions. This was so even in the case of independent
candidates who simply lifted policies from party platforms with which
they had little connection. The Pangu platform of support for youth
struck a happy chord everywhere, but no-one really knew what the
policy meant. The packaging of policies by national parties is useful for
poorly educated candidates as a means of impressing even less well
educated voters.
Campaigning is very expensive, but if candidates are to be believed
almost all of the money spent was personal money with very little
coming from business or the political parties. Whatever happened in
1982 it seems unlikely that personal funding of election campaigns will be
adequate in the future, although many candidates seem to have almost a
moralistic opposition to accepting cash donations. This moralism or
naivety was evident at various times throughout the campaign period and
especially during the long, three-week polling period. For example,
everyone seemed to treat my suggestion that candidates might pass out
how-to-vote cards as somehow subversive, and many felt such a tactic
would be illegal, although I am certain it is not. Also, candidates were
very hesitant to appear anywhere near a polling booth, and generally
kept a fairly low profile during polling. Most candidates arrived at the
polling booth very early in the morning to put up their posters but hurried
off before any voters appeared. This modest physical presence of
candidates during the three week polling probably had a lot to do with
the form campaigning took during this period. In particular, the use of
identifiable symbols helped to keep the candidate's presence in the mind
of the voter. Pangu were superb at the manipulation of symbols, ranging
from bright green flags and emblems on supporters' trucks to night
convoys of trucks touring the area playing distinctive theme music on
loudspeakers and with supporters in the back chanting 'Bebes' and
'Pangu'.
Campaigning also took the form of continued protests against
officials who were manning the polling booths. The whispering vote and
the question of section 141 votes caused complaints. Scrutineers were
expected by candidates to supervise the procedure for whispering votes
by illiterates to officials through a witness, but they themselves were
kept some distance away from the whisperings, and they seemed rarely
to trust the official or the witness. At many polling stations only voters
who could show that their name was omitted through a printing error
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(i.e., could show they had actually enrolled), or who could convince the
official they had made an attempt to get on the Goroka Open rolls for a
national election, were given a Section 141 vote. In other electorates I
visited returning officers seemed to be more lenient with section 141
votes. The rolls themselves were a source of antagonism, for it became
evident early during polling that many people were not on them. Even
among the eight government employees who were the polling officials for
Goroka Open, only two people were on the roll. One official was omitted
through a printing mistake, but because he had proof of his application to
enrol he got a section 141 vote. Another official could show he voted in
1977 and thus was also given a section 141 vote. Two other officials
could not vote because they had changed their place of residence and
had not bothered to enrol in Goroka Open, and two other officials had
only just turned eighteen and did not know they had to enrol to vote
(personal interview, Daryl Woodward, Returning Officer, Goroka Open
Electorate, 5 June 1982) These were all educated people, half of whom
had failed to enrol. One can only imagine how many migrant labourers,
women and informally employed men from village backgrounds were
also disenfranchised, although some poll officials were liberal in allowing
section 141 votes.
Results
The results of the election are presented in Table 2. The total vote was
below the figure on the rolls - 13,452 compared with 16,368, and the
town/country proportion in the actual vote was approximately the same
as on the rolls (19:81 instead of 22:78). Bebes won a slender victory
over Silas, 3,250 votes to 2,993. The two leaders polled well ahead of a
group of middle candidates who polled around the 1,000 vote mark. It
seems likely that the candidates from the middle group who stood in
order to split rural votes from the leaders (Sali from Silas, Hoffman from
Bebes) not only failed but may have lost rural votes to the leader they
were trying to split. Perhaps leaders can pick up rural votes in the fringe
areas of the electorates where the local village candidate is not taken too
seriously. However it seems likely that the other middle level candidates
held their rural base intact except Clancy, who came from the same
village as Sali and probably lost most of his rural votes to Sali.
Conclusion
Most accounts of electoral struggle in Papua New Guinea ignore class
altogether as a basis for political mobilization. Premdas and Steeves'
(1983) observations on the 1982 elections, for example, embody an
unresolved contradiction: they say that in many areas party labels are
significant variables, but that loyalty remains parochial, very much village
and clan based. Yet without the concept of class they have no analytical
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tool for linking party with ethnicity and thus exploring the contradiction.
This paper has attempted to analyse the linkage between class, party
and ethnicity in one electorate. It has shown that class fractions do exist
and were indeed the mobilizing forces in the Goroka Open election of
1982. Class fractions selected candidates to represent the fraction in
opposition to other fractions. The selection process is determined not by
the candidate's individual characteristics or background, but by his
potential for winning or vote splitting, which depends in turn on his
strategic location in town and country. The study has also shown that
the mobilisers were flexible in their choice of party label, and this should
not surprise, given that parties in Papua New Guinea remain caucus
parties and not mass parties.
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Table 8.1
Final Results, Goroka Open Election 1977
Atau Waukavi 1,168
Buka Vitovito 444
Koni Aize 1,981
Binn Nalehupa Aravaki 426
Oreve Janis 313
Silas Atopare 2,796
P.J. Gehapine 484
Patrick Akunai Rove 498
Bebes Korowaro 2,116
Source: Post Courier, 13 July 1977, p.5.
Table 8.2
Final Results, Goroka Open Election, 1982
Patrick Gehapine 1,166
Silas Atopare 2,993
Bebes Korowaro 3,250
Clancy Atuwara Piholowa 548
Sali Hurutuve Y.G. 944
Robin Saho 523
Joe Irairo Wiwiao 1,205
Doctar Hietire 248
Hoffman Ohuma Iize 840
Paul Matimo 322
Koni Aize 1,235
Source: Daryl Woodward, Returning Officer, Goroka Open
Electorate, 1982.
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Chapter 9
POLARIZATION OF A PROVINCE: THE 1982 ELECTION
IN THE SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS*
J.A. Ballard
Introduction
The national election of 1977 in the Southern Highlands was a turning
point for the province, providing the occasion both for its consolidation as
a political arena and for its incorporation into national party politics
(Ballard 1983). By contrast the national election of 1982 was merely one
in a continuing series of contests for power within the province. The
difference reflects the events of the intervening period and especially the
introduction of provincial government, which marked an end to the
remnants of kiap rule and signalled the open politicization of policy
making. The period was, effectively, one of decolonization in provincial
politics and the establishment of a new political class in the province.
During the period after the 1977 election the province continued to
benefit from its strong tradition of administrative teamwork, and a small
core of talented expatriate public servants helped maintain a capacity for
innovation. The most obvious product of this capacity was the Southern
Highlands Rural Development Project, a five-year project launched with
substantial World Bank funding in 1978. This encompassed not only the
extension of the Highlands Highway across the province, the addition of
two high schools and the development of coffee and tea plantations run
by a provincial Management Authority, but also imaginative programs in
non-formal education, health, nutrition and subsistence agriculture. By
1982 the roads and high schools had been completed, but the plantations
and Management Authority were problematic and subject to
considerable criticism, and the most innovatory portions had only begun
after long delays in attracting staff (Hinchliffe 1981; Millett and Rausi
1983; French and Walter 1984; Clarke 1985; Crittenden and Lea
1989).
Further evidence of the province's substantial administrative
capacity could be found in its adaptation of provincial government; its
decentralized planning and administrative arrangements were taken up
by the Public Services Commission and National Planning Office as
models for other provinces (Ballard 1980). On a few other matters, such
as health monitoring, the co-ordination of government and mission health
This paper has benefited from comments by Rob Crittenden, Paul Fearman,
Bill Standi sh and Mark Turner.
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facilities through local committees and the encouragement and
application of land-use studies, the province also led the country.
Although much of this innovation depended on the presence of a few
remaining expatriate officials, evidence of the continuing authority of
government in the province lay in the absence of serious tribal fighting
during a period in which other Highlands provinces were frequently in
strife. In these respects the Southern Highlands might simply be said to
have lagged a few years behind the other Highlands provinces.
However, despite these advantages and some preferential funding
through the National Public Expenditure Program, the Southern
Highlands remained last among the 19 provinces in indices of
development based on the 1980 census (D'Sa 1987: 63).
In the absence of private resources available for the accumulation of
individual wealth, government remained the main source of new wealth
in the Southern Highlands. Much of the allocation of government funding
was tied to technical formulas which reflected the strengths of the
national ministry of Finance and the National Planning Office and, within
the province, the strength of the provincial secretariat. But during the
period after 1977 challenges to these formulas and delegation of new
powers to the provinces, e.g., over liquor licensing, offered increasing
scope for political patronage. This culminated in the removal of
agricultural and transport sectoral grants from the National Public
Expenditure Program after 1980, primarily in order to give members of
parliament pre-election patronage. In the Southern Highlands the
strength of the planning tradition was, however, such that most MPs
collaborated with the provincial administration in planning and spending
their sectoral grants.
The political geography of the province, with its informal division into
three regions, East, Centre and West, was well established by 1977
(Ballard 1983:180, 194) and was reinforced by competition for resources
and positions within the new provincial arena. The notion that the top
three posts in the province should be divided among the three regions
retained a measure of legitimacy under provincial government, and the
allocation of provincial resources, particularly public works, was closely
inspected for regional equity. The extension of the Highlands Highway to
Tari reduced the isolation of the West, but the well-established access of
the East, and especially Ialibu, to Mount Hagen and external commerce
gave it a continuing competitive edge in development activities.
Politically the 'East' was Ialibu which, because of its commercial and
educational advantage, saw itself as the 'natural' leader of the province
in alliance with Kagua, with which it shares linguistic and cultural affinity.
The Wiru of Pangia and the isolated groups in Erave, with distinct
languages and limited road access through Ialibu, did not automatically
share in a sense of Eastern regional identity and Pangia was often in
opposition to the Ialibu-Kagua axis. The 'West' was essentially the Huli
of the Tari Basin, whose leaders could only on occasion command full
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unity among the Huli of Koroba, Komo and Margarima, and rarely
among the non-Huli groups of isolated Kopiago and Bosavi. The
'Centre', despite a fair measure of linguistic and cultural affinity among
the Anggal Heneng of Mendi and Nipa Districts, had a much less firm
core identity. Among the major regional leaders, those from the East
and West were from Ialibu and Tari and so had bases in the core areas
of their regions, while those from the Centre had narrower bases in
Mendi or Nipa and were more dependent on forging alliances with one
of the other regions.
Not only was there a division within the province among the three
regions, but within each of these there was a division between core and
peripheral areas. The latter, occasionally referred to by those from core
areas as a distinction between hausman and hausmeri, applied, for
instance, between Tari and Koroba and within Kagua-Erave and Nipa-
Kutubu electorates with Kagua and Nipa as cores. Just as the real or
supposed neglect of the West was grounds for mobilization of the Huli,
the relative isolation and lack of development in peripheral areas
throughout the province served as an essential basis for the development
of social and political identity (see Ballard 1987; for 1980 indices of
development at district level, see de Albuquerque and D'Sa 1986: 47.)
These grounds of differentiation were of critical importance in defining
political groupings during the 1982 elections.
Provincial Government
During the years leading up to the 1982 election the politics of provincial
government reshaped the province as a political arena. The history of
this period provides vital clues to an understanding of political leadership
and coalitions within the province.
The Southern Highlands adopted provincial government with
conspicuous lack of enthusiasm. Its local government councils had
substantial roots in the initial stages of colonial administration in the
1950s and 1960s and the provincial area authority based on the councils
had developed a strong provincial identity in the 1970s. Provincial
government, however, was pressed on the province from Port Moresby
despite consultations by a provincial constituent assembly which
attracted little public interest. Plans to declare an interim provincial
government were delayed until after the parliamentary elections of mid-
1977, in which area authority members contested against incumbent
MPs. In December 1977 the constituent assembly adopted a provincial
constitution.
Before the interim provincial government could be inaugurated, the
national government unilaterally devolved powers upon all provinces as
of 1 January 1978. The constituent assembly chose an administrative
secretary for the province from among the few experienced Southern
Highlands public servants, with its president, Andrew Andaijah of Tari,
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casting the deciding vote for Roya Yaki of Ialibu over Joe Keviame of
Mendi. Yaki, a UPNG law graduate, had served as Highlands regional
planner for the National Planning Office and most recently as the
Highlands agent for the Department of Decentralisation in setting up
provincial governments; he had also served as consultant to the
constituent assembly. As administrative secretary he took over a
provincial administration whose only other Southern Highlands graduate
was Keviame, executive officer to the area authority, who became
provincial secretary to the new interim provincial government. As in
many other provinces, the North Solomons formula enshrined in the
Organic Law on Provincial Government provided a recipe for rivalry
between the administrative secretary, as head of the public service, and
the provincial secretary, as head of a policy secretariat under the
provincial assembly and cabinet.
Andaijah, the new premier of the interim provincial government, was
respected as the ablest of its members, most of whom had local
government and area authority experience but limited formal education.
Yaki was determined to ensure that there was no political interference in
the implementation of policy. By late 1978 the premier and
administrative secretary had disagreed over control of functions and
were exchanging formal letters of complaint with each other and with
authorities in Port Moresby. At the end of the year Yaki proposed a
unified structure of provincial administration, abolishing the policy
secretariat and converting the positions of administrative and provincial
secretary into those of secretary and deputy secretary of the province.
With the support of expatriate division heads, who had the confidence of
Andaijah and his ministers, this reform was adopted and served
eventually as a model for other provinces.
By March 1979 Andaijah, supported by his Western and Central
ministers, was accusing Yaki, defended by Eastern ministers, of regional
nepotism in appointments and allocations. In October Andaijah obtained
a vote of 7-2 in the provincial cabinet in favour of Yaki's removal, but the
Easterners countered with a demand for Keviame's removal. The
national Department of Decentralisation, which considered Yaki one of
the ablest provincial officials, was unwilling to support a request for his
transfer. In December a motion of no confidence in Andaijah obtained
ten signatures from the East and Koroba, but failed to win a majority in
the provincial Assembly and Andaijah thereupon removed two of his
Eastern ministers.
The first provincial government elections were scheduled for May-
June 1980 and the provincial constitution prescribed direct election of the
premier, a feature shared only by North Solomons and Enga provinces.
On 11 March the national government under Michael Somare fell and
was replaced by a coalition led by Sir Julius Chan of the People's
Progress Party (PPP) and the Highlands leader, Iambakey Okuk of the
National Party. Yaki had been a founding and continuing member of ih«.
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National Party and he had links with the PPP through the new minister
for Public Utilities, Wiwa Korowi of Ialibu. He paid an extended visit to
Port Moresby in March and resigned as secretary to stand against
Andaijah for election as premier.
During the period before the provincial election, Chan, Okuk and
Wiwa visited the province, and both the National Party and PPP
contributed resources to Yaki's campaign. Andaijah criticised the
intrusion of national party politics into the provincial election, but he had
help from United Party MPs and tacit support from Pangu. In addition to
Yaki and Andaijah, Steven Mendepo, a businessman from Mendi,
mounted a candidacy for the premiership from the Centre, and there
were three minor candidates who campaigned only locally.
The results were a resounding victory for Andaijah, who captured
52 per cent of the formal vote, with solid majorities in the West and
Centre and in Pangia, where Pundia Kange, MP, provided support as he
had for Francis Pusal against Wiwa in 1977. Yaki, with 21 per cent,
received over half his support from his three home provincial electorates
in Ialibu, and beyond the East he had substantial minority support only in
Koroba, Kopiago and Upper Mendi, where he was backed by provincial
government members. Mendepo's support was confined to the Centre,
where he carried majorities in only two provincial electorates, and the
other candidates won support only in their home areas. Two of these, in
Kagua and Erave, deprived Yaki of support there, while another,
sponsored by Yaki in Andaijah's home territory, won only limited support
in the Huli periphery. In the provincial assembly, most incumbents from
the interim provincial government were re-elected, particularly in the
East and Centre, but older uneducated candidates lost out.
The election served to polarize the province on partisan lines much
more fully than had the 1977 national elections. The antagonism
between Andaijah and Yaki within the provincial government had
matured over the course of two years and all members of the Assembly
were identified with one side or the other. Their rivalry focused
competition not only between regions in the province, but also between
generations, with Andaijah representing the older experienced local
government leaders and Yaki the ambitious graduates and students.
Finally, since the election followed closely on the change of government
in Port Moresby, the sharpened party division there infected polarisation
within the province and clarified party alignments for the 1982 national
elections. Despite this the prime minister, Chan, immediately wrote to
Andaijah stating that his government's support for Yaki should not affect
relations between the two levels of government.
The lines of division within the province were almost immediately
blurred. The new Provincial Assembly met on 14 July and confirmed its
support for Andaijah by electing his candidate for deputy premier, Tegi
Ebeial of Nipa, by 16 to 8. The Eastern bloc walked out when Andaijah
announced that his 9 ministers included an appointed member from
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Pangia and no elected member from Ialibu. Then, five days later,
Andaijah was killed in an airplane crash in Tari Gap. During the stunned
interval in politics which followed, Tegi succeeded as acting premier and
it was agreed, despite opposition from the East, that the constitution
should be amended to allow the premier to be chosen by the Assembly
rather than through a fresh election.
It was initially agreed within the provincial government, out of
respect for Andaijah, that the premiership belonged to the West and that
Aya Dabuma of Tari, the only experienced Western member, should be
chosen. However, when the Assembly met in November to elect a
premier, Tegi had negotiated an alliance with the Eastern members and
defeated Dabuma 17-9, appointing a cabinet with no Tari representation
and with Andrew Awaisa of Erave, a firm supporter of Yaki, as deputy
premier. At the next session, in February 1981, Dabuma raised a motion
of no confidence which provoked a brawl before the motion failed by a
vote of 15-11.
Since the provincial election, Keviame had served as acting
secretary while Yaki held senior posts in Port Moresby. In March 1981
the National Executive Council, without consulting the provincial
government, appointed Yaki as secretary. The minister for
Decentralisation, John Momis, was not present at the NEC meeting and
objected to the failure to consult, as did the provincial government, which
appointed Keviame to the vacant post of co-ordinator of the Southern
Highlands Rural Development Project. Tegi was, however, dependent as
premier on Eastern support and rapidly reached accommodation with
Yaki.
In November-December 1981 a further motion of no confidence
almost succeeded in unseating the Tegi government. This time it was
organized by Francis Pusal, who had narrowly lost the provincial MP
election to Wiwa in 1977, had then become head of the province's
agricultural services, and had resigned in September 1981 to contest the
1982 elections. Pusal and Dabuma agreed on the need to restore
'legitimate' regional allocation of the three top posts: Dabuma from the
West would become premier and assist Pusal from the Centre to win the
provincial parliamentary seat, while Yaki from the East held the post of
secretary. Their attempted coup involved a refusal to pass the provincial
budget, last-minute resignations by three of Tegi's ministers and the
sequestering of the motion's supporters in Wabag, outside the province,
to forestall any temptations offered by Tegi, Yaki, and Wiwa. In the end,
however, Dabuma failed to hold unified Western support within the
Assembly and the motion was lost. Thus, in the months leading up to the
national elections, a provincial government and administration under Tegi
and Yaki remained in alliance with the national government of Chan and
Okuk.
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Electoral Boundaries
Electoral boundaries for the 1977 national election in the Southern
Highlands had been the result of extended bargaining between provincial
politicians and the Electoral Boundaries Commission, whose initial
proposals were rejected by a majority in parliament. The result was the
addition of an eighth open electorate and the carving of established
arenas, based on districts, into artificial electorates, particularly in the
cases of the new electorates of Imbonggu, linking north Ialibu and south
Mendi, and Komo-Margarima (Ballard 1983: 184-5).
The national census of 1980 gave the Southern Highlands a
population of 235,647, showing only minimal growth since the 1971
census, as compared with other provinces. The provincial government
was quick to point out that the census had been taken during the coffee
harvest, while large numbers of migrant workers were absent on the
plantations of the Western and Eastern Highlands; a provincial census in
1983 confirmed this. The provincial assembly resolved that the province
should receive two additional parliamentary electorates, but the Electoral
Boundaries Commission, following its legal mandate, rejected a plan for
eight coherent electorates drafted by expatriate officials in the province
and proposed instead a reduction to seven electorates, making the
Southern Highlands the only province to lose a seat.
As in 1977 the number of members of parliament disaffected by the
boundary proposals was sufficient to produce a majority against
acceptance of the Commission's report. In 1982, however, there was
not enough time before the scheduled elections to redesign electorates.
Thus the boundaries of 1977, likely to favour the chances of incumbents,
remained intact, leaving the Southern Highlands with eight open
electorates in addition to its provincial electorate.
Candidates and Party Endorsements
The 1977 election had produced a strong bloc of four MPs for the PPP
and the Somare coalition government, led by Wiwa Korowi as Minister
for Health, and including Posu Ank of Mendi electorate, Glaimi Warena
of Imbonggu and Yano Belo of Kagua-Erave. Ibne Kor of Nipa-Kutubu
broke with the United Party to support the government, but the three
MPs from the West of the province Matiabe Yuwi of Tari, Dambali Habe
of Komo-Margarima, and Paiele Elo of Koroba-Lake Kopiago as well as
Pundia Kange of Ialibu-Pangia remained with the United Party in
opposition.
When the coalition split late in 1978, Wiwa and Glaimi were leading
members of the PPP faction favouring an alliance with Iambakey Okuk's
National Party, and they and Posu moved with the PPP into opposition
along with Paiele. At the same time the United Party joined Pangu in a
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new Somare government, and Pundia became a minister; Yuwi also later
served briefly as minister.
With the fall of the Somare government in March 1980 and its
replacement by a PPP-National-led coalition under Sir Julius Chan, Wiwa
was first given the Public Utilities portfolio, and later Minerals and
Energy, while Ibne Kor held Environment and Conservation until his
removal from office after a conviction for rape. By 1982, Wiwa was
leader of the government MPs from the province, who included Glaimi
and Posu in the PPP and Paiele, Dambali, Yano and Ibne in Okuk's
National Party. Only Pundia and Matiabe remained with Somare in
opposition. Wiwa and Pundia, the most effective and best educated of
the Southern Highlands MPs along with Glaimi, saw themselves as
potential prime ministers.
Under legislation passed by MPs protecting their own interests,
public servants wishing to contest parliamentary elections were required
to resign six months before the close of nominations, by 17 September
1981. Two of the province's senior officials, Pusal and Bai Waiba of the
Bureau of Management Services, were both antagonistic to Yaki and
resigned in September to prepare their campaigns. In addition the
provincial assembly resolved in February 1982 that its members must
resign before standing for Parliament, and this deterred all but one
member, Anthony Temo of Mendi, from contesting.
It had been clear for some time that Wiwa and Pusal would be
rematched as rivals for the provincial electorate in 1982. Wiwa was a
leading PPP minister and held not only his own party's support, but also
that of its coalition partner, the National Party, whose leader, Iambakey
Okuk, had received a Bulolo gold-mining licence from Wiwa's ministry.
Pusal had stood in 1977 for the United Party and was close to Pundia,
who was in the pro-Somare faction of that party. Since Wiwa had firm
support from the national coalition government, all of his opponents were
likely to seek Pangu endorsement.
Somare's Pangu Pati had not been active in the province in 1977 and
had no incumbent MPs, but in 1981-82 it was the best organized party at
the national level. Its national secretary, Tony Siaguru, sent his former
colleague in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Dominic Diya, home to
Mendi in June 1981 to prepare for the party's campaign in the province.
Diya was interested in the provincial electorate himself, but was
particularly concerned to defeat Wiwa, a former Foreign Affairs protege
whom he had helped in the 1977 election but who had failed to support
Diya's career. In October Diya convened a meeting of Mendi graduates,
including Pusal and Francis Awesa, to reach agreement on a single
candidate from the Centre against Wiwa from the East and expected
candidates from the West. The others agreed to support Pusal if he
joined Pangu, though he initially preferred to campaign as an independent
for fear of losing votes amongst traditional United Party voters. Pusal
also dissuaded Keviame from standing as candidate.
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In the West the Huli leaders of Tari and the Hela Association did not
consider themselves bound by Dabuma's agreement with Pusal and they
called together potential Huli candidates to avoid a repetition of the 1977
fiasco: four Huli candidates had divided Western votes which, if
combined, would easily have won the election. They settled on Martin
Kajawi, who had recently left the University of Papua New Guinea for a
personnel post with the Ok Tedi mine in neighbouring Western Province.
Kajawi sought Pangu support at the party's Mount Hagen conference,
but Pusal was already a member of the party's organizing committee in
the province and readily won endorsement.
Leaders in the West and Centre had thus achieved some solidarity
behind the candidacies of Kajawi and Pusal, but in the East there were
others willing to stand against Wiwa. Saimon Apea, the first Roman
Catholic priest from the province, based in Kagua, had considered
nominating for the premiership in 1980, but his bishop opposed his
entering politics. Saimon had forged links with the National Party
through Yano Belo and through his former classmate, Michael Mel of
Mount Hagen, and he received some National Party support from
Thomas Kavali. Francis Apurel had left a brilliant record at the
University of Technology to return to work with his father, a successful
Ialibu businessman who had land disputes with Wiwa and encouraged
his son to stand against Wiwa. In addition Paul Poto of Kagua sought
Pangu support for a candidacy, visiting party headquarters in 1980 to
seek endorsement. Apurel suggested to Poto and Simon that two of the
three withdraw but Poto, having resigned his position with the
Development Bank, refused and all three nominated. For the provincial
electorate, then, there were six candidates, all with some tertiary
education, all aged between 25 and 34.
The leading political figures in the province took a strong role in
determining party endorsements for the open electorates. For the
People's Progress Party Wiwa was provincial leader and had
responsibility for determining the party's endorsements in the province.
Glaimi and Posu had PPP backing for re-election in Imbonggu and
Mendi, while incumbent National Party MPs were given only token
opposition from the PPP. In Ialibu-Pangia Wiwa endorsed Robert Paiya,
a young UPNG graduate serving as cultural co-ordinator in the province,
to stand against Pundia. Yaki had hoped to recruit Paiya as a National
Party candidate and gave him seven months' leave, enabling him to
evade the law requiring that public servants resign in September. In
Nipa-Kutubu, the PPP endorsed another graduate, Fred Malo Tomo.
As secretary of the Province Yaki could not take an open partisan
role, and the National Party campaign was organized by Mendepo, the
Mendi businessman who had contested the premiership against Andaijah
and Yaki. Many aspiring Southern Highlanders attended the National
Party's conference in Kundiawa, where they were interviewed by Okuk
and his expatriate business advisers. The incumbent National Party MPs
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Yano, Dambali, Paiele and Ibne were endorsed, and in each of the other
electorates several candidates were given limited NP support.
Pangu's provincial committee was composed of Pusal, Dabuma,
Matiabe Yuwi and Anthony Temo, a candidate for the provincial
electorate in 1977 who resigned from the provincial assembly to contest
Mendi Open in 1982. Pusal and Diya chose open electorate candidates
in the East and Pangu's Centre, while Dabuma and Yuwi selected those
for the West. The provincial committee then made recommendations for
endorsement to the party's Mount Hagen conference and these were
accepted in most cases. Pusal was chosen over Kajawi for the
provincial electorate and the two incumbent Somare supporters were
supported: Yuwi was able to defeat Dabuma's attempt to obtain a
second Pangu endorsement in Tari for Halalu Mai, and Ialibu-Pangia,
held by Pundia Kange of the pro-Somare wing of the United Party, was
the only electorate in the country which Pangu did not contest. For
Mendi Temo was endorsed and for Nipa-Kutubu Dick Peren Mune, a
police officer who had won strong support there as a provincial
electorate candidate in 1977. In Kagua-Erave Pangu endorsed Soso
Tomu, a district non-formal education co-ordinator who had visited party
headquarters with Poto and had obtained united support in his home
area, Erave. In Komo-Margarima Don Mailya of Enga Province, the
local government clerk in Margarima, was endorsed on Pusal's
recommendation.
In two electorates the provincial committee's recommendations
were challenged by the Pangu national office. For Imbonggu, the
committee sought endorsement for Pila Ninigi, a UPNG law student from
Glaimi's area, but Siaguru insisted that Diya be endorsed and during the
campaign Pangu funds for the province were distributed through Diya.
For Koroba-Lake Kopiago, Yuwi insisted that endorsement be given to
Dalewa Pipigi, to prevent his standing in Tari. Belden Sevua of the
Pangu national office disagreed and argued the case for his former
UPNG classmate, Arum Matiabe, who had been a strong candidate in
Koroba-Lake Kopiago in 1977. The Mount Hagen conference postponed
choice but the national office refused to upset the provincial committee
recommendation for Dalewa. The results supported the judgment of
Sevua, who had visited the province at intervals since 1980 to prospect
for likely candidates.
The minor parties made little attempt to organize support within the
province. The United Party endorsed its only incumbent MP, Pundia
Kange, and two former MPs, Andrew Wabiria for Koroba-Lake Kopiago
and Momei Pangial for Mendi. It also endorsed for Imbonggu Dus
Mapun, a UPNG graduate and former president of Mendi LGC who had
sought Pangu support. Aruru Matiabe, disappointed in his bid for Pangu
endorsement and competing against well funded campaigns by PPP and
UP candidates in Koroba-Lake Kopiago, turned to the Diro Independent
Group for financial support.
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Within the province there was an effort by some of the young
leaders of the Evangelical Alliance, bringing together Protestant missions
outside established denominations, to organize candidacies in the open
electorates, particularly in opposition to uneducated older MPs. This
effort coincided with a general sentiment among leaders in Tari and
Kagua that it was time for a change from Yuwi and Yano, who had been
MPs since 1968. Yuwi succeeded in persuading Dalewa Pipigi, literacy
supervisor for the Australia-Pacific Christian Mission (APCM) to contest
Koroba-Lake Kopiago rather than Tari, though this put Dalewa up
against Aruru Matiabe, who had strong support from his own mission,
Christian Missions in Many Lands (CMML). Tege Tandagua, APCM
education secretary, was a candidate in Komo-Margarima, and the
Evangelical group also supported Bai Waiba in Nipa-Kutubu and Soso
Tomu in Kagua-Erave. Both of these candidates came from the outlying
areas of their electorates, Kutubu and Erave, and mission support helped
to persuade other potential candidates from these areas not to stand and
divide the vote in their home bases.
When nominations closed there were 13 candidates for the open
electorates, a total of 81, compared with 91 in 1977. Apart from the
incumbents, 16 candidates had contested in 1977 (4 of them former
provincial candidates who chose this time to contest open electorates)
and all but 3 of these had performed well in that election. In addition 8
who had been serious candidates in 1977 were now members of the
provincial assembly and would have had to resign their posts to run
again; their potential rivals for the next provincial election, the presidents
of the local government councils, also did not contest the parliamentary
elections, but often built alliances with national candidates in their areas.
Of the 81 candidates, 71 were between the ages of 25 and 37, and of
the older group of ten, aged 38 to 50, five were incumbents and two had
previously been MPs. All six of the provincial candidates had tertiary
qualifications and fourteen of the open candidates also had some tertiary
education, while seventeen others had completed Grade 10 and only
fifteen had no formal education. This represented a substantial advance
in qualifications over those of 1977 open candidates. Apart from the
incumbents, 32 candidates were public servants, 8 private employees, 8
local government employees and 9 pastors or church employees, while 8
were self-employed businessmen. Although 5 listed themselves as
subsistence farmers, these included ex-MPs Momei Pangial and Andrew
Wabiria, the latter one of the wealthiest men in the province through his
United Party business directorships. Only one woman nominated,
Rombame Nandi, a prominent Ialibu businesswoman and sister of a
provincial minister.
The relative prominence of educated young men and absence of
established businessmen, by comparison with candidates in other
provinces, reflected the economic situation in the Southern Highlands,
where there were limited opportunities outside paid employment, mainly
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by government and church agencies, for self-advancement and
enterprise. It also reflected the almost complete segregation of
established local leaders in the local government and provincial
government arenas, leaving Parliamentary competition to better educated
and younger men.
The Campaign
Given the frenetic political activity in the province in previous years, the
1982 campaign, while giving scope to new players, was seen by many as
a continuation of contests under way at least since 1977. Incumbent
MPs, all of whom were candidates, had been visiting their electorates
frequently during the previous year and public servants who had resigned
in September 1981 were able to spend six months campaigning before
voting began; in fact several public servants had used their official
positions to campaign long before then.
The close of nominations on 15 April saw an unexpected break in
events. Posu Ank, Andaijah's predecessor as area authority president,
MP for Mendi and PPP provincial leader with Wiwa, died in a road
accident only hours before nominations closed. His younger brother,
William Mone Ank, a teacher, was hastily recruited to replace him as
PPP candidate. Posu's funeral in Mendi the following Sunday was a
major event combining Christian ceremony (Posu was a United Church
pastor) and traditional ritual with a political rally. Chan and national
ministers attended with huge floral wreaths, money trees were
flourished, and Mendepo formally transferred the mantle of Posu's
leadership to William. While Pusal and others were present and offered
donations, Temo, the Pangu challenger for Posu's seat, failed to attend or
provide a gift and this was widely interpreted as evidence of cowardice
or even complicity in Posu's death.
Chan was the only national party leader to make an extended visit to
the province, flying to most electorate centres with Wiwa to speak in
support of Wiwa and the PPP's open candidates. Somare cancelled a
scheduled visit because of illness, and Okuk made a hasty visit to a few
centres in the government's Dash 7. There is little evidence that national
leaders and party affiliation had a major impact, but the financially
straitened period of the previous two years led to reflection on the
previous period of Somare's leadership as 'the good times', and this was
a theme pushed by Pangu candidates.
As in 1977 party endorsements reinforced networks between
provincial and open candidates. Wiwa and Pusal travelled with PPP and
Pangu open candidates when campaigning in their electorates, and in
some cases relied heavily on them to muster support. Of the other four
provincial candidates, Poto confined himself to Kagua-Erave, but Fr
Saimon and Kajawi toured throughout the province and Apurel visited
most areas. None of these four had strong links with leading open
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candidates, and they generally avoided close identification with specific
open candidates so as not to lose the votes of partisans of other open
candidates. The same logic applied to candidates in open electorates,
who often avoided support even for their party's provincial candidate.
Thus Yuwi did not provide Pusal with support in Tari for fear of losing
Kajawi's voters, while Kajawi did not openly align himself with Tari or
Koroba-Lake Kopiago candidates, several of whom supported him.
Financial resources varied greatly among candidates. The two
substantial businessmen, Temo in Mendi and Wabiria in Koroba-Lake
Kopiago, were reputed to have spent K43,000 and K50,000 respectively
on their campaigns and Temo ended with considerable debt. Much of
Wabiria's expenditure went to schools, churches and water supplies,
while Temo gave K200 to his komiti (agent) in each village. Incumbent
MPs had some control over the allocation of sectoral funds of up to
K78,000 for transport and agriculture for 1981 and 1982, though only
government supporters received funds for 1982 (thus excluding Pundia
and Yuwi). These were contracted out for road and agricultural projects
of maximum political benefit, but where contracts were arranged directly
by the MP, as in Ibne's case, district managers withheld payment until
after the election. Unlike the situation in many other provinces, district
managers in the Southern Highlands were in a position to ensure that the
projects were of some real benefit locally, so sectoral funds were not
seen as a major political issue. All projects funded from outside the
province, whether by government or international sources, were claimed
by one or more candidates as the result of their personal intervention.
Wiwa, as a leading government minister, had access to further
resources. Not only could he obtain helicopter transport to remote areas
to open national government projects, but during the campaign he
distributed 400 coffee pulpers in Upper Mendi and other strategic areas.
It was widely believed that he was unable to obtain these from the
minister for Primary Industry, Paul Torato of Enga, until Torato received
a gold-prospecting licence in Porgera from Wiwa's ministry.
It is not known how much funding PPP and National Party
candidates received and whether this came directly from party
headquarters or passed through party co-ordinators based in Mendi.
These were Steven Mendepo for National and Yaungtine Koromba for
PPP; the latter, a mission education secretary from the largest village in
Upper Mendi, later became premier. Generally, however, PPP
candidates received substantial support, while National Party funds failed
to reach several candidates. Pangu's funds passed through Diya, who
received K7000 for the province and distributed K300 each to endorsed
candidates and Apurel and K200 each to other recognized pro-Pangu
candidates. The remaining K2500 went to Pusal to pay the expenses of
other successful candidates after results were known. The Pangu funds
arrived late in the campaign and provided a useful boost at a time when
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other resources were exhausted. The United Party gave K7000 to
Pundia, who used these funds primarily on his own campaign.
Independents were generally poorly funded though the more
promising among them, like those endorsed by the parties, had access to
PNGBC bank loans with only nominal rationale and security. In Koroba-
Lake Kopiago, confronted with two well-funded rivals in Wabiria and
Paiele, Aruru obtained a PNGBC loan of K5000 and also resorted to
raising small amounts from friends at UPNG until provided with K1500
by Diro; while Daniel Mapiria succeeded in raising K2000 from the
People's Action Party in Port Moresby, but proceeded to campaign for
Wabiria.
The parties also supplied transport, with the National Party disposing
of ten vehicles, PPP two, Pangu two and the United Party one. In
addition Wiwa received through Okuk the first of a national fleet of red
trucks mounted with four loudspeakers. All serious candidates had
access to one or more vehicles; for instance, Pusal borrowed three from
a friend who had built up a pool of vehicles from government auctions,
while Aruru had access to fourteen borrowed from various mission and
business friends. Bai made a down payment of K1500 for a National
Party vehicle which never materialized.
Few provincial or open candidates campaigned off the main roads
and this left the more remote areas to their own local candidates. Bai
walked with a backpack throughout Kutubu District and slept overnight
in most villages, and Soso and Poto had most of Erave District to
themselves. In the remote southwest corner, Bosavi, one candidate
visited a few villages and won support but the rest of the population
followed instructions from their provincial government member.
The issues that dominated the campaign were those of local
development and pride. Incumbents claimed responsibility for all new
roads, bridges, schools, clinics and agricultural projects, while other
candidates complained of the lack thereof and promised more.
Traditional local disputes were revived and insults remembered; for
instance, Wiwa's reference to the Wiru of Pangia as 'pumpkin-heads' for
having refused him their votes in 1977 was widely retailed by Pundia and
Apurel.
Results
The electoral administration of the province was exceptionally
professional and was recognized by the national Electoral Commissioner
as a model for the rest of the country. Under one of the few remaining
expatriate kiaps an imaginative training program was developed, tight
control was maintained, and the few crises that arose were defused (see
Fearman 1982). The province was the first to report its final results, and
recounts in Imbonggu and Nipa-Kutubu produced substantially the
original results. Though several losing candidates made allegations of
154 Pangu Returns to Power the 1982 Elections in Papua New Guinea
fraud, only two, Temo and Yuwi, pursued their appeals in court and both
were rejected.
Voter participation in the Southern Highlands remained among the
highest in the country. With 201,802 electors enrolled, 118,520 cast
votes, though of these 17,731 were not on the roll; the latter could not be
explained as migrant workers who had not been available for enrolment,
since a substantial majority of them were women.
In the provincial electorate Pusal, who was listed on the ballot as
'Francis Pusal Didman' to ensure recognition by those who knew him
only as a didiman, won 34.4 per cent of the votes, while Wiwa and
Kajawi took 23.5 per cent and 22.4 per cent respectively and the three
minor candidates each received between 5.5 per cent and 6.5 per cent.
As in 1977 Wiwa and, especially, Pusal were the only candidates to
obtain substantial support outside their home areas.
Poto provided the most extreme case of localised support, winning
97 per cent of his votes in Kagua-Erave, where he captured over 40 per
cent of the vote. Apurel won 85.6 per cent of his votes from Ialibu and
Pangia, while Father Saimon took 80.5 per cent of his votes from Ialibu,
Pangia and Kagua; his campaign to win Catholic voters throughout the
province was aborted by his bishop's opposition to his candidacy. All
three candidates cut heavily into Wiwa's Eastern base, where he
captured only 46.3 per cent of Imbonggu, 45 per cent of Ialibu-Pangia
and 12.2 per cent of Kagua-Erave.
By contrast Kajawi, 85.1 per cent of whose votes came from the
three Western open electorates, and more than half the rest from
adjacent areas of Nipa-Kutubu, captured 70 per cent of the vote in Tari
and 62 per cent in Koroba-Lake Kopiago. Pusal, while winning 62.7 per
cent of the vote in Mendi electorate and 73.6 per cent in Nipa-Kutubu,
also took more votes than Kajawi in Komo-Margarima, while in Tari and
the Eastern open electorates he took more votes than other outside
candidates though Wiwa did better in Koroba-Lake Kopiago.
The support for Pusal and Wiwa outside their home areas can be
explained in terms of party support, mustered primarily by open
electorate candidates. In the East, votes in the provincial electorate
were often directed to the local candidates opposed to Wiwa: thus
Pundia's supporters in Pangia, who had voted for Pusal in 1977, voted for
their clansman Apurel in 1982; and Soso's supporters in Erave voted for
Poto, though the pro-Pangu open candidate in Kagua, Thomas Umbi,
swung his voters to Pusal. In the Centre Posu Ank's PPP support in the
Upper Mendi and Lai Valley areas went again to Wiwa, but in Nipa-
Kutubu PPP and NP open candidates were unable to deliver support to
Wiwa, while Bai Waiba in Kutubu, Dick Peren Mune on the Nembi
Plateau and Don Mailya in Margarima provided solid blocs of votes for
Pusal. As in 1977 Wiwa's only support in the West came from the home
bases of local PPP candidates in Komo, Kopiago and north Tari, while
Dabuma's campaigning in the Tari Basin gave Pusal a respectable
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showing in Kajawi's home country. Since most provincial assembly
members supported local candidates their influence was difficult to
distinguish from other factors, and Dabuma's support provided a rare
instance of identifiable influence.
The major difference between the 1977 and 1982 provincial
electorate results lay in the capacity of candidates to secure unified
support in their home regions and to command a network of party allies
in peripheral areas of other regions. Pusal's narrow defeat in 1977 could
be attributed to the presence of three other candidates from the Centre,
one of whom, Peren Mune, captured populous Nipa. In 1982 Wiwa had
to contend again with a strong local Kagua candidate, but also with two
credible candidates from his home district taking 9000 rather than the
2300 votes lost there in 1977. Pusal's party network of ambitious young
open electorate candidates proved more effective than Wiwa's, which
was cluttered with less popular incumbents. As for the other provincial
candidates, their lack of party networks prevented them, despite active
campaigns, from attracting significant support outside their home bases.
Among the open electorate winners only two, Pundia in Ialibu-
Pangia and William Ank in Mendi, had substantial margins of victory.
Despite a field of thirteen candidates, the largest in the province, Pundia
repeated his 1977 achievement, winning by the largest margin in the
Highlands. Again the peripheral Wiru Loop area in Pangia provided a
strong base of support despite an active campaign by the PPP's Robert
Paia. Ank captured the same areas in the Lai Valley and Upper Mendi
that had voted for his brother in 1977; these were not their home base
near Mendi where Pusal had his base support, but the peripheral areas of
the electorate where Posu had worked as a pastor, developed ties
through marriage and pushed roads and other development.
The same solidarity in peripheral areas worked even more obviously
for Bai Waiba in Nipa-Kutubu and Soso Tomu in Kagua-Erave, who
were major beneficiaries of the first-past-the-post electoral system. For
each, mission assistance in discouraging other candidacies in Kutubu and
Erave paid off in competition with a strong field of candidates dividing the
larger populations of Nipa and Kagua. Bai took 97 per cent of the votes
from Kutubu, which provided 86 per cent of his total; in a field of seven
candidates, he took only 18.2 per cent of the vote, but this gave him a
winning margin of 172 votes over Dick Peren Mune. Soso received 97.5
per cent of the votes in Erave, excluding remote Wapasali, where he
failed to campaign and where another candidate who did collected all
votes. But he also won 63 per cent of the votes in adjacent East Kagua,
which had mission links with Soso and no local candidate. He defeated
the incumbent, Yano Belo, against whom all other candidates were
ranged, and he benefited from an alliance with Kagua's provincial
electorate candidate, Paul Poto.
In the Huli electorates of Tari and Koroba-Lake Kopiago the
established incumbents fell to the renewed challenges of educated young
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men. In Taxi Halalu Mai succeeded in toppling Matiabe Yuwi in a re-run
of their 1977 contest, the difference lying in the presence of seven other
candidates who reduced Yuwi's 1977 support by more than half, while
Halalu held his voters. In Koroba-Lake Kopiago the three-way contest
among Aruru, Wabiria and Paiele, begun in 1977 and repeated in a 1978
by-election, fell this time to Aruru. The Pangu candidate, Dalewa, cut
into Wabiria's base in Koroba and Philip Pakalu reduced Paiele's support
among the Duna, while Aruru, who campaigned very actively, increased
his support throughout Koroba.
In the two 'artificial' electorates of Imbonggu and Komo-Margarima,
created in 1977 out of unrelated areas, the results were again polarised,
with candidates attracting support only in their own portion of the
electorate. In Imbonggu Diya split the Mendi portion with Dus while
Glaimi edged out a challenge from Pila in the more populous Ialibu
portion. In Komo-Margarima, Marabe Makiba, an Aid Post Orderly
supervisor, defeated the Pangu candidate, Don Mailya, by 92 votes in the
larger Margarima area, while the incumbent, Dambali, split the Komo
vote with another candidate and five candidates divided South Tari.
Candidates whose base areas were least split were the winners.
The standard pattern of bloc voting for local candidates remained
largely intact, particularly in the more remote areas, and only in the less
parochial areas around district stations and in the broader communities of
Tari and Ialibu basins did voting on the basis of individual preferences
emerge. These too were the areas where provincial and open candidates
tended to avoid open alliances.
The results favoured younger and better-educated candidates,
especially in competition with older uneducated MPs. Yuwi, Yano and
Paiele all came second, Dambali third and Ibne last in a tight field, while
ex-MPs Wabiria and Momei ran third in their electorates, but among the
incumbents only Pundia and Glaimi, the two best educated, survived.
Voters and their local leaders appeared to feel that educated MPs had a
better chance of competing for resources for local development, but
there was also considerable criticism of the lifestyle of incumbent MPs,
particularly among evangelical mission voters. Fifteen candidates
forfeited their deposits (compared with 17 in 1977) by receiving fewer
than 10 per cent of the votes of the winning candidate in their
electorates, and five of these received fewer than 100 votes; most who
forfeited had not campaigned seriously.
Among the parties, Pangu was most successful in its endorsements.
Pusal, Soso and Pundia (United Party, but unopposed by Pangu) won,
while five other Pangu candidates ran second, three losing by fewer than
200 votes; only Dalewa in Koroba-Lake Kopiago lost badly. If Yuwi
had not had his way with endorsements in the West, Pangu would have
had victories with Aruru and Haralu as well. The PPP's Glaimi and Ank
won and Paiya came third in Ialibu-Pangia, but other PPP-endorsed
candidates did poorly. All four National Party incumbents lost, but Bai
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Waiba, Marabe and Halalu were nominally National candidates. It is
doubtful that party endorsement alone swayed many votes, but the
evidence suggests that Pangu chose its candidates and distributed its
funds more wisely than the others.
Mission-supported candidates did very well. Glaimi and Pundia
were the only incumbents with strong mission support and were the only
ones returned, and to this list must be added Ank, who inherited Posu's
mission support. Soso, Bai and Arum all had close links with evangelical
missions and Halalu, who had worked for several years with the mission
business group, Pasuwe, had APCM support in Tari. Only Pusal and
Marabe among the winners lacked a strong mission vote base. While
the missions eschewed links with any of the parties and did not constitute
a party in themselves, despite preliminarly planning among some young
mission educators, they were effective in mobilizing support for
candidates who were identified with their values.
Aftermath
The rapid reporting of Southern Highlands results gave Pangu an early
opportunity to implement its post-election strategy. A helicopter was
made available for Pusal to fly to Kutubu, Margarima, Tari and Koroba to
persuade the winners, Bai, Marabe, Haralu and Aruru, to join with him to
maximize the influence of the province in negotiating a parliamentary
majority. Bai, Marabe and Halalu were all nominally National Party
candidates, but that party and its provincial organizer, Mendepo, had
been ineffective in providing assistance for their campaigns. Bai had in
fact recruited solid electoral support for Pusal in Kutubu and had helped
persuade his wife's clansman, Marabe, to take down his National Party
posters and support Pusal in the last weeks of the campaign. Pusal had
Pangu funds with which to reimburse winning candidates for all receipted
election expenses.
At the Mendi Hotel, Pusal met with Soso, Bai, Marabe, Halalu and
Aruru. It was already known that Okuk, the National Party leader, was
defeated in (Thimbu and that he had passed the National Party leadership
to Ted Diro; this further weakened any remaining ties with what had
been seen as a Highlands-based party. Pusal argued for joining with
Somare and Pangu as a united bloc to ensure favourable treatment for
the province, and only Aruru, who had received funds from Diro, argued
for keeping options open. By the time Okuk and Thomas Kavali flew into
Mendi to gather the National Party winners, Pusal had led them in road
convoy towards a Pangu rendezvous in Goroka.
At Minogere Lodge in Goroka Pangu assembled its elected
supporters from around the country. Aruru was still attempting to
persuade his fellow Westerners, Halalu and Marabe, to join him in
supporting Diro, and he was challenged by Pangu leaders to declare his
allegiance. Shortly after he was evicted from the meeting, a telephone
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message warned that a time bomb had been planted and the Lodge was
hurriedly evacuated, with some politicians diving out of windows and
ending in hospital. Aruru was interviewed by police on his arrival in Port
Moresby the same day and denied responsibility (Post-Courier 5 July
1982).
Pangu's Highlands supporters were moved to Madang and kept
hidden from agents of other parties until parliament met at the start of
August. At the end of July, with Pangu's majority holding firm, ministries
were allocated. The Southern Highlands bloc joined with MPs from the
Western Highlands and Enga to support Paias Wingti of Mount Hagen
against John Nilkare of Chimbu for the post of deputy prime minister.
Pusal was given the important ministry of Minerals and Energy and the
other two regions of the Southern Highlands were each allocated
ministries, with Pundia given Health and Halalu Environment and
Conservation. Bai was offered the latter portfolio, but turned it down in
favour of Halalu so that regional balance would be ensured. In the
opposition Aruru was given the shadow ministry of Education, while
Glaimi and Ank sat on the cross-benches with the PPP.
The results of the national elections left the three key posts of the
province still in imbalance, with the Centre holding both the provincial
MP and premier positions through Pusal and Tegi, and the East the post
of secretary of the province through Yaki. Pusal and Bai were
determined to remove both Tegi and Yaki, and provincial politics of the
following year were shaped by their campaign. The 1982 elections were
thus for the Southern Highlands not a major turning point, but one in a
series of contests between increasingly polarized provincial elites with
increasingly firm links to national political parties.
The Election in the Southern Highlands
Table 9.1
Southern Highlands Results
* = elected
Southern Highlands Provincial
Francis Apurel 7,562
Francis Pusal Didman * 40,751
Wiwa Korowi 27,824
Pata Saimon Apea 7,654
Martin Hole Kajawi 26,537
Paul Poto 6,484
Informal 1 ,708
Total 118,520
Ialibu-Pangia Open
Rambua Kali 2,637
Karia Warm 70
Thomas Lawa Nou 430
Pepo Tobe 1,506
Pius Piane Kuba 1,342
Manda Pumuye Hilary 865
Robert Mandi Paiya 1,559
Jim Rema Rompompea 551
Mandawe Wabe 122
Rombame Nandi 383
Nicholas Rema Ita 851
Pundia Kange * 5,958
Edwin Kumbe Yokola 679
Informal 117
Total 17,070
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Imbonggu Open
Dominic Diya 2,035
Gamar Iki Kirepe 209
Dominic Mendano 653
Pumbu Oso 874
PilaNinigiKole 3,058
George Rombo 193
Glaimi Warena * 3,242
Dus Mapun 2,761
Robin Wane Kulumi 56
Opai Daiye 1,223
Informal 77
Total 14,381
Kagua-Erave Open
Akuna Wapi 991
Yano Belo 3,295
Kuna Balupa Kelly 283
Henry Ae 546
Soso Tomu * 3,844
Thomas Umbi 1,827
Mathew Yakoba 2,563
Kanga Mambi 1,366
Osa Nugi 747
Informal 63
Total 15,525
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Komo-Margarima Open
John Kane 20
Lape Langaio Waiya 871
Albert Taburu Waiya 1,044
Pepe Wagima 1,160
Tege Tandagua 520
Dambali Habe 2,288
Marabe Makiba * 2,647
Opena Don Jone Mailya 2,555
Ariebe Bongoli 565
J. Wandiali Dibale 1,315
Irai Pama 598
Informal 58
Total 13,641
Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open
Peter Pamburi Pambirali 541
Wabiria Andagali Andrew 2,880
Philip Kundai Pakalu 1 ,345
Daniel Mapiria 10
Ayu Pelepa Peter Tingapa 77
Paiele Elo 3,830
DalewaPipigi 1,005
Aruru Matiabe * 4,050
Informal 61
Total 13,799
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Mendi Open
1,826
5,901
1,834
3,302
461
173
2,438
167
Total 16,102
Nipa-Kutubu Open
Ibne Kor 1,339
Dick Peren Mune 2,609
Malo Fred Tomo 1,961
Nakone Ipe 2,473
Ungunaibe Wari Tombol 2,376
Kank Mongol Senk 1,774
Bai Yabe Eyo Waiba * 2,781
Informal 78
Total 15,391
Tari Open
Matialu Hoiari 727
Kilipa Hetabe 540
Pele Puli 861
Agali Michael Mekela Yabaria 843
Matiabe Yuwi 3,164
Iragali Harabe 1,028
Halalu Mai * 3,695
Pidiu Yari Kiwa 951
John Hako Yaguwaya 523
Agilo Kunini Victor 186
Informal 14
Total 12,532
Salei Tubei
William Mone Ank *
Kiee Kila Toap
Anthony Yarnaik Temo
Secial Sal Papol
Dul Mesi
Momei Pangial
Informal
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Chapter 10
■AFTER THE BIG ONE': THE 1982 CHIMBU PROVINCIAL
CAMPAIGNi
Bill Standish
Introduction
To observe the political fate of the deputy prime minister was one good
reason for studying the 1982 Chimbu2 Provincial (often called 'regional')
election. Iambakey Okuk, who was knighted soon before he died of
cancer in 1986, was to lose his seat to John Nilkare, but whatever the
outcome Okuk s role alone justified my desire to observe a third
consecutive national election campaign in Simbu.
This study is part of a larger study of Simbu politics in which I as an
Australian male examine the creative adaptation of Simbu people to the
changes in the Papua New Guinea state and their society, and attempt to
understand the rules of their political game and what the new democratic
institutions mean to them. As Bailey (1969: xiv) argues, politicians have
similar interests:
No statesman is effective unless he knows the rules of
attack and defence in the political ring. His interest is in
finding out what these rules are, both in particular
cultures and cross-culturally; the moral evaluation of
the participants' motives is beside the point.... Only
after we understand the rules can we start evaluating
the behaviour and so in the end come to a judgement
on the men, if we wish to do so.
In 1982 my specific interests included the impact of the Simbu
provincial government on the national electoral campaign. As new
I thank again the many people around Chimbu who provided essential but
warm hospitality and gave so generously of their thoughts and
information to make this research possible, and Geoff Lapthorne for the
photographs. I am grateful to La Trobe University and to UPNG for
assistance which facilitated this study, conducted over six weeks in May
and August 1982. An earlier version of this paper was given at the
Research Centre for South West Pacific Studies, La Trobe University, in
July 1982, and I greatly appreciate the comments received on it then and
those from Susan Andrews and Ron May.
Until the Organic Law on Provincial Boundaries is amended, the Province
and the Provincial electorate in the National Parliament are officially
called 'Chimbu', while the provincial government has chosen the version
'Simbu', which I also use for the people.
164 Pangu Returns to Power the 1982 Elections in Papua New Guinea
political arenas have opened to new generations of Simbu leaders, so
have new political resources become available for use within these
arenas or transfer back into older spheres of competition. The term
'political resource' includes family funds and obligations, clan support and
that of allied clans, and also the political skills and credit obtainable in
schools, churches and business, quite apart from the support of explicitly
political bodies such as political parties. One significant but
unquantifiable resource is ideology, and the ability through rhetoric and
action to make symbolic appeals for support within a changing political
culture. The ability to manipulate such varied resources is essential for
entry into and success in the Simbu political elite.
Previous experience had led me consider three resources as likely
to be of particular importance in 1982, which I summarise here with the
terms parties, beer and brotherhood.
In the 1972 election, I had wondered if there would be political
party activity for the first time, as an indicator of what political scientists
of the early 1960s called 'political modernization' or 'political
development'. This was the increased political mobilization and
participation then posited to emerge with improved infrastructure,
mobility and communications, and raised levels of education and income.
Political parties, it was expected, would aggregate interests and
articulate them in the national arena, channelling previously local and
parochial concerns into national affairs, and enable voters to make
informed choices about policy matters in an effective exercise of
democracy. Such theory had been largely demolished by events in
recently decolonized Africa and Asia in the 1960s, which showed that
with 'modernization' came stress, corruption, instability and frequently
disorder and open conflict, with a heightened consciousness of ethnic or
'primordial' divisions, and often more authoritarian government.
Modernization theory was based upon the expected growth of shared
social values and a degree of consensus on the legitimacy of the state,
and was unable to adequately analyse social change and in particular
conflict and the growth of economic classes. I did not find political
modernization in the 1972 election in Chimbu, nor much mobilization by
individuals or political parties (Standish 1976).
In the 1977 election there was considerable mobilization, and
although much political activity revolved around beer parties the
elections were essentially individual contests with some personalized
factions emergent (Standish 1983). Beer has long entered traditional
Simbu exchange networks but although it is a luxury it is not (to use
Salibury's 1962 term) a valuable. It does not come from the labour of
women, like village pigs, but rather is bought with cash, money which
need imply no traditional status but which can come from one's own
labour, or from friends and relatives, or commerce, or government. To
distribute much beer may be a sign of access to modern wealth, but is
not necessarily an indicator that the donor himself is a capitalist or even
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a rich peasant; it does not imply any traditional status. Although
considerable funds were spent by many candidates in the 1977 campaign
- with the winner, Iambakey Okuk, saying he spent K20,000 as well as
what he said he 'gave away' - this does not mean that Simbu politics had
become class-based. Rather, Okuk had used resources which became
available to him because of his political office. His generosity was part of
a campaign to induce in people a belief that he was a good and generous
man, and specifically to open friendships and even quasi-kinship relations
with local leaders around the province in the hope that they could deliver
their clans' votes en bloc . So I use 'beer' here as a shorthand way of
describing the entry of money into campaigning. The source of funds
used by the big players in the 1982 campaign would be a matter of great
significance, especially if it came from foreign business.
Personalities and policies aside, money and beer had been important
in the 1977 election, although Okuk won largely because the basic home
base solidarity of his principal rival, John Nilkare, was neatly split by a
political unknown (Standish 1983).
The analysis of the political expression of the social structure and
the ideology of clan brotherhood is one of the principal contributions of
social anthropology to the study of Papua New Guinea electoral politics,
along with an awareness of cultural factors. Perceptions of cultural
factors are important to candidates designing their political persona and
planning their campaign strategies. Debates about the nature of
traditional and modern leadership styles were integral to the 1978
Leadership Code debate (Standish 1978), which was a major factor in
the unravelling of the Pangu-Peoples Progress Party (PPP) coalition in
November 1978 and the fall of the Somare government in March 1980.
Clan solidarity in the form of corporate voting has proven to be the
essential first building block in successful electioneering. Northern Simbu
clans average only about 750 people, not enough to assure election for
an open seat. To garner enough votes a candidate needs the support of
his own people and only with a strong home base (including his patrikin,
matrikin and affines) is he respected sufficiently further afield to gain the
additional votes necessary for a winning margin in an open contest. For
provincial electorates the task is even harder, as voters must be
mobilized on a far wider scale across several language groups and open
electorates.
Previous elections have shown how older leaders have had
difficulty campaigning on a scale wider than traditional tribes which
number up to 5000 people (Criper 1965, Kuabaal 1976), and in the
provincial contests even young, highly educated and energetic men have
had trouble mobilizing support beyond their home district (Standish 1976,
1983). In 1977 as in 1972, clan solidarity was demonstrated in the voting
patterns, and on the wider scale of the provincial electorate large blocks
of votes were delivered to each of the ten candidates (some of whom
also gained support widely throughout the province). The deliberate
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manipulation of Simbu cultural values and the electoral response was
likely to be an important element in the 1982 campaign, and hence to its
analysis. 'Brotherhood* is used here as a shorthand symbol for the use
of such mechanisms.
Context
Chimbu Province covers some 6,153 sq km, and is divided from east to
west by a central mountain range which - although cut through by the
Wahgi River Gorge - serves to separate the areas containing the
greatest population, Kundiawa in the northern sector of the province and
Gumine nearer the centre. In 1978 Chimbu's jural population was
estimated at 220,000 and the resident population at about 180,000 people
(SIPG 1980) who speak some thirteen languages. Tokpisin serves as
the lingua franca and language of politics at district level and beyond.
About 90,000 speak Kuman in the northern and western part of the
province, the most settled valleys where densities reach 251 per sq km.
Among other major languages are Golin (spoken around Gumine by
26,700 people), Chuave (24,000), and Siane (8000) (Howlett et al. 1976:
20).
The modern 'central place', Kundiawa, is the administrative, political
and commercial capital and has about 5,000 residents, mainly non-Simbu.
Kundiawa is sited near where precolonial trade routes met (Hughes
1975), and is in the path of the Highlands Highway and the electric
power line which cross the province east-west across the northern
sector. The land is most suited for cash-cropping in this area, which has
by far the greatest concentration of government activities such as
schools and health services, agricultural extension projects and
Development Bank loans (Howlett et al. 1976), and long-established
mission activities.
The main cash crop, coffee, is grown principally in this northern
sector of the province where the infrastructure is most developed, but
also in the central area of the Gumine District. Incomes from coffee are
low (K50 per year per family in a normal year) for the small peasants,
but potentially far higher (especially in a boom year) for the coffee
buyers and processors. Although the 1982 election was held during the
coffee flush, the season was nothing like the boom year of 1977 when
coffee money fuelled a massive spending splurge by coffee-buyer-
candidates. At the time of the election, weekly minimum wages were
K14.48 (rural) and K32.76 (urban).
In the remote and therefore more marginalized parts of the
province, known locally as the 'corners', there has long been resentment
of the more developed people along the Highway, typified by the Kuman
language speakers known to southerners as 'Chimbu'. There are more
southern/central (or 'Bomai') people than Kuman speakers, if the Bomai
are defined to include the Chuave and Sinasina people in the east and all
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those south of the Wahgi River (such as the non-Kuman speakers in the
Kup census division of Kerowagi District). Further south again are the
Karimui people, who occupy that half of the province which is much
lower in altitude, less fertile for traditional agriculture, and still ridden with
malaria and until recently with a high incidence of leprosy, so that their
population density (about 3 per sq. km.) is much sparser than the
northerners (up to 280 per sq. km.). Although the Karimui people total
about 10,000, their dispersed residence meant that of necessity most
candidates for the National Parliament provincial seat treated them as
insignificant in the election in 1982, as had occurred previously. The
more densely settled northern part of their electorate, the Nomane area,
was accessible by road and so witnessed much heavier campaigning.
Provincial candidates
Although thirteen men stood for the provincial seat, from before the start
of the campaign period it was obvious that the main contest would be
between the leader of the National Party, deputy prime minister and
sitting provincial member, Iambakey Palma Okuk, and the prominent
businessman and Pangu Party executive member, John Mua Nilkare,
who came third in 1977 (the second placegetter, Kobale Kale, had since
left active politics). Ultimately the vote for each of these two men more
than doubled that for all other candidates, bar one, which helps justify my
concentration upon their campaigns in this report, even though the
combined role of the minor candidates was an essential factor in deciding
the outcome.
John Nilkare's home base was Dirima village in Gumine District, but
by 1982 he had gone far. A former magistrate and national liquor
licensing commissioner, he had moved close to expatriate businesspeople
and become a business lobbyist, an influential political door-opener who
was on the board of both South Pacific Breweries and the Westpac
Bank. A successful businessman, he had a pig and chicken farm near
Port Moresby in association with the large Dimo Farm operation, but had
kept a government role as a commissioner for the Port Moresby City
administration (which had replaced the suspended City Council). He had
polled well in the 1977 election, despite his long absence from Chimbu,
but was beaten because of the surprise nomination of a political novice
from his own village, Kai Bomai, who campaigned well and took many
southern Chimbu votes (Standish 1983). Nilkare has a tertiary-educated
Sinasina-born wife, Anna Minga, and himself comes from a politically
prominent family, his father having been Gumine Council president. He
had visited Chimbu often in 1981 and - especially since he was
campaigning as the only endorsed Pangu Party candidate - looked a
strong prospect in 1982 to oust the incumbent provincial member,
Iambakey Okuk.
Table10.1
ChimbuProvincialElection1982:Cand dates'Detail
Politician/businessman;ex-mechanic
Agriculturelecturer
Ex-soldier;e tu ent(UPNG)
Ex-teacher(primary)
Financeclerk
Businessman;ex-teacher(seconda y)
Barrister/solicitor
ResearchOfficer(BA.)
Anatomist(UPNG)
Consultant;ex-kiap,magis rate
andChief.L q.ic nsingomm
Politician;ex-soldier
Self-employed;ex-Provincialecret ry
Occupation
Pangu(end.)
Magistrate
National
Pro-Pangu
United
Pro-Pangu
Pro-PPP(?)
Pro-Pangu
Ind.Ind. Ind.Ind.
Libral(sic) Pro-Pangu Mel.Allce Pro-Pangu
Party
Agea
2N 2N
25 64 37
2N
2 2
N5N
65 65 67 2
IambakeyP.Oku
PeterKumgi
WeraMo i
JohnT.ombukon
GerryNinbe
RiyongH.Yauwe JosephMekTeine
MiugePeterKolkia[Kam s]
JosephD.Kagl JohnM.Nilkare
JosephSilNibabo
PhilipK.Nanme BarunkeK man
Name
A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K. L. M.
Note:aExc ptwheremark dithanast isk(N),thinformationcolumnsprovidedoa dby)
ReturningOfficer.
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The most publicized national politician before the election, Okuk was a
38-year old ex-mechanic who had first been elected in 1972, on his third
attempt. He immediately joined the National Party in the Pangu-led
government, as Minister first for Agriculture and later for Transport and
Civil Aviation. A strong highlands regionalist, he had been behind a mid-
1975 highlands push to replace Somare as prime minister, which was
one factor in his demotion to the Education portfolio in December that
year. However in 1987 Okuk admitted to me that the main issue in his
sacking in January 1976 was his dealings with the Boeing Aircraft
Corporation of Seattle, and his continued attempts - against an explicit
cabinet directive - to buy Boeing aircaft for Air Niugini.
While an MP Okuk used his privileged access to credit lines to
obtain investments in real estate and transport in Port Moresby, a small
gold-mine and plantation in Morobe province, and - in partnership with
his wife, Karina - an unsuccessful coffee-processing factory and thriving
retail stores (including liquor sales) in Chimbu under the name Tokma,
using expatriate managers. Some of the Chimbu enterprises had started
life under the Kamanegu Corporation which he set up for his tribe in
1984, and then later converted into the Chimbu Yomba Corporation, but
which came under his personal ownership when they became insolvent.
He was notorious in business circles for not paying off his debts, yet was
powerful enough to evade creditor:. As described previously, Okuk
retained access to sufficient resources to campaign with extravagant
generosity in the 1977 election and was re-elected narrowly (Standish
1983).
In the 1977 parliament Okuk soon set himself up as Somare's
principle opponent, and as leader of the small but revived National Party
rose to the opposition leadership on the issue of the 1978 Leadership
Code debate. Somare unsuccessfully proposed revising the Leadership
Code as a mechanism to reduce politicians' business interests and hence
deflect the salary demands of senior officials and as well reduce the
dangers of corruption in the bureaucracy. While Somare emphasised the
rapid redistribution of traditional leaders' wealth, and hence the levelling
effect of Melanesian cultural values, Okuk had stressed the elements of
acquisition and display of wealth and argued that the pressure to give
generously required a considerable fortune (Standish 1978). The PPP
leader, Julius (from January 1980, Sir Julius) Chan, argued that for
politics to attract the best people entrepreneurs should not be excluded.
Claiming Somare had failed to consult him over the Code, in November
1978 Chan took the PPP out of the coalition. In 1978-79 Okuk twice
moved votes-of-no-confidence to replace Somare which failed or were
withdrawn for lack of support, perhaps because people feared him or his
highlands regionalist base, and he succeeded in ousting Somare when he
nominated Chan rather than himself as prime minister on 11 March 1980.
Okuk himself was the most vulnerable target in the Chan
government. He developed what might be called a 'crash through and
170 Pangu Returns to Power: the 1982 Elections in Papua New Guinea
crash' style and his public profile was kept high by a tough-minded press
secretary, Geoff Wall. Okuk was the most combative and vocal minister
in Chan's government, projecting himself as a straight-talker who got
things done, and was seen as de facto prime minister. Chan later said
that working with Okuk was like 'living with a time bomb', one
conspiracy after another. 'Every dirty trick performed by Mr Okuk and
his men not only damaged his party, it bounced back on every coalition
member' (Post-Courier, 21 June 1983).
Reappointed as minister for Transport, Okuk immediately sparked
controversy and antagonized people across the country, not least in
Chimbu itself. In what proved to be a mistake expensive both for Air
Niugini and for himself, he single-handedly committed the airline to
purchase (later converted to lease) three Canadian Dash-7 aircraft for
K28 million, saying the deal was 'the best ever for PNG', although later
he claimed a Sydney middleman had taken K3.5 million for delivery of
the aircaft (Post-Courier, 11 February, 1984). These aircaft were able to
land at intermediate-length airstrips in the Gulf and highlands, but as 40-
seaters they were uneconomic because places such as Kundiawa could
only generate about ten passengers a day. With four engines they were
safe, but incurred heavy maintenance costs and were much slower than
the Fokker F-28 jets they replaced on trunk routes.
Okuk argued the need for status symbols at the very first meeting of
Chan's cabinet and pushed through the purchase of a K8 million
Grumman executive jet ('Kumul 2') which incurred both annual running
costs of K2 million and recurring political unpopularity. Okuk's use of
these aircaft to give joyrides to local leaders only served to antagonize
both elite and mass alike. 'Who benefits from this massive expenditure?'
asked Pangu supporters, and answered that it was not ordinary villagers.
Okuk's greatest innovation in government was, in the absence
overseas of Chan, Finance minister Kaputin and Provincial Affairs
minister Momis, to persuade cabinet to hand over sectoral funds for
Health, Transport and Primary Industry operations to the relevant
ministers for distribution direct to individual MPs. Okuk, when moving
his 1980 vote of no-confidence in Somare, had appealed to MPs'
resentment at provincial governments which had taken over from the
national government the power to initiate new projects, and had
promised them increased access to funds. During the nine month period
from September 1980 till June 1981 when the shaky Chan coalition was
vulnerable to a no-confidence vote, the government thus was helped to
retain power by the use of non-accountable cheques of up to K50,000,
given out to MPs to be used at their discretion on projects in their
electorates. Where district officers refused to certify the expenditure, the
funds were drawn on cheques issued at ministerial direction by the
departmental heads.
Some K6 million normally allocated to provincial governments by
the departments of Transport, Primary Industry, and Public Health was
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distributed in this manner, and rapidly became a major scandal. Few of
the many MPs who might have been eligible for prosecution faced
charges for misuse of these funds; they included one Simbu, Robert
Yabara (Chuave Open). The fact that most Pangu members also
accepted the funds did not reduce the anger of the thousands of political
aspirants across the country, and the sectoral funds issue provided ready
campaign ammunition for political aspirants.
In Chimbu the MPs' 'village projects' included campaign-related
activities. A Public Accounts Committee investigation revealed Okuk's
alleged misuse in 1981 of K30,000 of government warrants for helicopter
travel, nominally to check out sectoral projects (Post-Courier, 20 June
1983) and pilots and villagers reported that the trips involved the
distribution of beer. Some politicians passed the sectoral money over to
provincial officials in order to avoid the backlash of hostility from
provincial leaders. Okuk and Clement Poiye (Sinasina-Yonaggamugl
Open) discussed with officials in Chimbu how they would like the health
funds to be spent, but some other MPs were far less discreet. Some
bought cars and one bought a bus for his personal business (nominally for
a village project) and built a house outside his electorate. The available
data indicates that there were few controls established over what was,
even for a political public aware of Somare's 1979 and 1980 use of
Village Economic Development Funds to shore up his parliamentary
numbers, perceived as a spectacularly crude misapplication of public
funds.
Aided by his national role, with the open MPs in subordinate roles,
effectively as his clients, Okuk remained the giant overshadowing
Chimbu politics. In the 1970s Okuk had been in conflict with many
members of the interim provincial government of 1977-80 (Standish
1979) He had even brawled with its provincial secretary, Barunke
Kaman - a fellow Kamanegu tribesman and former economics student
who publicly accused Okuk of corruption -and in 1977 brought criminal
charges against him, which were not preceded with but had the effect of
quietening Kaman during the election campaign. But eventually Okuk
won over many local leaders with generous use of resources from his
liquor outlet and dance hall (later store) in Kundiawa, and from 1979
formed a close working relationship with the new expatriate general
manager of Chimbu Coffee Co-operative Society (CCCS), Bob Kotszka.
The CCCS was nominally run by the provincial government from 1979,
through the provincial-government-dominated business arm Chimbu
Holdings Enterprises ( known as 'CHE'), but in a reverse takeover it was
CCCS which effectively ran that government for a time.
In the June 1980 provincial assembly election campaign candidates
used party labels, 'Pangu-UP' for the Opposition coalition with United
Party, and 'lain bilong lambakey' for Okuk's groups. In a significant if
unsuccessful development a new southern (or Bomai) grouping of the
'corners' was also touted. Okuk used his access to central government
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resources as Transport minister and funds donated by some prominent
Simbu businessmen, including those involved in CCCS, to hire helicopters
to pluck winners to safety, away from their home areas which in several
instances had erupted into tribal fighting. Many winners dropped their
previously proclaimed party allegiances and joined Okuk. He took them
first to Minj and then to a plush Port Moresby hotel to choose a
government (Standish 1980), which was widely perceived as being his
puppet.
The new Simbu premier was Mathew Numambo Siune, another
Kamanegu who was fond of saying that Kamanegu are 'born to rule'.
Siune had bitterly opposed Okuk in the 1972 poll and afterwards
(Standish 1976), but was sacked in 1974 by Chimbu Coffee for theft of
$1,643.70 of coffee-purchasing funds. Despite Siune being defended by
Okuk's lawyer and saying he took the funds to pay higher prices to
growers, he was found guilty. After Okuk offered to repay the funds he
was not jailed, but rather placed on a one year K300 bond (Post-Courier,
1 March 1976). Siune became Okuk's client, and his father the nominal
(but not legal) chairman of the Kamanegu Corporation. Helped by Okuk,
Siune found employment with the Chimbu Area Authority and later with
the interim provincial government until sacked in 1979, allegedly for non
performance of duties, when he set up a tavern near the province's
western border which prospered despite the liquor ban in 1980.
Apart from these two likely front-runners, the provincial seat
attracted a highly qualified field of candidates, all slightly younger and
almost all better educated than Okuk himself. Nilkare aside, only
Barunke Kaman was a businessman with sufficient resources to mount
an effective campaign to cover the province. With perhaps one or two
exceptions they were all credible candidates, however, and what was to
become important was not the size of their campaign funds but the
simple fact of their nomination and the locations of their home bases.
Okuk's home base was divided internally, and was ringed by
serious-minded young men, determinedly opposed to him personally and
hence to the National Party. Map 10.1 shows the home villages of the
provincial candidates, indicated by a letter of the alphabet. As a central
northerner from the Awakane clan of Kamanegu tribe, Okuk (letter A on
the map) incurred the resentment of the advantages which his people
had gained from their central location in the colonial era. Worse, in
terms of Simbu values, he also had to overcome the shame of being
opposed by two fellow Kamanegu, the MA candidate Philip Nanme (L)
and the pro-Pangu (or pro-Somare) coffee buyer and former provincial
secretary, Barunke Kaman (M) from Bomaikane and Orgondie clans
respectively. In their home open electorate alone these two Kamanegus
were to gain 3,196 votes, which - if all had gone to Okuk - hypothetically
would have been enough to have reversed the ultimate result.
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Also among Kuman speakers the young lawyer and Independent
Independent, Joseph Mek Tiene (G), took nearby votes which otherwise
Okuk or Kaman might have expected, despite earlier Kamanegu tensions
with Mek Tiene's Endugwa tribe. Mek is the son of a former open
member for Kundiawa and provincial government minister Joseph Tiene.
His vehicle proclaimed him 'a man of the people' and perhaps to counter
allegations that he had a superior manner he occasionally went
barefooted during the campaign. He and some Gumine candidates
thought he would do well in Nilkare's base, Gumine, after acting there as
a fight mediator and defending lawyer. Still among the Kuman speakers,
Okuk was opposed by the graduate research officer and Independent
Independent, Miugle Peter Kolkia [Kamis] (H), from the Gembogl area
of the Upper Chimbu valley, where Okuk had gained blocks of votes in
1972 and 1977. In 1982, however, Gembogl people said they were sick
of the 'Highway men', and of Okuk in particular because he had failed to
build the road over the Iwam Pass to Bundi in Madang Province which
they said he had promised them in 1977. (They ignored the fact that
Okuk had taken credit for upgrading their road to Kundiawa in the early
1970s.)
In Kerowagi District, to the West, the Kuman-speaking pro-Pangu
agriculture lecturer, Peter Kumgi (B), had stood against Okuk in 1977,
and was still angry at the latter's previous role as minister for Primary
Industry. Again in Kerowagi District, a UPNG anatomist, Joseph D.
Kagl (T), a fifth Kuman speaker, stood as a self-proclaimed Libral (sic).
Just south of the Wahgi River there were two other minor candidates,
John Talba Kombukon (D), a pro-Pangu ex-teacher of Kup, and Joseph
Sil Nibabo (K), a pro-Pangu magistrate from Neragaima in the Dom
area. Okuk's base was thus ringed by at least five credible candidates.
To the east in Chuave there were three candidates, Wera Mori (C),
a young former soldier and student, who had been greatly assisted by
Okuk while at university in Port Moresby, but who eventually stood as
one of the few endorsed candidates in Chimbu of the once dominant
United Party (UP); Gerry Ninbe (E), a pro-PPP former finance clerk;
and Riyong Henry [Henganike] Yauwe (F), a Morobe-born but locally
raised pro-Pangu businessman and ex-secondary teacher, who had stood
unsuccessfully for Chuave Open in 1977. Riyong stood to gain a very
large block of Siane votes previously won by Okuk, and Mori and Ninbe
smaller blocks previously directed towards Nilkare, so although the
Chuave candidates effectively cancelled each other out, overall they
were likely to hurt Okuk more than Nilkare.
Five of the thirteen candidates were pro-Pangu, which may not have
been deliberate on Pangu's part - an issue discussed below - but merely
reflected the fact that Okuk had attracted a large field of educated
people who wanted to defeat him. To have the resources and
confidence to tackle the provincial seat they were likely to be well-
educated, and most well-educated and well-paid Simbu come from the
175
Table 10.3
Occupation of candidates and winners, Simbu elections
1972, 1977 and 1982*
(rounded percentages)
1972 1977 1982
C w C W C W
(n=71) (n=8) (n=105) (n=7) (n=132) (n=7)
Small peasant0 11 0 9 0 5 0
Big peasant0 20 0 13 0 5 0
Coffee and trade stored 10 0 2 0 3 0
(Peasant total) (41) <P) (24) (0) (13) (0)
Store ownere 7 37 11 14 14 14
Coffee Buyer* 7 0 17 29 4 14
Trucker* 3 13 3 14 8 14
(Businessmen total) (17) (50) (3D (57) (26) (42)
Public servants and clerks'1 IS 13 22 14 33 29
Teachers 7 0 11 14 18 0
Church workers1 10 12 9 0 4 0
(White collar total) (32) (25) (42) (28) (55) (29)
Blue-collari 10 13 3 14 6 29
Notes to Table 10.3
(a) Source: returning officers supplemented by field data (Principal occupation).
(b) Most rural people in northern Simbu grow coffee as smallholders, and are defined
as peasants here because the economic activities are land-based and export-oriented.
Some designated as 'subsistence farmers' by officials were in other occupations,
such as teachers up until the election. 'Small peasant' as used here is a relative term
used where no special record is kept of the size of coffee holdings or other
economic activities.
(c) These men are known to have large coffee holdings, cattle/pig projects.
(d) Coffee sales usually support the trade stores, which are frequently seasonal.
(e) Proprietors of viable stores and legal liquor outlets.
(f) Coffee buyers tend to be young and relatively well educated. Young men have less
access to land than their elders. They may also have coffee stores, etc.
(g) Truckers are those hiring plant to public works, plus passenger/cargo carriers.
(h) Includes some non-literate people such as aidpost orderlies, and interpreters, as well
as clerks in private enterprise.
(i) Includes non-literate catechists and evangelists and tertiary trained clergy,
(j) Includes skilled tradesmen, labourers and drivers.
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north of the province and so were likely to eat into Okuk's vote. Further,
any opponent of Okuk's was likely to be attracted to Pangu party with its
national rather than highlands regional orientation.
These other candidates might be thought to be on 'Kamikaze'
missions, merely there to split Okuk's potential vote, but some
campaigned very widely - especially Barunke Kaman, Mek Tiene, Wera
Mori and Gerry Ninbe - and with others showed that fanatic gleam
which the politically ambitious display in their mystic relationship with the
electorate, and they sounded quite genuine in saying that they expected
to win. They did not just 'run dead,' merely concentrating on their home
areas, as would deliberate 'splitters'. Each of these four candidates, and
Peter Kumgi, gained over six thousand votes, which is no mean feat.
Together the eleven 'minor' candidates polled 52,220 and although every
vote they gained was potentially one less for Iambakey Okuk, in some
areas - such as Kaman's campaign base of Gunanggi in Sinasina district
- it was also almost certainly also one less for John Nilkare.
Open candidates
Table 10.2 above summarises the background of all candidates and
winners (Open and Provincial) in 1982 as well as in 1977 and 1972. It
shows first of all the increasing number of Simbu attracted to the
electoral lottery, with the province's average of 22 candidates per open
seat again the highest in the country. The data reflect many of the
changes in Simbu society and the people who were entering its political
elite. The average age of candidates fell slightly to 33 years, but that of
winners dropped from 36 to 29. The 1982 candidates' average level of
formal education had fallen slightly from 1977, but eight were graduates
and many had 11 years' schooling; the winners' average formal
education rose from 7 to 1 1 years. Previous political office had been held
by far fewer candidates (10) and winners (1) in 1982 than in 1977 (23
and 4, respectively). So these people were new to electoral politics, as
were the first two Simbu women ever to stand for parliamentary
election, Mun Mek and Gagum Kama both of Kerowagi district, although
they had long played leading roles in various women's associations.
Table 10.3 below gives details of the occupations of candidates and
winners in the three national elections, and again reflects the changing
fortunes of Simbu. Compared to 1977, the proportion of 1982 candidates
whose economic activities were primarily cash-cropping (who are here
classified as peasants) almost halved from 24 to 13 per cent. As in 1977,
they provided no winners. There was a fall in the number of coffee
buyer candidates to 4 per cent in 1982 from 17 percent in 1977, and of
winners to 14 from 29 per cent. In other words, those few coffee buyers
who stood did relatively well in 1982, but fewer coffee buyers took the
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Table 10.2
Personal data, Simbu candidates and winners 1972, 1977 and
1982 elections*
1972 1977 1982
C W c W C W
Number 71 8 105 7 148 7
Age (average years) 35 34 37 36 33 29
Formal education
(av. years)
3 4 9 8 7 11
Previous candidacy15 34 6 28 3 45 3
Previous elected office0 18 6 23 4 10 1
Women 0 0 0 0 2 0
Re-elected - 4 1 m 1
Notes to Table 10.2
(a) The elections were for the House of Assembly (1972), the National
Parliament (1977 and 1982).
Source: returning officers supplemented by Field Data, Standish
1972-80.
(b) This includes candidacy in local government, provincial assembly
and parliamentary elections. Data may be incomplete.
(c) This includes council, provincial assembly and parliamentary
membership.
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risks of standing. A larger proportion of truckers, who are more
established businessmen, stood in 1982 (8 per cent, as against 3 in 1977),
and again were 14 per cent of winners. Overall, the proportions fell of
businesspeople standing (from 31 to 26 per cent), and winning (from 57
to 42 per cent). There was a slight rise in the proportion of teachers and
clergy standing (from 20 in 1977 to 22 per cent), but a fall in their
success rate (from 14 to 0 per cent). There were more public servants
standing (33 as against 22 per cent) and successful (29 as against 14 per
cent). There was a doubling of blue-collar wage-earning candidates
(from 3 to 6 per cent) and winners (from 14 to 29 per cent).
These figures probably reflect the rising numbers of educated Simbu,
of young men with confidence in themselves and the confidence of their
clans to back their ambition. There were fewer business opportunities
available during an economic downturn, but more Simbu public servants
in clerical positions with sufficient status and salary to consider standing.
They may also reflect the resentment of the better-educated at the
performance of the previous group of elected leaders. As Kobale Kale,
himself a former MP and minister, said, many stood to pull down or block
other bigmen, or potential bigmen, or to become bigmen themselves.
The sole sitting open member from Chimbu to be returned, Robert
Yabara, implied before the poll that he might well lose but was satisfied
because he had had 5 years and now had a business (Bill Standish [BS]
field notes 17 May 1982). Given the example the sitting members
showed of the material rewards available from successful candidature, it
is perhaps not surprising that so many stood, especially when even losing
candidature is a status-enhancing role within one's group.
My impressionistic assessment of the candidates from their career
paths is that Pangu tended to attract or endorse steadier individuals with
stable employment histories such as public servants, the Nationals
attracted private businessmen with somewhat unstable work histories,
while the MA tended to attract Christian welfarists such as church
workers and teachers. PPP candidates tended to be business people and
former public servants, some with slightly erratic histories.
Party endorsements were difficult to identify precisely, as were the
less obvious material assistance to candidates informally committed to
supporting parties. Endorsements seemed to be based upon personal
relationships with party officials and leaders, such as former school or
work mates, and assessments of those candidates likely to be winners
which were even less accurate than in 1977. Whether or not party
endorsement or association with the party leaders actually gained them
votes, there was some financial inducement for candidates to seek or
accept party support from the two major parties. Some candidates
shopped around for support, and one (Robert Yabara) changed parties
during the nomination period and finished up saying he was Independent.
National had the greatest number of open candidates endorsed,
about twenty, with Okuk the sole provincial nominee, and about thirty
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pro-Nationals who received party support. This was similar to Okuk's
strategy of 1977, when he effectively took over the UP campaign in
Chimbu. Pangu endorsed seven opens, with Nilkare the sole endorsed
provincial nominee but five of his opponents also identified as being pro-
Pangu. PPP had five opens, and no one nominated against Okuk
(although it was alleged that two of his rivals received PPP's material
support). MA had five nominees, with Philip Nanme the sole provincial
nominee and organizer. The UP had two opens as well as one provincial
standing. Many open candidates were independent, with about five
linked with Ted Diro's Independent Group. Of the provincials, two called
themselves Independent Independents, and found themselves the subject
of unwelcome soliciting and accusations from other candidates.
As discussed further below, this was an election in which
conspiracy theories abounded. Most of the minor candidates at some
stage or another were mentioned to me as having been put up to split
Okuk's vote, and one allegedly stood to split Barunke Kaman's. In the
provincial seat one potential candidate was said to have dropped his idea
of standing in order to become campaign manager, another to have
offered to withdraw for a K3,000 fee, while a third claimed (supported by
a credible witness) to have refused an endorsed intermediary's proffered
bribe of a K7,000 vehicle and a business if he withdrew his nomination -
a ploy hard to comprehend, because if carried out the main opponent of
the alleged initiator of the move stood to benefit most. There was an air
of suspicion about the 1982 election in Chimbu, with plenty of rough-and-
tumble when candidates shouted out at marketplaces ] is a thief.
The provincial secretary, Arnold Daugl, was right when he said that the
campaign was 'really hot'.
The campaign
Far more than in 1977, the election campaign in Chimbu was broadcast
by national FM radio into the many village portable receivers, over-laden
with commercial jingles in loud, penetrating nasal voices plugging the
political parties and their leaders:
Long bus, long nambis, ailans tu
Nesenel Pati bai emi halvim yu;
Yu na mi na Iambakey
Yumi stretim PNG;
Nesenel em i pati tru -
Votim em long '82P>
* La the bush, the coast and islands, too,/ National Party will help you;/ You
and me and Iambakey/ We'll sort out PNG;/ National is a party true -/ Vote
for it in 1982!
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and
We know what the Pangu means,
We're going to vote the Pangu team,
We need Somare and Pangu, today!!!4
The parties' high profile nationally was more than echoed at the local
level, however, starting with the National Party convention in Kundiawa
in March 1982, a massive feast with 180 pigs and beer provided for a
huge crowd, parts of which were so rapt in the string bands and their
own dancing that they barely made landing space for the (expatriate)
parachutists who were among the paid entertainers. Several months
later Okuk said 'We collected from business for the convention, and blew
K68,000, or K86,000 on that'. National had spent K15-20,000 on
conventions in seven other provinces. He considered the Chimbu
convention a mistake, and he was still annoyed at 'Barunke Kaman and
his mob' for having broken it up (BS 26 August 1982).
Whether or not party endorsement or association with the leader
actually gained them votes, the twenty endorsed National candidates or
their campaigners received about K100 cash, perhaps a beer party with
several pigs and a cow, and high quality posters. National also gave
about K150 worth of posters to its thirty self-proclaimed supporters.
Pangu's Chimbu branch had much less funding, and K6,000 of centrally
contributed campaign funds topped up by K1,000 from Nilkare was
grabbed early by its main organizers. The pro-Pangu supporters
recieved only about K50 of cheap leaflets to hand out. The other parties
as such were not particularly visible or significant in the Chimbu
campaigns.
Yet the importance of political parties was the dominant impression
to be gained from the big public spectacles of the campaign; Pangu and
National were named in almost every sentence, and speakers sought to
utilize the names of their figurehead leaders. Even more than when
prime minister, Michael Somare was in 1982 enormously popular in the
highlands, quite overshadowing the nominal prime minister. Perhaps
because people were blase" about politics and helicopters, although more
likely because the few PPP candidates were not very prominent men and
he did not front Okuk's heartland at Kundiawa, Chan's helicopter visit
lifted the profile of PPP around the fringes but attracted little attention
compared to the Pangu and National rallies.
Pangu had another song in Hiri Motu, as well. Perhaps because in Papua
New Guinea all major parties were equally involved, the role of Australian
advertising agencies and musicians in the campaigns drew no media
comment, to my knowledge, in contrast to the situation in Fiji that year
where foreign consultants' involvement in politics led to a royal
commission.
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These gatherings of several thousand were personalized into
competitions between Somare and Okuk, with the crowds quite partisan,
on at least one occasion to the point of foolhardiness. When Somare
early in the campaign arrived by helicopter at Kerowagi to campaign for
Nilkare, Okuk followed in an attempt to confront him, but the angry
crowd prevented Okuk's hired helicopter from landing. Somare
supporters actually grabbed the skids of the hovering machine and shook
it until Okuk departed. Similar events occurred elsewhere, with Okuk
chased away from Pangu meetings at Mai in Yonggamugl, in
Nambaiyufa and Omkolai, and threatened with stones at Chuave.
Deliberate and successful attempts were made to break up his rallies at
Kundiawa and Gembogl. Former premier Siwi Kurondo, who said Tm
Pangu, I don't change', perhaps reflected a quite widely held view as
well as any personal grudge in shouting at Minggende market 'Iambakey
man nogut. Em i hambag man stret ' ('Iambakey is a bad man. He is a
real humbug'. BS 14 May 1982).
Although the National Party branch in Chimbu had an executive
with a southerner as chairman, Timothy Yomba, and a crowded office in
Kundiawa, this was very much a personal operation and as such was
definitionally a political faction. Conventions had been held and policy
documents printed, but in Chimbu the focus was all upon the party
leader. His slogan, 'The First Highlands Prime Minister', bluntly stated
his ambition to be the country's boss and also his claim to stand for the
dignity of the highlanders, who would not be kicked around by coastal
people, a theme he had stressed in crude anal language in the 1977
campaign. He was thereby also proclaiming himself an equal of Somare,
the defeated prime minister.
Throughout the campaign in the highlands Okuk followed his
strategy of the previous six years, an appeal to a pan-highlands ethnicity
which bordered on highlands chauvinism. For historical reasons arising
from late contact because of geographic isolation, this region had been a
late-starter in colonial development, Western education and modern
employment. Okuk's supporters showed films which reminded people of
the famous Simbu leader, the late Kondom Agaundo, who was the first
highlands representative in the Legislative Council in the 1960s.
Kondom was said to have told coastal people that while they mocked his
rusticity he was sharpening his spears - the educated Simbu youth.
Okuk himself was one of the first highlanders to go to high school and
appeared to be driven by resentment at slights received years before, as
demonstrated in this paraphrased extract from a speech at a feast given
by Danga Bagme at Maki near Kerowagi, which was part of his
standard campaign speech.
They called us gris pik (pig fat), tinfish eaters, skin diwai (bark
belt wearers), beginners. Now I want to lift up your names.
There are many educated candidates; but think about it, look
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closely at them, and get an orator with a good head who knows
how parliament works. I am the son of a great leader, Palma,
and I have taken his place. There are people from my own
line, the Kamanegu, standing against me. The Prime Minister
shouldn't be a Sepik or a Kavieng. We shouldn't be cargo boys.
We have boundaries, setting out the positions in government.
It's nothing to do with university education or lots of money.
You can see that. Damn the educated young candidates!
Some of them don't even have jobs. They are the children of
rubbish men. The basis of work is competition. You Simbu
should be happy, we didn't oust Somare with spears, but lobbied
to vote him out of power. Now I'm competing to defeat them.
I talk for all gris pik men, all as tanget ('breach clout' wearers,
(BS 26 May 1982).
Villagers and educated people alike around Chimbu said this populist
pitch appealed to highlanders, especially the rural youth, who sense
injustice in their lack of success in the modern employment market and
resent their better-educated and more successful agemates. Okuk said
his main campaign theme was
decisive, strong, firm leadership. That is what we want.
Somebody has either got to do something - lead or bloody get
out of the way.... If you make the wrong decisions, people will
get you out .... I like to make some firm decisions. Good or
bad.... That is the style of leadership which I am selling....
PNG people need some instant decisions, right or wrong (Post-
Courier, 3 June 1982).
Asked if this could lead to a dictatorship, he said 'We have a tribal
system here which will defuse any dictatorship movement.... Tell me
who has the courage to say, "I want to become a dictator"?' (Post-
Courier, 3 June 1982).
Okuk's Port Moresby statements reported by the national and
international media focused on anti-communist and anti-union themes;
some of his nationalist statements (such as those criticising Filipinos)
were ethnocentric if not racist. He spoke out strongly at UPNG against
Indonesia for its role in Irian Jaya, and in particular transmigration
(Griffin and King: 59-61). The Indonesian Embassy took the bait and
responded in a newsletter that
One has to understand the nature of international politics if one
would become the leader of a certain nation, otherwise such a
person will create a disaster instead of developing peace and
harmony between two neighbouring countries (The Age, 30 April
1982).
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The embassy thus appeared both to meddle in Papua New Guinea
politics, for which Foreign Minister Noel Levi and Okuk condemned it,
and to imply that Okuk was a possible leader. Okuk reinforced this latter
impression by calling for a conference on Indonesia's armed incursions
into Papua New Guinea at the time of the election. His appeal for
'Melanesian brothers and sisters' may indeed have been intended as a
cheap way to place himself for the post-election prime ministerial
lobbying stakes, but first he had to ensure re-election at home.
When in Chimbu Okuk virtually ignored the national and
international themes he raised on the national media. The only
international issue I heard raised was the unlikely allegation that Okuk
had close relationships with communists. One informant said these
rumours were perhaps referring to China. Perhaps this is why Okuk
stressed his anti-communism in the national media, but the rumour had
no basis other than maliciousness or the confusion arising from Okuk's
personal business dealings with the Republic of China, Taiwan, which
had led to him breaking a government ban on importing rice by bringing
some Taiwanese rice in through Rabaul.
Since he was the incumbent, for the other Simbu candidates the
main campaign issue was the performance in government of Okuk
himself, in Chimbu. Despite having said since the 1970 by-election that
he would not give promises, Okuk in 1977 had made certain campaign
pledges, which were remembered in 1982 and against which he was
evaluated. Pangu supporters frequently said that Okuk had done nothing
in office, and - only slightly elliptically - Chan had said people should cut
out the tree that bore no fruit (BS 20 May 1982). In Chuave local
leaders said Okuk had not obtained the Nambaiyufa to Goroka road, the
promise of which had helped swing him the winning block of votes in that
remote and ethnically distinct corner of Chimbu, but ignored the massive
road improvements made during 1977. Nor had he built the road to
Bundi, as Upper Chimbu people recalled him pledging. These two were
local issues, but were skilfully utilized against Okuk by Pangu and pro-
Pangu candidates in areas where he previously had obtained large and
essential blocks of votes.
In Chimbu there remained a Pangu organization following on from
the provincial government election of 1980, with Barunke Kaman the
secretary, but this suffered after Nilkare used his Port Moresby
connections to get party endorsement for the provincial seat in 1982
ahead of Kaman. Pangu national organizer, Barry (later Sir Barry)
Holloway, said, 'The party organization in Chimbu was a shambles. We
tried to have it organised, but eventually left it to them.' (BS 27 August
1982). After giving K6,000 early on headquarters gave small sums
(often just plane tickets back home) to Chimbu candidates, as part of a
national budget which Holloway put at K630,000. Nilkare financed his
own campaign caravan of three vehicles on the road for three months.
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For Pangu Pati nationally Somare was the greatest asset, the man
who gained self-government and independence, bringing power from
Australia, and who set up the national currency. The party program
emphasized three policies. First, to tighten government administration and
reduce the size of the bureaucracy, which might not be expected to be
popular with Pangu's traditional public service constituency. Second, to
strengthen village courts, which mollify and appeal to those concerned at
declining public order in rural areas, and especially appeal to the village
leaders who might help sway blocs of votes. Pangu also pledged
improved health services and higher levels of universal education. Third,
and especially potent in Simbu, to improve the rural economy, especially
rural sectors through the proposed agriculture, industry and housing
bank. The Chan-Okuk government took power just as the second oil
price rise shock of 1979 took effect and commodity prices - including
coffee prices - plummeted 30 to 50 per cent. Overall, government
revenues declined 30 per cent in real terms. While a strong government
might have been able to restrain official spending, Chan's was not strong,
and government debt rose in 1981-82. Chan himself later said publicly
that coercive pressure to withdraw support meant that unreasonable
demands by coalition members could not be refused. Pangu was able to
use the Chan-Okuk government's extravagances during this economic
downturn to great effect. As pro-Pangu candidate, Peter Kumgi, said,
This is the people's money, and it is being wasted' (BS 13 May 1982).
Usually the corruption issue was raised by Pangu supporters in quiet
talk around the fringes of meetings and markets, rather than in public
speeches by endorsed candidates. Apart from accusations of waste
such as the aircraft purchases, a libellous allegation was made by one
endorsed Pangu candidate that Okuk had received a block of apartments
in Sydney as a kickback for the Dash-7 purchase, which I can mention
here because Okuk himself publicly denied it. Perhaps most Pangu
candidates avoided overt confrontations for fear of causing a breakdown
of public order, because aggressive confrontations - in the style used by
Okuk in 1977 - in Simbu frequently incite violence. To gratuitously stir
up conflict is bad politics. Okuk was sufficiently niggled to mention in his
speeches those who had broken up his meetings, but put them down
saying that they 'appeared crazy' (BS 26 May 1982).
If Pangu had a local figurehead at all it was Nilkare, but his personal
campaign was low-key. He made a last-minute dash around the
province by helicopter just before polling started to remind people of his
candidature. As in 1977, he had spent much of the time beforehand in
Port Moresby, which could have cost him the seat, but he had also kept
other southerners from standing and thus kept his vote catchment safe.
Nilkare had earlier used his connection with Somare in a helicopter tour
of the remoter parts of Chimbu, during which Somare avoided the heated
confrontational stance that marked Okuk's rallies. Despite this, Nilkare's
wealth meant his campaign was an autonomous one, distanced slightly
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from the Chimbu Pangu branch, although he had close links with some of
the endorsed open candidates like Nua Fred in Upper Chimbu, where a
large party helped win support for both (although a local informant said
he had forgotten what had been said after four days of drinking). Nilkare
conducted ten big rallies, at which he emphasized Pangu's economic
points and condemned the Chan-Okuk government's economic
mismanagement and the Dash-7 purchase. He also highlighted the falls in
coffee prices and commodity rice stabilization funds, although some Okuk
supporters said this was not the fault of the government.
Nilkare's northern opponents perceived that his sophistication could
be turned against him, and whispered widely that he had abandoned his
own kind: 'He doesn't have relatives to stay', some said - a story which
is false - while a contradictory rumour said 'When Simbu visit him he
breaks the dishes afterwards, because we're dirty'. Nilkare nailed the
'white man' story in a splendid Kuman language speech near Moruma,
west of Kerowagi, which drew laughter and applause:
People say I am a white man but my tokples is Bomai and I
have a black skin. It is true I have white friends, like Bill here
[in the audience]. Standup! People say I give to the whites.
Seventeen whites work for me and I have to talk with them.
It's a trick - if I don't talk with them they'll steal from me. ...I'm
a director of Westpac Bank. The staff work for me. Some
Number Ten men say I talk to whites, but they are working for
me: I'm a director of SP Brewery and I have accountants and
lawyers. I'm Port Moresby City Commission Chairman: so
when things go wrong, the whites have to come to me! (BS 23
May 1983).
There was also what he called the 'personality issue', and at
Moruma he attacked Nationals as 'humbugs', making 'bullshit talk about',
using government money for their helicopter trips. 'They give you money
and beer and imported pigs, and rotten old cars. Why do they have to
buy votes? Where have they been that they have to buy your votes?'
(BS 23 May 1982). Nilkare said that Okuk was trying to stay a
parliamentarian because he was looking after his own welfare, throwing
money around in the way one feeds a dog and forgets it, whereas Tve
got businesses, and I'm concerned about others'. Nilkare campaign team
leader and former deputy provincial commissioner, Matthew Towa,
drove the message home, saying Okuk and other candidates were 'only
thinking of government money, whereas John has business. He has
money already in his hands, so he is not thinking of himself. So John
Nilkare will look after us later' (BS 23 May 1982).
A Kamanegu councillor, Tiene Boi, who had travelled the province
with Nilkare also spoke, saying Okuk had failed to deliver. Nilkare had
concluded his Moruma speech by warning
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Soon this country will be ruined. Okuk wants to be a dictator, one
king alone, bossing the police and the army. If he says shoot
someone, they'll do it - he's doing it now. Now we have a prime
minister, but one without balls. True or false? Problems are like yar
trees, they grow and grow.... If you want a happy life like before,
vote for me.
The meeting ended with reminders from a local candidate that Pangu
was like the country's parents, and had opened the way to people to sit
down together, with Somare supporting the good life. 'People should
acccept Okuk's food or pork gladly, but not be happy with the man; vote
for the best man and consider a replacement' (BS 23 May 1982).
The Pangu woman candidate, Mun Mek, spoke too, expressing
concern about the waste of government money which should be spent on
health and educational services. Later she talked to me about how men
are the wasters, and they destroy women's subsistence base in their clan
warfare. Such outspoken statements, even a woman speaking up in a
forum outside the clan, goes against the Simbu ethos that women are
seen in public but rarely heard, and in the circumstances was immensely
courageous, which may explain why Mun Mek's manner was
deferential, if not her content.
Nilkare claimed he would not try to grease people with beer or
money, but did present small cheques (K50-150) to youth groups and
churches. Although absent from Chimbu early in the campaign period,
he kept three campaign teams on the road with vehicles for months, and
while his close supporters said he spent K76,000 in Chimbu (and he said
it was K45,000), his campaign was less ostentatious than Okuk's. He
worked on his key supporters among the older leaders, taking them en
masse to a weekend party at Ilimo, strengthening the bonds. He had a
huge party at his home base at Omkolai, but none at his wife's village this
time. As in 1 977 he revived traditional links with groups of voters in Kup
('My people sheltered yours when you were refugees from warfare'),
and stressed the Bomai identity when in the south, although often this
was left to his campaign helpers.
It was not clear that Somare's widespread personal popularity was
transferred to Pangu as a whole. The pro-Pangu/pro-Somare stand of
some people was not necessarily translated into a pro-Nilkare stance, as
shown when the former interim premier, Siwi Kurondo, publicly
supported Pangu against Okuk but then endorsed his fellow Gena
tribesman, Peter Kumgi, rather than Nilkare. One Pangu supporter,
Barunke Kaman, apparently could not accept Nilkare's endorsement; to
Nilkare's annoyance Kaman waged energetic campaigns in areas which
otherwise would be Nilkare territory in Gunanggi and Salt. With five
pro-Pangu people competing for the provincial seat and party funds long
spent, the Pangu campaign as such had ceased to exist in the last month
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of the campaign, apart from Nilkare's links with Somare and the general
use of Somare's name by many of Okuk's rivals.
Of the minor candidates, perhaps none campaigned harder than
Barunke Kaman. Although his criticism of Okuk dates from his student
days (Standish 1979), Kaman was widely thought to be motivated by his
resentment of Okuk's hostility towards the interim provincial government.
Kaman said he had received support from businessmen, including several
Simbu, who were fed up with Okuk Clearly he did not campaign just to
split Okuk's vote, however, and after the election he expressed
resentment at certain business deals which he alleged had benefitted
Nilkare at the expense of the provincial business arm, CHE (BS 12
August 1982). He himself said he had spent K30,000 (in what was
nonetheless a shoe-string operation). If Kaman's primary aim had been
to enter parliament there could have been an easier way. Observers and
participants though that he might readily have won the Kundiawa Open
seat, and Nilkare later said he had offered 'to support him fully' for that,
but 'he was after the big one for himself (BS 25 August 1982).
Kaman's campaign style was almost a parody of that of Okuk,
whom he attacked at every opportunity, heckling him by the roadside,
whereupon Okuk laughed and drove away. One Simbu graduate thought
Barunke was 'uncool', and villagers said he was either very brave, or
obsessed. Nilkare said that if you attack opponents directly like that in
Simbu people walk away. Villagers from Kenange in late May reported
Barunke arriving uninvited at their men's house at night, supporting
Pangu but primarily attacking Okuk and his electoral grease as 'a
trickster, a spoiler, who if elected would only think of himself and his
Tokma business'. They said Kaman spoke so loudly he shook the house
and frightened people, and they felt that attacking people behind their
back was bad form (BS 19 May 1982). Kaman's tension was shown
when he exploded at a PPP rally near Minggende at the sight of a
'mudman' who gave some contextually bizarre performance theatre,
showing mock poverty and singing country songs, which he explained
was designed to 'make people laugh at the bigmen' (BS 20 May 1982).
Provincial government
The actions of the Simbu Provincial Government (SPG) under Matthew
Siune became a major element in the campaign. The run-down of
provincial services had worsened dramatically since the 1980 election
when what was identified as Okuk's team took over, and Okuk was
blamed. The province had been K2.2 million over-committed at that
time, but had only reluctantly followed central government advice to
tighten financial controls - which later became conditions for accepting a
rescue package. In 1981 the SPG had closed down the Chimbu Works
and Industrial Division (WID), based at Kerowagi, thereby sacking 1600
workers, and antagonizing its dynamic executive, a former engineering
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student named Camillus Dagama Bongoro, who became endorsed Pangu
candidate for Kerowagi and fearlessly attacked Okuk for corruption,
making quite specific allegations. Okuk had joined with the provincial
government in 1982 in closing Kerowagi airstrip for urban redevelopment
and to build promised factories, which further alienated many people in
this mostly Kuman-speaking electorate.
The Siune government had placed millions of kina worth of WID
plant under the control of the provincial-government-dominated firm,
CHE, which was by now based at Chimbu Coffee. The provincial
government then paid CCCS excessively to hire its own WID plant for
services which in some instances were not performed. Various
unprofitable enterprises had been set up using Chimbu Coffee facilities
by the CCCS general manager, who was also running his own
businesses in partnership with some Simbu political figures.
At the time of the campaign the Coffee Cooperative was closed,
during the coffee season. Despite Okuk's attempts to gain further
finance, a decision had been taken by the provincial government to
permanently close it down because - even with a national government
loan of some K200,000 - it was effectively bankrupt. The closure of
Chimbu Coffee - with the loss by some 17,000 mostly small shareholders
of over K300,000 issued capital - might have been the biggest scandal of
the election, and had the potential to become a symbolic issue which
could utterly discredit the provincial government. This was a step which
had been avoided by colonial and post-colonial governments alike for
twelve years, and Okuk had played for time by insisting that the decision
remained confidential till after the election.
The Chimbu Coffee issue was an interesting test of political
communication in the campaign. At a PPP rally Barunke Kaman asked
the prime minister about the CCCS, and Chan not very pointedly
suggested that people should look closely and see who was responsible
for its problems. Danga Bagme at his feast near Kerowagi told Okuk
that he had heard that Okuk had got hold of CCCS and asked about
reopening the co-operative, but received no reply in Okuk's long and
demagogic speech quoted above (BS 26 May 1982). The news of its
permanent closure simply did not enter the Chimbu debate. I had been
told in confidence of the decision; people in Port Moresby knew and it
had been mentioned on national radio. The Post-Courier (20 May
1982) had reported Fr Momis saying Okuk had insisted that it remain
open for the election period without any hope for recovery. With 550
newspapers reaching Chimbu daily one can only assume that candidates
were too busy to have monitored the news: so much for theories of the
great political influence of the modern media in rural areas!
Okuk was able to recall some political obligations from the
provincial government during the campaign. Mathew Siune dutifully
appeared at a number of National rallies, albeit in low-key roles. He also
helped Okuk's cash flow problem: his cabinet insisted that the provincial
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government's business arm, CHE, purchase a Port Moresby town-house
from Okuk for K150,000, with an immediate deposit of K65,000. (On
valuation, before purchase, the property was found to be worth
Kl 90,000.) But this was an ambiguous relationship at best. Perhaps
hoping the voters had short memories as to the origin of the provincial
government, Okuk tried to distance himself from some of the problems of
Chimbu by patronizing Siune at Danga's feast at Paki:
Mathew is my brother, my cousin; we come from one place.
Work slowly and your work is true. The Premier finds the
work a bit heavy. We should be easy on him. All the Upper
Chimbu and Yonggamugl representatives gave their votes to
him, so he allocated the money to get businesses in their areas.
But don't you worry, later on he'll help you here in Kerowagi.
This year he'll help you here with money too. Right?
And Siune, who had been seated with head bowed, nodded (BS 26 May
1982).
Late in the campaign, however, rumours spread to Port Moresby of
a rift between Okuk and Siune over the activities of the Chimbu Coffee
management, and at a meeting on the future of CCCS Siune reportedly
rejected the suggestion of a Development Bank official that Okuk attend,
saying 'We don't want outsiders here'. A Simbu official observed that as
Okuk's defeat grew more and more likely, so too did Siune's confidence
grow: 'Maybe the premier realises he doesn't have to support a loser'
(BS 2 June 1982). Other Provincial Assembly members and ministers
appear mostly to have tried to keep the two arenas distinct, and played
low key roles - if any - in the campaign, staying in their own areas but
utilizing the generosity of provincial candidates for their own political
benefit when this was possible.
The greatest issue in the campaign in Chimbu, however, was
Okuk's local status: he was a Kuman speaker, a northerner and more
specifically a Kamanegu tribesman, which in a bitter irony could not be
separated from the actions of his fellow Kamanegu, the premier.
In campaigning in southern areas in 1982 Nilkare emphasised the
'Bomai' issue and the need to develop the southern part of Chimbu. This
appeal struck a response. In the 1980 Provincial Assembly election the
'South Bomai Chimbu' slogan had been used effectively by non-Kuman
speakers, who formed the majority of the assembly. The 'Bomai bloc'
had lacked decisive leadership, however, after the accidental death of its
main organiser, Gola Ulgan, which enabled Okuk to sway a majority of
Assembly members behind Matthew Siune as premier (Standish 1980).
Siune survived a series of no-confidence motions in 1980, with
Kuman Dai of Gumine the alternate candidate, but was facing another
challenge in February 1981 when his Kamanegu bodyguard was killed
after disturbing a suspected thief. Siune and his family proclaimed this an
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attempted Bomai assassination plot, and posses were organized using
provincial government vehicles; seventeen men were subsequently
charged (Post-Courier, 9 April 1982; Times of Papua New Guinea, 10
April 1982). Siune's father was one of six convicted for the 'payback'
killing of three southerners in Kundiawa that morning. A state of terror
divided the province north from south, across its 'middle'. Police and
government officials prevented the payback killings of several
northerners working in southern villages, and with helicopters and trucks
with armed escorts ferried southerners out of Kundiawa to safety, and
backloaded northerners from the Gumine area, a two-way exodus which
eased the trauma throughout the province.
Foreseeing an electoral backlash against himself, Okuk was furious,
and attempted in cabinet to have the provincial government suspended.
He helped organize K4,000 plus pigs and cattle from the Kamanegu in
compensation, a fairly small amount which was reluctantly accepted by
Gumine people. Years later their bitterness remained towards the
Kamanegu, and specifically Okuk himself, because of the actions of his
protege Siune. The candidature of Joseph Sil, a magistrate, can be
directly attributed to this incident. Okuk's instantaneous assessment of
this event was correct; it certainly affected his electoral chances,
because early in 1981 the local leaders of Gumine including Kuman Dai
got together and decided that only one southerner would nominate for
the provincial seat - and that he would be John Nilkare. Thus over a
third of the electorate had only one candidate, and although Nilkare used
the Bomai issue in his campaign, he later said he avoided speaking
directly of the killings because that only turned people away (BS, 25
August 1982). He did not need to, of couse. After the election, one of
Okuk's campaign managers joined other observers when he said 'the
main problem was that premier and his provincial government,
not the economy'.
Apart from the north-south division, a Simbu educationist said that
there were two competing ideas circulating among Kuman language
speakers in the north. They wanted Okuk as a highlander for prime
minister, he said, but were angry with him because he was campaigning
all over the country and they did not see him in Chimbu. They also
remembered the good life under Somare, and blamed Okuk for the
economic deterioration since he took office. Okuk had done nothing
during his ten years in parliament, they felt. 'They are divided on this, it
is not clear at all. They are confused in their bellies, and it's up to the
people now' (BS 24 May 1982).
Campaign extravagances
Although cash was given out occasionally by candidates at the roadside
with the plea 'Remember me!' the use of money was far more complex
in 1982 than 1977. Two elements of Okuk's 1977 campaign were
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ritualized and reinforced by many candidates in the 1982 campaign. The
first was the use of motor vehicles equipped with loudspeakers and
cassette tapes of raucous music, which played loud and long in rural
areas. Speakers were not used in towns, however, perhaps because a
judge threatened contempt of court action for disturbing his proceedings,
and so the loudspeakers did not, as in 1977, lead to near-riots. The
second ritual was that it was virtually obligatory for candidates to give
very large beer parties, to show that the candidate was a good and
generous man, and to reinforce his position in his own group and beyond.
Otherwise, open candidates used much the same campaign style as
previously, but with very frequent mention of their political party and the
name of its leader. They walked and talked their way around the men's
houses at night, and the markets by day, with a fairly standard spiel that
they would speak out firmly (tok strong) for their people, and try to get
more and better roads for their electorates. They expected voting to
follow clan lines, and so generally they stayed in their own clan
territories and those of affiliated groups, such as affines, where they both
felt comfortable and needed to maintain the solidarity of their primary
support base.
By contrast to this use of real kinship, the provincial candidates
placed more emphasis on pseudo-traditional Active kinship relationships,
which were essentially those of patron and client. One instance with an
element of historical truth was the party given at Maki by the wealthy
farmer and former perennial losing candidate, Danga Bagme, at which
Okuk said that his Kamanegu tribespeople were brothers to the emigrant
Kamanegu group on the Koro River some 20 kilometers to the west (BS
26 May 1982). Although Nilkare and others used similar procedures on
a smaller scale, and some candidates gave money in private rather than
out in the open, the clearest examples are the occasions when Okuk
delivered funds for a cattle project, or a beast, to a big peasant, who
would thereupon have acquired an obligation to deliver political support
in return. Most probably Okuk would try to cement this by holding a
party, at which the beer (worth K500- 1,000) and several pigs and
perhaps a cow or pig (bought from Madang, Mount Hagen or Lae) was
supplied by Okuk, and towards which the local people had then made a
smaller contribution in order to maintain their own dignity.
Okuk's relationships were often strongest with older men who were
no longer capable of getting into national political electoral competition in
their own right, but who had links with local candidates and vote-
influencing attributes of their own. Under their auspices a party was
given, largely supplied by Okuk, although local open candidates usually
gave some beer as well, to assert his own status. 'In the electorates',
Okuk later said, 'we gave out K20,000 for old leaders each to distribute
as campaign expenses. K7-10,000 [sitting] went to opens. Nothing was
given to individuals, so there was no bribery to vote' (BS 26 August
1982). Commenting on Okuk's campaign, Barunke Kaman said that
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Okuk gained votes where he gave through local bigmen; and thrice said
that 'the way to get elected is what you give and who you give it to' (BS,
12 August 1982). Thus Okuk inflated the funds needed for campaigning,
and expenditures of up to K5,000 came to be regarded as the barest
minimum for open candidates, and much more for provincials.
Okuk's approach inevitably caused problems. The context was a
society where rural wages were K752.96 per annum, and where an
average cash-cropping peasant family may earn only K50-100 a year. In
a phenomenon noted in Tanzania (Hyden 1980), Simbu villagers almost
certainly decided that they should maximize their benefits from
candidates because elections were the one time when they had a chance
to exert some leverage. More than any other candidate, however,
Okuk's generosity was on a scale likely to be counter-productive. He
often had 'party' relationships - in both senses - with five or more
candidates in each open seat and was also away in other provinces
during the campaign, so he simply could not keep up with the demand.
He was being booked for three places at once in the run-up to the poll.
One consequence was that some people expecting to see him and to
consume his beer were disappointed; there are limitations to how much
direct contact can be maintained by one person in a society based upon
face-to-face interaction, and Okuk overreached those limits.
Okuk's spectacular generosity was to backfire, at least in some
areas. He bought or guaranteed loans for nineteen new four-wheel drive
motor vehicles, of which he gave five new ones to National Party
campaign organizers and candidates in Simbu, and twenty seven
reconditioned ones, of which twelve went to Simbu supporters who he
hoped would deliver large blocks of votes. One of the latter vehicles was
involved in fatal accident near Salt in Gumine District, and this death in
turn led to the area's first eruption of clan warfare since pacification,
during which eleven more people were killed. The bereaved people said
that apart from a standard Third Party insurance payment Okuk's
promised Kl 0,000 compensation had not come, and they were angry.
As noted already, one of Okuk's innovations was his use of his
ministerial position to allocate sectoral funds for transparently electoral
purposes. Okuk later said he had been careful not to give out cheques;
rather, Cash Fund Certificates had been used. He allocated amounts of
K2,000 to each of the nine local government councils and up to K20,000
to each district (BS 26 August 1982), funds which the councillors thought
were his but which were actually government money. Only four or five
councils received the funds, to the irritation of the others. Okuk said he
ensured that the cash was spent on roads. In several instances a
combination of caution and irritation amidst officials shocked at this
irregular procedure meant they kept the funds unspent in district offices.
In some cases where roadwork was done the payments were ordered
and made at four times the usual rates - to the annoyance of district
officials and some provincial ministers who resented the waste. These
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Iambakey Okuk (centre) distributes beer at Kundiawa, 29 May 1982
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funds were widely seen as political 'gravy' to boost the names of local
leaders, and Okuk's. The casualness with which resources were used
and abused astonished Simbu and expatriates alike; Okuk's staff wrote
off two government Range Rovers, the highlands most prestigious
vehicle, and simply got others where they had come from. 'Throwaway
cars', said one missionary lightly, but the fact that people were killed in
one accident at Ganigle in Kerowagi District - without compensation
other than insurance - once again told against the candidate.
Okuk's most spectacular innovation was on the eve of the election
liquor ban to give out 4,000 cartons of beer, each with twenty-four
bottles, at Kundiawa airstrip on 29 May, following an all night string band
competition. In ten years I had not seen him wear traditional dress, but
on this occasion Okuk did wear the traditional apron and breach clout.
The story of the 'bare-bottomed MP' and the deputy prime minister's
wife 'dancing bare-breasted' at the 'beer barrel election' was duly
reported internationally, along with front-page photographs (Sydney
Morning Herald [SMH] 5 June 1982; ABC Background Briefing 6 June
1982; The Age 2 June 1982), but this was not an occasion for mockery.
Witnesses said that Okuk - who as at Maki spoke in Tokpisin - again
said that he was the son of a traditional Chimbu leader and asserted a
right to political power under the Simbu ideology of hereditary leadership.
At least 10,000 people came to collect the beer, with Okuk as master of
ceremonies distributing huge piles for supporters in each open electorate
and fifty cartons each for the police, Pangu supporters and the mostly
expatriate Hash House Harriers. There was some squabbling and a
motorized counter-demonstration by Mek Tiene and some Pangu
supporters added to the tension. Eye-witnesses told me that many
accepted the beer as a natural part of campaigning, saying this was their
due: 'We are only getting our own', 'We'll take the beer, but vote Pangu',
or 'National today, Pangu tomorrow'.
Okuk's press secretaries spent the day assuring reporters that this
was a traditional occasion. Apart from the attempted symbolism
involved in this spectacular finale to the campaign, I have a hunch as to
Okuk's motivation in dressing traditionally. Under the Papua New
Guinea Criminal Code it is an offence to give beer in order to influence
votes (the old English custom of 'treating'), and bribery and the exercise
of undue influence may be grounds for rendering a poll null and void. In
1978, however, Okuk had read a draft report of mine on the 1977
election in which I stated that gift-exchange for prestige purposes was a
customary practice, with generosity and display intrinsic to Melanesian
leadership. Were any charges to be laid, I had said, this argument,
backed by the Constitution's endorsement of custom, might be used as a
possible defence. It was a case Okuk put frequently thereafter.
Costing these extravagances and individual campaigns as a whole is
enormously difficult. Most candidates in the provincial seat inveigled
businesses into providing support in kind, and probably all candidates
The 1982 Chimbu provincial campaign 195
were assisted by their clans. Electoral expenditure became a matter of
pride, and although one provincial candidate said he had spent only K550,
most of the others claimed at least K10,000. Joe Sil said he was
spending a minimum of K6,000 for petrol, leaflets and a speaker; the
others were 'skyscrapers' (BS 17 May 1982). An SP brewery worker
said Nilkare was buying 200 cartons of beer a week during the campaign
worth about K2,500 at wholesale prices. Nilkare said he had spent
K45,000 in Chimbu, much of that on two new vehicles at K9,000 each
and four days helicopter hire (K6,000). A close campaigner said he
received much 'in kind' from business supporters, such as T-shirts, free
car tyres and K9,000 of fuel from one foreign company, whereas Nilkare
himself denied the free fuel. All companies, he said, supported all parties.
Nilkare's K45,000 total probably excludes the funds he spent on bringing
close supporters to Port Moresby, but compares with an estimate by a
campaign assistant of K76,000 expenditure. 'Not a toea of my campaign
came from the party', he said; K25,000 was derived from bank
overdrafts, the rest from savings (BS 25 August 1982).
Whatever Nilkare's total, the Okuk campaign extravaganza was on
a different scale. Okuk said the National Party had spent Kl million in
total, of which K547,000 was his own: 'I am the party business!'.
National Party ministers had received K40-50,000, and backbenchers
K10,000 each. He had given personal guarantees for K80,000 to four
prominent National Party candidates, and several party figures had put
up K80,000 each. The Papua Action Party, which he agreed was a 'fully
owned National Party subsidiary', had been given K20,000 (BS 26
August 1982). He had spent, he said, K36,000 on helicopters and
K48,000 on airlifting people and papers. He had bought 7,000 cartons of
beer at K7.80 (based on half price at Lae, K5.00, and K2.80 transport
costs, K54,600 total). Okuk said he then went to San Miguel and got the
same discount, 'a good promotion for them' (BS 26 August 1982).
Nilkare and Okuk each claimed the other had received free beer from
different breweries. It was foruitous that the two breweries in 1982
were in a marketing battle which matched the electoral tussle. Certainly
almost all the beer distributed in Okuk's last big splurge was San Miguel.
Okuk said he had bought 208 pigs at K200 (K41,600), but in a
memorable phrase said 'Pigs are a hassle. There's too much work in
killing and cooking them. Beer is better' (BS 26 August 1982). In total,
he said, he had spent 'perhaps K120-150,0O0 in Chimbu', to which I said
Td put it at a quarter of a million', and he replied 'When it's all added up,
K240-250,000' (BS 26 August 1982). Peter Kuman - his campaign
manager till the last few weeks, when Okuk sacked him - said 'We
wasted more money here in Chimbu than Somare all over the country'
(BS 22 August 1982).
Whatever Okuk's total expenditure, how was it financed? He said
that businesses told him to come back for donations after he won,
whereas Peter Kuman said they had, 'like Somare', got a lot of money
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from businesses (BS 22 August 1982). Astonishingly, Okuk said that
much of the funding came from commercial bank loans or overdrafts
against his own assets. Perhaps the assets were more than sufficient to
cover the borrowings and guarantees made by Okuk, or perhaps the
companies thought these funds were for normal business purposes.
They cannot have been unaware of the election, so it is also possible that
they were mindful that if re-elected Okuk might be able to exercise an
influence over their future in the country and they accordingly felt they
had no choice but to lend to him. I did not ask them.
However the banks, like Okuk, no doubt were aware that the Papua
New Guinea Constitution makes provision for Organic Laws on the
Integrity of Candidates and of Political Parties (which have not been
passed) to control contributions to parties, and the Organic Law on the
Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership states that defined national
'Leaders' accepting gifts or other benefits or advantages from a person
or foreign enterprise are guilty of misconduct. In guidelines which the
Ombudsman Commission issued before the election5, it was proposed
that parties should not accept any 'cash contribution or other form of
financial assistance' exceeding K1,000 from citizens, and none from non-
citizens or groups effectively controlled by non-citizens. Leaders were
reminded of the existing Organic Law.
The guidelines stated that the constitutional provisions are designed
to prevent individuals and companies, both national and foreign, gaining
influence over leaders whose decision-making might thereby be
compromised by conflict of interest. Pressure to provide funds for
politicians, which Australian businessmen in Papua New Guinea
sometimes call 'the bite', would appear to be a case where the
businesspeople were compromised by the politicians, rather than the
reverse, although this does not invalidate the concern properly expressed
by the ombudsman.
Okuk did have his own sources of funds, but the campaign
devastated his businesses. For three months Okuk said he had taken half
the K140,000 monthly takings from his businesses (the Chimbu stores
and the goldmine), and used advance rent from the coffee factory. He
had sold a house in Port Moresby, a commercial building and five town-
houses, and was trying to sell the Tokma coffee factory. He said he had
borrowed K64,000 against 'my company' (IMK), K440,000 against 'this
company' (Universal Brands Marketing), and K50,000 from one bank
and K15,000 from another, which adds up to K569,000. The banks were
chasing him for interest on the personal loans he had guaranteed, and
were seeking repayment of overdrafts. He had sought more funds to
5 Ombudsman Commission, 'Guidelines for the Acceptance of Election
Campaign Contributions and Benefits', 15 January 1982, mimeo.,"Voluntary
Guidelines for Acceptance of Campaign Contributions by Political Parties',
IS January 1982, mimeo.
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'pay my way on top again', which would take him three years, he said,
and then he would have another crack at the prime ministership. When
he got it, he would soon retire to spend the time he felt he owed his
family (BS 26 August 1982).
Results
The voting period in Chimbu was fairly quiet, aided by the declaration of
a 'Fighting Zone' under the Inter-Group Fighting Act, 1977. There were
the usual logistical problems for campaign teams and many technical
hitches for the officials to do with electoral rolls and non-literate voters6,
allegations that the 'finger dye' was not indelible and so forth, but only a
few disturbances when frustrated voters or scrutineers sought to
intimidate officials. Okuk's bombarding of one booth with leaflets from a
helicopter was counter-productive as it annoyed everyone else present,
and the provincial returning officer, Trevor Downes, said Chimbu was
'one of the quietest' provinces: 'Campaigning here has been done with
more decorum than in most other provinces, it would seem' (Post-
Courier, 10 June 1982).
The most striking result indicated from Table 10.4 is an increase in
political mobilization: the vote was up 30 per cent, to 96 per cent of those
enrolled - although many of those who voted, especially women, were
not on the rolls. Perhaps this can be largely explained by the rise in the
number of open candidates, which meant that more people had a
favourite for whom they had to vote, but these people also voted for the
provincial candidates. The provincial informal vote was a low 0.5 per
cent, a fall from 6.2 per cent in 1977.
In the open seats, the only sitting member returned was Robert
Yabara, perhaps to his own surprise. Under the first-past-the-post
system, with so many candidates standing, it was not surprising that most
of the the open winners in Chimbu needed only about 10 per cent of valid
votes to win, and in one case (Kerowagi with twenty three candidates) a
mere 7.7 per cent. In Karimui-Nomane, where a mere thirteen stood,
the winner's vote was 19.7 per cent.
As in previous elections the turnout of women was as high as that
of men. Half the voters were women but this was not reflected in a
fracturing of the solidarity of the votes from each booth, recorded by
ballot box. In other words, women usually voted as did the clans they
were born or married into. Half the voters were women, but this sort of
public politics is a male game, and only few of the minor candidates were
heard making a direct appeal to women's interests. While women may
have voted for the two women candidates in Kerowagi Open, at 179 (or
0.0093 per cent of the valid vote for the twenty three candidates) their
Alexander Papenberg, The Chimbu Experience, mimeo [n.d.], [n.p.].
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combined vote was so small as to be negligible, and so it can not be
said they had mobilized many women voters.
When compared with the 1977 result (Standish 1983: 111), Table
10.4 shows that the leading provincial candidates raised their vote: Okuk,
despite his many northern rivals, increased his 1977 total vote by 2,470 to
19,379 (19.3 per cent of the valid vote) in 1982. Nilkare almost doubled
his 1977 total from 11,472 to 22,287 votes (22.2 per cent) and won by
2,908 votes. Wera Mori came third, with 10,953 votes (10.9 per cent),
Gerry Ninbe fourth with 8,316 (8.3 per cent) and Barunke Kaman fifth
with 7,581 (7.6 per cent). Table 10.4 shows the distribution of these votes
by open electorate, and clearly shows that in 1982 Okuk's vote dropped
in Chuave - the seat containing Nambaiyufa - by 2,404, and in his home
seat, Kundiawa - which includes the Upper Chimbu - by 868. Okuk
simply could not believe that the local candidates could have collected
the votes they received there except through dishonest actions by polling
officials (BS 26 August 1982). Although he gained slightly in the
remaining open electorates, this was to prove insufficient.
Nilkare's vote fell in both Chuave (by 1,384) and Kerowagi (313),
two seats which had several local candidates, but rose dramatically in
Gumine (by 7,014 votes) and Karimui-Nomane (4,377). It also rose
marginally in Kundiawa (328) and Sinasina-Yonggamugl (980), an
electorate where Barunke Kaman with 2,831 votes ate into Nilkare's
matrikin's vote, and where Wera Mori got 5,995 votes. Thus Wera
Mori's candidature almost certainly harmed Nilkare, as did Gerry
Ninbe's (he got 3,350 votes in Karimui-Nomane). But the two southern
seats, Gumine and Karimui-Nomane, together provided Nilkare with an
additional 11,391 votes compared to 1977, and aided by the fragmented
northern vote the Bomai strategy won him the election.
Post-mortems, recriminations and appeals
There was considerable tension during the count, but compared to the
1977 and 1980 elections, when there had been violence against election
officials and tribal fighting, there was very little strife in Chimbu in 1 982.
Contrary to a report that thousands of people had stormed Radio Chimbu
in anger at some incorrect figures being broadcast, about a dozen went
to the electoral office to protest. On 28 June a sombre Okuk told
journalists 'I accept defeat without bitterness' (SMH 29 June 1982).
Several women cut off finger joints in a traditional mourning gesture at
Okuk's loss, which he related to me with quiet pride. 'After the election
it was the time for revolution, people were so upset. I was the
responsible one... the true nationalist'; he appealed for calm (BS 26
August 1982).
Okuk said simply that T was over-confident. I should have put
somebody up, down in Gumine, to split Nilkare's vote' (BS 26 August
1982). Certainly there was no candidate in Nilkare's area, which raises
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the question who Okuk was thinking of when he told journalist Sean
Dorney 'my opponents are vigorously campaigning up in the highlands to
split my highland vote but I'm also doing the same so Til come out on top'
(ABC, AM 31 May 1982). Okuk's campaign manager Peter Kuman -
reputedly a tough former riot squad police officer, who won the
Kundiawa Open seat - said that he had advised Okuk to put a 'splitter' up
against Nilkare, advice Okuk rejected because 'he had worked hard
there and thought he would do well ... and that's why he lost'. He said
the intense electioneering by northerners had reduced Okuk's potential
vote, and the huge expenditure on beer had been wasted. 'The reason
why Iambakey lost was the hacking up of those three or four Gumines
because of the Premier' (BS 22 August 1982).
After the election Okuk's immediate recriminations were against
Chan, whom he told me he had attacked bitterly in the Opposition party
room, but in his search for an explanation he also blamed others: 'John
[Nilkare] is a good man, I can talk to him. But he should do it honestly.
It was Barry [Holloway] who did it. He organized the whole thing and
got everyone else to stand' (BS 22 August 1982). On this topic Holloway
said that 'there was no definite strategy' in Chimbu. Holloway said that
Henry Riyong Yauwe had approached Pangu headquarters for help,
saying he was doing well in Nambaiyufa and beyond, and Peter Kumgi
had also put strong pressure for help as he was taking votes from Okuk,
'These people we were forced into helping, despite our nomination of
John; we couldn't turn them away totally'. Pangu had rejected Wera
Mori outright, even though they recognized that he would do well. 'The
overall effect of these was to pull down Okuk's vote' (BS 27 August
1982).
Perhaps it was pride that led Okuk not to seek to oppose Nilkare
indirectly. Nilkare said that he had not rubbished Okuk, and they had
talked. Like Peter Kuman, Nilkare considered Okuk could have won the
Kundiawa Open seat. 'He knew he would lose. He even considered
standing here [in Port Moresby] and in the Open', but Okuk 'stood for the
provincial because he didn't want to lose face' (BS 25 August 1982).
Once the result was clear Okuk immediately set about mounting a
challenge in a Court of Disputed Returns. He sent teams around
collecting tape recorded allegations and documented declarations of
bribery and of bias and cheating by what he called 'Pangu electoral
officials', which I scanned. Many of the complaints appeared to arise
from illiterate voters claiming the clerks had misrecorded their
'whispered' votes, but none of their chosen witnesses had raised
complaints at the time. Legal opinion was that these statements carried
little weight, although one allegation of the alleged bashing of a woman
voter by a policeman - who was named - might, if verified, have
influenced the case. Okuk's petition to the National Court alleged bribery
by Nilkare and that he allegedly exercised undue influence on voters, and
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listed twenty-five instances of electoral malpractice7, which were
ultimately dropped from Okuk's case. It was not publicly stated why
Okuk dropped these grounds from his petition, however petitions on
similar grounds relating to the Chuave and Sinasina-Yonggamugl open
elections8 were rejected by the Court.
Okuk's barrister failed in his sole remaining argument that Wera
Mori was under 25 years of age and therefore ineligible to stand, and the
'total of votes he collected would have affected the end results
substantially'.9 The petition sought a declaration that Nilkare had not
been duly elected and Okuk should be declared the winner, or,
alternatively, that the election of Nilkare was absolutely void. Mr Justice
Andrew found that Mori was under age when he nominated, but
rejected the petition on the grounds that Nilkare was not aware of or
responsible for Mori's illegal practice. He said the court could not
speculate as to who would have obtained Mori's votes, and it would not
be just to declare Nilkare not duly elected because some other candidate
was a few months under the required age and Nilkare had no knowledge
of this. The judgement said that Nilkare had 'clearly obtained the will of
the majority and that it would be wrong that he should be penalised for
Mr Mori's behaviour in all the circumstances especially where that
behaviour is less heinous than say bribery or undue influence'.10
Parties, beer and brotherhood?
Was there a party vote? In the crudest measure, that of party allegiance
of winners, Chimbu voters did not follow the apparent national trend of a
swing towards Pangu, in that in total they elected two National Party
candidates, an Independent and a Melanesian Alliance candidate, and
one each from United, Pangu and PPP. (The fact that some winners
' Iambakey Palma Okuk Petitioner, in the National Court of Justice, MP No.
154 of 1982, dated 30 August 1982.
8 PNG, National Court of Justice, MP No. 133 of 1982, Paul Sinowai, Petitioner,
24 August 1982 ; and MP No. 143 of 1982, Dama Damien. Petitioner, 12
August 1982, respectively.
9 Iambakey Palma Okuk, op.cit. On 3 July 1982, very soon after the poll was
declared, Wera Mori wrote the following letter to Okuk 'I am very sorry
that my nomination helped to defeat you, our true Chimbu leader. /I must
admit that I was under 25 when I nominated. At the time I was filled with
hate and that is why I acted as I did. I hope you will forgive me for that
and understand my feelings at the time. /If your appeal wins, I hope you
will ask me to be one of your campaign managers. If not, I will work for
you in the future'.
10 Andrew, J., in the National Court of Justice, 17 February 1982, MP No. 154
of 1982. See also Post-Courier, 8. 16, 17 and 18 February, 1983.
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subsequently changed party affiliation up to twice after the post-election
blandishments of Okuk and Nilkare shows how flimsy were their party
allegiances, but that is another issue.) Presumably a party vote would
require a spread of votes for party supporters as well as for endorsed
candidates across the province, and would require detailed analysis of
voting figures for Open seats which are not available to me. In the
provincial poll, Okuk and Nilkare both gained votes widely, with
concentrations in the north and south respectively. Nilkare's solid
southern vote implies a degree of sub-provincial consciousness in the
latter case, which was roughly co-terminous with the Golin and Salt-Xui
language areas. Nilkare's northern spread of votes, however, was
probably achieved because of the economic issues and Pangu's
popularity, mobilized by well chosen and highly competent local
campaign staff. The reminders of the good times under Somare
appeared to strike chords, especially with older people. To verify a
Pangu appeal would also require a cross check of the votes to Pangu
candidates and known supporters in both open and provincial polls. One
experienced expatriate observer summed up the situation before voting
started by saying 'Pangu - if there is such a body as Pangu in Chimbu -
seems to have a lot of support' (BS 2 June 1982).
Okuk's highlands regionalism also seemed to many Simbu observers
to have wide appeal, especially to younger people, but without an 'exit
poll' at booths there is no way to verify whether that was converted into
votes. To check that his regionalism had appealed on a general basis
there would need to have been a wide spread of votes for him, even in
areas where there were local candidates. He got almost no votes in
much of the southern sector, and clearly lost most votes in some areas,
such as Nambaiyufa or the Upper Chimbu, where in 1982 he was being
challenged by local candidates. For whatever reason, his highlands
appeal did not work in such areas. A much more fine-grained analysis of
voting figures is required than time and space permit.
Access to funds, whether government money or from comprador
relationships with foreign capital, was clearly important in the high profile
and expensive campaigns in the Chimbu elections. Most candidates
spent between K5-15,000. This was not unique to Chimbu: in other
provinces sitting members spent K40-50,000, and - as John Ballard notes
for the Southern Highlands - the biggest spenders were not necessarily
elected, although there is a perceived need for candidates to spend as
much money as possible during a campaign. While some Simbu winners
were businessmen, with coffee, trucks, stores, and beer sales
enterprises, and could afford relatively lavish campaigns, not all were
wealthy in their own right by contemporary standards. Wealth helps, but
is not essential.
Cultural mechanisms of reciprocity of the type utilized by those
giving out beer (or pork) at elections are widely acknowledged in Papua
New Guinea. Papua New Guinea's then chief ombudsman, Ignatius
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(later Sir Ignatius) Kilage, a Simbu who was defeated by Okuk in 1972,
successfully moved in the Supreme Court against the attempt supported
by Okuk to raise the electoral nomination fee from K100 to K 1,000, using
the argument that collecting the deposit money would require intending
candidates to seek funds from both national and foreign sources, which
would incur obligations in violation of the Leadership Code. 'Nobody
gives for nothing in PNG - you have to pay it back, somehow' (ABC,
Background Briefing, 6 June 1982).
In Okuk's case, massive expenditure on beer might not have won
support, and perhaps even ultimately have gone against him. If a
highlander spends so much money he may be perceived as being so big
that he is beyond the normal exchange system, demonstrating such
'strength' that there is no possibility of 'equivalence', to use Read's
(1959) terms. Gifts which are so large and undirected are unrepayable
and hence do not incur an obligation, so that the recipient can take
without feeling obliged to make a return. One provincial minister said
simply 'It's all gris' (flattery). Certainly a number of the Kundiawa
people who took Okuk's beer from his campaign swan-song expressed
similar ideas to observers, but then Simbu people usually say that their
votes are not influenced by gifts of beer. I asked Okuk if his beer
presentations had been a mistake, and he replied elliptically 'I gave it to
everyone, including Pangu.' I then suggested that if it was given on such
a large scale, personal ties of reciprocal obligation would not apply; I
noted his response as follows 'O. took it in and agreed silently' (BS 26
August 1982). Perhaps, to coin a new term, a 'mega bigman' is no
longer a bigman.
Certainly Okuk's massive expenditure on beer, subsidized as it was
by discount prices, raised some questions amongst villagers who
supported him. One who had heard the allegations of corruption, and
knew of the 4,000 cartons to be distributed two days later, witnessed
Okuk blithely write a K1000 cheque for a truckload of a mere 80 cartons,
and was stunned. Somewhat bemused myself, I asked 'Whose money is
that?', and received the reply 'Nogut em moni bilong mipela' (It's bad if
it's ours). The presence of so much beer and the sight of a cheque being
paid shocked my friend profoundly. Okuk was exhausted near the end of
the campaign, but sounded out of character when he said that if he lost
he would forget it and become a villager, because 'I've tried everything'
(BS 25 May 1982).
There was a precolonial tradition that if a leader was too powerful,
perhaps too violent or exploitative of his own people without bringing
them sufficient return, or just causing them too much trouble, he could be
killed at the behest of his own people (Rev. W. Bergmann, personal
communication, 1978). The circumstances obviously differed in Chimbu
in 1982, but the election was a contemporary version of highlanders
manipulating clan and tribal loyalties as well as modern resources to
bring down a leader.
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Despite the talk of parties and beer, the parochial loyalties
summarized as 'brotherhood' probably provide the best key to the 1982
election in Chimbu. Most observers and participants I talked with
expected clan loyalties to continue to dominate voting behaviour in future
elections11. As well as boasting their government positions and modern
wealth, all candidates used kinship loyalties both real and fictive, and
manipulated ideologies of custom. This 'traditional' approach has a
modern rationale. In 1982 the greatest number of Simbu people voted
for the local man who could demonstrate he was most likely to bring
benefits for them or those near him, just as they had in 1972 and 1977.
This happened especially clearly in the open seats, where (unless there
were two or more local candidates) once again voting was in solid
blocks for the local man. 'That's our way', said Wambu John, a villager
from Mintima, 'party people are strange'.
The most striking instance of this corporate solidarity writ large was
Nilkare's vote in the south, a Bomai alliance which he kept together as
long as the election, despite the divisive open campaign raging all around
him. Nilkare had been endorsed locally in what was a modern move
with a traditional rationale, arising from a peculiar set of circumstances
which meant that no other local aspirant was prepared to undermine him
against the northerners. His wealth and great political skills assisted him
in gaining and keeping this de facto endorsement, and he was aided in his
campaign by his Pangu Pati endorsement, Somare's personal support and
the poor state of the economy. Nilkare, it seems, was elected as a result
of a combination of these factors. Okuk lost because his strongest
support areas were divided between better-educated young men of a
later generation than he, who, even if they were unlikely to scale the
political heights themselves, were determined at least to knock Okuk off
his pinnacle.
Party mobilization helped some candidates, and beer helped solidify
both recent party bonds and real or quasi-kinship relationships.
Ideologies of brotherhood operated strongly, helping some and hindering
others. The recent political history of the province had a profound
impact. Nilkare's campaign could not have been so strong without the
unity of purpose in the south which derived from the violence of Febuary
1981, and that solidarity in turn arose from the operation of a belief in the
transplantation of kinship loyalties and values into wider arenas. Rather
than the use of party labels, or beer and money, it was - as Okuk had
feared in February 1981 - the Simbu values of clan and tribal
brotherhood and even of a new southern ethnicity, arising from the
intrusions of provincial politics into the national elections, which
ultimately ended his career as a Chimbu politician.
1 1 For a splendid analysis of village level politics in Chuave, where clan
solidarity is not necessarily shown in council elections, see Warry 1987.
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Chapter 11
THE EAST SEPIK ELECTORATES
RJ.May
In comparison with many other parts of Papua New Guinea,
elections in the East Sepik Province have tended to be fairly quiet affairs
- the notable exception being the successful candidature of cult leader
Matias Yaliwan in 1972 (May 1975; Allen 1976). (For accounts of
earlier elections in the East Sepik province see Dewdney 1965 [Maprik
1964]; Allen 1976 [Dreikikir 1972]; Wandau 1976 [Angoram 1972];
Nyamekye 1983 [East Sepik electorates 1977] and Winnett and May
1983 [Yangoru-Saussia 1977].) That is not to say, however, that
electoral politics in the East Sepik have been uneventful: the province
gave birth to two minor political parties - among the first in Papua New
Guinea - in the late 1960s-early 1970s and has been one of the traditional
strongholds of the Pangu Pati; and, of course, it has provided the country
with its first, and present, prime minister, Michael Somare, and the
National Parliament with its longest-serving member, Sir Pita Lus.
In the 1977 national elections Pangu candidates dominated the
results in East Sepik, winning all but one of the province's seven seats.
The main question in 1982 seemed to be whether, in the face of what
some saw as a growing disenchantment with Pangu, the Pati could
maintain this dominance in what appeared to become very much a series
of 'Pangu versus the rest' contests.
The electorates
Apart from the regional electorate, East Sepik contains six open
electorates (see map 11.1): from east to west, with numbers of electors
enrolled in 1982 in brackets, Angoram (36,093), Wewak (23,566),
Yangoru Saussia (29,951), Wosera-Gaui (31,326), Maprik (31,076) and
Ambunti-Dreikikir (29,536).
Angoram is geographically one of the largest electorates in the
country, stretching north to south from the coast to the border with Enga
province. Its population, however, is concentrated along the Sepik River
and its major tributaries to the south, the Keram, the Yuat (Biwat) and
the Karawari. The electorate contains a number of language groups but
in terms of self-identification the bulk of the population can be roughly
divided into three geographical zones: the middle Sepik, which includes
a number of large river villages (Iatmul speakers); the lower Sepik,
including the Murik Lakes and the scattered poplation between the river
and the coast in the eastern corner of the province; and the grass
country south of the river, including the Keram and Yuat villages.
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The Wewak electorate includes Wewak town, with a citizen
population of 19,142 in 1980, many of whom are immigrants from the
inland East and West Sepik living in squatter settlements, a number of
coastal and inland villages, predominantly Boiken speaking, to the south
of Wewak, and a coastal strip extending west to the border with West
Sepik, containing Boiken, Arapesh and Abelam speakers.
Yangoru-Saussia contains - as its name suggests - two distinct
parts: Yangoru, a fairly densely populated area north of the Sepik
highway, comprising mostly Boiken speaking people with groups of Pukia
(Mountain Arapesh) and Abelam speakers, and a more sparsely
populated area, of mostly Plains Boiken villages, on the southern, Kubalia
or Saussia, side.
Maprik, the smallest and most densely populated electorate,
consists mostly of Abelam and Arapesh speakers and is the most
homogeneous of the six open electorates.
The remaining two electorates, Wosera-Gaui and Ambunti-
Dreikikir are, even more than Yangoru-Saussia, distinguished by a
pronounced bifurcation. Wosera-Gaui covers, to the north the very
densely populated grasslands and foothills inhabited by the southern
Abelam speakers, and to the south the villages of the middle Sepik and
its southern tributaries, including the Chambri Lakes, and a large but
very thinly populated area stretching south to the border with the
Southern Highlands and Enga provinces. Ambunti Dreikikir combines
roughly what used to be the Upper Sepik and Dreikikir electorates and
like Wosera-Gaui comprises a densely populated area of villages in the
Torricelli mountains to the north, and a vast but quite sparsely populated
area which stretches up river almost to the Indonesian border in the
west and south to the border with West Sepik. (The abortive electoral
boundaries commission report of 1981 recommended a redrawing of
boundaries inter alia to create a more homogeneous Wosera-Dreikikir
electorate and a single Ambunti electorate focused on the river and
incorporating most of Gaui.)
Within the Wewak, Yangoru-Saussia and Maprik electorates, and
to a lesser extent in the Wosera and Dreikikir segments of Wosera-Gaui
and Ambunti-Dreikikir there is an extensive road system of sorts,
dominated by the Sepik highway, which gives at least four-wheel -drive
access to the bulk of the population. In most of the Angoram electorate
and the Gaui and Ambunti segments of the other two southern
electorates transportation depends almost entirely on canoe and
(especially since the infestation of the Sepik by the acquatic weed
Salvinia molesta) is often difficult. The Ambunti Dreikikir electorate
especially presents almost insurmountable problems for even a
conscientious campaigner with a finite budget (thus, obviously, favouring
candidates from population dense areas).
By most socio-economic indicators the Sepik is a middle-to-low
development area. Income derives mostly from smallholder cocoa,
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coffee and copra, with smaller amounts from the sale of artifacts and
crocodile skins. The East Sepik has long been a major source of
outmigration. A small number of local bisnismen, however, is emerging,
mostly in Wewak, Angoram and Maprik, whose income - apart from
cash crops - depends largely on trade stores, transport, construction and
control of urban land.
The lead-up to the election
As in other provinces, electoral manoeuvring in East Sepik began well in
advance of the official campaign, as prospective candidates began to
jostle for party endorsement.
For Pangu there was a particular problem of having to preselect
from an excess of good candidates. The sitting East Sepik members
from 1977 were
Regional - Michael Somare
Ambunti-Dreikikir - Asimboro Ston
with Jaminan the only non-Pangu member. In early 1981 it seemed
likely that all these would stand again. In addition, following the fall of
the Somare ministry in 1980 several senior civil servants who were
Pangu supporters made known their intentions of standing in 1982,
among them Tony Siaguru, secretary of Foreign Affairs, one of the
'Gang of Four' and a Sepik from the Boiken area in the Wewak Open
electorate. Siaguru was obviously a valuable prospective candidate; on
the other hand, having been away from the province for much of his life,
his capacity to pull the village vote was suspect. Thus in 1981 Pangu
members with whom I spoke were considering alternative electoral
scenarios, including Siaguru as a candidate for the regional seat while
Somare contested Angoram (where Eichorn was by no means sure of
reelection), and either Siaguru or Somare contesting Wewak with Bais
standing in Yangoru-Saussia, his natal area. An additional element of the
situation was that well-known national figure Bernard Narokobi was
rumoured to be standing against Pangu (there had been similar
speculation in 1977), but whether for the regional seat or for Wewak
was not known.
In the event this situation was resolved when Siaguru stood as the
Pangu endorsed candidate for Moresby Northeast - which he
subsequently won - and the more general question of Pangu preselection
was partly dealt with by the party's decision to endorse all sitting
Angoram
Maprik
Wewak
Wosera-Gaui
Yangoru-Saussia
Bill Eichorn
Sir Pita Lus
Tony Bais
Matias Yambumpe
John Jaminan
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candidates. (The issue of preselection in Yangoru-Saussia is discussed
below.) Narokobi, as we shall see, nominated for the regional seat.
The candidates1
East Sepik Provincial: The provincial contest attracted only three
candidates: Somare, Narokobi, and Jimmy Simbago.
Simbago, a man of about 54 from Magom village (Wewak Local
census division), was a former policeman, soldier, teacher and public
servant before returning to subsistence farming in 1968. In 1982 he
listed his occupation as president of the East Sepik RSL. In the early
1970s Simbago had been secretary to cult leader Matias Yaliwan, and he
was a well known character, around Wewak at least. He had contested
the regional seat unsuccessfully in 1977. Simbago stood as an
independent but though his poster appeared in widely separated parts of
the province he did little campaigning and no one (not even Simbago)
expected him to win many votes - a judgement which was borne out by
the results. Somare, whose home village is Karau, in the Murik Lakes,
had held the regional/provincial seat since 1972, having been member for
Wewak in 1968, and the former prime minister was clearly the front
runner in 1982. Narokobi, 39, from Wautogik (But Boiken CD), one of
the country's first law graduates, had served variously as consultant to
the Constitutional Planning Committee, chairman of the Law Reform
Commission and chairman of the National Cultural Council, before
returning to the province to conduct a benevolent private legal practice
and serve, briefly, as provincial planner. Subsequently he was appointed
professor of Melanesian Philosophy at the University of Papua New
Guinea and a justice of the High Court, and at the time of the election he
was chairing a committee of review into local level government while
also assisting people in his home area to formulate proposals for
community government. Although an early admirer of Somare,
Narokobi - himself a very sincere and moral, if perhaps sometimes
unworldly, person - felt that Pangu had betrayed its ideals and that its
leaders (including Somare) had become corrupt. By 1982 this sense of
betrayal had produced a strong personal animosity towards Somare.
Having much in common personally with Fr Momis, it was inevitable that
Narokobi should gravitate towards the MA. The reasons for nominating
Narokobi to stand against Somare (instead of against Bais) are less
clear; the decision appears to have been taken by the MA's provincial
The following information is drawn partly from the data provided by
candidates to the Electoral Commission, partly from personal interviews
with candidates, and partly from interviews with party officials and
others, supplemented by personal acquaintance with some candidates
over several years. However, the information, of party attachments for
nonendorsed candidates in particular, cannot be guaranteed.
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branch, but almost certainly with Narokobi's concurrence. At the start
of the campaign few people would have given Narokobi a chance, but as
the campaign proceeded some began to see Narokobi as a significant
threat to 'the chief (see, for example, Times of Papua New Guinea 28
May 1982).
Ambunti-Dreikikir
The winner of the then newly formed Ambunti-Dreikikir electorate in
1977, was independent Pangu candidate Asimboro Ston: Ston, 45 in
1982, from Asiling village (Urat CD), had been a public servant and
former president of Dreikikir Council before his election. Nine candidates
stood against Ston in 1982:
Toromble Kabai, 40, from Bongos (Gawanga CD), former public
servant, self-described as 'subsistence farmer', but having a trade
store, coffee, and interests in PMVs; former village court magistrate
and Dreikikir councillor; member for Dreikikir Open in the 1972-
1977 house; pro Pangu.
Felix Wengisu Sowaimbau, 25, from the river village of
Tongwinjamb (Waskuk Hills CD) a Roman Catholic catechist,
community school teacher and youth coordinator. Said to be pro
MA.
Judah Nim, 26, of Musendai (Urat CD), a local pastor and teacher,
pro MA.
Nick Klapat, 30, from Maio (Upper Sepik CD), a teacher. PPP
candidate.
Cain Yapi, 29, of Karkubze village, a Corrective Services officer;
pro Pangu.
John Paiyep, 40, from Avatip (Upper Sepik CD), a teacher; the
endorsed MA candidate.
Harry Weldon Tubugman, 36, of Bangwis village (Waskuk Hills
CD), resident in Ambunti, former SDA mission worker, now
prominent local businessman (chairman of Sepik Maira Motors and
Sepik Investment Holdings; a director of Sepik Cocoa Producers
and of SPCA) and unsuccessful candidate in 1972 and in 1977
when he was runner-up to Ston. Tubugman was the endorsed NP
candidate.
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Aikam Maromban, 38, of Malu (Upper Sepik CD), resigned from
the PNGDF to contest the election, as a pro-Pangu candidate.
Gista Hapeli, 40, a former public servant turned local businessman,
from Waringambi (Warn CD). Hapeli had been an unsuccessful
candidate for the Dreikikir seat in 1972, when he stood for the PPP.
In 1982 he was said to be pro Pangu (though he was also heard to
support the MA).
Angoram Open
In 1977 the Angoram electorate returned the sitting Pangu member, Bill
Eichorn. Eichom, 46, mixed race, Australian-educated ex-teacher and
former president of the Keram Local Government Council, ran a not-
very successful crocodile farm and bought crocodile skins along the
Keram River. In 1982 he was not generally regarded either as a
particularly notable member of the house or as a very energetic
constituency politician, and had it not been for the decision of the Pangu
Pati to endorse all sitting members he might have been lucky to regain
preselection.
Against Eichorn were seven candidates:
Philip Lucku Yua, 37, of Timbunke (Middle Sepik CD), a local
businessman (former telephone operator) who in 1979 had been
elected provincial member for Middle Sepik. Yua, a pro Pangu
candidate, nominated at the last minute with the support of the
Angoram Development Association, a group of influential local
businessmen, but to the obvious annoyance of local Pangu officials
who realized that Yua would draw votes away from another
promising pro Pangu candidate, Maiben, and also perhaps from
Eichorn.
Teddu Sane, 33, born at Koragopa in the Grass census division,
former naval cadet officer, merchant seaman and then stevedore
instructor in Lae. Sane had returned to the province in 1977 and
contested the national elections in that year as a PPP candidate,
coming third in an eight-way contest. In 1982 he was resident in
Angoram where he operated a store and bought crocodile skins.
He stood for the NP, claiming to be the founder, in 1981, of that
party's East Sepik branch. Sane was a great admirer of Okuk, with
whose political style he had much in common.
Jerry Sapka Moka, 35, a social worker from Marienberg mission
station on the lower Sepik; the MA endorsed candidate.
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Jae Maika, 42, of Moim village (Middle Sepik CD), former council
clerk (1961-1977), subsistence farmer; unsuccessful candidate in
1977 and in the 1979 provincial elections; pro Pangu.
Mas Niangri, 56, from Angriman (Middle Sepik), former cook,
World War II carrier, and policeman. Mas had been an
unsuccessful candidate in 1964, and in the late 1960s was known
around Angoram town as something of a 'wild man'. It appears that
the nomination of Mas, a NP supporter, was made at the very last
minute, following the late nomination of Yua, in an effort to draw
votes away from Yua in the Middle Sepik.
Ludwig Schulze, 32, a mixed-race man from New Ireland,
Australian-educated and with an Australian wife, had come to
Angoram in 1979 as manager of a private company but had gone
into business for himself, with a trade store and crocodile skin
buying. Schulze was pro Pangu (though because of his New
Ireland origins several villagers referred to him as 'kantri bilong
Julius Chan', and felt he must be pro PPP). He was an early
nominee but by the time of the election seemed to have counted
himself out of the contest.
John Maiben, 32, mechanic and vocational school instructor, born in
Wosera-Gaui but resident in Angoram town since 1978; pro Pangu,
and, before the nomination of Yua, apparently seen by local Pangu
officials as the likely winner.
Benny Chimbi, 40, of Imbuando village (Lower Sepik CD), a former
forestry officer and Angoram councillor; PPP candidate.
Maprik Open
The seat of Maprik had been held since 1964 by Sir Pita Lus, Lus
becoming in 1982 the only member to have been returned in every
general election. A foundation member of Pangu, Lus had held portfolios
in successive Somare governments (for detailed biographical data on
Lus see Lus 1970, Herlihy 1974). Again in 1982 he looked reasonably
sure of reelection.
Seven candidates stood against Lus:
William Maniku Mimbaki 30, of Bongiora (Memblep CD), a
subsistence farmer and Seventh Day Adventist church leader and
one time deacon of the New Apostolic Mission; the endorsed MA
candidate.
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Jimmy Tool, 48, of Ilahita 3 (Bumbita-Muhiang CD), a farmer, about
whom little seems to have been known.
Peter Walwal, 30, of Yalahin (Yamil CD), a trained motor mechanic
and former community school teacher become businessman, and in
1982 a director of Sepik Cocoa Growers. Said to have some NP
support.
David Nalas Melep, 38, of Albinama (Bumbita-Muhiang CD), a
subsistence farmer and director of Sepik Producers' Co-operative
Association. Unsuccessful candidate in 1977. Said to have NP
support.
Tobias Kuelik Sakra, 35, of Neliqum (Wora CD) a former school
headmaster, a director of the East Sepik Development Corporation
and former chairman of the provincial independence celebrations
committee. In 1977 Kuelik had resigned to contest the national
election, coming second to Lus. Since then he had remained in the
village, as a subsistence farmer. Kuelik was said to have NP
support.
Redman Keni, 38, of Aupik 2 (Wora CD), a malaria control officer
and subsistence farmer who had stood unsuccessfully in 1977. Pro
Pangu.
Manikut Manigoli 32, of Kuminibus 2 village (Maprik CD), self-
described as a subsistence farmer, but in fact a local businessman
of some substance (owning a trade store, coffee and a piggery) and
chairman of the Maprik District Youth Council. Said to be pro
Pangu.
Wewak Open
In 1977 the Wewak electorate had been won by Tony Bais, then 33, a
UPNG graduate, former social worker, assistant principal private
secretary to the prime minister (Somare) and then provincial
commissioner in East Sepik before resigning to contest the election as
the Pangu endorsed candidate. Bais was unlucky not to receive a
portfolio in the Somare ministry (which already included two East
Sepiks) but was compensated with the chairmanship of the
Constitutional Review Committee. A somewhat gruff personality and
probably more of a national than a constituency politician, Bais was
perhaps respected rather than popular around Wewak; there was also
some adverse comment on Bais's 'business interests' (he owns a trade
store) and several people with whom I spoke in 1981 suggested that he
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might be lucky to be reelected. Nine other candidates contested the
Wewak electorate:
Andrew Mungwusi, 39, of Kurupie village, self-described as
'subsistence farmer' but in fact a technical officer with Posts and
Telegraphs before resigning to contest the election as a pro-PPP
candidate.
William Hawarry, 39, of Magom village (Wewak Local CD),
businessman, founder in 1970 of the short-lived Sepik-based
National Labour Party, member of the Interim Provincial
Government but unsuccessful in the 1979 provincial election),
unsuccessful candidate in 1972 and 1977; NP supported.
Jenki Michael Malenki, 39, of Kremending village (Wewak Local
CD). Malenki, who described himself as a subsistence farmer, was
a former major in the PNGDF and had served as Somare's
electoral secretary from 1977 to 1980, before falling out with
Somare (and with Pangu). In 1982 he was national secretary of the
MA, whose endorsement he received.
Laura Martin, 60, Australian-born, resident in Wewak since 1952, in
Papua New Guinea since 1949, and company secretary of Wewak
Transport, a large locally-owned company which had been
established by the Martins in the early 1950s. (Mrs Martin's
husband, Frank, was member for the Madang-Sepik special
electorate, 1964-1968 and an early supporter of Pangu.) Mrs
Martin was a well-known Wewak identity, active especially in
women's sport and outspoken against excessive use of alcohol. She
had stood in 1977 (coming third) and again unsuccessfully in the
provincial elections of 1979, on each occasion, as in 1982, as an
independent.
Nelson Kaspar Galo, 43, of Yawauoro village (But-Boiken CD), a
former public servant (1962-1974) and provincial secretary of the
Public Service Association, turned subsistence farmer. Galo, who
had stood unsuccessfully in 1977, stood, again, as an independent
(though it was said that he had UP sympathies, which were not
reciprocated by the UP).
Maira Karaga (Benedict Maira), 38, of Kreer village (Wewak Local
CD), subsistence farmer, former member of the Interim Provincial
Government, defeated in the 1979 provincial elections. Maira was
the endorsed PPP candidate (though he told me in May 1982 that
he had received no help from the PPP).
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Tomogel Maraf, 45, from Sirasin village on Kairiru Island (Wewak
Islands, CD), ex-soldier, member for Wewak Islands and former
speaker in the provincial assembly. Pro Pangu.
Magis Hautokia, 42, of Urip village (But-Boiken CD), former
community school teacher (1961-1978), subsistence farmer,
unsuccessful candidate in the 1979 provincial elections. Hautokia
stood as the endorsed NP candidate.
Lainus Hepau Tingoan, 43, of Saure village (Wewak Local CD).
Hepau, a former carpenter, who described himself in 1982 as a
komiti and a church leader, had been an active figure in the Peli
movement in the early 1970s and in 1983 succeeded Matias Yaliwan
as the member for Yangoru-Saussia when Yaliwan resigned from
the house (see May 1982); in 1977 he had been heavily defeated
(Winnett and May 1983). Hepau was a pro-MA candidate, and his
poster was displayed in the MA office.
Wosera-Gaui
In 1977 the Wosera-Gaui seat was won by a Pangu stalwart from
Indingai village (Chambri Lakes CD), Matis Yambumpe. Yambumpe,
49, a subsistence farmer and former Gaui Council president, lacked
formal education but was a shrewd politician. Against him in 1982 stood
ten candidates:
Bartley Sua, 47, of Korogo on the Sepik River (Main River CD), a
former teacher and correctional institution warder, who in 1982
described himself as a subsistence farmer involved in 'community
developments in Korogo - business activities etc.'. Sua was the
endorsed NP candidate.
John Nigiti, 25, from Wabindumakag (North Wosera CD), former
malaria control officer and komiti of the Wosera Council.
Independent.
Jambiambo Gambaura, 35, from Weikor village (North Wosera
CD), a subsistence farmer and village director of a local business
group; unsuccessful candidate in 1977.
Bande Wangikia, 40, from Waigamaga (North Wosera CD), former
personnel manager with a large foreign company, now subsistence
farmer and businessman; the endorsed MA candidate.
Joe Yanj, 29, from Kandangei village (Main River CD), a salesman
with a big local private business; PPP candidate.
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Mali Adam, 33, born in the Chambri Lakes but currently employed
as manager of the Sepik Producers' Co-operative Association at
Hayfield, near Maprik.
Gugudimi Wabi, 33, a former broadcaster with Radio East Sepik,
now self-employed, from Yenchanmangua (Main River CD). Pro
Pangu.
Patrick Kamban, 30, from Isogum 2 village (North Wosera CD),
president of the Wosera Local Government Council, a former
teacher who had resigned in 1977 to contest the national elections,
without success.
Awikia Wanjik, 30, from Wombisa village (South Wosera CD), a
local businessman and coffee buyer, and Wosera councillor; pro
Pangu.
Chambameri Wak'n, 39, a Sepik River man from Burui (Sepik Plains
CD), who had served as a local government council officer before
'retiring' to subsistence farming in 1975. Said to be pro PPP.
Yangoru-Saussia
Yangoru-Saussia has had a peculiar political history, having returned cult
leader Matias Yaliwan in 1972 and his deputy Hepau in a by-election in
1973, and being the only East Sepik electorate not to return a Pangu
candidate in 1977. Between 1977 and 1982 the career of the sitting
member, John Jaminan, had not been without incident. Elected as a UP
candidate, Jaminan had become the opposition's shadow minister for
Finance. In 1977-78 he was involved in moves to oust Sir Tei Abal (UP)
as opposition leader; subsequently he left the UP to join Okuk's PUF
when Okuk took over the leadership of the opposition but fell out with
Okuk in late 1978 and drifted back to the UP. When the Chan
government took office in 1980 Jaminan became minister for Health.
Following his election to the National Parliament, however, Jaminan
began drinking heavily. Early in 1980 he was summonsed to appear on
what the Post-Courier (15 January 1980) described as three 'long
adjourned charges' - two of assault and one of using offensive language.
Later the same year he was convicted of driving under the influence of
liquor. His aggressive behaviour also alienated him from many people
within East Sepik, especially within the provincial bureaucracy. In
February 1981 Jaminan was arrested for failing to appear in court to
answer the earlier charges. Chan sought his resignation from cabinet
and when Jaminan failed to respond he was sacked. In the midst of this,
Jaminan quit the UP and rejoined Okuk. He stood in 1982 as an NP
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candidate. As in 1977 Jaminan was the sole candidate from the Pukia-
speaking area of the electorate.
Against Jaminan were five candidates:
Patrick Hokmori Saginginik, 28, of Toanumbu (Wewak Inland CD) a
graduate (politics major) from UPNG who had been working with
the provincial government as a village development coordinator; pro
MA.
John Wauwia, 46, born in Waramuru (Yangoru CD) but resident on
Yangoru station; a former community school teacher, broadcaster,
parliamentary interpreter and ministerial services executive officer,
Wauwia returned to Yangoru to contest the 1973 by-election won
by Hepau and stayed on, becoming an influential local businessman
(a leading figure in the Leningie Avaun Business Association
Group) and councillor. Wauwia was a close runner-up to Jaminan
in 1977 and an unsuccessful candidate (behind Yaliwan) in the
provincial elections of 1979.
Petrus Wapigaua (Petrus Wafi), 30, of Harua village (Yangoru East
CD), an Assemblies of God evangelist before being elected in 1979
to the provincial assembly where he became minister for
Commerce; MA endorsed candidate. As Commerce minister
Wapigaua was chairman of a provincial government fund created to
assist small businesses; early in 1982 Wapigaua was charged with
misappropriating money from this fund (subsequent to the election,
he was convicted of misappropriating K4,500 and sentenced to a 2
year gaol term). The affair cast a substantial shadow on
Wapigaua's candidature - indeed MA officials counselled him
against standing.
Tom Fimaimba, 30, a former community school teacher from
Haringer (Yangoru CD) and newcomer to politics. Under
somewhat controversial circumstances (see below) Fimaimba
received the Pangu endorsement.
Peter Rony, 32, of Numburuon village (Yangoru CD), executive
officer to the Greater Maprik Local Government Council and
unsuccessful candidate in 1977 and in the 1979 provincial elections;
pro Pangu.
In summary, a total of fifty-seven candidates contested the seven
East Sepik seats in 1982, the same number as stood in 1977 and eleven
more than stood in 1972. Of this number twenty-three had been
candidates in 1977 (including the seven sitting members) and another
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two had been candidates in earlier elections but not in 1977. Ten had
stood in the 1979 provincial elections, of whom three had been
successful, resigning their provincial seats to contest the national
election. Several of those who had returned to the province, or who
resigned from public service positions in the province, to contest the
election without success in 1977 had stayed on in the village in the hopes
of gaining election but none was rewarded (except, subsequently,
Wauwia - see postscript).
The mean age of candidates in 1982, at 38, was fractionally lower
than in 1977 (39), a slightly higher proportion of candidates under 30 and
a markedly lower number of candidates over 50 (two compared with
eight in 1977) being offset by the ageing of the twenty-three candidates
contesting both elections.
Educational standards were predictably somewhat higher. In 1982
about half of the fifty-seven candidates had been educated to grade 10 or
beyond, including four university graduates (Narokobi, Bais, Jaminan and
Hokmori), while another eleven had attained grades 8 or 9. Only five
had little or no formal education, but these included three sitting
members (Ston, Lus and Yambumpe) and one former member (Kabai).
As might be expected, the proportion of genuine subsistence
farmers among the candidates in 1982 appears to have been lower than
in previous elections, but the information given by candidates concerning
'occupation' has never been very reliable.
The campaign
As in previous years, the election campaign was a fairly quiet affair.
Most candidates for the open electorates made some attempt to get
around their electorates though there was a tendency, perhaps more
evident in 1982 than in 1977, for candidates to rely on networks of komiti
or friends to distribute posters and to carry the talk beyond kinship areas.
A number of rallies were organized in the towns and at government and
mission stations, markets and schools, and trucks with loudspeakers
were used in the towns and on some rural patrols. A few small beer
parties were reported. Party leaders Okuk, Chan and Momis all made
brief visits to the province. Okuk appears to have planned a somewhat
longer 'helicopter drop' tour but was thwarted by inability to obtain fuel;
he did, however, drop in on Sane's campaign in Angoram, and in
Yangoru where he received a mixed reception. Somare, busy with
Pangu's national campaign, was not seen in the province as much as
local Pangu officials would have liked, but was there for the last few
days of the campaign.
About four weeks before voting commenced there were reports
that a rally was to be held at Marambanja village, on Mount Hurun, the
home in 1970-72 of the Peli movement (May 1982). There was some
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confusion concerning the purpose of the rally. It appears to have been
initiated by Daniel Hawina, who played a leading role in the Peli
movement and had perpetuated its more cultish aspects, following the
withdrawal of Yaliwan, first through the Seven Association and more
recently through a fundamentalist religious organization, the New
Apostolic Church. The latter operated for the most part through a
network of village 'deacons' and 'bishops', nearly all of whom were
former Peli Komiti; in 1982 a number of these New Apostolic Church
officials acted as MA komiti. Regional candidate, and former Peli
secretary , Simbago was associated with Hawina in organizing the rally.
From discussions with several people involved, it seems that the main
purpose of the Marambanja meeting was to elicit support for the MA -
though none of the major MA personalities in East Sepik was directly
involved. The officer-in-charge of Yangoru station, however, interpreted
the planned event as a Peli cult revival and called for roadblocks on the
Sepik highway and the road from Kubalia. In the event, officials in
Wewak decided that such drastic action was not warranted but the
organizers were persuaded to cancel the meeting and shortly after Radio
Wewak broadcast a message through the province urging people not to
get involved in what it called the 'Beibi cult'.2 Some MA supporters
interpreted the government's intervention in this matter as being directed
against the MA. There were also complaints from the Maprik district
that the charging of several villagers, who happened to be MA komiti,
for non attendance at council workdays was politically motivated.
Apart from this, there were the usual complaints of opponents
defacing, removing or 'pasting over' posters, and in a few villages some
candidates were given a hostile reception. At least two incidents
occurred on the Sepik highway in which candidates were threatened
with physical violence, but though the election campaign may have
sharpened antagonisms between the contending groups involved, the
underlying causes lay beyond the politics of the election, and for the most
part relations between candidates were cordial.
At first glance political parties appeared to be much more salient in
1982 than in previous elections. Of the fifty-seven candidates, fifty could
be at least fairly clearly identified with a party (see footnote 1 and, on the
basis of casual observation, popular knowledge of party attachments,
formal or informal, seems to have been surprisingly widespread.
Four parties fielded candidates in East Sepik. Pangu, with its
traditional stronghold in the Sepik, had endorsed candidates in all seven
electorates while a further fifteen candidates put themselves forward - in
almost all cases, it seems,without party approval or support - as either
Before the Peli movement there had been a cult movement in the
Yangoru area. A leading figure in this movement was Beibi Yembanda, a
subsequent member of the national House of Assembly, who was also
involved in the Peli movement.
222 Pangu Returns to Power the 1982 Elections in Papua New Guinea
'pro Pangu' or 'pro Somare', or were generally recognized as having
Pangu sympathies. The Melanesian Alliance also endorsed seven
candidates; another four identified themselves as pro MA. The National
Party endorsed only five candidates not putting up contestants against
Somare or Lus; but it gave limited support to at least another four (two
of them in Maprik) and had another pro NP candidate without support in
Maprik. PPP put forward four candidates (Ambunti Dreikikir, Angoram,
Wewak and Wosera-Gaui) but had another two 'pro PPP' candidates.
The UP had no electoral organization in East Sepik but Galo in Wewak
described himself as a 'UP supporter'. The remaining seven either stood
as independents or had no known party attachment.
Of the four parties, Pangu probably ran the strongest campaign.
Although as late as 1981 party organization appeared to be in little less
than a shambles, by early 1982 there was a reasonably effective
organization throughout the province. In Wewak, from an office next to
the provincial assembly, a campaign coordinator and a deputy
coordinator directed activities in the seven electorates, in which the
party claimed to have a total of 'about 2000 komiti', mostly traditional
bigmen and younger men of influence in the villages.
According to party officials, the Pangu budget for East Sepik was a
modest K7,000, most of which went on a vehicle and four outboard
motors. Endorsed candidates were assisted with printing and transport
costs; officially 'pro-Pangu' candidates were not supported financially but
'pro-Pangu' candidates in Angoram, Wosera-Gaui and Yangoru-Saussia,
at least, did receive some assistance. Pangu T-shirts were available for
purchase. Although precise estimates are impossible, most candidates,
both endorsed and non-endorsed, appear to have outlayed sizeable
amounts from their own and their supporters' savings, especially along
the river where fuel is an expensive item.
With a smaller organization than Pangu, and a small budget, the MA
nevertheless ran a highly effective campaign. From a small office in the
Wewak-But Council building Narokobi, Malenki and a campaign
manager organized the regional campaign in conjunction with those of
the six open electorate candidates. An extensive network of komiti was
organized along regional lines in a number of teams with names such as
a sak (shark), tarangau (hawk), with which party organizers met
regularly.
With limited funds, much of the MA's rural campaign was
conducted on foot; Narokobi especially attempted to capitalize on this,
describing the MA to village people as the 'kanaka pati', 'pati bilong
yumi' and contrasting the foot patrols of the MA with the vehicles and
blaring loudspeakers of Pangu. The MA organizers also carried around
a census printout which listed all villages and directed Komiti to the
areas of greatest population.
The campaign of the National Party was run on a part-time basis
from the business office of the Wewak-based provincial party organizer.
Campaigning in the back blocks, East Sepik
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According to the party organizer the NP had only five endorsed
candidates, that is, candidates it thought could win, and who had
'dedication' (i.e. who would not switch parties after the election!), but, as
noted above, the party gave some assistance (K50-100 plus 'moral
support') to another four or five pro-NP candidates in the other
electorates. Party sources claimed that the NP had a budget in East
Sepik of K2,000 in addition to being provided with a landcruiser (which
was used mostly in Wosera-Gaui), two speedboats and two outboard
motors; candidates were also assisted in the purchase of fuel and the
party distributed free T-shirts.
In Angoram, where there was an NP branch presided over by the
Angoram Council vice-president, the NP appeared to have a well
organized network of komiti systematically covering the electorate with
or on behalf of Sane, many, it seems, using their own canoes and often
having to buy their own fuel.
In Yangoru-Saussia Jaminan ran his own campaign with little
interaction with the NP organization, but it was a pale shadow of the
very extensive campaign he had conducted in 1977. In several places
he presented cheques representing sectoral programme allocations; in at
least one instance - in East Yangoru - this backfired, as the recipient
community school headmaster publicly accused Jaminan of 'holding on'
to money which should have been allocated in 1981 so that he could use
it for 'political purposes'.
The PPP had a small office in Wewak, next to that of the MA; it
was, however, generally deserted. According to the PPP candidate for
Wosera-Gaui, the PPP provided two vehicles and an electoral allowance
of K300 per month for its four candidates.
With Narokobi the only serious non-Pangu candidate in the regional
electorate, both the NP and PPP organizations supported his campaign
regionally and there were several instances of collusion between MA,
NP and PPP candidates in open electorates, notably in Angoram and
Wosera-Gaui.
Having commented on the apparent saliency of parties in the 1982
election it is necessary immediately to make two substantial
qualifications.
The first concerns the fluidity of party attachment. The point is
perhaps best made by anecdote. For one, on the only occasion I saw
the PPP campaign truck in Wewak (where there was a PPP endorsed
candidate and a pro-PPP candidate) it was being driven by a man (a kin
of one of the candidates) who sported a T-shirt with the inscription:
'Vote 1 Laura Martin' (the independent candidate in Wewak). For
another, the MA's provincial campaign manager in 1982 had in 1977
served as campaign manager for Angoram candidate Teddy Sane, then
a PPP candidate; in 1982 Sane was endorsed NP candidate for
Angoram, yet when the MA's team visited Angoram with Narokobi in
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May they urged voters to support Sane, notwithstanding the fact that
there was an endorsed MA candidate in Angoram.
Secondly, it should be noted that while the major parties provided
endorsed candidates (at least) with a valuable grassroots organization,
there is little evidence of parties being able to control their supporters
when it came to nominations. The best illustration of this is probably the
case of Pangu Pati in Yangoru-Saussia. In 1977 Yangoru-Saussia was
won by UP candidate Jaminan with 3464 votes; Pangu endorsed
candidate Wauwia was a close second with 3349; pro-Pangu candidate
Rony, who is from more or less the same part of the electorate as
Wauwia came third with 1588. Had Rony not stood Wauwia probably
would have been elected. In 1982 it was generally felt that Jaminan's
popularity had declined and that he was vulnerable. Late in 1981,
however, the Pangu branch on the southern (Saussia or Kubalia) side of
the electorate made representations to the party hierarchy in Wewak
urging that, since in the previous two elections Pangu had been
represented unsuccessfully by a candidate from the northern (Yangoru)
side, it was Kubalia's turn to put up the endorsed candidate. Party
officials (including the campaign deputy coordinator, who was a Kubalia
man) eventually accepted this argument, endorsing political newcomer
Fimaimba. Wauwia and Rony were annoyed by this decision and both
stood in 1982 as pro-Pangu candidates, thus splitting the Pangu vote
three ways. In the absence of polling place figures it is obviously difficult
to disentangle party and local elements of the vote; also the position in
1982 was rendered more complex by the presence of a solid vote for the
MA candidate. But it is at least possible, and indeed likely, that this lack
of party discipline cost Pangu the seat for the second time. In Angoram,
a Pangu victory was probably never in doubt; nevertheless the fact that
four pro-Pangu candidates stood against the endorsed candidate -
including one whose electoral support came largely from Eichorn's home
area, and two from Middle Sepik - had no rationality as far as the party
was concerned.
The general conclusion would seem to be that although party was
an important element in candidates' perceptions of the elections and
although voters appear to have been much more conscious of parties
than they had been in 1977, party organization was still fairly
rudimentary and, except perhaps in Wewak, local and kin ties and
exposure to the electorate were still critically important.
Issues in the campaign were conspicuous mostly by their absence.
Apart from parochial issues (roads, bridges, community schools, aid
posts) Pangu candidates campaigned primarily on the record of the first
and second Somare governments (which, of course, had carried the
country through self-government and independence) and the
extravagance and corruption which, they argued, had characterized the
Chan-Okuk ministry. Some candidates (and, it seems, the Pangu
coordinator) sought specifically to discredit the MA - which was
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perceived as the main electoral threat in East Sepik - accusing that party
generally and Narokobi particularly of being dreamers or even 'cargo
cultists' (the link with the New Apostolic Church/Peli Association being
exploited), having 'communist' tendencies, and risking war with
Indonesia (on the basis of Narokobi's public antipathy towards
Indonesian rule in Irian Jaya).
The MA defended itself against such charges, arguing that MA
leader Momis had been responsible for the only significant policy
innovation since independence - provincial government, and accusing
Pangu of being 'the only true cargo cult party'; playing on the Pangu
slogan 'Husat i save rot?', Narokobi asked 'Wanem rot? Rot i go long
Maprik? Rot i go long Wewak? Nogat. Rot bilong kago tasol'. The MA
sought to discredit Pangu by portraying its candidates as a corrupt group
of rich politicians who had betrayed the ideals of the early nationalist
movement. Narokobi made pointed references to 'political leaders who
do not consider Papua New Guinea's schools good enough for their
children' (Somare has two children at school in Australia) and to the
business interests of the Pangu Pati and of individual (unnamed) Pangu
candidates. MA candidates also accused the outgoing Chan government
of extravagance. Narokobi's electoral poster carried an eighteen-point
manifesto ('as bilip'), the first point of which was 'Papua Niugini i mas
kristen kantri' ('Papua New Guinea should be a Christian country'), and
a letter to electors was signed 'Yours in Christ'. Many voters saw
Narokobi primarily as a christian candidate and there is no doubt that he
picked up a substantial vote from among the more religiously inclined
communities, including, as noted above, the New Apostolic Church.
NP candidate Sane emphasized his party's support of local business
and foreign investment but apart from this neither NP nor PPP
candidates contributed much to the debate of issues.
The 1982 election was, of course, the first national election since
the establishment of provincial government. As such it raised two
important questions: first, what sort of interaction would there be
between national and provincial politics, both issues and personalities?;
secondly would there be aspirants for the national parliament among
provincial politicians, and, if so, how would provincial office affect
national candidature?
On the first question: in some provinces there had been
considerable antipathy between national politicians and their provincial
counterparts, each seeing the other as a threat to its political authority;
this was perhaps especially true of some national members, one of
whom (a highlander) summed up his opinion of the members who had
emerged from the provincial elections of 1978-79 by describing them as
the failed candidates from the 1977 national election. In 1982 the
provincial politicians' time came and some provincial assemblies
announced that they would give public support to those candidates
whom they considered would adequately represent provincial interests.
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In East Sepik, however, relations between national and provincial
members had been generally cordial and the provincial assembly took no
such action. (Although East Sepik was one of those provinces whose
assembly had voted against party politics, in 1982 at least three quarters
of the provincial members, including the premier, were known Pangu 1
sympathizers - which undoubtedly facilitated harmonious relations.) Nor,
so far as I was able to observe, did provincial members give much overt
support to candidates, although Narokobi subsequently accused the
provincial government of supporting Pangu (an accusation which the
premier promptly denied, see Post-Courier 4 August 1982).
On the question of provincial members contesting the election:
three provincial members stood (Maraf in Wewak, Wafi in Yangoru-
Saussia, and Yua in Angoram). Nothing in the provincial constitution
required them to resign before contesting the election but a resolution of
the assembly early in 1982 did so. Of the three, Yua was the only one
successful and my impression was that membership of the provincial
assembly was a liability; in several casual discussions with rural
villagers, people expressed surprise or confusion at the candidature of
provincial assemblymen, and among those better informed a number said
that it was not right that a person elected to serve a provincial
constituency should resign his seat to contest the national election
without consulting with those who voted him into the provincial
assembly.
The results
The results are set out in Table 11.1. In the absence of polling place
figures analysis of the voting is virtually impossible.
In the regional seat Narokobi did well to capture a sizeable 24 per
cent of the vote. This was undoubtedly in pan the result of an effective
campaign by both the party organization and Narokobi as well as a
reflection of the combined support which Narokobi received from all the
non-Pangu parties.
But it would also seem to provide evidence in support of the MA's
claim that there was in 1982 some fairly widespread disillusion with
Pangu Pati and even with Somare, who was not seen much in the Sepik
during the campaign and who was felt by some to have lost touch with
village people. In Ambunti-Dreikikir, Ston won clearly (39 per cent of the
vote), ahead of three pro-Pangu candidates, with pro-MA and NP
candidates respectively fifth and sixth (each getting 6 per cent of the
vote) and the endorsed MA candidate receiving a meagre 532 votes.
In Angoram also, though the sitting Pangu member was beaten into
third place, the party swept to victory with the first three candidates
(Yua and Maiben pro-Pangu, and Eichorn) collecting 73 per cent of the
vote, ahead of the endorsed NP candidate (12 per cent). The MA
candidate scored a negligible 187 votes.
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In Maprik Lus predictably won a clear majority (56 per cent) with
the MA candidate collecting a creditable second (22 per cent), probably,
however, reflecting regional, as much as party, loyalty.
Bais, too, recorded a very decisive victory in Wewak for Pangu (54
per cent), streets ahead of his nearest opponents Malenki (MA, 16 per
cent) and Martin (independent, 1 1 per cent).
In Wosera-Gaui, Wanjik the pro-Pangu man from the populous
Wosera area narrowly defeated the sitting member from the Sepik River
(the two capturing 45 per cent of the vote) with the MA candidate a
creditable third (16 per cent).
Yangoru-Saussia again proved to be the maverick. In the face of a
poor electoral strategy, and an indifferent campaign by its strongest
candidate, Wauwia, Pangu again lost out to Jaminan (NP), who despite
the pre-election predictions of most observers scored a clear victory (29
per cent to Wauwia's 21 per cent). Notwithstanding the shadow cast
over his campaign and the possible handicap of his provincial
membership, MA candidate Wapigaua did well to gain third place, with
20 per cent.
Thus five of the seven sitting candidates were reelected, and in the
other two electorates endorsed sitting Pangu members were defeated by
younger pro-Pangu candidates.
Overall, a tentative assessment would seem to be that party vote
was important in 1982, perhaps even more important in deciding the
winners than locality, kin or personality. But in view of the fact that the
system of single endorsement did not prevent other candidates attaching
to themselves party labels it is difficult to judge just how important
parties were. Certainly nearly all candidates wanted a party label, but as
we have argued above this did not necessarily imply acceptance of an
overall party strategy, nor did it preclude a considerable fluidity in party
attachments. Moreover the results in Angoram, Wosera-Gaui and
Yangoru-Saussia, at least, provide evidence of the continued strong
importance of regional/kin factors.
Postscript
In August 1982 Jaminan was charged on four counts of rape, the
incidents having occurred in Mount Hagen in October 1981. In April
1983 he was convicted and sentenced to four years' gaol, thus losing his
parliamentary seat. In the subsequent by-election fourteen candidates
stood. A Wantok newspaper report (31 March to 7 April 1984) listed
five candidates as MA (not including Wapigaua - who was also in gaol),
four as Pangu, two as PPP, two as independent, and one undecided.
Fimaimba, Wauwia and Rony all stood again, but they were the only
candidates from the 1977 contest. This time Wauwia was the endorsed
candidate and he won, giving Pangu, at last, a clean sweep in East Sepik.
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Table 11.1
The East Sepik Results
East Sepik Provincial
Bernard M. Narokobi 21,691
Michael T. Somare 66,395
Jimmy Simbago 936
Informal 1,014
Total 90,036
Turnout (%) 49.6
Ambunti-Dreikikir Open
Toromble Kabai 1,766
Felix Wengisu Sowaimbau 978
Asimboro Ston 5,970
Judah Nim 683
Nick Klapat 444
Cain Yapi 2,836
John Paiyep 532
Harry Weldon Tubugman 975
Aikam Maromban 154
Gista Hapeli 1,018
Informal 54
Total 15,410
Turnout (%) 52.2
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Angoram Open
Lucky Yua 5,312
Teddy Sane 1,890
Jerry Sapka Moka 187
Jae Maika 500
Mas Niangri 23
Ludwig Schulze 1,381
John Maiben 3,266
Benny Chimbi 125
William Eichom 2,648
Informal 102
Total 15,434
Turnout (%) 42.8
Maprik Open
William Maniku Mimbaki 3,8 1 8
Jimmy U. Taol 288
Peter Walwal 659
David Nalas Melep 208
Pita Lus 9,873
Tobias Kuelik Sakra 1 , 1 90
Redman Keni 817
Manikut Manigoli 619
Informal 244
Total 17,716
Turnout (%) 57.0
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Wewak Open
Andrew Mungwusi 399
William Hawarry 325
Michael Malenki 2,390
Laura Martin 1,566
Nelson Kaspar Galo 127
Maira Karaga 114
Tomogel Maraf 631
Magis Hautokia 683
Lainus Hepau Tingoan 117
Tony Bais 7,950
Informal 447
Total 14,749
Turnout (%) 62.6
Wosera-Gaui Open
Bartley Sua 321
John Nigiti 1 ,355
Jambiambo Gambauro 524
Bande Wangikia 2,354
Yambumpe Matias 3,201
Joe Yanj 946
Mali Adam 475
Gugundimi Wabi 254
Patrick Kamban 1,383
Awikia Wanjik 3,456
Chambameri Wak'n 423
Informal 35
Total 14,727
Turnout (%) 47.0
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Yangoru-Saussia Open
John Jaminan 3,449
Patrick Hokmori 274
John Wauwia 2,489
Petrus Wapigaua 2,337
Tom Fimaimba 1,825
Peter Rony 1,307
Informal 299
Total 11,980
Turnout (%) 40.0
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Chapter 12
MANUS YEARNS FOR QUALITY LEADERSHIP:
A QUESTIONABLE VERDICT IN 1982.
Polonhou S. Pokawin,
It is a tradition in democratic societies that the electorates speak through
the ballot boxes to choose their leaders. The tradition has since 1964
been an element of Papua New Guinea's national life. In 1982 the voters
of Manus spoke. At the end of it all Michael Pokayou Pondros, a
member of the National Parliament since 1972, emerged the winner in
the Provincial seat, and Nahau Kambuou Rooney, an MP since 1977,
emerged belatedly from the chambers of the National Court as the
winner of the Open seat .
Background
For the 1982 national election, Manus had a population of 25,844. The
Electoral Office issued 10,366 Provincial and 10,366 Open electorate
ballot papers to the seven polling teams which covered seven polling
regions.
Table 12.1
Ballot Papers issued to seven regions
Polling Region Ballot papers
(Provincial and Open Electorates)
Western Islands 335
West Coast 1,661
North Coast 1,748
Highway 1,260
South Coast 1,330
East Coast 2,634
South East Islands 1,398
10,366
Of the 10,366 ballot papers issued, only 10,315 were returned for
both the Provincial and Open electorates. The total of eligible voters
according to the principal roll of electors was 16,546. The principal roll of
electors however had a lot of errors.
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Manus since 1972 has been the best represented province in the
National Parliament. The creation of electorates made it a national policy
that, in addition to the open electorates which are created according to
the number of people, each Province should also elect a representative to
the National Parliament. Each open electorate should consist of about
40,000 people, but Manus, with a population of only 25,000, nevertheless
has two representatives elected by the same set of voters. This unique
anomaly has been noted by politicians representing larger electorates as
well as by the Law Reform Commission, whose report of early 1983
recommended the abolition of the provincial seats as being costly and
lacking an effective purpose. During the 1964 and 1968 national
elections, Manus had only an Open electorate. On both occasions Paliau
Maloat was elected to the parliament. Manus shared the Regional
electorate with New Ireland in 1964 when Jim Gross was elected and in
1968 when Wally Lussick became Regional member. But since 1972
Manus has constituted a provincial electorate on its own. In 1972, Pikah
Kasau was elected to the Provincial seat and Michael Pondros to the
Open seat, while in 1977 Nahau Rooney became the second woman to
be elected to the National Parliament in the Open seat and Michael
Pondros was elected to the Provincial seat. Since the 1964 national
election the issue of leadership has been an important one. Political
leadership at the national level has become a goal which aspiring and
ambitious personalities have sought after. It has great attractions and
glamour. It is commonly said that that is where the power is, and that, if
elected, leaders can bring services and achieve big things for the people.
Leaders themselves often downplay the personal benefits of power, but it
has become commonplace that many national leaders have risen to new
heights in business, social and political circles following election success.
Manus has had experience with the politics of leadership through the
Manus Local Government Council and its predecessors since 1950. The
council's leadership was dominated for about 30 years by traditional
personalities. This began to change towards the end of the 1970s when
younger and better educated Manus men were elected as councillors.
By the time the council was abolished in April 1982, the majority of the
councillors were either educated or semi-educated people. Furthermore,
the introduction of provincial government, and its predecessor, the area
authority, added another level of leadership to the Manus political scene
after 1976. In 1979, the electors went to the poll to elect their first
provincial government. Since then the role of leadership and government
has come closer to where the people are. The people have become
more and more familiar with the art of government and the behaviour of
leaders. They have over a long time developed their expectations as to
what the role of the leader is and how he should conduct his own affairs
as well as the affairs of government. This knowledge has increased the
people's political awareness. Furthermore, their high expectation of the
role of leaders and government has failed to be met by the councillors,
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the National Parliament members, and the provincial government
members up to 1982. Consequently, the province yearned for better
leaders. Everywhere, the electors talked about the need to have better
quality leaders. Younger and more ambitious people began to see in
themselves the answer to the people's yearning and the province's
demand. They responded by contesting the 1982 national election. They
believed they had the answer to the province's search for the type of
leaders it deserved. The 30-odd years of Manus' political experience
since the establishment of the Baluan Council, based on historical
experiences with the forces of colonialism and capitalism, has made the
Manus population a politically aware one. By the 1982 national election,
every decision made on Manus was a potentially political one. Increased
education, involvement in business, the effect of government in the
province, access by the villagers to decision makers and the experiences
accumulated through years of political and or business rivalry had
contributed to the politicization of the Manus populace. Consequently,
political participation through attempts at influencing decisions and taking
an active role in public meetings had become an 'in' thing. From youth
groups to women's groups to the provincial government, the populace
stands up to be counted and aspires to be heard and to be taken into
account when decisions are made, money is distributed and services are
provided. Politics has emerged as a popular game to play and career to
pursue.
The 1982 National Election
The 1982 national election was unlike any election in the past. The
campaigning was sophisticated and full of activities; the electors enjoyed
a feast of political sophistry from candidates and their supporters. The
high level of political consciousness contributed to the raising of
expectations - that the time of change in leadership was here, and that
there would actually be changes. Well before nominations, it was
obvious in Manus who the candidates would be. Apart from the
incumbents, the activities of others were indications that they intended to
contest the elections. Some like Roy Poius Pogat had been on the
campaign trail about one year in advance. Radio Manus became a
medium for aspiring candidates to issue statements. Thus the list of
candidates for the Provincial electorate was fully predictable, while the
only surprise for the Open electorate was the Melanesian Alliance's
nomination of a woman candidate, Mrs. Elizabeth Buarra, when the party
had already nominated a male candidate, Charles Batapei.
Apart from individuals, political groups also prepared themselves for
the election. The two most publicized ones were the Pangu Pati, which
hurriedly established a branch a few weeks before the election, and the
Makasol Party, which increased its public appeal as election day
approached. Organizing efforts were made by the People's Progress
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Party, the Melanesian Alliance, and the National Party, but did not
receive as much attention. Mobilization by candidates and parties meant
that Manus was well prepared for the 1982 national election. Thanks to
Radio Manus and the invasion of villages by candidates, their supporters
and posters every elector knew that an election was on.
The Candidates
By the time nominations closed on 15 April 1982, a total of 20 candidates
had nominated for the two seats. Eleven candidates nominated for the
Open Seat and nine for the Provincial seat. This was an increase of four
candidates over the 1977 election - three more for the Provincial seat and
one more for the Open seat. The trend in the number of candidates
contesting the national elections since 1964 has been as follows:
Table 13.2
Regional/
Year Provincial Seat Total
1964 1 1 1
1968 3 5 8
1972 4 6 10
1977 6 10 16
1982 9 11 20
The increase in the number of candidates for every election is indicative
of the raw interest in politics within the province. The Regional seat was
not contested by a Manus person in the 1964 and 1968 elections. All
candidates hailed from New Ireland. From 1972, when Manus had its
own Provincial seat, the interest has been continually on the increase.
Apart from the fact that the national leadership role was still a new thing
in the 1960s, the qualification clause and the costs involved in
campaigning in Manus and New Ireland were beyond the ability of a
Manus aspirant at that time. With improved communication, and
financially sound political parties and their effective machinery today,
these difficulties are a thing of the past.
The 1982 national election candidates were a totally new generation
of leadership aspirants. None of the 1960s candidates contested. Five
candidates for the Provincial seat had contested in the 1970s, but only the
incumbent for the Open seat was re-contesting the election. It was,
overall, a field of fairly well educated and informed candidates.
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Since there is no substantive difference between the Open and Provincial
electorates in Manus, I shall treat the twenty candidates together. The
legislation and regulations which provide for Open and Provincial
electorates makes their application in Manus an anomaly. In all
respects, the boundaries of the two electorates and the number of voters
are the same. With the increasing number of very well educated
candidates contesting both seats, the educational qualification is
becoming irrelevant and insignificant.
Educational Background
The 1982 candidates for both the Open and Provincial seats were better
educated and more widely experienced in the operations of government
than in 1977. The least educated, Elizabeth Buarra, had only six years of
formal education. However, she has been a teacher. And six
candidates, 30 per cent, had University degrees - Francis Posanau,
Nahau Rooney, Kisokau Pochapon, James Sisosor, Paul Masta, and
Paliau Lukas. Every candidate except for Lalau Maiah had had
extensive experience in government and the private sector. Except for
Buarra, all candidates were qualified to contest either of the seats in
Manus. It has become obvious from experiences of the national
elections since 1964 that it is the better educated people who aspire to
leadership positions in government. The fact that no 'old timer' contested
this election suggests that the population sees the need for better-
educated and well-informed persons to take the lead at the national level.
The popular expression has been that: Nesenel Palamen i bilong ol
save man, na Provensel gavman em bilong ol lapun bilong pies. The
Manus provincial parliament has provided an opportunity for village-
based leaders to try their political luck, while leaving the National
Parliament to the more educated candidates. It is most likely, however,
that better educated persons will contest the provincial elections in
future. This may push the village-based leaders back to community
governments. And as younger and better educated people move to
community governments the age of village-based leaders will end, and a
new generation of leaders will become completely entrenched in the
island province.
Is education therefore the key to leadership? Education is a
necessary qualification, but the candidate must also have proven ability in
the province, not necessarily the village. For a person to be considered
seriously for a National Parliament seat, he or she must have a good
education and be fairly well known in the province. A broad base is
required to win. Locally-based support is not sufficient unless other
candidates fail to win votes from outside their own base. During the
campaign few references were made to the educational background of
the candidates. Paul Masta, a candidate for the Provincial seat, alone
continually stressed in his news releases aired by NBC that he was a
university graduate in Politics and knows about the way government
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works. For every other candidate, educational achievement was a non-
issue. It was shown in the nomination form and that was it. It was not
used to downgrade the other, less educated candidates. One's
employment and experiences however were used in campaign leaflets
and public speaking campaigns. For instance, Francis Posanau's work
and educational experience as a surveyor enabled him to use the issue of
land effectively in his platform. While in the 1982 election, educational
qualifications per se were not an overt issue, electors were in fact well
aware of the educational qualifications of candidates.
Exposure to National and Provincial Life
Out of twenty candidates seven were either incumbent or former
members of the National Parliament, the Provincial Assembly, the Lae
City Council or the Manus Local Government Council (MLGC) - Nahau
Rooney, Michael Pondros, Barnabas Kombil, Mathew Tuam, Pikah
Kasau, Arnold Masipal, and Roy Pogat. Another ten had had extensive
experience in the public service and statutory bodies - Joseph Kove,
Hanai Popon, Francis Posanau, Charles Batapai, Kisokau Pochapon,
James Pokasui, James Sisosor, Jim Paliau, Paul Masta and Paliau Lukas.
One, Levi Polomon, was a promising young businessman. Two, Lalau
Maiah and Elizabeth Buarra, lived mostly in the village. Some had
experience in both the government and private sector (Paliau Lukas, Joe
Kove, and Francis Posanau). Together, the twenty candidates had a full
range of career experiences.
The experiences of the candidates featured prominently in their
campaigns. Barnabas Kombil, as former premier of Manus, thought that
he was the ideal representative for Manus in the National Parliament.
Arnold Masipal had not only been involved with the churches, the local
government council, business and community work: he was also runner-
up in 1972 and 1977. He thought that his chances were good and that he
had the background to represent Manus over the next five years. And
Levi Polomon thought that his rising success as a businessman, his active
and effective involvement with Manus communities in Port Moresby and
Arawa, his very good reputation in the villages, and his links with
educated Manus functionaries made him an ideal representative of
Manus.
But all candidates viewed their experiences as having equipped
them for the job. The incumbents Michael Pondros and Nahau Rooney
had been there - one for two terms and the other as a cabinet Minister -
and they thought they knew the job through and through. Their return
would enable them to continue from where they left off when their terms
ended. A new representative would start from scratch.
Political Party Endorsement
For the first time political parties played an important part in a Manus
election. A total of six political parties fielded candidates. This involved
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payment of the nomination fees and contributions to campaign expenses.
Apart from the party candidates, every single candidate associated
himself or herself with a political party. This was an interesting change
from past elections. The Pangu Pati, People's Progress Party,
Melanesian Alliance Party, National Party, PNG Independent Group and
Makasol Party altogether fielded eleven candidates. Pangu Pati
endorsed the incumbents Michael Pondros and Nahau Rooney for the
Provincial and Open seats respectively. The PPP endorsed James
Sisosor and Hanai Popon; the MA endorsed Paul Masta for the
Provincial seat and Charles Batapei and Elizabeth Buarra for the Open
seat; the National Party endorsed only Barnabas Kombil for the
Provincial seat; the PNG Independent Group endorsed James Pokasui
for the Open seat; and Makasol Party endorsed Paliau Lukas and
Kisokau Pochapon.
Apart from those endorsed candidates, four provincial seat
candidates were Pro Pangu Independents - Jim Paliau, Levi Polomon,
Pikah Kasau, and Arnold Masipal; Pangu also attracted the other five
Open candidates - Roy Pogat, Mathew Tuam, Joseph Kove, Francis
Posanau, and Lalau Maiah. It was obvious that Pangu Pati was the most
popular political party during the 1982 national election in Manus. Of the
total twenty candidates, eleven candidates were either endorsed by the
Pati or publicly associated themselves with it. One wonders whether the
other candidates would have associated themselves with Pangu had they
not been endorsed by the other parties. The tendency seemed to be that
where a candidate was not financially supported by another Party he
opted for Pangu. The fact of financial support determined the affiliation
of most candidates who claimed membership of political parties apart
from Pangu. There were two candidates, however, who were clearly
not Pangu supporters even if they were not endorsed by other political
parties. These were Paul Masta of the Melanesian Alliance, and James
Pokasui of the PNG Independent Group.
For the first time, then, party politics featured significantly in Manus
political life, and it tended to justify Pangu Pati's claim that Manus has
been Pangu's territory.
Regional Distribution ofCandidates
During the 1 982 National election a candidate's effective base was his or
her village or the group with which he or she had worked closely. Since
the 1979 provincial government election, however, a new kind of base
has come into existence, the provincial assembly electorate. Table 12.3
show where each candidate came from and from what Provincial
electorate. In some cases, the candidate's continued presence in another
electorate is shown.
As for villages, Kali-Bipi and Rapatona had one candidate for the
Provincial seat; Soparibeu, Pere-Ribunai, Kurte and Los Negros one for
the Open; Lelemasli and Nali one Provincial and two Open; Eue Kele
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and Sopomu-Malai Boy one Provincial and one Open; and Balopa three
Provincial and one Open. Of the fifteen regions, eleven were
represented.
Lorengau is a special case. The member for Lorengau in the
Provincial Assembly, Barnabas Kombil, contested the election; however,
I have placed him under Balopa because he originated from Balopa.
Since Lorengau is a town, and also because the majority of candidates
had lived for many years in Lorengau, for all practical purposes
Lorengau was open for every candidate.
As these regional identities based on Provincial electorates develop,
and are nurtured in villages they could decide future elections. With
effective political party machineries and membership, the present
tendency to vote according to one's knowledge of the candidate could
give way to either voting on the basis of political party membership or on
building strongholds in a number of these regions. And since the eligible
voters of the 25,000 people of Manus are only about 11,000, of whom
only about 8,000 have voted consistently in past elections - and also
given the increasing numbers of candidates - an effective control of three
or four regions, with some votes coming in from other regions, could
easily send a candidate to the National Parliament.
Open Electorate Candidates
Roy Poius Pogat. During a public gathering organized by the
Provincial government in Lorengau to provide the candidates with
an opportunity to present themselves to the voters, Roy Pogat began
by saying: 'I have a candidate. I want to present my candidate to
you. He is Mr. Roy Poius Pogat! It is time to change the Open
member!' So Roy Pogat presented himself to the voters.
Roy Pogat was a loner throughout the election. His supporters were
silent. Throughout the period of campaign he was accompanied by
an insignificant admirer, Mr. Pokuweh Ponape, from a village other
than his own. Until his resignation about a year before the election
Roy Pogat was a health extension officer based in Lae and a Lae
City councillor. He was an active member of the Pangu
establishment in Lae. When he resigned and returned to Manus to
prepare for the elections he became very active in the affairs of his
village group, the Karun Business Group. He was elected chairman
and he helped to acquire and run a PMV truck for the group. But
internal differences created a split between himself and Paul Masta,
also from Karun, and an intending candidate for the Provincial seat.
Roy Pogat had had an eye on the national election from the time he
set foot on Manus. He became the secretary of the PMV
Association and he was often heard on Radio Manus news bulletins.
He was a common sight in Lorengau - fully dressed with trousers,
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long sleeved shirt and a brief case. He did all he could in one year
to make up for his years of absence from the province. During the
campaign period, he travelled on foot, by canoe and on trucks to visit
the voters and he distributed a leaflet with his head photo on it. His
major objective was to unseat the incumbent representative, Nahau
Rooney. He was frank about it. Yet from the start his chance of
succeeding was insignificant, although he was hopeful and strove to
the end.
Mathew Tuam. Mathew Tuam has been a bright political figure in
Manus. Since the early 1970s, his involvement with the Kele
Planters Association helped to introduce him to the voters. He was
elected a councillor in the 1970s and rose to be an interim member
of the Manus Provincial Government in 1977. He became deputy
speaker. In 1979 he was elected as member for Ene-Kele to the
Manus Provincial Assembly. He became deputy premier and also
held on different occasions the Transport and Works and Finance
portfolios. At the beginning of 1982 he resigned when the premier at
that time resigned. He contested the premier's position and lost.
During the national election, he held his seat as a back bencher in
the Lapan Assembly.
Tuam embarked on an extensive campaign throughout the province.
First, before the election he got possession of a tipper truck which
he utilised during the campaign. His bid was strengthened by his
accompanying the incumbent Provincial member, Michael Pondros,
on the campaign trail. This association between Tuam and Pondros
was an anomaly. Even though Pangu Pati endorsed Rooney and
Pondros, for all practical purposes, Tuam replaced Rooney as far as
Pondros was concerned. It was indicative of the conflict between
Pondros and Rooney. Tuam has a powerful personality. He is a
forceful speaker and understands the mind of the Manus voter: he
fits the stereotype that many Manus voters have about the kind of
leader they should have.
In accompanying Pondros he reaped benefits from Pondros'
established reputation, his video attractions, his motor canoes, and
his support base. Tuam was not a serious candidate to many
observers, but the result showed otherwise. An explanation was
that many of his voters would have been Rooney's votes. His
association with Pondros and thus the Pangu base denied Rooney a
significant number of votes. Nevertheless Tuam emerged unscaned
from the election. He scored well, and he continued to show his
energy on the floor of the Lapan Assembly. However, he became
more and more involved in his block at Salame and spent lengthy
periods away from Ene-Kele.
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Joseph Kove. Joseph Kove was a name associated with the Manus
Local Government Council. He was its executive officer until his
appointment as administration officer with the Manus provincial
government in 1979. He has a quiet and unimposing personality but
is a serious worker behind the scenes. He had spent many years in
Lorengau.
Since Kove's resignation from the provincial government in 1981, he
has been involved in dealing with trochus shells and has acted as
middleman for some foreign business interests in the province. He
owns a block of land in Lorengau and operates his business from
there. Kove did not conduct an elaborate campaign. He produced a
leaflet with his photo and statements of his dreams for Manus. He
also produced T-shirts with his name and picture on it. These were
widely displayed. Except for an appearance in his home region of
Balopa, he never went public to push his course, although his use of
family connections through his wife and his extended family was
effective. As the election approached he was able to establish
contacts with his long-forgotten extended family. This got him some
votes.
Kove was reserved before, during and after the elections. His quiet,
self-controlled personality has remained intact. He is more a private
person than a public personality.
Hanai Popon. A former school inspector and incumbent appointed
member for Youth and Recreation in the Lapan Assembly, Hanai
Popon was considered a strong candidate from the beginning. His
Kurti region constituted a large voting population and his teaming
with James Sisosor further would give him votes from Kali-Bipi and
Sopariben areas.
Popon in 1979 had bid for the provincial assembly seat of Kurti but
lost to an older generation leader, Kuluwali Suhvau. His background
and associations with the political masters in the province, however,
enabled him to join the leadership as an appointed member. Popon
could be a formidable opponent and a dynamic leader. He was,
however, inhibited. His approach was one of presenting himself as
one of the alternatives for the voters to choose from. He never
pushed his candidacy to the front line and his association with PPP
was perhaps a factor. PPP never had a name in the Province.
Perhaps as a matter of logistics, he sought PPP's endorsement for
the sake of contesting the elections. If the ceremony at Naringel
during which he was endorsed by the then prime minister was any
indication, he lacked the drive and enthusiasm to fight the election.
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The ceremony was more an impromptu than an organized one fitting
for a prime minister to attend.
Elizabeth Buarra. For all practical purposes, Elizabeth Buarra was
set up to split the women's votes which it was thought would
otherwise go to Rooney. She was the only woman to contest the
election besides Rooney.
Elizabeth Buarra was, until she was nominated by the Melanesian
Alliance Party Branch, an insignificant personality. The
functionaries of the MA were determined to put up another woman
against the incumbent Mrs Rooney, but their attempt to recruit
prominent women leaders including Mrs Kimat and Mrs Paliau
failed. In desperation the party branch put up Buarra, even though it
had already endorsed Charles Batapei as the official candidate for
the Open electorate. Her candidacy was a set-up; Her chance of
winning was negligible, but it was assumed that her candidacy
would not affect Batapei's votes. It would prevent Rooney from
getting the women's votes.
Francis Posanau. Francis Posanau was one of the first graduates in
Surveying from the then Institute of Higher Education, now the
University of Technology. He rose within the profession to be
deputy surveyor-general in Papua New Guinea. About two years
before the election he left the government and became a partner in a
private surveying firm based in Rabaul. Posanau moved to Manus
and was involved in surveying work on a contract basis for the
government. This enabled him to survey roads and land boundaries
throughout a large part of the province. He was also a regular
weekly commentator on a programme 'Toktok Bilong Graun', on
Radio Manus.
At Rene, his home base, Posanau had a good reputation and was
highly regarded. This was substantiated through his endorsement by
Pranis Pabasi, a village bigman, former councillor, and a respected
old-generation provincial leader. Pranis and other leaders of Rene
accompanied Posanau throughout his campaign.
Posanau printed a quality leaflet which publicized his policies and
displayed a photo of himself looking through surveying equipment.
He also produced a singlet with his impression on it. It was worn
widely. Posanau's statements of policy highlighted the issue of land,
and his ideas as to the best way to effectively resolve land problems
and utilize land for the benefit of the land owners in the modern
economy and, subsequently, for the government also. Posanau was
bright, academically highly qualified, very experienced, and
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possessed potentially good ideas. He had the basics to be a good
representative. A humble person, Posanau had a quiet way of
getting people to opt for his ideas. He is persistent and he is open to
ideas. He recognized his limitations and was prepared to be guided
by people he respects. Had Manus been true to its yearning for a
quality leader, Posanau was one. He was openly pro-Pangu. His
eye for political leadership made him turn down an offer to be
deputy vice chancellor at the University of Technology, Lae, only a
few weeks before polling began.
Nahau Rooney Mrs. Nahau Rooney was the incumbent. In 1977
she overcame all odds to be the second woman to enter the
National Parliament and the first woman to do so from Manus
Province. With a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of
Papua New Guinea and a working experience in the centre of
power during the early 1970s she also had proven ability in the eyes
of Manus people during her term with the Department of Manus.
As an elected representative, she had tasted power as minister for
Justice, minister for Liquor Licensing, and briefly as minister for
Decentralisation. She has long been at the heart of power in Papua
New Guinea politics and she is a pioneer in her own right as a
woman and a Manus leader. Mrs. Rooney was the candidate to
defeat. She was an active Pangu personality, the endorsed Pangu
candidate, and was personally presented to the Manus people by
'the Chief, Michael Somare; she had widespread support.
During her term as the Open member from 1977, concern had been
raised by critics and opponents in Manus about aspects of her
leadership. Her central role in the 'Rooney Affair' which eventually
toppled the Somare government in 1979, and her socially outward
personality were points raised against her. This carried weight not
so much because it had any substance but because she was a
woman. It was an expressed view during the campaign that
Rooney's womanliness had been used as a weapon to get what she
wanted in politics. Rooney had a running conflict with her colleague
in the Provincial seat, Michael Pondros. Pondros' open campaign
against Rooney by teaming with Tuam was not taken easily by
Rooney. Eventually, as party branch secretary, she acted to remove
the party's Suzuki vehicle and 25 horse-power outboard motor from
Pondros. At the same time Roy Pogat, a Pangu supporter and an
opponent for the Open seat, manoeuvred to undermine Rooney's
support and leadership within the party. Rooney, however, was a
formidable opponent. She maintained an effective role within the
Party's machine.
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Her campaign involved leaflets, the party's functionaries, and teams
of supporters to publicize her cause during the polling day at the
legal distance from the polling booth, as well as village public
meetings. Knowing that she was the target for all candidates, she
campaigned extensively to maintain her lead and challenged their
candidacies. She received firm support from her own base.
Lalau Maiah Lalau Maiah was the youngest candidate. Many
claimed that he was under age. He claimed he was 26 years old.
He had stayed home after unsuccessful completion of Grade 10.
Maiah's candidacy was a surprise. It had been rumoured earlier
that his father, Joel Maiah, the premier of Manus and an
unsuccessful national candidate since 1964, was contesting the
election. His election as premier at the beginning of 1982 when
premier Kombil resigned changed the situation. Not wanting to miss
the opportunity altogether Joel Maiah put up his eldest son as a
candidate for the Open seat. He got the provincial minister for
Economic Development, Damien Kahu, to endorse his son and
authorize his campaign publicity. Maiah was not a threat to
anybody. Other candidates were concerned, however, that he
would split their votes. He was attacked as being under age. Some
threatened to sue him.
He produced leaflets with his photo and statements of policies
directed towards the youth. Clearly he aimed at getting the votes of
his own age group. His smaller briefcase size leaflet was produced
in red and green colours. He claimed in his leaflet 'In God I Trust'.
His father, the premier, used the official premier's car to campaign
for him and distribute the leaflets. A former journalist from the
Times of Papua New Guinea newspaper, Mark Hosea, directed his
campaign and accompanied him everywhere. They used a truck
and a speed boat to make quick appearances in many villages.
It would seem that Maiah's candidacy was effected only to maintain
the tradition of having the name Maiah on the ballot papers. Since
Maiah senior was in the premier's hot seat, his son was put up to
maintain the tradition and also to reap the benefit of his father's
achievements and his presumably good reputation as premier for
Manus. Lalau Maiah was too young even if he was 26 years old.
In the eyes of the Manus people, he still had not shed the ways of
the carefree youth in him. However, he scored good votes in view
of his youth.
Charles Batapei. Charles Batapei was formerly Charles Brilante,
but running for the Open seat was a mistake. With an eye on the
national election, he resigned from the Department of
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Decentralization where he had risen to be first assistant secretary
and returned home to Sori Island. One of his parents came from
there. The other was of white heritage. Batapei became very
involved with the community and helped to establish the IROS (Sori
back to front) Club.
Batapei was endorsed by the Melanesian Alliance Party as one of
its candidates for the Open seat. The other was Buarra. With a
mixed race background he had an uphill battle. The party's
additional endorsement of Buarra did not help; in fact, it created
doubts in the voters' minds about his candidacy. How could a party
put up another candidate when they had one already? Earlier, at the
beginning of 1982, the Melanesia Alliance Party branch was opened
in Manus. It was launched by the party leader, Fr John Momis.
The branch played its part in campaigning for the endorsed
candidates, including Batapei. He accompanied Paul Masta, his
colleague for the Provincial seat, everwhere. Buarra only joined
them in areas near Lorengau.
Batapei did not produce any leaflet of his own, although the party
did, but he made public appearances in town and in the villages.
Batapei, like Buarra, was not a strong candidate. The Party, being a
new one in Manus, had a long way to go before it could make its
candidates significant when they were not personally so. One
expression was popular during his appearances: 'Em i bilong Manus
o em i bilong we?' . His mixed-race complexion did not help his
candidacy. If anything, today, unless a mixed race candidate or a
naturalized white Manusian candidate is an extraordinary
personality, his or her chance of being a political leader in Manus is
very slim.
James Pokasui. A captain with the land element of the Papua New
Guinea Defence Force, James Pokasui utilized his acquired skills to
launch into politics. He was able to be transferred to Lombrum as
adjutant at the maritime element base in 1981, and during his short
period of service there he made contact with the ex-servicemen,
organized their pensions and got them involved as a group. When he
resigned early in 1982 to prepare for the elections he had reliable
and trusted allies among the ex-servicemen. They worked hard for
him wherever they were and they provided him with a place to stay
when he visited their villages.
Originally Pokasui had applied for PPP's endorsement, but failed in
this. However his association with Ted Diro in the Defence Force
enabled him to join forces with the former Brigadier-General, and he
was endorsed as the only PNG Independent Group candidate in
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Manus. Pangu supporters and campaigners worked against him
because he was a PNG Independent Group candidate. They
claimed that, if that Group won, Communists would run the country,
and the soldiers would run the government. Pokasui was however a
formidable opponent. He had determination, drive and a base to
fight on. Informally, he was in league with Levi Polomon, the
Provincial candidate. They both originated from Lelewasih, but only
in their base did they join forces. In other areas, they went their
separate ways. The party produced Pokasui's poster with a
standard PNG Independent Group slogan: IT IS TIME FOR
CHANGE. Ted Diro's endorsement was included. It was the
largest poster used in the campaign. It was effectively used and so
was his private utility vehicle.
Pokasui campaigned extensively in all areas except the south and
south-east islands. The results proved that this cost him ultimate
success. However, he emerged from the election a respected
person and a potentially effective leader. His strong campaign and
broad base made him a candidate to be reckoned with.
Kisokau Pochapon. Kisokau Pochapon was the first Papua New
Guinean surveyor-general. He maintained his position until he
resigned to prepare for the election. Since his return to Manus in
1981, he had taken an active leadership role in the Makasol Study
Group or Makasol Party - the offspring of the Paliau Movement of
1946. He helped to prepare the Makasol base for the election. His
island village of Mbuke was a stronghold of the Makasol Party.
Pochapon is not a public figure by nature. He is more a back room
technocrat. His attempt to enter political life did not fit his
personality. A policy leaflet with his photo was distributed by the
Makasol functionaries, but his campaign was contained within the
Makasol community; he also had personal differences with the
party's candidate for the provincial seat. They were hardly ever
seen campaigning as a team. He depended on the misinformation
that Makasol had 10,000 members all over Manus and the
reasonable assumption that ten other candidates would split the
votes of non-Makasol members. Apart from his occasional visits to
Lorengau and his appearances at frequent Makasol gatherings in
Lorengau and various villages, he hardly appeared in non-Makasol
public gatherings.
Pochapon had a good academic background, but his work
experience as surveyor-general was no great asset. His attempt to
broaden his experience by organizing the Makasol Party did not give
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him much opportunity to broaden his base. It also did not fit with his
personality. His was a case of a wasted resource.
Provincial Electorate Candidates.
James Peter Sisosor. With the establishment of the Department of
Manus in 1979, James Sisosor, then finance officer with the Manus
Local Government Council, was appointed assistant secretary for
Finance. With an Accountancy degree from the University of
Technology, work experience with bank and the local government
council in Manus, he was a logical choice for this important
responsibility. In 1981 he resigned to prepare for the 1982
elections. He returned to his village, Salian, in the Kail Bipi area and
became involved in community activities. Not all his involvement
served to establish him in a conservative village set-up. On one
occasion he prevented the building of a church by the Seventh Day
Adventists on a piece of land which he had rights to. The area had
a substantial SDA membership, including his village.
He was the endorsed PPP candidate and campaigned jointly with
Hanoi Popon, the Open PPP candidate. He printed his leaflets and
distributed them widely. He and Popon were the only candidates
who visited the Western Islands. They chartered the MV Maluan
Solok for the trip. The PPP leader and then prime minister, Sir Julius
Chan, and the party president, Hudson Arek, came to Manus to
officially endorse Sisosor and Popon at a small gathering in
Naringel. But lack of enthusiasm at the ceremony marked the
occasion. Apart from the lack of preparedness on the part of the
organizers, the village was a Pangu stronghold. The then village
Komiti, Thomas Parakei, however did his best on short notice to
arrange for the occasion. He put aside his Pangu affiliation and set
the stage for PPP to present its candidates. But the impact of the
party leader and prime minister could not equal that of Pangu's chief,
the then leader of the Opposition, Michael Somare.
Sisosor counted on winning the West Coast votes. He worked at
the required politics to establish his base. He did very well, but
could not rely on the West Coast alone to win.
Jim Paliau. Jim Paliau left his job as the clerk of the Manus
Provincial Lapan Assembly, and armed with very extensive
experience in the local government system and a good educational
background, he made a bid for the National Parliament. Paliau had a
very pleasant personality and was accessible to everybody. He
enjoys chewing betel and had around him his drinking mates and
closest friends. But his campaign was feeble. In fact, he did not do
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any public campaigning until the final week when he hired a utility
truck on which he installed a public address system and drove
through the streets of Lorengau publicizing his intentions. Between
the announcements there was music.
Paliau was indifferent towards the elections. He merely nominated
and left the decision to the voters. He knew from that start that his
chance of success was negligible. There was, however, no reason
why he should not contest the election. Paliau's resignation
coincided with the launching of Admiralty Bookmakers. He went in
to run the betting shop. Throughout the campaign period he was
behind the counter making money for the newly established venture.
Jim Paliau, a rebellious son of Paliau Maloat and the Paliau
Movement, has ideas about how and where Manus should go. He
can articulate them to technocrats and political allies. He can
defend them against his opponents. But he had a problem
communicating them to the public to win their votes in the first
place. His closest aides seemed to be of no help. In actual fact, the
real motive for contesting the election was not to win but to
challenge and prevent a certain candidate having it all his way -
Paliau Lukas.
Paul Masta. Paul Masta resigned from the Melanesian Council of
Churches early in 1982 and returned home to enter the contest. He
has been instrumental in organizing his Karun villagers. Among his
other colleague motivators was Roy Pogat, a candidate for the Open
electorate. Masta holds a BA degree in Political and Administrative
Studies from the University of Papua New Guinea. He was enrolled
as an honours student; was an active student leader; and during
the 1978 student encounter with the police he was injured and
ended up in the lock-up. Paul Masta's earlier working life as a
soldier, an airline employee and a union official had introduced him
to the exciting life of politics. He entered the university as a mature
student. Masta was involved with the Melanesian Alliance Party
when he was in Port Moresby. On his arrival in Manus he helped to
establish a party branch towards the end of January 1982. The
branch immediately moved to identify candidates for the election.
He was instrumental in determining the fate of the branch.
Masta has a mind which when decided on something is hard to
change. His perception of life or understanding of a situation would
not be changed even if the hard facts proved him wrong. If he
decided a line was straight, it would be difficult to get him to see that
in actual fact it was crooked.
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Michael Pokayou Pondros. In 1982 Michael Pondros had been in the
Parliament for two terms. In 1972 he was elected to represent
Manus as Open member, but in 1977 he switched to the Provincial
electorate and defeated the then incumbent, Pucali Kaseu. Pondros
saw that as a success story, a rise in status.
Pondros was the Pangu endorsed candidate for the Provincial
electorate. Pangu had questioned his candidacy, but in view of his
support for Pangu in times of hardship, the Chief insisted on his
running on the Pangu ticket. Pondros, however, was bitter - not
because his Pangu position had been questioned, but because during
his two terms in office he was not offered any ministerial position.
When Rooney got into Parliament in 1977 she was given senior
ministerial positions. This made Pondros mad. His pride has been
hurt. He was an ambitious man and such by-passing could not be
stomached. During this election it became obvious that he did not
want to see Rooney returned. His only chance of becoming a
minister was to return a novice as the Open member. He therefore
teamed up with Tuam. It almost cost Rooney her seat.
Pondros demonstrated during the campaign that he doubted his
chance of returning. He went flat out to convince the people that
Manus could not make it without him. He used leaflets, public
appearances and, for the first time in Manus, he used video
machines in villages to attract the crowd and at the same time to
campaign. Many people flocked to his public rallies to see the
white man's wonder. He covered more areas of Manus than any
candidate in the 1982 election. He could not afford to lose. He
had debts to repay and losing would signal his demise. When
Rooney removed Pangu's car and outboard motor from him when
he was away in Port Moresby, he returned with a 25-horse power
outboard motor. He drifted further away from Rooney and
publicly campaigned against her. Rooney eventually confronted
him in Lorengau and the truth came out. He was anti-Rooney
because Pangu by-passed him and gave Rooney a ministerial
position. He went further to assert that the Manus people did not
respect him because of this.
At the time of the campaign it was revealed that he had
squandered K50,000 of government VEDF money in his own
business. This revelation almost delivered a knockout blow to the
man. His campaign became a way to defend himself. He resorted
to Christianity. His side-kicks claimed that Pondros was a true
Christian unlike other candidates. Due to his success in the two
past elections and his forceful personality he had support all over
the province. But a lot of concern was expressed that he had
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outlived his usefulness and that Manus needed a better leader. He
knew this and he went out of his way to be returned. He had a
dream, he said, that the winners would be himself and Tuam. This
motivated him to push on. He was the candidate to beat. He
claimed publicly that no one in Manus was yet ready to replace
him. This would not happen until after 1994. Until then he was
the leader for Manus.
To critics and opponents, Pondros's type of leadership had outlived
its usefulness. But the villagers said he was still the sort of leader
they wanted. They denied that he made a fool of himself, talked
nonsense and brought shame to thinking and understanding Manus
people. Raised in Pokusui, he had lived in Port Moresby since he
was elected to parliament and married his third wife. He became
an elderly son of Thomas Posakei and built himself a house at Topi
in Dungou. He considered himself as being from Dungou which
was resented by a section of Dungou people. At the election he
was the heavyweight that had to be done away with. He was
seriously threatened and the popular view was that he had had it;
but he emerged the convincing winner. Pondros won but he was
hurt. The wound would be politically fatal. Manus had returned a
man whom many feel could be better utilized by not being elected.
Levi Polomon. Levi Polomon came fourth in 1977. In 1982, he
came out very determined to defeat the incumbent and outplay
other contestants. A get-Polomon-elected committee was formed
and set out to plan his strategies. The campaign was done
systematically and aimed at establishing broad support. It aimed
not at stating what he intended to do if elected, but presenting him
as a person to know. Leaflets were printed with his head photo,
and he campaigned extensively. He hired a canoe which took him
to almost every village that had voters. He was accompanied by
his close associates and supporters. He identified his strong points
and contacts and used them to get votes. This included his
membership of the SDA church, and his base at Lalaneaish.
Polomon was a candidate to watch. His supporters created a
situation which made other candidates worried. During polling in
Lorengau, two truck loads of youth, posters and loud hailers
invaded the town urging people to vote Polomon. The youth were
mobilized by a functionary, Memel Pohei. In the early morning,
before the polling booth opened, the town was flooded with
Polomon's posters. An up and coming businessman, Polomon has
some clear ideas about what is required from a Manus leader. He
thinks business, and sees political leadership as central at this time
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to encourage and assist individuals and groups to set up
businesses. He viewed this as a must for Manus.
Polomon's greatest strength is his good relations with resourceful
Manus people from all areas. He asks for advice, listens and
decides. When he places trust in a person, he works with him.
He is good at identifying people and involving them in his schemes.
Polomon even involved the older generation in his campaign.
Betelnuts were ceremonially cut and sent to groups in customary
fashion. Big men were recruited to carry the message.
Indications during the campaign were good. But when the voters
spoke, he could only muster third place. Polomon should consider
concentrating his talents into developing his business ventures.
Pikah Kasau. Of all the candidates Pikah Kasau did the least
campaigning. He appeared only twice in public. His candidacy
was a last minute decision. When he learned that Pondros had a
record that could work against him in the polls he wrote a letter to
the Pangu branch offering himself to be considered for
endorsement instead of Pondros. The branch refused it. He went
ahead and nominated as an independent, pro-Pangu.
Pikah Kasau was not new to Manus and national politics. He was
elected in 1972 to represent Manus as Provincial member. He lost
to Pondros in 1977. Since then he had attempted to go into
business but was not successful. A humble man, Kasau also
possessed an easy-going personality. He was not demanding but
he could work behind the scenes to get what he wanted. Kasau
believed that there was no need for expensive campaigns. The
Manus voters knew him. He had nominated like the eight others.
The voters should choose whom they wanted to lead them. This
nomination was an act of offering himself to the Manus people.
Kasau did not work at influencing the voters' decisions. Every one
else did. He stood alone. Kasau has good ideas. He needed
however to learn how to get the voters to acknowledge his
potential and rally behind him. With the new generation of leaders
emerging, his attempts to return to the National Parliament will be
an uphill battle.
Barnabas Kombil. Barnabas Kombil was a health extension officer
by training. In the mid-1970s he was posted to Lorengau. His
involvement in political leadership started when he was elected a
councillor from Lorengau town to the Manus Local Government
Council. When provincial government was established in 1977, he
was appointed a member. But he resigned and continued as an
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ordinary councillor. In 1979 he contested the provincial seat of
Lorengau town and was successful. He became one of the very
few better-educated elected provincial members. He immediately
lobbied for the position of premier, challenging Joel Maiah, the
current premier, and defeating him. He had the honour of
becoming the first elected premier in 1979. After over two years
he tendered his resignation following a massive demonstration to
the provincial government in February 1982 after a fatal stabbing
in Lorengau allegedly committed by a youth from his own island of
Lou.
Kombil made history in Manus and contributed to unravelling the
puzzle of decentralization in Papua New Guinea. He has a
pleasant personality. But he can be forceful when situations
demand it. In 1982 he was a tiger in a lambs skin. During his time
as premier he impressed many people and his name became a
household word. Songs were composed about his claim and he
enjoyed it.
He was uneasy about the role of the public servants and
politicians. He worked to make politicians the masters of the
government, but often he believed that the public servants of
Manus, led by the then secretary of the department, Elijah Titus,
were effectively in control even of the political affairs of the
province. This was a perpetual issue for him during his time as
premier. At one stage in 1981 Kombil suspended the secretary for
advising the cabinet that he (the secretary) refused to approve an
administrative change which Kombil initiated for the Division of
Finance. Kombil wished to recreate a policy secretariat and make
himself minister for Finance responsible for issuing final authority
for any expenditure. The after-effect of this episode was his
imprisonment in 1982 for misappropriating K3,500 during that time.
Kombil had a reputation as a 'rascal premier'. When loaded with
alcohol he could be a nuisance. Often he would either start fights
or become involved in fights. At one stage in 1980 he fought his
legal officer at a social gathering after a few drinks because the
legal officer refused to draft an instrument to give him authority as
minister for Finance to issue authority for spending public money.
Kombil decided to contest the election because his potential was
not being utilized as an ordinary member of the provincial
assembly. As a former premier, being an ordinary member is an
unpleasant experience. As nomination time approached he went
to Port Moresby to seek support from political parties. He visited
Pangu, PPP, and Melanesian Alliance but could not get an
endorsement. As he stopped at the traffic lights at Murray
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Barracks Mr. Okuk's wife recognized him, and while waiting for
the lights to give way she learned of his purpose in Port Moresby
and his failure to get an endorsement. She told him to follow her.
She led him to the government building and straight to Okuk's
office - the office of the deputy prime minister, minister for
Transport, and leader of the National Party. She walked up to her
husband with Kombil by her side and introduced him as the
National Party's candidate for the Manus Provincial seat. Without
any question, Okuk instantly approved and discussed strategies to
win the election in Manus.
Kombil at that time was a desperate man. He would do anything.
Okuk was on the Dash-7 trial flight to Manus and endorsed
Kombil as the sole NP candidate. The party produced his poster
and provided him with an outboard motor. During the campaign
period the party president, Michael Mel, came and accompanied
him to a number of villages near Lorengau. Kombil also used his
supporters to campaign in their respective villages. He considered
his candidacy a strong challenge to Pondros. At the polling booth
he stood his supporters at the legal distance from the booth with
the hope of influencing some voters' mind for him at the last
minute. He was able to achieve just that.
Paliau Lukas. Paliau Lukas was endorsed by the Makasol Party, a
Manus based political party of which he was the chairman. He
possessed a Bachelor of Arts and a Bachelor of Economics
Degree from the University of Papua New Guinea. Before he
returned to Manus, he was the national housing commissioner. He
became a director of Edgells and Whitely Pty Ltd and a part
owner.
He became very involved with the Makasol Group which claimed
to be the party of the village man and woman. It had links with
the 1946 Paliau Movement. As the election drew closer the
political activities of the group intensified. It became clear that
they were mobilizing for the election. Paliau Lukas was the brain
behind the group. Lukas is hard to understand. He is either driven
by a higher ideal or is a confused simpleton. Given his academic
credentials I want to think that he is driven by a higher ideal. But
critics of the Makasol group call him, and others such as Kisakau
Pochapon, political opportunists who use the village people for
their own political gains. There is some substance to this view.
Lukas like Pochapon concentrated his campaign with the Makasol
membership. He published a leaflet presenting himself and his
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ideas to the voters. He also aimed his campaign at mobilizing the
Mouk people, his hosts.
Lukas is a thinker and a schemer. He works behind the scenes
while others do the publicity. Only occasionally would he
personally become involved publicly. The height of his campaign
was a meeting of the Makasol group at Timoanai during Easter
where they vowed to take over the Manus government. He is
effective when he meets with the Makasol group. Otherwise, he
is resented by many who know him. He has become known by
his critics as an impractical motivator. He aimed at taking the
reins from Paliau Maloat, his mentor, because at the time of the
election he had a strained relationship with this mentor. He uses
the old man for political gain. The old man had a base and he
wanted to inherit that base. But it may actually be more difficult
than he assumes.
Arnold Masipal. In the 1972 national election Arnold Masipal
made his first bid to represent Manus in the National Parliament.
He lost to Pikah Kasau. He made another unsuccessful attempt in
1977. 1982 was his third bid. Arnold Masipal is a leader and a
practical man. He was a tradesman and had been involved on and
off in construction work in Lorengau. He desired, however, to be
a political leader. He replaced Kombil as councillor for Lorengau,
and from the chambers of the Manus Local Government Council
he was elected president. In his bid to be a political leader, he had
been active in church work and community work and had taken
up political courses including leading the Manus people against the
Lonui people when they blocked the passage way at the Lonui
bridge. He joined at least four churches for brief periods. He
knows what he wants and works to achieve it. When it fails, he
re-assesses the situation and sets about achieving new leadership
goals.
Masipal became the last council president. In March 1982, the
council was abolished. As former councillor for Lorengau town,
he and his komiti used their ward savings account to give services
to the communities in Lorengau. Over K3,000 was withdrawn. A
cash donation of K500 each was given to church groups in
Lorengau and a number of water tanks were supplied to the
squatter settlements on the fringe of Lorengau town. The abolition
of Manus Local Government Council came at an opportune time
for Masipal. With money available he legitimately used it to
benefit his electorate. He killed two birds at the same time.
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Masipal's generosity has been a key part of him and he uses it
effectively to achieve political objectives. During the campaign he
provided food, fish and turtles for custom work. His utility was
always ready to help people and he was always the first at a
situation of need. He did his part as effectively as he could, but at
the end the voters decided that he was second best to Michael
Pondros.
Political parties: the line-up
For the first time in an election in Manus, political parties became
actively involved. As we have seen, their involvement included
establishment of party branches in the province, endorsement of
candidates, publication of leaflets and posters, provision of funds for other
campaign purposes, appearances of party leaders campaigning for the
candidates, publicizing the party's achievements or apparent
achievements to convince voters, and urging voters to vote on party
lines. The involvement of political parties in the election was manifested
in the fact that every single candidate was either endorsed by a political
party or publicly associated with a political party.
Six political parties took to the polls in Manus. Five were nationally
organized political parties and one was Manus based. They were: the
Pangu Pati, People's Progress Party, the National Party, the Melanesian
Alliance Party, the Papua New Guinea Independent Group, and the
Manus Kansol Kastam or Makasol Party. The branches of the nationally
organized political parties had policies determined by the national
executive of the Party and were linked with the party in origin.
Information about national parties can be got elsewhere. The Manus-
based party however deserves mention here.
Makasol Party
What is popularly known known as Makasol comprises the remains of
the Paliau Movement of 1946. In the late 1970s what had continued as
the Paliau Church since 1946 became actively involved in politics. This
coincided with the return to Manus of Paliau Lukas, a candidate for the
Provincial seat, and a few other well educated sons of followers of Paliau
Maloat. They formed what was called the Makasol Study Group. It
emphasized a group approach to the search for knowledge and
understanding of the dynamics of the situation surrounding them. As the
election drew near and people began forming strong opinions about
politics within the province, a Makasol Party was formed with Paliau
Lukas himself as chairman. He saw the party's role as one of
implementing the philosophies and policies developed by the Makasol
Study Group. In 1982 they came into collision with the Provincial
Government when it set out to establish community government in the
province.
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The party's patron and leader was Paliau Maloat. It established
study groups of members in villages where the followers of Paliau
Maloat were. They collected money and discussed the eventuality of
their taking over the provincial government. Their endorsement of two
candidates for the national election was one way of achieving their
underlying objective. The party claimed to have 10,000 members in all
parts of the province. This represented about 40 per cent of the
population. The party leaders in actual fact had inflated the party's total
membership. This was based on their assumption that since they had
members in a village, everyone else in the village was a member of the
Study Group! Their strategy of winning the election based on this
understanding therefore did not work out.
Pangu Pati
As the election got closer, political parties began to show interest in the
province. The expression of this interest was the establishment of party
branches. Pangu Pati already had a branch, but it existed only in name.
In 1981, the branch was re-activated and Pangu personalities Sir Pita
Lus and Michael Somare appeared in the province to boost the image of
the Pati. Branch komiti were found from various villages and invested
with Pati Komiti badges by the Pati leader, Mr. Somare, in 1982 just
before polling began. The branch executive was elected, but no sooner
had the executive settled down than internal conflict emerged. Roy
Pogat, a candidate for the Open electorate, challenged the Secretary,
Mrs. Rooney the incumbent representative, soon after the declaration of
the result in which she was defeated by one vote. Conflict between
Pondros and Rooney also had their supporters estranged. Another
problem was that the Pati's branch president, George Papom, had taken
no interest in the affairs of the Pati. He had not attended a number of
executive meetings.
During the campaign the Pati branch did its part in promoting the
Pati's image and directing the voters to vote for Pangu and its candidates.
It was the most popular party in the province. Apart from the two
endorsed candidates, eight other candidates openly associated with
Pangu - four for each of the contests. Effectively, therefore, 50 per cent
of the candidates were Pangu. Being a Pangu candidate or supporter
was politically advantageous. Even though Pangu's opponents and critics
claim Manus is not Pangu territory, the 1982 election tended to suggest
that Manus voters were either sympathetic to or openly pro-Pangu.
Even if the branch had not been re-established, the voters in Manus
would have voted for Pangu candidates. Personalities, however,
contributed significantly to the final outcome.
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People's Progress Party
The establishment of the PPP's branch was an insignificant occasion in
Manus' political life. The branch came into existence basically because
of the election. PPP was not a subject in the discussions of the Manus
villager. During the campaign the branch seemed to materialize only in
the two candidates and the party branch's president. There was no
committee to carry on the campaign. Organizations in the villages were
non-existent. Overall, the branch's actual work for the cause of getting
its candidates elected was a missing factor.
National Party
There was no branch of the National Party established at the time of the
election. For all practical purposes, the party did not aim at contesting
the election in Manus. It was not yet ready to seriously do so.
According to the party's candidate, Barnabas Kombil, he was the living
manifestation of the National Party. The National Party in Manus was
Kombil and Kombil was the National Party for the purposes of the
election. In this context, the party branch was informally set up when
Kombil officially nominated to contest the provincial seat. And the Party
branch disappeared when Kombil lost the election.
Melanesian Alliance Party
Like the other parties, the Melanesian Alliance was set up for the
obvious reason of contesting the election. At the end of January 1982,
the party leader, Father John Momis, visited Manus and launched the
branch. It consisted, basically, of younger people. Like the PPP, it was
new to Manus political life. The branch executive aimed at developing
the party's branch from members of the Christian churches, especially
the Catholic Church. The influence of Father Momis, a Catholic priest,
was the determining factor. The branch was active partly due to the
assistance given by a local businessman and active supporter of the
West Irian fight for independence, who was a West Irianese himself,
Constance Nere. But the Party has a long way to go before it can stand
on its own as a political factor in Manus and not just as an election ploy.
Papua New Guinea Independent Group
Like the National Party, the PNG Independent Group was manifested in
the candidate, James Pokasui. There was no party branch in the
Province, and the candidate and the national leadership did not plan to
establish a branch. Established parties, especially Pangu and its
supporters, attacked the PNG Independent Group as authoritarian and
said that a vote for its candidate would be a vote for military leadership.
He seemed to be a threat to Pangu's candidates.
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Endorsement of candidates
Of the twenty candidates, eleven were endorsed by political parties. Of
these, two each were endorsed by Pangu, PPP and Makasol.
Melanesian Alliance endorsed three candidates, one for the Provincial
electorate and two for the Open. National and PNG Independent Group
endorsed one each. The other nine were pro-Pangu candidates.
Almost all candidates had sought endorsement but it was not
possible for all to be endorsed. Pangu had made it clear that, if any pro-
Pangu candidate won, his campaign expenses would be refunded. A
number of candidates had applied for PPP's endorsement. Among the
unsuccessful applicants was James Pokasui, who then sought assistance
from his ex-colleague, Ted Diro, and was accepted as the PNG
Independent Group candidate. The endorsement of the National Party
candidate was a last minute effort by Kombil to get an endorsement.
And his choice of the National Party came only when he had failed to
get any positive responses from Pangu, Melanesian Alliance and PPP.
Melanesian Alliance endorsed a candidate for each of the two contests,
and, realizing that the candidate to defeat was Rooney, the branch put up
a woman candidate to split her vote. The Makasol Party had agreed
well before the election on its two candidates.
The endorsement of Pangu candidates was made by the party chief,
Michael Somare, at a public meeting in Lorengau. At a reception in the
evening, he received and publicly acknowledge the pro-Pangu
candidates. Sir Julius Chan, the PPP leader, and the party's president,
Hudson Arek, made a brief visit to Manus and endorsed the party's
candidates at Naringel village. And Okuk, the National Party's leader at
the time of the election, entered Manus in style. He brought in the Air
Niugini Dash 7 on its maiden flight to Manus, and at the airport endorsed
the former premier Kombil as his candidate. In addition the party
president spent a few days in Manus. The two Makasol candidates
were endorsed at Timoenai where the Party held one of its major
meetings just before the election. The parties' endorsement of
candidates involved presentation to the public for most candidates and
payment of nomination fees for all endorsed candidates. But the
Melanesian Alliance and PNG Independent Group candidates were not
officially presented to the voters by the leaderships of the respective
parties.
Leaflets and Posters
Leaflets and posters to publicize the candidates were a common medium
used by almost all candidates. The contents included statements of
policies and photographs of candidates. For two first-time candidates
small leaflets with a photograph and a 1982 calendar were produced. All
political parties produced leaflets for either all or some of their
candidates. There were two types. One consisted of the common party
slogans used elsewhere in the country. This included the Pangu and
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National Party leaflets. Such leaflets were authorized by the respective
party leaderships. The other type was designed and authorized either by
the candidate or his agents.
Posters and leaflets were widely used. However, their effectiveness
is difficult to assess. Perhaps the best they could do was to remind the
voters of the candidates contesting the election. Their production costs
perhaps outweighed the actual effectiveness in influencing the voters.
Even though they may have been cheap to produce, political parties and
individuals could have utilized their limited resources better.
Campaign finance
It is difficult to estimate the funds each candidate received and from
what source. It is, however, expensive to campaign in Manus, unless
one walks and paddles from place to place. The use of trucks and
outboard motors is very expensive. Political parties like the National
Party and Pangu Pati supplied outboard motors and/or cars and additional
finance for general expenses. For others, extra money to spend was
either very limited or non-existent. Candidates for smaller parties like
the Melanesian Alliance could not afford an expensive campaign.
A lot of political money changed hands. The Manus premier was
alleged to have used his discretionary funds to contribute money to
groups throughout Manus to win votes for his son - a candidate for the
Open electorate. Rooney alleged this to have taken place in Mbunai
when his son presented a cheque to the Evangelical Church of Manus
congregation in that village. Arnold Masipal, a Provincial candidate and
former councillor for Lorengau, got the approval of his komiti in
Lorengau to use the Lorengau ward account to provide services to
communities within the town boundaries, as recorded above. Such
utilization of public resources was common practice. For many
candidates, including party-endorsed ones, it was common to return the
people's hospitality with some financial contributions. This was not
necessarily done to buy votes but to acknowledge the assistance and
support provided by the people.
Campaigns by the party leaders
Appearances by party leaders to campaign for their candidates were a
major contribution by the party concerned. In this election Pangu, PPP
and NP had their leaders over to Manus to put their respective weights
behind their candidates.
Somare for Pangu came and was received in style and treated as a
prime minister. The party branch did its part in preparing the province
for the coming of its Chief. He was received by dancers at the airport,
taken to Mokeneng village for a day of feasting, dancing and speeches;
and he appeared publicly in Lorengau where he was heard by several
hundred voters. Radio Manus carried the proceedings over the airwaves
that week.
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Chan, the then prime minister and leader of PPP, was received
without much pomp. The dancers were organized at the last minute, and
at Naringel, where Chan endorsed his candidates, less than 100 people
were present. Many people were either not informed or decided to be
unavailable. As I have said, Naringel was a Pangu stronghold. Many
villagers who were there were not interested in the proceedings,
especially the speeches. Even though the party chairman came, he was
dwarfed by the presence of the prime minister.
However, the arrival of the deputy prime minister and leader of the
National Party was an occasion to remember. He came with the newest
addition to the Air Niuguini fleet, the Dash 7 which he himself was
instrumental in purchasing. Between 100 and 200 people turned up at
the airport to see the plane, and there Okuk praised the plane, praised
himself for introducing it to Papua New Guinea, and endorsed Kombil as
his candidate. Kombil was there with him. Okuk's airport performance
was marred by a minor misunderstanding. The premier of Manus invited
the people to inspect the plane and every enthusiast flocked to the
tarmac to do so. They were, however, stopped by the officials and that
inspection was summarily cancelled.
Other parties left their candidates to themselves or their branch
supporters. Leaders could be major vote winners but, for this election,
their mere presence was insufficient. The attitudes of the electorate
towards the party and the leadership were decisive. And groundwork by
the branch was also required. Somare was the most effective leader.
His was a household name and Pangu had similar status. Chan, in spite
of being prime minister, was not effective. He came only to campaign
for his party and his candidates, and for this purpose the voters were not
as interested in him as they would have been had he come as prime
minister for some other purpose. Okuk was even less effective than
Chan. The Dash 7 was an interesting plane, but Momatee Airport could
receive large planes and was already serviced by jets. The prop-driven
Dash 7 was a step backward for the Manus people. Perhaps they felt
that so was the National Party. Mel, the party chairman, was a non
person to the Manus voters. An assessment of the party's status in the
electorate would have assisted greatly in better utilizing the party
leadership to promote the party and benefit the candidates. It is not
enough to depend on the position of the leader unless the leader has
charisma or is a national hero.
Achievements of political parties
Increasingly the voters are associating political parties with their
achievements. The voters also have their views as to what party
contributes to good government. At the election the major political
parties took pains to outline their achievements and offer themselves as
the party to form the in-coming government. A lot of deception and half-
truths were involved in this approach. The ability of the party
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functionaries to use words and the preparedness of the electorate to be
taken for a ride determined the effectiveness of this approach.
All the political parties contesting the election in Manus except for
the Papua New Guinea Independent Group and the Makasol Party had
been involved in determining the policies of PNG and implementing them
since 1972. Pangu, PPP, NP and MA have been in the various coalition
governments and helped each other to determine and achieve
government policies. It is therefore deceptive and a half truth when a
single political party claims full benefit for a policy achieved by a
coalition. What the parties really should have said was that they or one
of their ministers had been sharing power when the government
achieved or initiated a particular policy. In fact they claimed credit for
the success and disclaimed any responsibility for failure. Again, the
effectiveness of this approach depended on the status of the party in the
electorate. The electors do want to hear good things about their
favorites and refuse to acknowledge the virtues of their opponents. It is
such an attitude that makes politics dirty and makes opponents enemies.
To vote party, vote candidate
Unlike previous national elections, political parties had become accepted
in 1982 and could stand on their own and get support depending on their
status in the electorate. So much so that in this election political parties
began to campaign with the theme: 'If you want your party to win, vote
so and so candidate'. In 1977 Pangu took to the polls with the slogan, 'A
vote for Pangu is a vote for Somare'.
With Pangu entrenched in Manus, the slogan 'Pangu i save Rot'
became the rallying cry. Pangu must form the government, so Pangu
candidates must win. Pangu was the only party which took on this
campaign approach. PPP attempted but did not insist. Other parties
were not in the position to use their names in this way. The trend,
however, suggests that future national elections will see more
campaigning on party lines and less by individual candidates.
The 1982 national election saw the beginning of party politics in the
Manus electorates. The political parties have learned, the candidates
and potential candidates have gained experience and in the years to 1987
the voters will become more and more politically aware and wise about
political parties and elected leaders. The total experience could make
the behaviour of the voters more difficult to predict, the candidates more
sophisticated and the political parties more resourceful.
The campaign
For some candidates the campaign began about a year before the poll.
Intending candidates who had been absent from the electorate returned
and began to establish themselves. The public servants resigned and
went home to prepare for the election. When the writs were issued and
nominations commenced the campaign went into full swing. The level of
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campaigning, however, varied from candidate to candidate depending on
their attitude to voters and their objective in contesting the election.
All candidates had their basic supporters. This was the group of
people who either stood side by side with their candidate or worked
behind the scenes. Assistance ranged from advice to planning campaign
strategies, organizing logistics, providing assessments of how the
electorate was responding and keeping an eye on rival candidates.
Candidates with established reputations already had a broad base of
support, while new candidates, including James Pokasui, Francis
Posanau, Paul Masta and Charlie Batapei, had to develop that support
during the campaign period. The task was enormous and could be
expensive for serious candidates, especially the logistics.
Generally the campaign was a clean one. Many candidates
acknowledged that the voters would finally decide. Their personal
knowledge of each other also contributed to the low level of character
assassination. There, were, however, instances of straight talking and
exploiting situations to gain political points. Candidates like Roy Pogat
identified the candidate to defeat and said so. 'It is time to change the
Open member!' The Open member being a woman, he sought
arguments against her in Manus traditions and the government's attempt
to revive Papua New Guinea's cultural heritage. And in taking on James
Pokasui, the PNG Independent Group candidate, he spread fears about
the military taking power if that party got into power. In reply the
incumbent emphasized her proven leadership, and cast doubts on the
leadership potential of the challengers.
Michael Pondros interpreted the challenge by other candidates as
showing disrespect for him on the part of the electorate. He could not
understand why any person would challenge him. He did not challenge
the other Provincial candidates. Instead he worked on the emotions of
the voters, forcefully re-asserting his personality. He did, however,
attack the incumbent Open member for causing the overthrow of the
Somare government in 1980, and he said that this could be repeated if
she was elected. His chances of ascending to the heights of power
depended on her defeat by a less known personality.
In their campaigns all candidates identified their respective bases
which coincided with the village and the language group and also, in
most cases, with provincial electoral boundaries. It turned out generally
that candidates got good support from their bases except where the
support was split. A further factor was religious affiliation. A number of
candidates attempted to use their membership of a church to support
their candidacy. The members of the Makasol Study Group voted en
bloc for their two candidates. For other religious groups, there may have
been some solidarity but generally membership of church groups was not
a guarantee of support.
The factors most influential were party membership, individual
reputation and membership of a traditional or customary or language
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group. In this election, it paid to be endorsed by Pangu, to have
individually developed a broad base and to be a member of a relatively
large language or customary group. These central factors in the election
tended to question the seriousness of the Manus voters' yearning for
quality leadership. In so far as the voters vote according to these
factors, unless the candidates are of similar type the ultimate election of
the quality leader will be accidental.
The Electors
Manus in 1982 had just over 25,000 people. Only 44 per cent of the total
population were eligible voters, and of these only 73 per cent cast their
votes. The people of Manus said they wanted good leaders: as the
election approached it became a common household demand made
urgent by their experience of national and provincial government over
the past five years. It was, however, difficult to reach agreement on
what a good leader or quality leadership was.
The people had some ideas. They wanted a strong leader, a strong
personality, one who could shout down opposition, aggressively cany the
cause of his people forward and make his presence felt within the
electorate even if he did not continually reside with them. The electors
do not necessarily appreciate a leader who effectively represents them in
a quiet manner; they want a leader who excites them and makes them
feel part of his achievements.
As usual the Manus people were pleasant to the candidates who for
several weeks in the first half of 1982 pestered them for their ears. It
was the period when a prospective leader showed interest in visiting the
villages and did not show contempt for the villagers. In fact, he stressed
how much he respected them and promised that he would do what the
incumbent had not done and do what he had done better. The electors
would show interest in his presentation and his candidacy. The
candidate would leave the village with the impression that he had been
successful in winning votes from that village. Some candidates would
come out fully satisfied that they had bagged all the votes. The
hospitality of many Manus villagers continues today even during political
campaigns, but this hospitality is deceptive. A naive candidate fails to
understand that the same village will extend the same hospitality to his
opponents.
By the 1982 election, the electors in Manus had come to know
something about the politics of elections and the ways of the prospective
leaders. National elections since 1964 with accompanying campaigns,
broken promises, unachieved expectations, and increasingly wealthy
elected leaders had made the electors more aware of what the exercise
meant. 'Em win moni bilong ol' became the common expression. In a
way the electors took the candidates for a ride. They knew this was the
only opportunity within the next five years to influence national leaders,
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and these elaborate visitations would not necessarily continue after the
election.
Most electors decided which candidate to vote for as soon as they
knew their intentions. The campaign was really aimed at the minority
who were undecided, to establish the candidate in the minds of the
electors before the campaign proper. Thus the campaign could easily be
costly and ineffective unless one chose to actually buy votes. Once the
voters have made up their minds, they play their part in receiving every
other candidate, but once such a candidate has left the village, the
electors will say: 'He is a good man, but he is wasting his time!' Or:
'Had we not agreed to vote for so and so, we would vote for him!'
In the 1982 elections, therefore, the electors were politically aware
of the dynamic of this leadership process; well educated in the behaviour
of candidates and elected leaders they yet willingly subjected themselves
to the campaign formalities. Some candidates like Kasau and Paliau
were well aware of this and decided to keep campaign expenses to the
bare minimum. Others like the Melanesian Alliance candidates were
taken for a ride only to be properly dumped. A politically conscious
electorate must be known and appreciated by the candidates well in
advance before they can launch a successful campaign. Otherwise, the
small businessman plus the major business houses would be the major
beneficiaries of this political exercise.
Polling
The provincial electoral office, led by the returning officer, Joseph Kiluai,
conducted the election. Seven teams of about five officers each covered
the province from the Western Islands to Lorengau in two weeks. The
province was sub-divided into seven polling areas and each polling team
was given responsibility for an area. The objective was to make it easy
for every voter who wanted to vote. Armed with experience from past
elections the returning officer briefed the teams on the procedures as
well as the polling programme. The people were informed through Radio
Manus on the dates of the election, from the issue of the writ to the
return of the writ. The programme of each of the polling teams was
broadcast through special Radio Manus programmes as well as through
the most listened to programme, 'Tok Save', which was aired twice in
the evening and once early in the morning of the next day. Each team
was accompanied by a policeman. Though no situation arose which
would require police action during polling, their presence was required
for procedural reasons.
Within two weeks, all of Manus had been given a chance to vote.
Since the Open and Provincial electorates covered the same
geographical and population area, the poll was easy to complete. Voters
away from their villages could easily cast their votes so long as they
were registered. Every area in Manus turned out to vote except for Aua
and Vuvulu. The team went to the Western Island group but left with
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only ten votes cast. The people of Aua and Vuvulu boycotted the
election because they wanted to be part of East Sepik Province, which in
practice was looking after them.
It was a well conducted election. The polling teams were led by
officers of the Division of Provincial Affairs, but included officers from
other Divisions within the Department of Manus. Only two incidents
during counting are worth mentioning. First, as counting proceeded in
Lorengau on the night of 26 June, 1982, and results began to show the
actual decision of the voters, certain expectations were proven wrong
and a number of candidates and their supporters thought that malpractice
had occurred. This was confirmed according to them by their
interpretation of certain behaviour during the counting.
Barnabas Kombil assumed that the election was between Arnold
Masipal, Levi Polomen, and himself, and that Polomen and himself would
get most if not all votes from the Malai Bay area. According to him the
incumbent Michael Pondros was a goner. It became obvious, however,
from team 3 onwards that Pondros would lead the counting. When the
Malai Bay votes were counted, Kombil and Polomon did not get them all;
Pondros also got good votes. As he observed the counting, Kombil
witnessed communication between Pondros' scrutineer and the leader of
Team 5 which covered the Malai Bay area, Chapan Lili. Lili was a
relative of Michael Pondros. All this suggested to Kombil that the officer
concerned had redirected votes in the Malai Bay area towards Pondros.
Kombil then exploded in the counting hall and accused the officers of
malpractice. The police who were present in full strength interviewed
and questioned Kombil.
Soon after the result was declared in the early hours of the morning
another provincial candidate, Arnold Masipal, began to collect
information and lobby the other candidates to appeal the electors'
decision in favour of Pondros on the basis of malpractice. This never
eventuated. The returning officer supported the integrity of his officers
during the incident and requested the aggrieved candidates to take action
through proper channels. The other incident arose from the counting.
After the first count Open incumbent Nahau Rooney and James Pokasui
were equal. A recount was ordered, and in the afternoon of the 27th
James Pokasui was declared the winner by 1 vote. But Mrs Rooney
appealed to the National Court of Disputed Returns and she was later
returned, as we shall see.
The candidates' challenges to the integrity of the electoral officers
were not substantiated. It is true that a second re-count would probably
have decided in favor of Rooney against Pokasui's and kept the matter
out of the courts. Generally, however, the election was conducted in a
manner worthy of democratic government. The returning officer and his
team did a good job.
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The Results
On 27 June, 1982 Michael Pondros was declared the winner in the
Provincial electorate and James Pokasui, the former captain with the
Papua New Guinea Defence Force, was declared the winner of the
Open seat.
Table 13.4
Results
Candidates Votes Open Votes
First Count Second count After court's decision
Roy Pogat 424 424 429
Mathew Tuam 1,013 1,014 1,027
Joseph Kove 1,380 1,380 1,394
Hanai Popon 1,466 1,467 1,394
Elizabeth Buarra 110 110 117
Francis Posanou 977 977 983
Nahau Rooney 1,537 1,540 1,559
Lalau Maiah 380 368 305
Charles Batapei 288 301 305
Kisokoiu Pochapon 815 822 825
James Pokasui 1,537 1,541 1,548
Total 8,577
Table 13.5
Provincial
Candidates Votes
Paliau Lukas 1,133
James Sisosor 873
Jim Paliau 420
Paul Masta 468
Michael Pondros 2,428
Levi Polomon 1,692
Pikah Kasau 237
Barnabas Kombil 777
Arnold Masipal 1,958
Informal 329
Total 10,315
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In the Provincial poll Michael Pondros took over the lead from the
runner-up, Arnold Masipal, from team 3 onwards and maintained his lead
until he was declared the winner by nearly 500 votes. Pondros' return
was a surprise to his critics and opponents. Only his supporters were
convinced that Pondros was the candidate to defeat and that in fact he
would be returned. The critics were of the opinion that his dismal
performance during the past ten years, and more importantly his constant
absence from his electorate during his second term and the allegation
that he was involved in diverting K50,000 of government money to his
business, would be enough to knock him out of the race. It turned out
that these had little or no effect.
To the critics, the candidates to watch were Arnold Masipal and
Levi Polomon. They conducted strong campaigns and the critics were
certain that one of them would knock Pondros out for good, but it was
not to be. Pondros' win was God's plan, according to his supporters. In
his campaign Pondros repeatedly said 'I may not always attend church
services, but I have Jesus in my heart!' He was often seen carrying the
Bible and attending church services. In his entire campaign he went all-
out, and spent a lot of money. At the end, the voters were convinced;
however, the allegation that he misappropriated government money spoilt
his victory. It bothered him and turned him into an incoherent
personality. In fact, his success in the poll turned his life into a
nightmare.
Pokasui took his seat as the new Open member for Manus without
any pretensions. In preparation for his inauguration he visited the
relevant government officers in Lorengau including the secretary of the
Department of Manus, Elijah Titus, to get a briefing on the state of the
Manus Development Plan. Later, when his nominal leader, ex-Brigadier
General Ted Diro decided to take the reins of the National Party,
Pokasui questioned his own continuing association with Diro and
membership of the PNG Independent Group. His close friends advised
him to support the Pangu Pati to form the government. He reviewed his
position and ultimately when the National Parliament convened to elect
the prime minister, he voted for Fr John Momis and later supported Diro.
He knew of Rooney's bid to get the Court of Disputed Returns to rule on
a number of issues regarding his election to the parliament. This did not
deter him from taking up his new role. He performed it to the best of his
ability. Among other issues, he immediately set out to clarify the status
of the Western Islands.
The Court of Disputed Returns, however, ruled in October that the
Electoral Commission had erred and that the actual winner of the 1982
national election for the Manus Open electorate was the Pangu
candidate, Mrs Nahau Rooney. And so Rooney returned to parliament,
this time being the only women parliamentarian.
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The Aftermath
The 1982 National Election saw the return of the two Pangu-endorsed
candidates, Michael Pondros and Mrs Nahau Rooney. Pangu's claim
that Manus was its stronghold was substantiated. The story of the
election, however, did not end after the declaration of the results. I shall
look at Nahau Rooney's challenge to the results and her subsequent
success, and Michael Pondros' obsession with the allegation that he
misappropriated K50,000 of government money.
The Rooney Appeal
At the end of the first count for the Open seat Pokasui and Rooney had
equal votes. After a recount, Pokasui had a majority of one vote. Mrs
Rooney then began to ask questions. Basically, she wanted another
count to put an end to any doubts. She did not get it. The declaration
was made and Pokasui became the winning candidate. However her
supporters began to produce information which suggested that several
votes were invalidated by the officials because they felt they were
improperly marked. The scrutineers suggested that they could be valid
votes. The ball began to roll and eventually Mrs Rooney took the matter
to the Court of Disputed Returns. Mrs Rooney claimed all she wanted
was fair play on the part of the Electoral Commission. Since she was
defeated by only one vote there could have been some mistakes.
In her petition there were three respondents: the Electoral
Commission for invalidating a number of votes she claimed were valid;
Pokasui for improperly influencing Defence Force personnel at Lombrum
to vote for himself; and Lalau Maiah for being an underaged candidate.
When the Court of Disputed Returns sat to consider the petition, Mrs
Rooney decided to call only the first respondent - the Electoral
Commission. After the initial hearing the presiding judge ruled that the
recount be held. On the court's recommendation, the judge received
evidence of the recount and was presented with the doubtful votes to
decide on their validity. After considering all this evidence, the judge
ruled that the decision of the Electoral Commission was invalid. The
final count was Pokasui 1548 and Rooney 1559.
Mrs Rooney emerged from the court room elated with success, but
the Manus people received the news with indifference. To them the
excitement of the political exercise had ended with the declaration of the
election results. The bid by Rooney in the courts was none of their
business. Rooney's closest aides and supporters of course were
overjoyed.
Pokasui accepted the decision of the court. He only requested the
court to rule that the Electoral Commission compensate him for its
incapacity and his inconvenience.
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The Pondros Dream
The approach by Michael Pondros to the 1982 election campaign was
determined by the Ombudsman Commission's revelation that he was
answerable under the Leadership Code for his use of certain funds. An
approved sum of K50,000 from the Village Economic Development Fund
was given to the Admiralty Transport Group of which he was a member.
The other members were senior Manus public servants. The money
was approved for the purpose of purchasing a number of barges for use
in the province. The other half of the required initial finance was to be
raised by the group.
As it happened, the group failed to produce the other half. Pondros
then decided, apparently with the consent of the other members, to re
direct the money to purchase several buses to operate as PMVs in Port
Moresby. Admiralty Transport was unregistered, and the operation of
PMVs in Port Moresby was done under Pokaiou Company Ltd., of which
Pondros and his wife were the directors. Pondros did not produce any
report on his involvement in this venture as required under the
Leadership Code, and the Ombudsman Commission revealed this well
before the campaign started. It was, however, during the campaign that
Iambakey Okuk, the leader of the National Party, publicized it and called
upon the government to take the necessary action against such leaders.
Already a few other leaders were being investigated.
Okuk's move made Pondros return to Manus to defend himself. He
went on air and used every opportunity be had to explain his side of the
story and win the sympathy of the Manus people. He claimed he did not
steal any public money and that the K50,000 was not given to the Manus
people but to him. In his campaign which took him to the villages of
Manus, he had to say something about this drama. He claimed he had
nothing to hide but was very concerned about the allegation. It was
questionable whether he was concerned because the allegation might
cost him votes or because there was some truth in it.
Since his victory at the polls, the Public Prosecutor's Office has
decided to prosecute the Manus Provincial member. This has not helped
his cause. Soon after the election of the prime minister, Michael Pondros
was appointed minister for Public Utilities. Not long after, he was
suspended as a minister because of the allegation. And in the
subsequent re-shuffle his ministry was given to another minister and he
remained a suspended minister without portfolio.
Pondros became obsessed with the allegation. On the floor of the
parliament he often reverted to making references to the impending case
before the court. His visits to Manus were short-lived and unimpressive.
On one occasion, as the end of December 1982, he failed to appear at
the opening of the Pobirua Community Government which was delayed
especially for him to attend. He claimed that he was sick. He
continually makes references to the matter and insists on his innocence.
277
Pondros' pride led to his downfall. He was anti-Rooney because
Rooney became a minister and he was not. He achieved his goal and
became a minister, but no sooner had the dust settled than he was
suspended. Finally, in July 1983 a leadership tribunal found him guilty on
four charges under the Leadership Code, and he was dismissed by the
Govenor General as a minister and as a member of parliament.
Conclusion
By 1982 Manus had had experience with political leadership at Local
government council, provincial government, and national parliament level.
The politically aware section of the community has demanded more and
more from the leaders; in fact, the demand has tended to become
insatiable. It has become a pastime to continually find fault in the
leadership, and to yearn for 'quality leadership'. In 1982, for several
reasons, the incumbents Pondros and Rooney did not satisfy these
demands and expectations, and the camps which desired a change of
leadership hoped that the election would bring it about. The public
servants who were initiating new ideas in policy making wanted to work
with leaders who could sit down with them and discuss programmes in
order that they might jointly work to achieve them. They had not been
able to work with the incumbents during their terms in office.
Quality leadership was desired, but it meant different things to
different groups. Those who were implementing government decisions
or formulating policy initiatives wanted leaders who could sit down and
discuss matters at a high level and make firm decisions based on
available information and careful analysis of options. They wanted
leaders who could stand on their own and achieve set objectives. On the
other hand, in popular Manus thinking a quality leader is one who is
'strong' or speaks the loudest. For a villager, a forceful leader ignites the
feeling of involvement, and a leader must be seen to have his way by
shutting down his opponents. Thus these two groups of voters did not
see eye-to-eye, and the outcome of the election was a blow to one group
and a boon to the other.
Michael Pondros' type of leadership was demanded by the villagers
and resented by the implementers and the politically sophisticated voters.
These two groups could not associate with such a leader, whereas the
villagers would. On the other hand, Rooney's success was difficult to
evaluate due to the insignificant majority. Rooney's talent was
recognized from the time she was elected in 1977 and made a minister in
preference to Pondros. Her style, however, was not generally liked.
There was a demand even by the politically sophisticated section of the
community to replace her. However this demand may have arisen
because of her success in the power game and, even more, because she
is a woman.
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The verdict of the Manus voters in 1982 was questionable. There
was demand for quality leadership, but the outcome did not seem to
produce it. In the final analysis, the yearning of the Manus people for a
leader they could all rally behind and identify with remains to be realized.
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Appendix A.
DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS
PROVINCE: PROVINCIAL RETURNINGOFFICER'S
REPORT
591255 District Services Division
Free Mail Bag
MENDI SHP
Mr H.T. Veratau
Electoral Commissioner
Electoral Commission
P.O. Box 5348
BOROKO
National Capital District
13 July 1982
P A FEARMAN/juk
PROV RETURNING OFFICER
Dear Sir
SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS ELECTORAL RETURNS: EIGHT OPEN
ELECTORATES PLUS PROVINCIAL
Because of our strong management and coordination structure the
Southern Highlands has been able to coast through this general election
with a minimum of problems. We have also been able to make
considerable savings and pose some useful suggestions for the future.
Although our Southern Highlands team boasts of its superiority over
the other less organised provinces, we do realise that our effort would
not have been functional without the exceptional support that we
received from yourself and your staff. We would like to particularly
thank Mr. Abraham Wari whose consistent, dedicated hard work gave
the basic support to our team.
Attached please find each of our eight open electorate reports and
attachments. These being:-
(i) Report body
(ii) Returning Officers' General Return
(iii) Counting Tally Sheets from Counting Centres
(iv) Financial Expenditure Summaries
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Pre-Electoral Campaign Headquarter Leadership
The brilliant early but timely start by the National Electoral Commission
was perhaps the main contributing factor to assist us identify field
problems, and other areas requiring support or training.
We managed to switch on to electoral duties in time to
systematically plan our pre-electoral campaign. Because all Returning
Officers were at the first Regional Conference we then had everybody
switched on to electoral duties at the same time. Similarly, I feel the
next conference with Provincial Returning Officers and Provincial
Electoral Officers of each Highland Province cemented the relationship
between the Electoral Staff and Field Staff.
Conference
From the Returning Officers' conference in Hagen, our officers felt that
we had National Headquarter support and that we had been able to
interact on the central planning. Although our input was perhaps small,
we like to feel that the Returning Officers' Handbook on electoral
offences, and the training paper for Scrutineers eventuated from this
conference. We also managed to be refreshed with Polling Booth Lay
Out and on general electoral duties. Thus we would support similar
conferences for future elections even if other expenses were to be cut.
Radio
Mr Wari (Provincial Electoral Officer) mounted a regular twice weekly
radio toksave program on the various electoral issues. The regular six
weekly meeting of the District Managers - Returning Officers was able
to identify content of these programs and offer some feedback as to how
effective these were. These talks were repeated, and played over for
the four months prior to polling. Although these talks did not enable
people to completely understand the role of scrutineers and of literate
people to witnesses, they did assist us when situations arose where we
would have to talk to the people to explain these roles. I understood it
was the same message as passed over the radio. Thus it was the same
rule for the entire province. Nobody would like to think that their village
is the only place where scrutineers can't mark ballot papers. This
programs should be a regular part of our pre-election work.
Training
After being led to switch on to electoral work so early in the year, we
had to keep switched on. We arranged a training workshop for all key
officials four weeks or more prior to polling. To do this we divided the
Province into three sections :-
East:
West:
Central:
Ialibu-Pangia, Kagua-Erave, and Imbong'gu
Koroba-Kopiago, Komo-Margarima, and Tari; and
Mendi and Nipa.
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We then had our training workshops at Ialibu, Tari and Nipa.
All training sessions were participatory and were highly repetitive
but fun because most officers acted a role or prepared a script. During
these sessions I thought some of the scripts were far fetched with
possible situations; however, now that the elections are over, I believe
we should have used more imagination. Who would believe that an
officer would have been assaulted for not letting scrutineers mark the
paper, or that the Prime Minister would make an announcement that our
officials were corrupt and one had been thrown in jail, when nothing of
the sort had happened? Who would have thought that one of our
Presiding Officers would allow six year old school children to vote?
Although we didn't act all of the possibilities our workshop trained our
Presiding and Assistant Presiding Officers well. We trained extra staff in
case of an emergency. This was also very useful.
The other useful aspect about this training session mean that
immediately prior to departure of the electoral patrols the Returning
Officer was busy. The Assistant Presiding Officers and Presiding
Officers were nervous. The short course which was conducted then for
Poll Clerks and to refresh everybody, although generally not so well
conducted, acted as a base to give confidence to the nervous officers
departing to the field. Also scrutineers were involved in this course and
put in their place by the experienced Returning Officers.
Handouts of Presiding Officers' Instructions, Polling Booth Layout,
Presiding Officer Return Forms, Sex Tally Sheets, Patrol Instructions to
Presiding Officers and a guide to making a talk to village people were
distributed at these workshops for people to read prior to departure on
patrol. The course content revolved around these handouts:
Procedures to be followed by Presiding Officers
Set up of Booth
Use of Witnesses
Use of Ink
Control of Scrutineers
Liability of Presiding Officer
Familiarity of Electoral Act and Offences
It was stressed that when in doubt the Presiding Officer should send
for his Returning Officer for advice. The situation should be kept calm
and in control. If need be, close down the booth until advice arrives, but
don't push the people towards being violent. Be nice to people even if
they are threatening you. Ask them to understand your point of view
working with the likes of them. Only experienced officers were sent to
remote areas. Other areas were visited by the Returning Officers
regularly.
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Selection Teams
Polling teams were generally selected at the training time and were
trained as a team. Each team was selected on racial grounds. Officers
were asked to give their name and place of birth as well as comment on
marriage or relationship to specific area. We attempted to use mainly
outsiders from the Province as Presiding and Assistant Presiding
Officers. We also made sure that no team was made up from people of
one area. This included area of work and religion, as well as race.
By the time the teams departed we were quite sure they had all
been screened and carefully selected so that no one team could be
accused of being wantoks or beer buddies. Public Servants with known
problems of honesty, reliability or alcohol were left off the teams. It
seems that mostly Southern Highlanders and neighbouring Highlanders
were held in suspicion by candidates, even though these officers were
often capable officers.
Number of Teams
Each Returning Officer planned their own Polling Schedule and number
of teams to be used. These were as follows:-
Koroba 7 teams
Komo 7 teams
Kagua 5 teams
Nipa 6 teams
Tari 3 teams
Mendi 5 teams
Pangia 5 teams
Imbong'gu 4 teams
Some extra teams were added to the previously budgeted number owing
to fear that time would limit the following of previous schedules. Each
team had a Presiding Officer, an Assistant Presiding Officer, one or two
Poll Clerks as required by population of booth catchment area, and two
Police who acted as door keepers. Drivers and Interpreters were used
in some areas. I believe that Kagua could have sent only one team to
Waposali to walk out, owing to the shortage of people to carry. Also
Komo could perhaps have been reduced by one team. I make these
points now in case the Returning Officer for the next election wishes to
reduce in these two districts. Neither of these Returning Officers
commented on possible reductions to the amount of teams but I will
suggest they do so on their Station file copy of this report to assist the
next election.
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Finance
Rather than send fixed amounts to each district for their electoral use,
we agreed with the various District Managers that costs should be kept
to a minimum so that future elections don't look too expensive. Thus
each Returning Officer was given the fund's numbers and requested to
spend very carefully. This was done and so great reductions were
made.
Only basic equipment was purchased. Each team was issued two
patrol boxes, one hurricane lamp, 2 chairs, 2 tables, 1 plastic container, 2
clipboards, 1 primus and some tent flies. We thus forwent the chance to
resupply our patrol equipment and debit the Electoral Commission.
This system seems to have been reasonably effective as it stopped
areas of low cost getting large allocations to spend. It seems Koroba
reduced costs more than other districts and perhaps they could have
made their teams a little more comfortable without being extravagant. I
would like to congratulate Koroba however for their effort at saving on
costs. Perhaps for the next election a zero-based budget system should
be employed for patrol funding three months prior to departure. This
way all districts will suffer the same financial support even though the
isolated areas will receive a much larger slice of the cake.
Vehicles
Owing to our current shortage of vehicles, and the fact that PTA's
present policy is to send old vehicles out to remote areas and new
vehicles to Mendi NWA, we were forced to requisition extra vehicles for
electoral purposes. We hired a ten seater extra to Tari, one for Mendi
and a short wheel base vehicle for Ialibu. These vehicles were to be
shared for the three regions within the Province. This worked well.
Also the fact that our District Manager/Returning Officers control all
transport within their district meant that teams could be moved by
coordinating existing vehicles without any extra expense to the Electoral
Commission. If there are funds surplus at the completion of our
accounting period we will pay the Province for its great assistance.
Supervision
Most of the teams were visited by the Returning Officers, especially for
the first few days. This of course could only be where there was easy
road access; however this is getting more and more possible with each
election.
Both Mr Wari and myself also visited the various districts and some
teams during the polling. I found this most beneficial both for morale of
the teams and because I was able to be on the spot at a few places
where an unpleasant situation was in the making.
It is often known which areas are trouble spots and Returning
Officers' know these and were able to guide teams through these areas
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without obviously interfering. Thus a planned schedule of visits to the
teams by Returning Officers' was most effective.
Law and Order
There were only minor law and order problems associated with this
election. We were fortunate that beer sales were stopped and that we
had such good police cooperation and control. Our Police Commander
Peter Wagarando had detailed a section of the riot squad at Tari, one at
Ialibu and one for Mendi. He had also allocated two policemen for each
team and run briefing sessions throughout the Province.
Our policy was to make as many arrests as possible prior to serious
trouble. These arrests were publicised over the NBC and Radio Mendi
so that people realised that action would be taken against people who
failed to respect the Electoral Act and its Regulations. We believed that
an early arrest of a man who attempted to cast a second vote in Mendi
was a good deterrent to the rest of the Province not to try double voting.
There were, however, numerous arrests made for attempting double
voting.
The biggest disturbance was in the Lai Valley where the Presiding
Officer was knocked unconscious and eight ballot boxes were stolen,
this was caused because the literate witness to a voter identified a
mistake written on a ballot paper.
Most Presiding Officers spoilt ballot papers during the election
owing to the mundane and boring nature of the exercise. When Highland
men made this mistake they were accused by people of accepting bribes.
The Lai Valley incident was provoked by scrutineers who felt they had
been shamed by the Presiding Officer because he would not let them
witness the voting. Fortunately after the incident where the patrol team
was chased from Mararai village, the village court magistrate saved the
day by taking the still locked ballot boxes and storing them until we could
come and collect them. He also arrested two of the 32 offenders who
attacked the patrol.
It was interesting to note that our recovery of these boxes and
mediation with the people was done via Police Helicopter from Hagen at
great expense. This could have been done by a vehicle patrol if NWA
had not closed off the Lai Valley road for road works without any
warning to anyone. In fact we could have retrieved the boxes by
helicopter sooner if we had known NWA Mendi was closing roads.
Perhaps for the next elections, we should insist NWA work within the
requirement of the laws and gazette road closures and give us some idea
of what they are doing.
Another sad incident is the untrue press report that one of our
officers had been arrested and put in prison. I have previously requested
some Electoral Commission action be taken against the person who
actually furnished this report. The Returning Officer Imbong'gu has
commented more fully on this incident.
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Our policy for incidents where one of our officials was threatened
was to change the patrol members to another area or use our
emergency trained staff. Before we changed the staff from the teams, I
went myself and talked with the Returning Officer and people where the
incident occurred. Only the Lai Valley incident was actually serious;
others were minor and trivial.
There were a few complaints about our electoral staff acting
outside of their capacity or being dishonest. All of the allegations made
were investigated and only one was found to be true. I'm still awaiting a
report from the Returning Officer and legal advice to proceed against
Mr A. Epi, Patrol Officer, for accepting votes from very young primary
school children at Det and Poroma Schools. I feel that this officer risked
the invalidation of his electorate result through his incompetence in his
duties.
It was quite obvious that the use of ink was most useful; however it
should be more carefully applied and checked to be dry prior to the voter
leaving the compartment.
Also some research could be done to assist us to identify those who
have scraped the ink off or in some way cancelled it.
Although our Police made many arrests for small offences we had
no serious problems of law break down. There was no need for the
patrols to have armed police escorting them, although the armed Riot
Squad was quietly reassuring. The Southern Highlands people are
growing to accept defeat in elections and to act through the correct legal
channels to show any bad feeling they might have. Also the Public
Service seems to have the respect and confidence of the people. Both of
these two developments makes the work of electoral officers within the
Province much easier.
Counting Centres
Although our counting centres managed to count their votes efficiently
there could easily have been some improvement. The week prior to
counting, while the polling was continuing, I visited each of the Returning
Officers to make sure that his counting centre was ready. This was a
worthwhile visit, but I should have checked that emergency lighting was
available. Three of our counting centres, Ialibu Station, Ialibu High
School and Kagua had power blackouts and Tari nearly had one.
Koroba counted all night using kerosine lamps. We arranged three
communication networks for each centre, Police Radio, NWA Overseer
Car radio, and Posts and Telegraph. It was pleasing that Post and
Telegraphs proved to be the most reliable medium for transferring
information for the night. (This was a fluke.)
We had planned to have all the boxes numbered and divided into
eight to ten counting tables per electorate. Where this was done
counting was completed by 0200 a.m. Sunday morning. Each counting
table requires only two or three counters. At the end of each table the
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scrutineers may stand and witness the count. We allowed each
candidate the scrutineers for about four tables.
As we placed both Provincial and Open ballot papers in each box,
we could balance each box tally Open against Provincial. Sometimes
there was some discrepancy as some people only voted for Provincial in
some polling places. The procedure followed was to tip out the contents
of the box on the table. This was done by the Returning Officer. Then
the papers were sorted out into normal (common roll) and section '4'
votes. The normal were sorted first for Open and Provincial and then
placed in piles for each candidate. These piles were then counted into
tens and stapled together. When the piles were ready scrutineers were
asked to check the piles. The bundles were folded, similarly to money in
a Cash Office. Once the scrutineers agreed to the count the papers
were rubber banded together and placed back in the boxes. The record
was recorded in duplicate. The section votes were then counted,
recorded after the scrutineers agreed, and placed back in the box. The
Returning Officer then came and checked that no papers were left out of
the box. The duplicate of the box count was placed on top of the box
and the original was taken and entered on the master tally sheet. Once
this was done a new box was counted. Often the Returning Officer
insisted a counting table take a coffee break between boxes. Tired
people can't count. Some confusion was experienced by some Returning
Officer, who tried to count the boxes in order. Following our general
system the counts could all have been completed at 2 a.m. and any
recounts could have been quickly and efficiently redone after a day's
break. Our recounts were both very easy because of this system.
Sundries
The large ballot boxes were not a success for rural areas as they were
too heavy to carry, not water proof, not strong and made so that they
could not be adequately sealed - a screw driver could open any of the
lids. Also they were more boring to count, a little too big.
Seals issued were found to be useless because they were too short.
We used Post Office Sealers and seals used for mailbags and
replaced string with tie wire. These seals were strong, durable and
cheaper than locks. Locks were generally only used for the outside of
the boxes. Boxes were all sealed prior to patrol departure by the
Returning Officers under scrutiny.
Ink for marking fingers should have been on hand one month prior
to when it was.
Ballot papers were on hand in ample time. So were normal and
supplementary rolls, as were most official forms. Some people
complained about the lack of cardboard voting compartments; however,
we also received complaints at Kagua when a Presiding officer
fabricated one from a fish carton.
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Suggestions for Future in Summary
1. We should go back to using the old ballot boxes that were made of
fibreglass and were light, watertight and easy to seal.
2. Marking ink should be rechecked by the outward doorkeeper to make
sure it is dry. This might require extra legislation that I believe was
proposed.
3. More clear instructions should be given to control scrutineers within
the polling booth: that they must not be ever closer than seven
meters to the voting compartment. Our weaker Presiding Officers
had some problems controlling their teams. The electoral handout on
liabilities to scrutineers was most certainly very useful.
4. Bank tellers' rubber thumbs should be issued to people at each
counting table.
5. Telephone should be installed in each district.
6&
7. Common rolls should be done away with in favour of the use of
census books and village identificational tribunal. This would also
mean voters could only vote at their own polling place.
8. A format should be circulated for disputed returns.
9. Funds control measures could be easily made nationally, if money
was short, by only paying camping allowance and cutting out all other
allowances plus weekend work. It would be relatively easy to only
pay annual allowances and make this work a function of the various
District Services Divisions of the Provinces. Even if allowances are
paid they could be reduced. I myself along with all of our officers
was very pleased to accept the extra money for electoral duty.
However, if it looked like funds were going to place an obstacle in
future elections I'm sure cuts could be made in this area.
We have previously sent you a copy of our proposed Southern
Highlands Electoral Act Amendments. This Act is a draft of what we
feel is a streamlined electoral system. We realise this act wouldn't be
suitable for all Provinces, but it does suit us.
Political Observations
Dr J. Ballard from ANU accompanied me throughout the Province after
the count. Although he was assisting the Province with some advice on
the structure of Transport and Education, he was able to get statistics on
box by box vote counts. He will be compiling this into a political paper
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that will be made available to the Electoral Commission and for whoever
is interested. His observations have been discussed with our field staff
and will be of great interest for those interested in this aspect of the
elections.
In general more money was spent for this election than for any
other by the various candidates. Money was spent on vehicles, posters,
gifts, parties, etc., this money being collected by varied and numerous
means. At least one candidate has a warrant out for his arrest as a
result of money used for electoral purposes.
It was obvious that Provincial, and, to a more limited extent, Local
Government members took an active part in supporting the various
candidates. Previously this role was carried out more by traditional
headmen not holding government positions.
The political party system is now being used by local political
factions to gain their own ends. Thus the party system is starting to
strengthen even though the pressure to join is still based on land or pig
problems.
Open candidates campaigned more openly than Provincial
candidates; however that did not mean they campaigned more fiercely.
Various tactics were used, including Open and Provincial candidates
assisting each other; people standing to cause the downfall of other
candidates through breaking the vote; people being encouraged to
withdraw from standing to assist each other, etc. In fact the tactics
were so wide and varied it is obvious that the people are very highly
politically motivated.
Conclusion
We have had several threats of disputed returns. So far I don't know if
any have officially gone to the court; however, we are confident that we
can survive the disputes that have come to hand so far. Our officers,
particularly the Returning Officers, all worked well and as part of a team.
We have a lot to be thankful for: yourself and your officers gave us
whole hearted support. We hope we don't have to be working with you
on by-elections in the coming months.
Yours truly
P.A. FEARMAN
Provincial Returning Officer
cc All Returning Officers - Southern Highlands Province
cc Secretary of the Southern Highlands Province
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Appendix B
THE SOMARE CABINET OF AUGUST 1982
The full cabinet consisted of: Michael Somare (East Sepik) -
Prime Minister; Paias Wingti (Western Highlands) - Deputy Prime
Minister, Minister for National Planning and Development, and Minister
for Primary Industry; Mathew Bendumb (Bulolo) - Transport and Civil
Aviation; Rabbie Namaliu (Kokopo) - Foreign Affairs and Trade; John
Nilkare (Chimbu) - Decentralization; Casper Angua (Bogia) - Labour
and Employment; Barry Holloway (Eastern Highlands) - Education;
Pato Kakarya (Wapenamanda) - Works and Supply; Pundia Kange*
(Ialibu-Pangia) - Corrective Institutions and Liquor Licensing; Martin
Tovadek* (Gazelle) - Health; Philip Bouraga (National Capital) -
Finance; Bebes Korowaro (Goroka) - Lands; Lucas Waka (West New
Britain) - Forests; John Giheno (Henganofi) - Police; Kala Swokin
(Western) - Urban Development; Tony Bais (Wewak) - Justice; Epel
Tito (Kavieng) - Defence; Boyamo Sali (Morobe) - Media; Roy Evara*
(Kikori) - Home Affairs; Tom Awasa (Huon Gulf) - Religion, Youth and
Recreation; Mackenzie Javopa (Sohe) - Culture and Tourism; Sir Pitas
Lus (Maprik) - State (Parliamentary Services); Michael Pondros
(Manus) - Public Utilities; Karl Stack (West Sepik) - Commerce and
Industry; Halau Mai (Tari) - Environment and Conservation; Tony
Siaguru (Moresby East) - State (Public Service); and Francis Didiman
Pusal (Southern Highlands) - Minerals and Energy.
* United Party
Note: All non-asterisked ministers were endorsed Pangu candidates,
except for Philip Bouraga (pro-Somare) and Tom Awasa (United Party
turned pro-Pangu after the election).
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Appendix C
THE ELECTION BY QUOTATION
(gathered by the editor on the campaign trail)
Prophecy
'We [NP] will do exceptionally well in West Sepik' (Jeff Wall,
Deputy PM's Staff* )
'Nobody is safe' (Jeff Wall)
The Business of Politics
'We must stop idle speculation on corruption' (Bill Rudd, Papua
Action Party candidate for Moresby South)
'Business can be the name for development' (Fr John Momis)
'I'm really a businessman' (Ted Diro)
'I'm not going into government to make money' (Hugo Berghuser,
independent candidate for Kairuku Hiri)
'It's no use being in Opposition' (Hugo Berghuser)
'Politics shouldn't have business'"1- (Ken Tresize, PPP staff)
'Power - it's money' (Bernard Narokobi, MA candidate for East
Sepik Provincial)
The Campaign Pitch
'I'm a big man - nobody will tell me what to do' (Hugo Berghuser)
'I'm a villager' (Hugo Berghuser)
'Hitler? Not a good man, not a bad man ...' (Hugo Berghuser* )
'We have not been greedy for power' (Roy Evara)
+ The National Party candidate in West Sepik lost heavily
+ i.e., political parties shouldn't have business arms
+ who explained to his village audience that Hitler was a land reformer
who consolidated village plots
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The Issues
'Issues in the Islands, personality in the Highlands...' (Pedi Anis,
MA campaign director)
1) West Papua:
'They will never be Asians' (Iambakey Okuk)
I'm very concerned about the West Irianese and about everyone
on this earth' (Sir Julius Chan)
2) Bureaucracy: ,
'Some of our Department heads can't speak Standard* English'
(Ted Diro)
'The public service is training people it cannot employ and
employing people it will not train' (Ted Diro)
3) The Grumman Executive Jet
'If you don't invest you don't get anywhere ... we have to be
optimistic ... The US reached the moon and we buy tuna and
worry about six million kina' (Sir Julius Chan)
4) Foreign Investment
'We are mortgaging everything we have to everybody .... If you
don't think that's wrong there's something wrong with you'
(Bernard Narokobi)
The Parties
'Papua Besena says we [Papua Action Party] are an offshoot of
the National Party - we are not' (Bill Rudd)
'We started this PAP' (Iambakey Okuk)
'We've been a humble party' (Roy Evara)
'We are closely knit' (Ted Diro)
'Pangu is on the Left. The National Party is on the Right. The
Independent Group is slightly left of Centre and ideologically
closest to the United Party' (Ted Diro)
'Professor G.P. King is supporting the PNG Independent Group'
(Candidate).
The Campaign Trail
'I travel without my wallet now' (Ted Diro)
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On Coalition Formation
'I knew how to get him' (Roy Evara)
'There are one or two I won't go with, but I won't tell you now'
(Roy Evara)
The Other Candidates
'Kairuku Hiri needs a Papua New Guinean who won't sell the
country for a couple of Filipino girls' (Hugo Berghuser)
'The others are rubbish candidates, they are all corrupt or have
two wives' (Gina Kimi, IG candidate for Rigo Open)
Appendix D
1982 ELECTION SEMINAR: THE PARTICIPANTS
The post-election seminar held in the University of Papua New
Guinea Council Room on 7-8 November 1982 was attended by:
Peter King, David Hegarty, Richard Jackson, Nao Badu, Jim Griffin and
Ngen Isana (University of Papua New Guinea); Marie Reay (Australian
National University); Robin Osborne (Office of the Prime Minister);
Pedi Anis and Patterson Lowa (Melanesian Alliance); Tony Siaguru,
Barry Holloway, Gabriel Ramoi and Belden Sevua (Pangu Pati); Reuben
Kaiulo and Morea Veri (Electoral Commission); Larry Benner
(Ombudsman Commission); Paul Fearman (Southern Highlands
Returning Officer); Michael Pope (Department of Transport); Prosey
Mailau and Aruru Matiabe; Alfred Sasako (Post-Courier) and Sean
Dorney (Australian Broadcasting Corporation).
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